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June  2005 Abstract 
This  study  examines  in  detail  for  the  first  time  the  emergence  and  development  of  a 
highly  specialised  sector  of  British  manufacturing  industry,  charting  its  evolution  and 
explaining  its  growth  predominantly  through  scrutiny  of  original  source  material  relating 
to  the  key  actors  in  the  story.  It  proposes  that  after  1888  Britain  produced  an  optical 
munitions  manufacturing  structure  which  succeeded  in  dominating  production  of  the 
most  militarily  important  and  commercially  valuable  instrument  in  the  field,  and  which 
by  1914  had  achieved  an  hegemonical  position  in  the  international  marketplace.  The 
study  also  overturns  the  conclusions  of  the  previous  brief  scholarship  on  the  topic, 
asserting  that  the  industry  responded  well  to  the  challenges  of  the  Great  War  and  going 
on  to  show  that  there  was  a  difficult,  but  ultimately  successful  translation  back  to  peace. 
This  largely  ignored  branch  of  British  technological  manufacturing  performed  effectively 
and  ran  counter  to  notions  of  the  relative  decline  or  comparative  failure  of  industries  in 
the  sector,  and  the  narrative  puts  forward  reasons  to  explain  that  success.  To  do  this,  the 
account  employs  a  methodology  embracing  a  combination  of  theories  and  models  of 
historical  explanation  to  demonstrate  reasons  for  the  industry's  path  and  to  test  the 
interpretations  put  forward. Acknowledgements 
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1  The  nature  of  optical  munitions  and  the  importance  of  the  industry. 
The  British  industry  that  made  specialised  optical  instruments  -  `optical  munitions'  -  for 
use  in  warfare  has  not  previously  been  systematically  examined.  It  is  curious  in  having 
been  almost  entirely  overlooked,  particularly  as  it  constituted  an  important  component  in 
the  evolution  of  scientific  and  technological  industries  in  Britain  during  the  late 
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries.  Optical  munitions  were  devices  either  specially 
designed  or  adapted  for  use  in  warfare,  and  used  for  observation,  measuring  target 
ranges,  and  controlling  gunnery,  torpedoes  and  aerial  bomb  aiming.  They  employed 
complex  optical  systems  requiring  great  precision  in  manufacture  and  incorporation  into 
mechanical  mounting  systems  which  were  equally  demanding  in  their  construction,  and 
represented  highly  specialised  applications  of  optical  technology  that  generally  had  no 
outlet  into  civil  markets.  Although  optical  devices  such  as  telescopes  had  been  used  in 
warfare  from  the  early  seventeenth  century,  it  was  only  during  the  last  two  decades  of  the 
nineteenth  century  that  their  development  was  accelerated  by  a  combination  of  other 
advancing  technologies  that  influenced  and  stimulated  weapons  design,  a  process  that 
continued  at  an  advancing  pace  and  peaked  during  the  Great  War  of  1914-1918,  slowing 
with  the  return  of  peace  and  eventually  being  checked  in  1923  through  a  combination  of 
political  will  and  financial  constraint. 
Optical  devices  became  essential  components  of  the  most  complex  and  important 
weapons  systems  that  evolved  during  the  period  of  this  study.  Without  them,  for 
example,  neither  the  capital  ship  nor  the  submarine  could  have  functioned  effectively  and 
would  have  been  compromised  as  effective  strategic  instruments.  The  optical  munitions 
industry  that  furnished  these  key  components  became  a  vital  part  of  the  British 
armaments  industry. 
2.  Previous  scholarship  and  conceptions. 
The  optical  munitions  industry  which  emerged  in  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century 
and  grew  to  strategic  importance  in  the  following  thirty  years,  has  been  almost  entirely 2 
overlooked  and  never  closely  examined,  a  state  of  neglect  for  which  reasons  will  be 
suggested  later.  This  study  closes  that  gap  in  knowledge,  and  shows  a  capable  and 
effective  industry  whose  performance  runs  counter  to  some  frequent  conceptions  of 
shortcomings  in  British  technological  manufacturing  in  the  early  20th  century.  It  explains 
why  this  new  industry  emerged,  charts  its  evolution,  provides  a  chronology  and  a  cast  of 
players  in  the  perspective  of  contemporary  events,  and  describes  and  explains  the 
relationship  that  developed  between  the  industry,  the  State  client,  and  the  armed  forces 
which  used  its  products.  The  account  demonstrates  the  growing  importance  of  optical 
instrumentation  in  warfare  and  explores  how  the  armed  forces'  attitudes  to  optical 
munitions  were  influenced  not  only  by  national  and  international  politics  but  also  by 
institutions  and  traditions  within  their  own  structures,  which  in  turn  affected  both  the  pre- 
war  development  and  post-war  survival  of  the  optical  munitions  industry.  The  story 
shows  that  an  overlooked  facet  of  British  technological  manufacturing  had  sufficient  skill 
and  commercial  ability  to  compete  so  successfully  for  foreign  business  before  the  Great 
War  that  it  reached  a  hegemonical  position  which  was  eroded  only  by  the  massive 
political  and  demographic  changes  caused  by  the  reversion  to  peace  in  the  early  1920s. 
Despite  its  importance,  the  optical  munitions  industry  has  not  only  been  almost  entirely 
overlooked,  but  what  little  that  has  been  written  about  it  has  created  a  number  of 
misconceptions.  The  nature  of  optical  munitions  themselves  has  not  generally  been 
understood  by  historians  dealing  with  industry  and  individual  businesses,  who  have 
accepted  that  military  optical  devices  were  either  the  same  as  those  intended  for  civil  use 
or  little  more  than  modifications  of  them.  Nor  have  they  recognised  the  growing 
importance  and  significance  of  optics  in  warfare  after  the  1890s  and  the  consequent 
importance  of  the  firms  making  them,  and  none  have  made  the  connection  that  places 
optical  munitions  manufacture  within  the  field  of  the  armaments  rather  than  the  scientific 
instruments  industry. 
The  first  printed  account  dealing  with  the  optical  munitions  manufacture  was  in  the 
History  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  prepared  in  1922  as  an  official  record  of  that  body's 3 
work  during  the  Great  War.  '  Its  relatively  brief  coverage  of  war-time  optical 
manufacturing  (just  forty  four  pages  in  a  twelve  volume  work)  related  to  what  it 
described  as  `The  Optical  and  Scientific  Instrument  Trade'.  Two  principal  problems  have 
arisen  from  this  account  and  misdirected  later  scholars.  Firstly,  it  located  the  production 
of  optical  munitions  within  the  commercial  instruments  industry,  a  position  which  has 
subsequently  been  accepted  without  question  but  which  this  account  will  show  to  be 
erroneous.  And  secondly,  it  maintained  that  the  earlier  production  of  optical  munitions 
took  place  within  the  context  of  a  backward  and  inefficient  optical  industry,  an 
impression  that  has  also  been  generally  adopted.  This  study  demonstrates  the  inaccuracy 
of  those  interpretations  and  illustrates  how  they  have  helped  to  generate  misconceptions 
and  errors  in  the  recognition  and  understanding  of  optical  munitions  production  in 
Britain. 
For  example,  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod's  study  of  the  British  government's  relationship 
with  the  optical  instruments  industry  during  the  Great  War  drew  on  both  the  official 
History  and  some  Ministry  of  Munitions  files,  reinforced  by  contemporary  reports  and 
published  correspondence.  They  saw  optical  munitions  production  as  part  of  the  general 
optical  instruments  industry's  activities  rather  than  in  a  separately  identifiable  sector. 
Their  concern  was  principally  with  the  State's  `mediations'  in  what  they  described  as  the 
`science-based  industries'  that  included  those  making  optical  instruments,  and  they 
considered  that  the  production  of  optical  munitions  took  place  `at  the  extreme  end  of  the 
science-based  industries'.  Following  the  lead  given  by  the  Ministry's  account,  they 
emphasised  the  inadequacy  of  the  pre-war  optical  industry  and  the  transformation 
achieved  during  the  war,  whilst  recognising  that  they  had  `been  unable  to  look  in  detail  at 
individual  optical  technologies  ...  or  the  business  histories  of  individual  fums'  4  Had 
they  been  able  to  direct  their  examination  down  those  routes,  a  very  different  picture 
would  have  emerged. 
Great  Britain,  Ministry  of  Munitions,  History  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  12  vols.  (London:  HMSO, 
1922). 
2  R.  and  K.  MacLeod,  "Government  and  the  Optical  Industry  in  Britain  1914-1918.  "  In  War  and  Economic 
Development,  edited  by  J.  M.  Winter.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  press,  1977)  p.  165. 
3  MacLeod  (1976)  p.  191. 
4  MacLeod  (1976)  p.  166. 4 
Man  Williams  touched  on  optical  munitions  production  when  she  compared  aspects  of 
the  British  and  French  `precision  industries'  between  1870  and  1939,  in  the  context  of 
connections  between  precision  engineering  and  the  military  sciences  5  She  identified 
precision  industries  as  those  `at  the  forefront  in  scientific,  technical  and  industrial 
research',  6  and  although  not  dealing  specifically  with  optical  manufacture  recognised 
there  were  links  between  such  industries  and  the  armed  forces  that  had  a  catalysing  effect 
on  them.  Williams  cited  the  case  the  case  of  the  Glasgow  rangefinder  makers  Barr  & 
Stroud  as  an  instance  of  how  such  connections  could  encourage  and  shape  the  growth  of 
a  particular  business.?  Nevertheless,  she  saw  Barr  &  Stroud  as  part  of  the  instrument 
making  community  and,  despite  the  company's  total  lack  of  either  commercial  products 
or  civil  clients,  failed  to  recognise  its  close  connection  with  the  armaments  industry.  In 
her  discussion  of  the  Great  War  period,  Williams  took  up  the  theme  developed  by  Roy 
and  Kay  MacLeod,  citing  from  their  earlier  work  and  archival  material  from  surviving 
Ministry  of  Munitions'  files,  accepting  that  a  weak  pre-war  industry  had  been  in  need  of 
State  intervention. 
A  third  reference  to  optical  munitions  manufacture  is  found  in  Anita  McConnell's  history 
of  the  York  optical  firm  of  Thomas  Cooke  Ltd.  8  She  showed  the  firm's  involvement  in 
optical  munitions  production  before  the  Great  War,  but  because  much  of  that  was 
`instruments  adapted  to  military  needs',  or  derived  from  earlier  types  of  survey 
instruments  designed  originally  for  the  civil  market,  she  regarded  them  as  essentially  no 
different  from  the  fun's  other  commercial  optical  apparatus.  9  However,  McConnell 
made  it  clear  that  by  no  means  all  of  the  optical  munitions  produced  by  Cooke  had  any 
likely  civil  sales;  the  Watkin  depression  rangefinder  and  Grenfell  gunsights,  for  example, 
were  designed  specifically  for  use  with  artillery,  and  a  marketing  agreement  with 
Grenfell  and  the  arms  producers  Vickers  was  signed  in  1896.10  Despite  this  separation 
s  M.  E.  Williams.  The  Precision  Makers;  a  History  of  the  Instruments  Industry  in  Britain  and  France  1870- 
1939.  (London:  Routledge,  1994).  In  particular,  see  chapters  2,3,  and  4. 
6  Williams  (1994)  p.  1. 
Williams  (1994)  p.  34. 
8  A.  McConnell.  Instrument  Makers  to  the  World;  a  History  of  Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms.  (York: 
William  Sessions,  1992). 
9  McConnell  (1992)  p.  64,  and  pp.  72-78. 
10  McConnell  (1992)  p  65. 5 
from  civil  marketing,  like  the  MacLeods  and  Mari  Williams,  she  still  saw  optical 
munitions  manufacture  as  an  adjunct  to  commercial  instrument  production  rather  than  a 
separate  enterprise. 
This  failure  to  identify  the  importance  of  optical  munitions  in  the  context  of  industry  and 
business  has  been  paralleled  in  the  study  of  military  technology  and  warfare,  where 
optical  devices  have  been  seen  as  subordinate  elements  of  other  more  elaborate  weapons 
systems,  rather  than  as  critically  important  artefacts  in  their  own  right.  Jon  T.  Sumida's 
detailed  study  of  the  introduction  of  gunnery  direction  (fire-control)  systems  into  the 
Royal  Navy  between  1889  and  1914  emphasised  the  primary  importance  of  the 
mechanical  computational  elements  that  predicted  the  future  position  of  a  moving  target, 
minimising  the  vital  role  played  by  the  optical  instruments  that  provided  the  initial  target 
distance  required  to  set  the  process  in  train.  l  l  Norman  Friedman's  lengthy  examination  of 
the  evolution  of  the  U.  S.  submarine  confined  discussion  of  the  periscope  -  the  only 
means  by  which  a  submerged  vessel  could  see  what  was  happening  above  the  surface  and 
thus  function  as  an  underwater  weapon  -  to  an  appendix,  even  then  concentrating  largely 
on  the  context  of  its  installation  and  maintenance  in  the  boat's  hull.  12  Like  Sumida,  he 
relegated  optical  instrumentation  to  a  secondary  role  within  a  larger  technological 
system,  and  in  his  companion  history  of  U.  S.  battleships  gave  even  less  attention  to  the 
question,  mentioning  optical  fire-control  on  only  seven  of  450  pages  without  indicating 
its  importance  at  all.  13 
British  historians  have  followed  similar  paths.  In  their  major  history  of  the  design  of 
British  capital  ships  after  1912,  Alan  Raven  and  John  Roberts  devoted  only  one 
paragraph  specifically  to  rangefinders  in  the  period  between  then  and  1922,  and  Ian  Hogg 
and  John  Bachelor  allowed  just  one  page  to  optical  munitions  in  their  comprehensive 
i  J.  T.  Sumida.  In  Defence  of  Naval  Supremacy;  Finance,  Technology  and  British  Naval  Policy  1889- 
1914.  (London,  Routledge,  1993).  See  chapters  3,5,  and  6  for  details  on  fire-control  systems  as  a  self- 
contained  technological  entity. 
12  Norman  Friedman.  U.  S.  Submarines  through  1945;  An  Illustrated  Design  History.  (Annapolis,  MD: 
Naval  Institute  Press,  1995).  p.  267  if. 
"  Norman  Friedman.  U.  S.  Battleships;  An  Illustrated  Design  History  (London,  Arms  and  Armour  Press, 
1986).  See  Index. 6 
history  of  the  naval  gun  and  its  employment.  14  John  Brooks  examined  the  location  of  fire 
control  equipment  aboard  early  twentieth  century  battleships  in  great  depth  without 
giving  any  attention  to  the  nature  of  optical  instruments  themselves.  15  This  characteristic 
passing-over  of  optical  technology  was  partly  explained  by  D.  K.  Brown,  another 
historian  of  warship  design,  when  he  said  that  he  took  into  account  `the  technology  of  ... 
fire  control  ...  only  [in  its]  impact  on  the  overall  design  of  the  ships'.  16  Historians  of 
naval  armament  technology  have  not  been  oblivious  to  optical  munitions,  but  through  a 
repeated  subordination  to  other  considerations  have  minimised  their  importance  and  so 
failed  to  introduce  any  significant  body  of  knowledge  into  the  literature  of  armaments 
and  their  application. 
The  only  published  work  dealing  in  any  detail  with  optical  munitions  manufacture 
remains  Michael  Moss  and  lain  Russell's  history  of  the  Glasgow  rangefmder  makers 
Barr  &  Stroud  Ltd,  commissioned  by  the  firm  to  mark  its  centenary  in  1988.17  Not 
intended  to  be  either  a  critical  or  analytical  account  of  the  company,  still  less  a  survey  of 
an  entire  industry,  it  is  a  straightforward  record  of  the  firm's  inception  and  growth  that 
provides  a  narrative  account  of  its  fortunes  as  a  specialist  maker  of  optical  munitions. 
The  authors  had  access  to  the  company's  large  archive,  and  the  book  contains  much 
useful  basic  factual  content  about  the  business,  as  well  as  some  contextual  information. 
However,  its  `broad  brush'  nature  precluded  any  analysis  of  the  company's  development 
and  inter-action  with  the  State,  so  that  the  book  is  something  of  an  aperitif  to  the  whole 
subject  of  optical  munitions  production  rather  than  being  a  meal  in  itself. 
3  Themes,  theories  and  models. 
The  history  of  the  optical  munitions  industry  cannot  be  encapsulated  or  fenced-off  from 
other  history.  It  existed  not  only  within  its  own  business  world  and  the  pursuit  of  its 
14  A.  Raven  and  J.  Roberts,  British  Battleships  of  World  War  II  (London:  Arms  and  Armour  Press,  1976) 
79,  and  I.  Hogg  and  J.  Batchelor,  Naval  Gun  (Poole,  Dorset:  Blandford  Press,  1978)  p.  108. 
s  J.  Brooks,  "The  Mast  and  Funnel  Question:  Fire-Control  Positions  in  British  Dreadnoughts  1905-1915.  " 
In  Warship  1995  (London:  Conway  Maritime  Press,  1995)  pp.  40-60. 
16  D.  K.  Brown,  The  Grand  Fleet;  Warship  Design  and  Development  1906-1922.  (London:  Chatham 
Publishing,  1999)  p.  7. 
"  Michael  Moss  and  lain  Russell.  Range  and  Vision;  the  First  Hundred  Years  of  Barr  &  Stroud. 
(Edinburgh:  Mainstream  Publishing,  1988).  In  particular,  see  chapters  1  to  3. 7 
specific  scientific  research,  but  also  in  context  of  evolving  military  technology  and  the 
political  will  to  employ  and  exploit  such  technologies  within  a  framework  of  national 
security  and  foreign  policies.  As  a  result,  its  story  embraces  not  only  elements  of 
entrepreneurship  and  invention,  of  business  history  and  the  growth  of  business  structures 
-  what  may  be  called  `internal'  elements  -  but  also  has  a  content  concerning  the 
evolution  of  military  technologies,  of  naval  and  military  history,  as  well  as  domestic  and 
international  politics  -  the  `external'  elements.  Although  the  principal  theme  is  of  an 
evolving  industry  responding  to  developments  in  military  and  naval  technologies  and 
growing  eventually  to  become  a  strategically  critical  part  of  the  national  armaments 
industry,  there  are  other  themes  which  emerge  from  the  external  context,  interweaving 
with  and  adding  layers  to  the  story,  enriching  the  account  but  complicating  its  telling  and 
explanation.  These  contributing  themes  include  the  nature  of  military  and  naval  societies, 
the  State's  attitude  to  rights  of  inventors  and  the  international  proliferation  of  armaments, 
the  economic  factors  influencing  expenditure  on  arms,  and  the  willingness  of  government 
to  sustain  vital  elements  of  the  defence  industry  in  peacetime.  The  story  of  the  industry  is 
diverse  and  complicated,  and  it  must  look  for  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  historical 
scholarship  to  guide  and  facilitate  its  interpretation  and  explanation. 
There  is  no  shortage  of  theoretical  underpinning  to  draw  on;  the  problem  is  to  decide  if 
any  one  theory  or model  might  possibly  serve  as  a  unifying  thread  to  run  through  the 
study.  Notions  of  technological  determinism  might  seem  highly  appropriate  to  the 
understanding  of  the  industry  at  a  time  when  advances  in  military  technology  were  acting 
`as  a  crucial  agent  of  change'  in  how  armies  and  navies  saw  the  potential  of  new 
weaponry  and  acted  to  acquire  it.  '8  Advances  in  armaments  technology  between  the  late 
1880s  and  the  early  1920s  could  be  interpreted  as  having  led  the  governments  of  the 
major  (and  some  minor)  powers  into  `a  situation  of  inescapable  necessity'  where  they 
had  to  acquire  the  latest  and  most  sophisticated  weapons  systems,  a  seemingly  clear-cut 
case  of  what  Merritt  Roe  Smith  and  Leo  Marx  called  `hard  determinism'  where 
technology  itself  is  credited  with  `the  power  to  effect  change'.  As  the  following  account 
18M.  R  Smith  and  L.  Manx,  editors,  Does  Technology  Drive  History?  The  Dilemma  of  Technological 
Determinism  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  MIT  Press,  1994)  pp.  ix,  xii,  xiii  and  xiv  are  the  locations  of  the 
quotations  in  the  rest  of  this  section. 8 
will  show,  this  seems  sufficiently  convincing  at  the  start  of  the  story,  when  the 
technology  of  new  explosives  led  to  the  development  of  weapons  whose  effective 
deployment  demanded  the  creation  of  new  instruments  for  their  direction.  However, 
subsequent  changes  through  time  indicate  that  the  development  of  both  instruments  and 
industry  was  influenced  as  much  by  those  involved  with  them  as  by  the  inexorable 
pressure  of  technological  evolution. 
The  accommodation  of  this  trend  could  be  more  suitably  reached  through  the  alternative 
understanding,  still  in  the  area  of  determinism,  that  `the  history  of  technology  is  a  history 
of  human  actions',  demanding  comprehension  of  the  social,  political  and  economic 
circumstances  surrounding  those  responsible  for  a  particular  advance  in  order  to  provide 
explanation  for  it.  This  `soft  determinism'  argues  that  the  agency  for  change  through 
technological  development  lies  not  in  technology  itself  but  in  the  structure  of  the  society 
in  which  it  is  located.  Comprehension  of  the  nature  of  technological  power  requires 
understanding  the  `actors'  who  were  at  the  heart  of  the  process.  19  These  approaches  lend 
themselves  to  a  process  of  fusion  where,  as  Smith  and  Marx  suggest,  technological 
determinism  maybe  understood  as  being  the  human  characteristic  of  producing  societies, 
whether  military  or civil,  that  `invest  technologies  with  enough  power  to  drive  history'. 
However,  the  industry's  evolution  will  be  seen  to  involve  a  great  deal  of  influence  from 
areas  which  were  not  themselves  directly  connected  with  the  developing  technology, 
raising  the  question  of  whether  the  `softly  deterministic'  approach  can  actually  be 
adequate  to  explain  the  process  of  evolution  that  took  place. 
The  nature  of  those  outside  influences  and  forces  will  be  seen  frequently  as  other  than 
technological  in  their  nature,  issuing  from  a  variety  of  sources  located  outside  the 
industry  itself,  all  having  their  own  particular  interests  and  priorities  which  were  by  no 
means  always  similar.  The  industry's  story  is  made  up  of  a  `seamless  web  of  technology 
and  society',  where  the  overall  context  in  which  technological  developments  were 
located  played  a  significant  part  in  the  identification  and  solution  of  problems  in  the 
19  Smith  and  Marx  (1994),  p.  xiii. 9 
development  of  optical  munitions  2°  Contextual  factors  frequently  heavily  influenced  the 
nature  of  solutions  to  perceived  problems.  The  `social  construction  of  technology' 
method  (SCOT)  might  be  used  to  explain  how  non-technological  factors,  emanating  from 
distinctly  identifiable  social  groups  whose  interests  or  goals  were  by  no  means  identical, 
shaped  the  evolution  of  instrument  design  (and  the  industry  itself)  and  then  influenced 
the  recognition  of  a  particular  solution  as  being  appropriate  for  its  intended  purpose. 
SCOT  suggests  that  technology  is  socially  constructed  by  groups  of  people  involved  in  a 
process  of  innovation  and  who,  individually  and  collectively,  interact  with  each  other  in 
order  to  produce  a  particular  artefact.  In  this  study,  the  term  artefact  can  be  applied  both 
to  the  instruments  being  made  and  to  the  industry  which  produced  them.  These  groups, 
or  `actors',  may  have  differing  views  of  the  `proper'  form  of  the  artefact  involved,  but 
work  towards  a  `stabilised'  outcome  to  achieve  `closure'  of  a  process  which  is  essentially 
social  rather  than  technical  in  its  nature. 
Although  the  social  constructivist  approach  promises  here  to  allow  a  better  understanding 
of  contextual  factors  than  soft  determinism  might,  it  still  leaves  some  difficulty  in 
explaining  certain  aspects  of  the  industry's  evolution.  This  is  particularly  so  in  respect  of 
events  during  the  Great  War,  where  attempts  to  overhaul  the  optical  munitions  industry 
were  frustrated  by  a  set  of  factors  which  were  by  no  means  covered  by  the  social 
dimension,  being  inherently  technical  in  their  nature  and  suggesting  a  decidedly 
determinist  nature.  Taking  into  account  the  apparent  appropriateness  of  some  aspects  of 
the  industry's  development  for  deterministic  interpretation,  it  seems  fitting  to  ask 
whether  SCOT  is,  after  all,  the  ideal  model  to  adopt. 
The  `systems'  approach  to  the  study  of  the  history  of  technology  adopted  by  Thomas 
Hughes,  which  stresses  the  importance  of  attention  to  `the  different  but  interlocking 
elements  of  physical  artefacts,  institutions,  and  their  environment',  seems  best  suited  to 
facilitate  the  assimilation  of  the  variety  of  factors  bearing  on  the  development  of  the 
20  W.  E  Bijker,  T.  P.  Hughes  and  T.  J.  Pinch,  editors.,  The  Social  Construction  of  Technological  Systems: 
New  Directions  in  the  Sociology  and  History  and  Technology  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  1989)  p.  10 
supplies  the  quotation. 10 
optical  munitions  industry.  21  Although  recognising  the  essentiality  of  considering  both 
non-technological  and  social  factors,  Hughes  maintained  it  was  not  possible  `to  deal 
separately  with  the  technological  and  the  social'  in  considering  the  evolution  of 
technology.  22  Unlike  the  SCOT  approach,  in  Hughes'  view  social  interests  should  not  be 
seen  as  especially  privileged.  Furthermore,  he  argued  that  those  involved  in  the 
development  of  technological  industries  had  to  consider  how  their  artefacts  related  to  the 
social,  political,  economic  and  scientific  contexts  that  surrounded  them,  defining  them  as 
`system  builders'  who  perforce  had  to  manage  a  plethora  of  variables  in  order 
successfully  to  place  their  artefacts  in  `an  enduring  whole'.  23  Hughes  went  on  to  explain 
how  these  system  builders  evolved  strategies  to  cope  with  problems  that  occurred  in  the 
growth  of  their  particular  areas,  providing  a  `model-within-a-model'  to  understand  their 
development. 
Of  all  the  models  considered,  this  approach  promises  to  allow  the  most  satisfactory 
understanding  of  the  range  of  social  and  technological  forces  that  bore  directly  and 
indirectly  on  this  industry,  Hughes'  model  may  indeed  be  interpreted  as  `a  kind  of  soft 
determinism  924  but  he  maintained  that  his  emphasis  on  what  he  termed  technological 
momentum  permitted  `a  more  flexible  mode  of  interpretation',  a  condition  which  will  be 
particularly  useful  here.  In  his  view,  the  social  constructivist  approach  was  particularly 
applicable  to  the  understanding  of  `young'  technological  systems,  whereas  determinism 
was  better  adapted  to  the  comprehension  of  `mature'  ones.  In  the  case  of  the  optical 
munitions  industry,  whose  history  here  goes  from  embryonic  to  mature,  this  model  has 
more  to  commend  it  than  the  others. 
Any  of  the  `determinist',  `constructivist'  and  `systems'  approaches  could  therefore  be 
employed  successfully  in  considering  the  optical  munitions  industry,  although  one 
promises  to  be  more  successful  than  the  others.  But,  because  of  the  diversity  of  themes 
21  Bijker  et  al.  (1989)  p.  4  supplies  the  quotation. 
22  D.  Mackenzie,  `Missile  Accuracy:  a  Case  Study  in  the  Social  Processes  of  Technological  Change'  in 
Bijker  et  al.,  p.  196. 
23  J.  Law,  `Technology  and  Heterogenous  Engineering:  The  Case  of  Portuguese  Expansion'  in  Bijker  et  al 
(1989)  p.  112. 
24  David  Hounshell,  `Hughesian  History  of  Technology  and  Chandlerian  Business  History:  Parallels, 
Departures  and  Critics'  in  History  and  Technology,  1995,  Vol.  12,  p.  215. 11 
that  occur  through  the  phases  of  its  development,  it  seems  appropriate  to  consider 
whether  any  single  theory  or  model  can  in  fact  be  applicable  throughout.  No  matter  how 
attractive  may  be  the  idea  of  a  single  one  to  bind  together  the  story,  the  changing  nature 
of  the  emphases  revealed  throughout  the  account  (as  in  the  Great  War  period  mentioned 
above)  suggests  the  need  to  consider  the  appropriateness  of  employing,  or  at  least 
referring  to,  more  than  one  type  of  theoretical  underpinning.  Although  proponents  of 
determinism  and  constructivism  may  argue  that  those  approaches  are  frequently  mutually 
exclusive,  as  the  story  unfolds  it  will  suggest  that  at  different  stages  in  the  industry's 
evolution  one  approach  does  better  suit  the  case  than  another.  Accordingly,  even  though 
Hughes'  systems  approach  has  much  to  commend  it  as  the  most  suitable  model  which 
will  be  chiefly  used  as  an  aid  to  understanding  the  changes  that  took  place  during  the 
period  of  this  account,  where  necessary  it  will  be  supplemented  by  reference  to  the  other 
models  mentioned  above. 
4  Strengths  and  weaknesses  of  resource  bases. 
The  scarcity  of  published  material  on  the  industry  means  that  this  study  relies  on  archival 
sources  for  almost  all  its  detail  and  also  for  much  of  its  supporting  background  matter.  So 
far  as  the  industry  itself  is  concerned,  it  is  frustrating  that  so  few  records  have  survived 
for  many  of  the  individual  companies,  and  in  some  cases  almost  nothing  could  be 
located.  Details  for  two  of  the  Royal  Navy's  largest  suppliers  of  sighting  instruments  - 
W.  Ottway  &  Co.  Ltd.  and  the  Ross  Optical  Company  Ltd.  -  are  virtually  non-existent, 
apart  from  trade  catalogues  and  advertisements.  Little  more  than  trade  catalogues  remain 
for  R.  &  J.  Beck  Ltd.,  which  became  a  very  large  munitions  producer  during  the  Great 
War.  Happily,  more  details  remain  for  other  fines  such  as  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  Ltd,  and 
Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd,  both  of  which  had  significant  roles  in  the  production  of 
optical  munitions.  The  Hilger  material,  although  modest  in  quantity,  provides  details  of 
the  firm's  size  and  its  premises,  and  includes  a  memoir  left  by  its  Managing  Director 
relating  to  his  work  with  the  firm  before  1925.  Cooke's  records,  although  incomplete, 
include  the  indexes  to  its  design  office  drawings  for  the  period  up  to  1914,  and  the 
Directors'  Minute  Book  up  to  the  business  being  wound  up  in  1923. 12 
Most  importantly,  a  very  large  amount  of  material  has  been  preserved  by  Barr  &  Stroud 
Ltd.  which  not  only  became  by  far  the  largest  British  optical  munitions  producer,  but  also 
made  the  single  most  important  type  of  instrument,  the  rangefinder.  The  collection 
includes  material  relating  to  the  firm's  foundation,  and  its  earliest  correspondence  with 
the  War  Office  and  Admiralty,  as  well  as  letters  and  memoranda  passing  between  the 
firm's  principals  during  its  early  years.  The  material  increases  substantially  for  the 
company's  later  years,  and  after  1900  there  is  an  almost  complete  set  of  financial  records, 
orders  and  contracts,  as  well  as  a  wealth  of  correspondence  with  British  and  foreign  State 
clients,  foreign  agents  and  domestic  sub-contractors.  It  provides  the  `thick  description  25 
that  yields  much  detail  not  only  about  the  company's  day  to  day  activities,  but  also  its 
attitudes  to  its  domestic  and  foreign  customers. 
Company  sources  alone  however,  no  matter  how  detailed,  would  not  permit  a  balanced 
and  reasoned  assessment  of  the  optical  munitions  industry's  progress.  Even  the  Barr  & 
Stroud  collection  lacks  the  letters  written  to  the  business,  only  their  replies  having 
survived.  Fortunately  a  large  body  of  Admiralty,  War  Office,  and  Ministry  of  Munitions 
records  provide  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  information  relating  to  the  Services'  and 
the  State's  attitudes  to  both  the  industry  and  the  instruments  themselves.  The  naval  and 
military  material  provide  much  important  and  highly  relevant  context  to  allow 
explanations  of  how  the  industry  evolved,  particularly  in  the  period  up  to  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.  Other  context,  particularly  relating  to  dealings  with  both  the  Royal  Navy 
and  foreign  navies,  is  to  be  found  in  published  works  dealing  with  the  technological  and 
political  background  to  the  growth  in  armaments  from  1905  to  1915.  For  the  Great  War, 
when  the  industry  was  placed  under  previously  unimagined  pressures,  the  surviving 
Ministry  of  Munitions  records  provide  information  that  reveals  a  great  deal  more  about 
the  industry  than  the  printed  account  even  hints  at,  and  allow  an  explanation  of  why  the 
official  history  came  to  paint  such  a  misleading  picture  of  the  pre-war  optical  industry  as 
a  whole. 
25  Bijker  et  al.  (1989)  p.  5. 13 
5  Chapter  outline. 
The  opening  chapter  considers  the  underlying  reasons  that  led  to  the  War  Office's  public 
advertisement  for  a  practical  and  effective  distance  measuring  device  in  1888,  an  event 
that  conveniently  marks  the  start  of  systematic  optical  munitions  manufacture  in  Britain. 
In  exploring  how  evolving  late  19th  century  military  technologies  created  a  new  demand 
for  specific  optical  aids  to  gunnery,  it  introduces  the  notion  that  social  forces  within  the 
Army  itself  had  already  begun  to  generate  a  specific  understanding  not  only  of  what 
forms  those  aids  should  take,  but  also  what  was  the  relevant  social  group  to  design  them 
and  by  what  means  they  should  be  procured.  It  shows  how  those  ideas  became  so  firmly 
entrenched  that  they  acquired  a  significance  that  would  influence  attitudes  towards  both 
instruments  and  industry  until  the  upheaval  of  the  Great  War  finally  forced  their 
wholesale  revision.  This  combination  of  deterministic  and  constructivist  factors  develops 
to  the  start  of  the  Boer  War  in  1899,  when  the  emergence  of  a  distinct  specialised 
manufacturing  structure  for  optical  munitions  becomes  clear.  At  the  same  time,  the 
growing  importance  of  the  Admiralty  appeared,  stressing  the  increasing  significance  of 
the  rangefinder.  In  considering  the  emergence  of  the  monopoly  of  Barr  &  Stroud  in 
British  rangefinder  manufacture,  the  account  shows  how  that  firm  was  able  to  establish 
itself  so  successfully  and  quickly,  and  suggests  why  other  established  companies  in  the 
optical  field  failed  to  capture  this  business. 
The  period  from  the  Boer  War  to  the  end  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  in  1906,  dealt  with 
in  the  second  chapter,  marks  an  increasing  use  of  optical  devices  on  land  and  at  sea, 
together  with  a  growing  complexity  in  the  story.  These  were  the  first  occasions  when 
optical  munitions  were  systematically  used  in  battle  and  the  chapter  discusses  the 
influence  that  both  conflicts  had  on  the  progress  of  their  subsequent  development  and 
incorporation  into  both  British  and  foreign  armies  and  navies.  Questions  of  the 
relationship  between  specialised  British  industry  and  the  State  and  the  capacity  for 
industrial  mobilisation  in  time  of  war  add  layers  to  the  account,  emphasising  the  financial 
and  organisational  problems  involved  in  optical  munitions  production  besides  the 
technical  difficulties  involved  in  the  development  of  the  instruments  themselves.  The 
continued  growth  of  Barr  &  Stroud  and  its  simultaneously  deepening  relationships  with 14 
both  the  Royal  Navy  and  foreign  powers  opens  up  issues  concerning  conflicts  of 
commercial  interest,  involving  secrecy,  patent  protection  and  monopoly  of  supply. 
The  succeeding  chapter  covers  the  stage  from  1907  up  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War, 
illustrating  how  optical  munitions  (and  by  extension  their  makers)  became  confirmed  in 
their  importance,  especially  through  their  incorporation  in  the  most  important 
contemporary  strategic  weapon  system,  the  Dreadnought  battleship.  It  emphasises  how 
one  firm  and  one  instrument  came  to  dominate  the  whole  question  of  optical  munitions 
production,  and  shows  how  far  political  and  economic  considerations  rather  than 
advancing  technology  were  coming  to  affect  the  whole  question  of  market  potential. 
Scrutiny  of  the  relationship  between  the  British  armed  forces  and  the  optical  munitions 
suppliers  emphasises  the  weakening  of  a  case  for  a  straightforwardly  deterministic 
explanation  of  the  industry's  evolution  and  suggests  that  the  growing  complexity  of 
relations  between  the  key  maker  and  the  British  government  was  influenced  as  much  by 
technological  as  by  social  factors,  emphasising  the  relevance  of  Hughes'  systems 
approach  in  the  interpretation  of  events. 
Because  the  Great  War  of  1914-1918  was  by  far  the  most  important  episode  in  which  the 
industry  was  involved  during  the  period  of  this  study,  three  chapters  are  devoted  to  it.  A 
number  of  new  issues  are  introduced  there,  some  of  which  seemingly  shift  the  emphasis 
back  to  the  appropriateness  of  a  more  determinist  explanation  for  the  industry's 
evolution,  whilst  others  similarly  appear  to  emphasise  the  validity  of  social  explanations, 
reinforcing  the  better  applicability  of  an  analytical  model  that  embraces  both  fields.  The 
first  war-time  section  analyses  and  assesses  the  performance  of  optical  munitions  making 
up  to  the  summer  of  1915  and  suggests  that,  contrary  to  some  previous  accounts,  the 
failures  in  delivery  stemmed  principally  from  the  War  Office's  own  organisational 
inadequacies  rather  than  shortcomings  in  the  structure  of  optical  manufacturing. 
Nevertheless,  the  analysis  identifies  weaknesses  in  the  trade,  relates  them  to 
contemporary  perceptions  of  the  whole  optical  industry,  and  then  explains  how  they 
influenced  the  State's  subsequent  efforts  to  mobilise  and  transform  it. 15 
The  second  chapter  on  the  Great  War  period  examines  how  the  creation  of  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  resulted  in  what  amounted  to  the  conscription  of  the  civil  optical 
instruments  trade  into  what  became  a  hugely  expanded  but  temporary  `hostilities  only' 
optical  munitions  military-industrial  complex,  and  explains  the  agenda  that  was  pursued 
by  some  Ministry  officials  in  an  effort  to  rejuvenate  optical  manufacturing  capability  and 
produce  an  efficient  instruments  industry  that  would  compete  successfully  in  the 
expected  post-war  market  place.  The  account  demonstrates  that  the  relatively  restricted 
success  that  was  achieved  was  largely  through  the  immediate  pressure  of  technical  issues 
resulting  from  the  pressures  created  by  the  war  itself,  which  were  sufficiently  powerful  to 
negate  the  efforts  of  the  social  group  attempting  to  further  reorganisation.  It  also 
considers  the  massive  scale  on  which  the  war-time  industry  was  expected  to  operate,  and 
the  means  by  which  the  Ministry  regulated  and  directed  its  daily  activities. 
The  third  of  the  sections  devoted  to  the  war  uses  case  studies  to  examine  the  performance 
of  three  distinctly  different  instances  of  optical  munitions  production,  examining  by  what 
means  and  with  what  degree  of  success  each  one  operated.  It  is  in  this  stage  that  Hughes' 
model  becomes  particularly  relevant  to  comprehending  the  complexity  of  the  forces  that 
were  actually  driving  the  social  groups  involved,  a  disparate  grouping  of  military, 
technological,  political  and  business  `families'  responding  both  collectively  and 
individually  to  a  frequently  conflicting  body  of  requirements. 
The  following  chapter  deals  with  the  problems  of  industrial  demobilisation  immediately 
following  the  end  of  the  Great  War,  illustrating  how  the  Ministry  of  Munitions' 
reformation  plans  for  the  optical  industry  were  frustrated,  this  time  by  a  range  of  factors 
that  were  more  socially  constructed  than  technologically  determined.  It  details  the  extent 
of  the  problems  facing  both  the  `regular'  and  the  `conscript'  optical  munitions  industries, 
emphasising  how  different  the  two  branches  were  and  illustrating  the  differing  strategies 
attempted  in  converting  back  to  peace.  The  coverage  of  the  industry  once  more  becomes 
focussed  on  just  one  company,  reflecting  the  increased  importance  that  Barr  &  Stroud 
had  acquired  during  the  war  and  how  the  rapid  and  major  cut-backs  in  both  the  Army  and 16 
Navy  paradoxically  accentuated  its  commitment  to  optical  munitions  rather  than 
stimulating  a  determined  effort  to  diversify  into  civil  product  lines. 
The  closing  chapter  describes  how,  by  1923,  the  development  of  optical  munitions  had 
been  checked  not  by  a  limitation  of  scholarship  in  military  technology,  but  by  political 
will  driven  by  fiscal  prudence  allied  to  military  and  naval  uncertainties  about  the  likely 
nature  of  warfare  in  the  light  of  maturing  weapons  technologies  such  as  the  aeroplane 
and  submarine.  The  account  shows  how  these  factors  effectively  led  to  the  beginning  of  a 
hibernation  that  lasted  until  the  re-armament  programmes  of  the  late  1930s.  At  this  point, 
the  momentum  of  military  technology  might  be  seen  to  exert  what  could  be  termed  a 
`reverse  hard  deterministic'  effect  on  the  industry,  where  the  financial  costs  and  political 
implications  of  armaments  programmes  led  the  principal  powers  once  again  into  `a 
situation  of  inescapable  necessity',  but  this  time  with  the  opposite  effect  of  the  same 
condition  before  1914.  Then,  the  condition  had  led  to  massive  expenditures,  but  by  1923 
it  was  pressing  governments  to  scale  back  spending  drastically.  At  the  close  of  this  story, 
optical  munitions  production  in  Britain  is  shown  to  be  reduced  in  scale  to  a  level  at 
which  its  continuation  by  those  involved  represented  almost  a  gesture  of  faith  and 
patriotism  rather  than  sound  business  sense,  a  circumstance  again  best  explained  through 
a  fusion  of  deterministic  and  constructivist  theories  on  the  lines  suggested  by  Thomas 
Hughes. 
5  Summary 
This  study  continually  shifts  focus  to  bring  into  clear  view  the  internal  and  external 
factors  that  governed  the  industry's  evolution  in  response  to  unprecedented  changes  in 
the  scale  and  scope  of  military  technologies.  As  with  an  optical  system,  the  closer  the 
study  gets  to  its  subject,  the  harder  it  is  to  keep  it  all  in  focus,  particularly  where  the 
shape  of  what  is  under  examination  is  often  ill-defined.  Inadequacies  and  gaps  in  the 
source  material  used  to  build  up  an  image  of  the  industry  mean  that  there  are  unavoidably 
parts  of  the  larger  picture  that  cannot  be  seen  clearly,  despite  the  best  efforts  to  interpret 
and  extrapolate  meaning  from  established  facts  in  order  to  re-construct  events  and 
provide  explanation.  The  total  elimination  of  aberrations  that  distorted  the  images 17 
produced  by  the  lenses  of  the  optical  instruments  described  in  the  following  pages  was 
indeed  impossible,  and  their  designers  were  obliged  to  settle  not  for  perfection  but  for 
what  was  possible  with  the  knowledge  and  materials  available.  This  account  is  governed 
by  similar  constraints,  and  if  at  times  the  picture  is  less  than  crystal  clear  then  (like  the 
instruments  themselves)  it  must  rely  on  having  enough  clarity  to  show  this  particular 
portion  of  the  past  essentially  as  it  was. 18 
Chapter  1 
The  emergence  of  the  industry,  1888  to  1899 
1.1  Introduction 
In  1888  there  was  no  recognisable  optical  munitions  industry  in  Britain,  principally 
because  neither  the  Army  nor  the  Royal  Navy  used  specialised  optical  instruments  on  a 
scale  large  enough  to  support  any  business  in  their  manufacture.  Although  both 
employed  telescopes  for  observation  and  signalling,  they  were  issued  in  small  numbers 
and  were  little  different  to  those  sold  commercially.  Telescopic  gun  sights  were  rarely 
used  and  rudimentary  rangefinders  were  found  only  in  the  Army.  1  This  situation  began  to 
change  after  the  late  1880s,  not  because  of  progress  in  optical  science  but  because 
developments  in  armaments  technologies  created  problems  in  maximising  the  potential 
of  new  weapons  that  were  capable  of  solution  only  by  the  application  of  optical 
technologies.  As  the  range  and  accuracy  of  guns  increased,  it  became  essential  to  know 
target  distances  in  order  to  set  elevations  correctly,  and  to  have  some  means  to  aim  at 
targets  so  far  distant  as  to  be  almost  invisible  to  the  eye.  These  needs  were  not  entirely 
novel,  and  both  services  had  experimented  with  rangefinding  instruments  and  aiming 
telescopes  in  a  haphazard  manner  since  the  1860s,  but  only  with  the  arrival  of  the  new 
more  powerful  `nitro'  or smokeless  propellants  did  the  conditions  emerge  where  optical 
aids  to  gunnery  became  not  just  desirable  but  essential.  As  a  result,  the  Army  and  Royal 
Navy  began  separately  to  seek  new  instruments  and  so  created  conditions  which  could 
nurture  the  growth  of  a  distinctive  optical  munitions  industry.  By  far  the  most  important 
of  these  gunnery  instruments  was  the  rangefinder,  and  this  first  chapter  examines  its 
manufacture  in  the  light  of  developing  technology  and  the  contextual  influences  affecting 
it,  considering  how  innovation  in  armament  technology  came  to  drive  specialised  optical 
manufacturing  into  a  completely  new  sector  that  sat  between  civil  optical  instrument 
production  and  the  armaments  industry. 
1  For  descriptions  of  observation  instruments,  see  W. Reid,  "Binoculars  in  the  Army,  Part  1:  1856-1903" 
Army  Museum  (1981),  and  R  J.  Cheetham,  Old  Telescopes  (Southport,  Lancashire,  1997),  and  for 
descriptions  of  early  rangefinding  devices,  see  Great  Britain,  Army.  Regulations  for  Musketry  instruction 
1896  (London:  HMSO,  1896). 19 
1.2  The  War  Office  and  its  Rangefinder  Paradigms 
In  May  1888,  faced  with  the  introduction  of  a  new  infantry  rifle  that  could  be  used  at 
ranges  of  a  mile  or  more,  2  the  War  Office  published  an  advertisement  in  the  London 
journals  Engineering  and  The  Engineer  inviting  designs  for  a  rangefinder  suitable  for  use 
by  the  infantry,  which  marked  a  convenient  point  to  start  chronicling  the  emergence  of 
specialised  optical  munitions  production  in  Britain.  3  The  Army  already  used  small 
numbers  of  rudimentary  range  measuring  devices  based  on  surveying  instruments  using 
techniques  that  were  well  known  to  civil  engineers.  These  used  the  principle  of 
triangulation,  setting  out  a  base-line  of  known  length  perpendicular  to  the  object  whose 
range  was  required,  and  then  measuring  the  angle  subtended  between  the  target  and  the 
extremity  of  the  base  in  order  to  calculate  the  target's  distance.  They  had  all  been  devised 
by  serving  officers  and  manufactured  by  optical  instrument  makers  who  produced  for  the 
civil  market.  The  only  successful  rangefinder  then  in  service  was  a  highly  specialised 
device  used  by  Coastal  Artillery  in  fixed  and  elevated  defensive  positions  and  which  was 
incapable  of  being  used  by  mobile  forces.  5  This  `Depression  Rangefinder'  (so-called 
because  it  measured  the  angle  of  depression  between  itself  and  the  target  in  order  to 
produce  a  distance  reading)  had  been  devised  by  a  Royal  Artillery  officer,  Major  H.  S. 
Watkin,  who  had  also  produced  another  instrument  for  Infantry  known  as  the  `Field 
Rangefinder',  based  on  the  surveyor's  box-sextant  6  Like  earlier  attempts  to  make 
military  rangefinders  by  Captain  Nolan  and  by  Major  Weldon  in  the  1860s  and  1870s, 
2  For  the  background  to  the  new  rifle,  see  E.  G.  B.  Reynolds,  The  Lee  Enfield  Rifle  (London:  Jenkins, 
1960)  Chapter  1. 
3  M.  Moss  and  I.  Russell,  Range  and  Puion:  The  First  Hundred  Years  of  Barr  &  Stroud  (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream  Publishing,  1988)  p.  13.  Their  illustration  is  not  the  notice  of  25.5.1888,  for  which  see 
University  of  Glasgow  Archives,  Barr  &  Stroud,  City  of  Glasgow,  Optical  Instrument  Makers,  collection, 
reference  UGD  295  (subsequently  UGD  295)  16/1/4,  Letter  Books  and  Correspondence,  Archibald  Barr, 
27.5.1888. 
See  W.  F.  Stanley,  Surveying  and  Levelling  Instruments  (London:  Spon,  1901)  chapters  1,2,  and  6  for  the 
history  of  survey  techniques  and  descriptions  of  instruments  relevant  to  rangefinding. 
S  A.  McConnell,  Instrument  Makers  to  the  World:  A  History  of  Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms  (York:  William 
Sessions  Ltd,  1992)  pp.  64,65  and  78. 
6  For  details  of  the  box-sextant,  its  history  and  use,  see  W. F.  Stanley,  Surveying  and  Levelling  Instruments 
(London:  Spon,  1901)  pp.  413-420,  and  for  background  to  the  development  of  earlier  rangefinders  see 
Minutes  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Institution,  Vol.  II,  p.  332ff,  Vol.  IV,  p.  1  ff,  Vol.  VIII, 
p.  161  f1  Vol.  IX  p.  47  ff  and  pp.  549-553,  Vol.  XI,  p.  365.  For  descriptions  of  some  of  these  devices,  and 
comments  on  them,  see  Great  Britain,  Army,  School  of  Musketry,  Annual  Report  1891.  (London:  HMSO, 
1891)  p.  20,  and  Great  Britain,  Army,  Regulations  for  Musketry  Instruction  1896  (London:  HMSO,  1896). 20 
his  portable  device  had  been  far  from  satisfactory  and  had  attracted  criticisms  of 
inconvenience,  fragility,  and  inaccuracy.  7  These  were  of  relatively  little  consequence 
whilst  combat  distances  for  rifle-fire  were  usually  short  enough  for  sight-settings  to  be 
less  than  critical,  but  the  advent  of  a  new  high-velocity  cartridge  and  a  magazine-fed 
repeating  rifle  presented  the  possibility  of  delivering  high  volumes  of  fire  at  ranges 
where,  without  knowing  the  range  correctly,  errors  in  sighting  would  mean  missing  even 
massed  ranks  of  men-8  The  decision  was  therefore  taken  to  seek  a  new  rangefmder,  and  a 
public  request  made  for  submissions.  9  The  successful  rangefinder  had  to  be  hardy  enough 
for  use  on  active  service  in  all  weathers,  had  to  be  portable  by  one  fully  equipped  soldier 
and  require  no  more  than  two  men  in  use,  and  had  to  be  able  to  measure  ranges  with  an 
accuracy  of  4per  cent  at  1,000  yards.  The  designs  had  to  be  received  before  August  1", 
1888,  an  interval  of  only  eight  weeks. 
Even  if  all  the  Army's  previous  rangefinding  devices  had  originated  from  serving 
officers,  there  had  been  earlier  commercial  efforts  to  design  instruments  similar  to  what 
was  now  requested.  In  1860,  the  Scottish  instrument  maker  Patrick  Adie  had  been 
granted  British  Patent  37/1860  for  `improvements  in  means  to  measure  angles',  and  he 
obtained  a  second  one  in  1863  (608/1863)  for  improvements  to  his  first  design.  Adie's 
rangefinder  differed  from  those  tried  by  the  Army;  it  was  a  self-contained  type  operated 
by  one  man,  with  a  short  measuring-base  of  three  feet  six  inches  rather  than  the  75  feet  or 
more  used  with  the  `long-base'  patterns  in  the  Army.  10  Two  other  designs  for  short-base 
rangefinders  had  been  patented  in  the  mid-1880s  by  H.  R.  A.  Mallock  (British  Patent 
8043/1885)  and  by  the  Astronomer  Royal,  W.  H.  M.  Christie  (British  Patent 
12404/1886),  but  neither  had  been  marketed.  Adie  had  tried  to  sell  his  for  survey  use, 
and  it  had  been  included  in  trials  held  by  the  Royal  Artillery  in  1869,  although  it  had 
'  Great  Britain,  Army,  School  of  Musketry,  Annual  Report  (London: HMSO,  1893)  p.  18. 
a  E.  G.  B.  Reynolds,  The  Lee  Enfield  Rifle  (London:  Jenkins,  1960)  p.  21  describes  the  origins  of  the  Lee 
Metford  rifle,  and  Great  Britain,  Army,  Regulations  for  Musketry  Instruction,  editions  for  1887  and  1896 
(London:  HMSO,  1887  and  1896)  illustrate  the  differences  in  ranges  between  the  old  new  rifles  in  Tables  E 
and  F  (1887)  and  fig.  419  (1896). 
9  The  following  conditions  are  extracted  from  the  advertisement  itself  preserved  in  UGD  295/16/1/4- 
'0  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  describe  and  illustrate  this  and  other  patterns  on  pp.  18-21;  L.  C.  Martin, 
Optical  Measuring  Instruments:  Their  Construction  Theory  and  Use  (London:  Blackie,  1924)  discusses  the 
principles  of  the  short-base  rangefinder  on  pp.  104-107. 21 
performed  poorly  and  was  dismissed  as  fundamentally  unsuited  for  Army  service.  " 
These  designs  offered  the  advantages  of  being  compact,  convenient  and  quick  to  use, 
qualities  that  apparently  made  them  well-adapted  to  the  Army's  newly  published 
requirement. 
There  was  also  a  substantial  British  optical  instruments  industry  that  could  consider  the 
problem.  At  least  34  optical  instrument  makers  existed  in  1888  who  were  making,  or  had 
recently  made,  survey  instruments,  telescopes  or  microscopes,  all  of  which  had  some  of 
the  characteristics  of  rangefinders  in  using  precisely  worked  optical  systems 
incorporating  lenses,  prisms  and  mirrors  mounted  in  protective  housings.  12  These  firms 
made  up  an  industry  producing  a  wide  range  of  precision-made  artefacts  which  sold  not 
only  domestically  and  throughout  the  Empire,  but  also  in  Europe,  the  Far  East,  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  South  America.  There  were  telescopes  from  small  hand- 
held  opera  and  field  glasses  up  to  complete  astronomical  observatories,  surveying 
instruments  from  the  simple  box  sextant  up  to  the  largest  transits  for  primary  surveys, 
laboratory  microscope  bodies  and  their  eyepieces  and  objectives,  as  well  as  stereoscopes, 
spherometers,  ophthalmoscopes,  and  lenses  for  photographic  cameras  and  lantern-slide 
projectors.  A  panoply  of  contemporary  optical  instruments  was  being  made  in  Britain 
and  it  might  be  expected  that  such  a  diverse  industry  would  have  produced  ideas  for  a 
new  military  rangefinder. 
That  did  not  happen.  Despite  this  substantial  manufacturing  base,  not  one  firm  entered  a 
design  of  its  own  in  the  trials  of  1889,  and  the  only  civilian  submission  came  from 
private  inventors.  13  The  apparent  lack  of  interest  may  have  been  connected  with  the  short 
time  allowed  for  the  submission  of  designs,  eight  weeks  being  perhaps  considered 
insufficient  to  produce  even  draft  plans  for  a  device  that  was  being  considered  ab  initio. 
There  was  also  the  question  of  cost  and  likely  return  on  such  a  project,  particularly  as  the 
"  Captain  Nolan,  "The  Range-Finder.  "  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Institution  II  (1874):  161-207. 
12  Extracted  from  R.  G.  W.  Anderson,  J.  Burnett  and  B.  Gee,  Handlist  of  Scientific  Instrument  Makers' 
Trade  Catalogues  1600-1914  (Edinburgh:  National  Museums  of  Scotland.,  1990)  and  the  unclassified 
collection  of  makers'  catalogues  held  by  the  National  Museum  of  Photography,  Film  and  Television, 
Bradford,  West  Yorkshire. 
13  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  pp.  22-23. 22 
War  Office  had  given  no  indication  of  how  much  business  might  result  or  the  likely 
rewards.  The  only  civilian  design  that  reached  the  end  of  the  trials  came  from  two 
academics  who  took  up  the  idea  as  an  alternative  to  a  moribund  research  project  with 
which  they  had  become  disillusioned. 
In  1888,  Archibald  Barr  (1855-1931)  was  Professor  of  Engineering  at  the  Yorkshire 
College  in  Leeds,  and  William  Stroud  (1860-193  8)  was  Cavendish  Professor  of  Physics 
there.  14  Neither  had  any  connection  with  the  armed  forces  or  the  optical  industry,  and 
Stroud's  later  description  of  their  decision  to  enter  the  competition  suggests  it  was  rooted 
in  little  more  than  momentary  caprice.  The  two  men  had  met  in  Leeds  during  August 
1885  and  in  1887  they  began  to  design  a  camera  to  simplify  the  production  of  lantern- 
slides  as  teaching  aids.  Early  in  1888  they  decided  to  collaborate  in  a  research  project  on 
the  numerical  value  of  the  mechanical  equivalent  of  heat  but  had  made  little  progress  by 
the  time  the  War  Office  advertisement  appeared  on  May 25th.  Stroud  subsequently 
recorded  that 
On  the  morning  of  May  26th,  Dr  Barr  came  round  to  see  me  and  proposed  to  drop 
the  subject  of  the  determination  of  the  mechanical  equivalent  of  heat  and  take  up 
the  invention  of  Rangefinders;  so  there  and  then  we  decided  to  enter  for  the 
competition  for  Rangefinders,  about  which  neither  of  us  knew  anything.  In 
blissful  ignorance  of  what  had  already  been  done  on  the  subject,  we  dashed  off 
regardlessly.  '5 
Stroud's  account  was  written  late  in  his  life,  possibly  to  be  read  by  his  family  as  an 
informal  memoir,  and  it  suggests  a  levity  not  mirrored  in  Archibald  Barr's  surviving 
correspondence.  However,  it  indicates  that  they  really  did  know  nothing  about 
rangefinders  and  only  after  their  first  and  hastily  constructed  rudimentary  prototype  was 
a  `ghastly  failure'  at  the  beginning  of  June  did  they  begin  to  approach  the  problem  in  a 
deliberate  and  scientific  manner.  They  began  by  obtaining  Adie,  Mallock  and  Christie's 
14  See  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  Chapter  1  for  background  material  on  Archibald  Barr  and  William  Stroud.. 
's  William  Stroud  (n.  d.,  but  circa  1936)  Early  Reminiscences  of  the  Barr  and  Stroud  Rangefinders 
(privately  printed)  p.  6 23 
patents  and  examining  them  in  the  light  of  their  failure  to  produce  a  satisfactory  model. 
Unlike  earlier  designers,  the  pair  could  employ  simultaneously  a  combination  of  optical 
and  mechanical  skills  that  allowed  them  to  integrate  ideas  first  in  analysis  and  then  to 
work  on  the  invention  of  solutions  by  scientific  methodology.  They  were  sure  that  the 
principal  reason  for  the  failure  of  earlier  short-base  rangefinders  had  been  in  the 
weakness  of  the  mechanical  engineering  around  one  key  part  in  the  optical  system. 
Previous  attempts  had  all  provided  a  distance  reading  by  aligning  a  movable  image  of  the 
target  with  one  that  was  fixed  to  the  operator's  view.  The  displacement  of  the  movable 
image  was  done  by  rotating  either  a  lens  or  a  mirror  about  its  vertical  axis,  but  the 
amount  of  rotational  movement  was  so  small  that  reading  errors  resulted  through  what 
Moss  and  Russell  colourfully  described  as  `drunken  screws'  and  `deranged  reflectors  '.  16 
To  Stroud,  the  solution  was  obvious  and  easily  attained  by  the  replacement  of  one  type  of 
optical  component  with  another,  coupled  with  a  new  mechanical  arrangement  to  house  it. 
Instead  of  rotating  a  lens  or  a  mirror,  the  image  displacement  could  be  done  by  moving  a 
wedge-shaped  prism  along  the  optical  system's  axis,  converting  a  rotational  movement 
of  a  few  thousandths  of  an  inch  into  a  much  longer  lateral  motion.  Neither  aspect  of  his 
proposal  was  novel  but  their  application  and  combination  were,  and  the  `invention'  could 
therefore  be  patented  and  protected.  Moss  and  Russell  noted  that  it  was  `the  most 
important  innovation'  in  the  design,  which  perhaps  under-stated  its  significance;  the 
tracking-prism  patent  alone  was  enough  to  keep  any  other  serious  competitor  out  of 
rangefinder  manufacture  until  it  expired  in  1903  and  gave  the  professors  a  head  start  in 
making  and  selling  them.  '7  The  realisation  of  such  a  simple  solution  to  a  serious 
difficulty  must  have  prompted  them  to  act  quickly  before  anyone  else  considering  the 
same  question  arrived  at  the  same  answer.  A  second  force  to  urge  them  was  the  War 
Office's  response  to  an  enquiry  made  by  Barr  on  June  13a'.  18 
Barr  asked  what  would  happen  to  the  intellectual  property  in  the  design  if  it  were  taken 
up  by  the  War  Office.  He  enquired  whether  it  would  become  the  Government  property, 
or  would  the  inventor  `be  at  liberty  to  treat  with  foreign  governments'  and  if  it  would  be 
16  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  21. 
"  UGD  295  Unclassified  material,  J.  M.  Strang  manuscript,  p.  18. 
18  UGD  295/1611/4,  Barr  to  War  Office,  13.6.1888. 24 
`necessary  or  advisable'  to  seek  patent  protection  for  the  invention.  The  reply  was 
dismissive,  saying  that  arrangements  about  ownership  and  rights  would  be  made  only 
after  the  trials,  without  any  indication  as  to  how  the  questions  of  title  and  reward  would 
be  dealt  with.  As  for  patents,  an  inventor  should  decide  for  himself  about  the  desirability 
of  protection.  What  Barr  made  of  all  this  is  not  recorded  in  the  surviving  records  but  a 
reasonable  interpretation  was  that  the  War  Office  regarded  itself  as  the  sole  arbiter  of 
how  inventors  should  be  treated  and  would  offer  only  the  terms  it  thought  fit.  In  that 
event,  patent  protection  was  clearly  an  advantage  and  the  pair  quickly  drafted  a 
provisional  specification  and  lodged  it  at  the  Patent  Office  before  the  end  of  June.  19 
Moss  and  Russell's  account  of  this  emphasised  the  collaborative  nature  of  Barr  and 
Stroud's  work,  stressing  that  Barr's  pragmatic  approach,  espousing  sound  engineering 
methodology  that  worked  towards  "the  elimination,  as  far  as  possible,  of  the  need  for 
accurate  and  difficult  craftsmanship",  enabled  Stroud's  `inventive'  solutions  to  be 
translated  in  to  a  practical  form.  20  However,  the  authors  placed  less  emphasis  on  Barr's 
entrepreneurial  instinct  that  was  vital  in  advancing  the  rangefinder  through  the  processes 
of  invention  and  development  to  introduce  it  successfully  to  a  specialised  market  place  in 
which  he  had  neither  personal  experience  nor  prior  training.  Barr's  ability  to  anticipate 
and  manage  business  problems  was  evident  throughout  this  first  phase  in  the 
development  of  the  industry,  demonstrating  his  capacity  for  devising  lateral  strategies  to 
deal  with  them. 
The  first  difficulty  came  after  the  War  Office  examined  the  design  and  requested  a 
prototype  for  examination  by  its  Trials  Committee  before  the  end  of  December  1888.  The 
costs  had  to  be  met  personally  by  the  inventors  as  the  War  Office  refused  even  to 
consider  any  claims  for  expenses  until  after  the  trials,  and  there  was  no  guarantee  that 
they  would  be  met  if  the  submission  was  unsuccessful  2'  According  to  Stroud,  both  he 
and  Barr  suffered  from  `acute  impecuniosity',  so  to  minimise  their  cash  outlay  they  used 
"British  Patent  9520/1888  records  the  application  date  as  30.6.1888. 
20  Extract  from  Barr's  inaugural  address  to  Glasgow  University's  Engineering  Society,  January  1892.  Cited 
by  Moss  &  Russell  (1988)  p.  22. 
21  UGD  295/16/1/4,  Barr  Personal  papers,  War  Office  to  Barr,  16.6.1888,  extract  from  War  Office 
Memorandum  for  Inventors. 25 
the  College's  Physics  Department  technician  to  do  all  the  mechanical  construction  work, 
assembling  mechanical  components  made  by  James  White  &  Co,  in  Glasgow  (where 
Barr  had  connections  from  his  earlier  work  at  the  University  there  as  assistant  to  Sir 
William  Thomson).  The  pair,  taking  care  not  to  broadcast  what  they  were  about,  kept  `a 
rigid  account'  of  his  time  at  Barr's  suggestion,  so  that  in  the  event  of  the  rangefinder 
being  successful  they  could  pay  for  the  man's  services  in  order  that  the  Yorkshire 
College  `should  have  no  claim  to  a  share  of  the  proceeds'.  Barr,  according  to  Stroud  had 
`the  wisdom  of  the  serpent',  22  although  when  word  of  the  clandestine  construction  work 
eventually  came  out  after  the  rangefmder's  adoption  Stroud  came  in  for  considerable 
censure  from  the  College,  irrespective  of  his  willingness  to  foot  the  bill  for  Departmental 
labour.  23  The  authorities  considered  the  institution  should  have  an  interest  in  the 
rangefinder,  and  pressed  Stroud  so  severely  on  the  matter  that  his  position  came  under 
review  before  he  eventually  convinced  them  to  settle  for  payment  of  the  technician's 
wages. 
But  long  before  then,  while  the  first  rangefinder  was  being  built,  Barr  began  lobbying  to 
gain  access  to  the  Trials  Committee  to  allow  him  to  replace  it  with  an  improved  model. 
In  November  or  December,  he  obtained  `letters  of  introduction'  to  Major  General  Clark 
(the  senior  reviewing  officer)  which  led  to  Barr  getting  a  meeting  on  January  18th  1889.24 
He  and  Stroud  had  refined  the  optics  and  their  housing  to  produce  a  more  easily  used  and 
durable  instrument  which  they  wished  to  build  and  substitute  for  the  one  recently 
delivered.  25  The  Committee  refused  this  because  it  contravened  the  terms  of  the 
competition,  but  Clark  told  Barr  that  if  the  original  rangefmder  passed,  the  improved 
version  might  possibly  be  entered  in  later  trials.  26  The  first  prototype  was  tested  in  March 
and  performed  well,  and  immediately  afterwards  Barr  persuaded  the  new  senior 
u  Stroud,  Early  Reminiscences  p.  7. 
23  See  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  23,  and  UGD  295  unclassified  material  ACC1539,  'Notes  by  Mrs  Shaw 
Murray  (Dr  Stroud's  daughter)  in  which  she  describes  the  effect  the  business  had  on  Stroud's  health. 
24  UGD  295/16/1/1,  Barr  to  Ripon,  1.1.1889,  and  UGD  295/16/1/17,  Barr  to  Ordnance  Committee, 
18.3.1889. 
25  UGD  295/16/l/17,,  Barr  to  Ordnance  Committee,  18.3.1889,  and  Archibald  Barr  and  William  Stroud, 
Memorandum  to  the  Ordnance  Committee,  Royal  Arsenal  Woolwich  March  18th  1889.  Copy  in  GUA,  UGD 
295'Un-classified  papers'.  Subsequently'Memorandum'. 
26  UGD  295/16/14,  Barr  to  Ordnance  Committee  acknowledging  their  decision,  21.1.1889. 26 
reviewing  officer,  Major-General  P.  Smith,  to  follow  the  lead  of  his  predecessor  and 
allow  the  submission  of  detailed  proposals  for  the  modified  design.  Before  the  end  of 
May  it  was  agreed  the  new  model  could  be  entered  for  the  second  set  of  trials  in  August 
as  the  `Barr  and  Stroud  Improved  Rangefinder'  and  on  the  19th  Barr  was  told  to  have  it 
delivered  by  the  end  of  July.  27 
Barr  wanted  to  enter  the  best  instrument  possible,  and  was  prepared  to  employ 
sophistication  in  design  to  obtain  the  required  accuracy.  This  did  not  conflict  with  his 
desire  to  eliminate  `accurate  and  difficult  craftsmanship',  by  which  he  meant  hand-fitting 
individual  components,  but  actually  endorsed  his  methodological  approach  to  appropriate 
engineering  solutions  where  he  was  prepared  to  use  whatever  means  were  essential  to 
attain  an  essential  goal.  Stroud's  original  design  used  right-angled  prisms  for  its  'end- 
reflectors'  in  place  of  the  mirrors  in  earlier  rangefinders.  Prisms,  which  had  only  started 
to  become  common  in  optical  instruments  during  the  1880s,  were  more  stable  and 
resistant  to  the  distortions  that  were  almost  impossible  to  avoid  in  glass  mirrors  and  had 
affected  the  accuracy  of  earlier  rangefinders.  Stroud's  proposed  optical  improvements 
used  a  novel  'objective  prism'  that  had  one  face  ground  to  a  curve  to  let  it  also  function  as 
a  lens  and  so  improve  the  image's  brightness  besides  providing  an  assembly  that  could 
be  more  rigidly  mounted,  improving  the  performance  substantially.  28  However,  they 
were  a  novel  concept  and  both  difficult  to  make  and  more  expensive  than  the  more  usual 
plane-surfaced  types,  a  combination  of  difficulties  that  was  to  prove  disastrous. 
Sometime  after  the  March  trials,  according  to  Moss  and  Russell,  the  inventors  decided 
their  rangefmder's  high  selling  price  `might  prejudice  its  chances'  and  they  looked  to 
make  `substantial  savings'  which  subsequently  had  a  catastrophic  effect  on  the 
21  Archibald  Barr  and  William  Stroud,  Memorandum,  compares  the  two  types  in  detail,  and  UGD 
295/16/1/4,  Bar  's  personal  papers,  Barr  to  Ordnance  Committee  acknowledging  their  decision,  3.6.1889. 
and  Ordnance  Committee  to  Barr,  19.6.1889. 
28  For  information  on  prism  designs  see  G.  Smith  and  D.  A.  Atchison,  The  Eye  and  Visual  Optical 
Instruments  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1997)  Chapter  8.  For  other  background  information 
on  optical  systems,  see  L.  C.  Martin,  Optical  Measuring  Instruments:  Their  Construction  Theory  and  Use 
(London:  Blackie,  1924)  and  D.  F.  Home,  Optical  Instruments  and  Their  Applications  (Bristol:  Adam 
Hilger  Ltd.,  1980). 27 
instrument's  performance  in  the  second  set  of  trials.  29  The  authors'  sources  for  this  were 
Stroud's  later  memoir  and  a  letter  from  Barr  to  the  Ordnance  Committee  on  May  18th, 
whose  contents  were  not  given  in  detail  and  which  is  not  in  the  now-surviving  records. 
There  are  grounds  to  believe  that  matters  were  by  no  means  as  simple  as  this  account 
suggests,  raising  questions  about  the  ability  of  contemporary  optical  manufacturing 
technology  to  provide  what  was  needed. 
Having  justified  the  submission  of  a  new  instrument  to  the  Ordnance  Committee  entirely 
on  the  grounds  of  significant  optical  and  mechanical  advantages  obtained  through  using 
`objective  prisms',  the  Professors'  change  from  them  to  `plane-parallel  silvered 
reflectors'  (glass  mirrors)  is  not  easy  to  understand  and  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the 
later  claims  about  economies  alone  being  responsible  for  it.  The  problems  with  mirrors 
were  well  known  to  Barr  and  Stroud,  and  they  had  always  recognised  that  their  use  had 
been  partly  to  blame  for  the  failures  of  earlier  rangefinders.  The  relatively  thin  sheets  of 
glass  were  virtually  impossible  to  mount  in  a  manner  that  let  them  respond  to 
temperature  changes  without  flexing  and  distorting  to  give  false  range  readings.  Even  if 
the  economies  had  been  great  enough  to  bring  the  price  down  to  anything  like  the 
Mekometer's,  the  dangers  of  using  them  still  remained.  But  reducing  the  rangefmder's 
cost  so  greatly  was  highly  improbable,  because  even  without  any  optics  the  complexity 
of  its  strain-resisting  body  inevitably  meant  a  higher  price  greater  than  the  simple  sheet- 
metal  box  used  by  Watkin  in  conjunction  with  an  optical  system  that  was  no  more  than 
two  mirrors  and  three  meniscus  lenses  similar  to  those  used  in  spectacles.  Despite 
Stroud's  later  abbreviated  account  of  the  trials,  the  change  must  have  been  driven  by 
some  other  factor. 
The  most  likely  explanation  is  a  failure  to  obtain  the  complex  prisms  that  were  at  the 
heart  of  the  improved  model.  Although  Moss  and  Russell  said  that  Stroud  had  gone  to 
the  York  instrument  makers  Thomas  Cooke  and  Sons  for  his  first  lenses  and  prisms,  it  is 
unlikely  that  Cooke's  actually  did  all  the  optical  work.  30  By  1888,  the  London  firm  of 
29  Moss  &  Russell  (1988)  p.  23,  and  Stroud,  Early  Reminiscences,  p.  8. 
30  Moss  &  Russell  (1988)  p.  22. 28 
Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  had  established  itself  as  the  country's  leading  maker  of  prisms,  and 
Archibald  Barr  may  already  have  been  acquainted  with  its  owners,  Adam  and  Otto 
Hilger,  through  his  earlier  connections  with  Lord  Kelvin  in  Glasgow.  31  The  Hilgers  had 
made  optical  parts  for  Sir  Archibald  Campbell,  an  associate  of  Kelvin,  since  1875,  and  in 
1888  Otto  Hilger  had  moved  to  Glasgow  to  work  for  Campbell  in  his  laboratory.  Barr 
had  been  Kelvin's  assistant  before  he  went  to  Leeds,  and  maintained  contact  with  him 
during  the  time  he  and  Stroud  were  developing  the  rangefinder,  sending  him  details  of 
the  design  and  receiving  comments  on  it.  32  Hilger's  having  made  prisms  for  the  1889 
instrument  is  supported  by  a  reference  in  the  firm's  surviving  papers  that  although  the 
first  order  from  the  partnership  of  `Barr  &  Stroud'  came  in  1891,  there  had  been  other 
earlier  ones  from  the  'individuals'.  3  Hilger's  prism  expertise  was  considerable,  but  it 
was  a  small  firm  which,  as  will  be  seen  in  subsequent  chapters,  regularly  had  difficulty 
keeping  its  work  on  schedule,  and  in  1889  relied  almost  entirely  on  Adam  Hilger  himself 
for  the  most  difficult  and  exacting  work  such  as  Stroud's  objective  prisms.  If  their 
unusual  form  caused  problems  and  delayed  completion,  then  the  delivery  deadline  of  31 
July  for  the  rangefinder  would  have  demanded  an  urgent  solution  for  which  the  use  of 
mirrors  must  have  been  the  only  course  open. 
Much  of  this  is  conjectural,  but  the  behaviour  of  the  rangefinder  at  its  trial  was 
indubitably  a  shock  for  which  Moss  and  Russell  advanced  no  explanation.  When  Stroud 
used  it  in  the  cool  of  the  August  morning  it  worked  well,  but  as  the  day  progressed  the 
sun's  heat  `distorted  the  mirrors'  and  `to  Dr  Stroud's  dismay'  it  produced  `wildly 
inaccurate  readings'.  34  That  the  failure  clearly  came  as  a  surprise  suggests  either  gross 
negligence  in  preparation  or  that  there  had  been  inadequate  time  to  test  it  properly 
beforehand.  The  notion  that  the  change  to  mirrors  was  solely  on  grounds  of  cost  hardly 
31  For  a  summary  of  Hilger's  history  see  D.  F.  Home  (1980)  Optical  Instruments  and  their  applications 
(Hilger,  Bristol)  p.  34,  and  for  details  of  connections  with  Campbell  see  Science  Museum  Library,  Hilger 
collection,  HILG  3/1,  History,  `Notes  from  Mr  Johnson  in  connection  with  his  history  of  Adam  Hilger', 
6.11.1952,  and  HILG  3/1,  `Mr  Twyman's  Lecture,  August  1944'. 
32  UGD  295/16/1/3,  Barr,  Personal  Correspondence,  William  Thomson  to  Barr,  8.3.1889,  commenting  on 
the  design. 
"  HILG  3/1,  Sales  Manager,  Hilger  &  Watts  (successor  company  to  Adam  Hilger  Ltd)  to  Barr  &  Stroud 
Ltd,  25.1.1952. 
"Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  23. 29 
stands  in  the  context  of  what  Barr  and  Stroud  already  knew  about  rangefinder  design. 
Moss  and  Russell  drew  their  account  from  Barr  &  Stroud  archive  material  that  apparently 
failed  to  survive  the  later  removal  of  records  from  the  factory,  35  and  Stroud's  own 
account  of  the  trials  makes  no  reference  to  the  performance  being  different  to  previous 
experience.  The  authors  noted  that  `the  professors  were  left  to  agonise  over  their  mistake 
in  substituting  a  cheaper  design'  but  the  cause  of  the  mistake  may  have  been  due  to 
limitations  in  the  level  of  contemporary  optical  manufacturing  technology  in  Britain. 
An  understanding  of  this  may  be  reached  through  the  ideas  propounded  by  Thomas 
Hughes  in  his  `systems  approach'  to  understanding  the  evolution  of  technological 
systems.  Stroud  had  encountered  what  Hughes  categorised  as  a  reverse  salient,  a  situation 
where  a  component  in  a  system  has  `fallen  behind  or  gone  out  of  phase  with  others' 
holding  back  progress  on  what  he  termed  a  `broader  front'  and  which  will,  when  solved 
correct  the  problem.  36  Hughes  recognised  that  such  situations  may  be  by-passed, 
allowing  progress  to  be  resumed  pending  a  solution,  which  appropriately  describes 
Stroud's  problem.  Because  satisfactory  prisms  were  unobtainable  -  whether  for  technical 
or  financial  reasons  -  and  time  was  pressing,  Stroud  had  no  option  but  to  deal  with  the 
problem  by  substituting  an  inferior  technology.  Ironically,  his  success  in  devising  the 
tracking-prism  to  overcome  an  earlier  reverse  salient  that  was  a  greater  `critical  problem' 
in  rangefinder  construction,  was  negated  by  the  unexpected  failure  to  deal  with  the 
second  one  of  end-reflectors.  There,  the  issue  was  not  one  of  an  appropriate  solution,  but 
the  unanticipated  problem  of  prism  procurement.  The  production  of  large  prisms  was  a 
reverse  salient  that  would  remain  for  several  years  but,  as  the  narrative  will  show,  a 
lateral  solution  was  devised  that  enabled  progress  on  the  broader  front  of  rangefinder 
development  to  continue  in  the  meantime. 
After  the  trials,  Barr  and  Stroud  were  told  that  their  instrument  had  not  been  selected  and 
the  Watkin  Mekometer  had  been  chosen.  However,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the 
35  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  238,  notes  32  and  34  state  `Cash  Book  No.  1'  referring  to  letters  received. 
36  T.  P.  Hughes,  "The  Evolution  of  Large  Technological  Systems.  "  In  The  Social  Construction  of 
Technological  Systems:  New  Directions  in  the  Sociology  and  History  of  Technology,  edited  by  W. E. 
Bijker,  T.  P.  Hughes,  and  T.  J.  Pinch.  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  MIT  Press,  1989)  pp.  73  and  74. 30 
decision  for  the  Watkin  was  made  simply  because  it  performed  more  accurately.  The 
published  specification  of  May  25th  1888  might  have  been  written  around  the 
Mekometer,  in  fact  it  described  exactly  the  kind  of  instrument  the  Mekometer  was.  All 
the  Army's  previous  rangefinding  devices  had  been,  like  the  Mekometer,  the  'two- 
observer  long-base'  type  and  the  Army  had  become  habituated  to  their  use,  largely 
because  when  used  deliberately  under  test  conditions  they  did  indeed  produce  far  more 
accurate  readings  than  the  single-observer  designs.  37  In  a  lecture  at  the  Royal  Artillery 
Institute  in  1881,  reviewing  every  variation  of  rangefinder  tried  since  1861,  the  speaker 
emphasised  that  the  only  types  proven  as  definitely  unsuitable  were  the  `yard  telemeters', 
by  which  he  meant  the  self-contained  single  observer  types.  8  He  emphasised  that  what 
was  needed  was  refinement  and  simplification  of  the  long-base  type  and  that  no  other 
system  was  likely  to  perform  satisfactorily.  This  pre-disposition  had  come  to  constitute  a 
`rangefinding  paradigm'  that  was  reflected  in  the  1888  specification  and  which  would 
continue  to  influence  the  Army  for  the  next  fifteen  years. 
William  McBride  has  considered  the  concept  of  both  intellectual  and  technological 
paradigms  in  the  context  of  what  he  designated  military  hierarchical  structures.  39  He 
defined  a  military  intellectual  paradigm  as  an  established  philosophy  within  an  army  or 
navy,  and  suggested  that  the  military  technological  paradigm  differed  from  Edward 
Constant's  earlier  definition  of  `an  exemplary  artefact  and  a  cultural  framework  devoted 
to  sustaining  it'  in  that  the  military  one  interacted  not  only  with  the  surrounding  culture 
but  also  with  the  intellectual  paradigm  of  the  related  military  profession.  4°  This 
combination  can  be  used  as  a  model  to  explain  the  selection  process  which  the  War 
Office  followed  in  1889  and  its  later  attitude  towards  rangefmding  apparatus,  particularly 
when  applied  in  conjunction  with  McBride's  other  thesis  that  `military  hierarchies  seek 
stability'  and  when  presented  with  a  new  technology  which  is  perceived  as  challenging 
such  stability,  they  can  react  adversely  towards  it.  This  sits  within  the  broader  framework 
"  Captain  Nolan,  "The  Range-Finder.  "  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Institution  II  (1874):  p.  162. 
38  E.  G.  Edwards,  "Field  Range-Finding.  "  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Institution  XI  (1883):  202-14. 
39  W. McBride,  Technological  Change  and  the  U.  S.  Navy  1865-1945  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University  Press,  2000)  pp.  4-6. 
40  MacBride  cites  E.  Constant  II,  The  Origins  of  the  Turbojet  Revolution  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University  Press,  1980)  as  the  basis  of  his  modified  definition. 31 
of  Thomas  Hughes'  understanding  of  the  growth  of  technological  systems  (which  here 
are  represented  by  the  rangefinder),  in  which  he  emphasised  the  interaction  of  both  social 
and  technical  factors  in  shaping  the  evolution  of  artefacts. 
With  the  British  Army  and  the  rangefinder,  the  evolved  intellectual  paradigm  was  that 
only  long-base  rangefinders  could  provide  sufficient  accuracy,  and  the  technological 
paradigm  was  manifested  in  the  assorted  instruments  in  use  that  all  conformed  to  the 
principle  of  extended  bases.  The  `exemplary  artefact'  was  not  one  single  device,  but  a 
family  of  similar  devices  that  had  in  common  inventors  who  were  all  drawn  from  the 
cultural  framework  of  serving  officers  which  supported  the  paradigm  itself.  From  that,  it 
can  be  adduced  that  the  intellectual  paradigm  was  extended  to  project  the  concept  that 
only  members  of  the  military  society  could  be  expected  to  understand  the  Army's  needs, 
and  so  be  competent  in  evolving  suitable  designs  for  it.  The  War  Office  was  pre- 
conditioned  to  frame  its  May  1888  specification  in  the  way  it  did,  because  its 
rangefmding  paradigm  postulated  that  a  successful  instrument  would  have  pre- 
determined  characteristics  that  would  favour,  or  even  demand,  a  particular  form  of 
instrument.  At  the  same  time,  according  to  Mc  Bride,  the  hierarchical  structure  of  the 
Trials  Committee  would  tend  to  reject  any  anomalous  artefact  that  challenged  the 
existing  (though  still  imperfect)  stability.  The  outcome  of  the  trials  can  be  construed  in 
exactly  that  manner. 
The  Mekometer's  operation  was  far  more  complicated  than  a  single-observer 
instrument.  1  Two  operators  stood  erect  twenty  five  yards  apart  and  aligned  their  separate 
instruments  on  a  pre-determined  target,  and  then  manipulated  one  vis-a-vis  the  other  until 
images  reflected  from  the  target  and  the  other  instrument  were  brought  into  alignment. 
With  the  single-observer  type,  all  that  was  needed  was  to  aim  the  instrument  and  align 
two  images  by  means  of  an  operating  wheel.  Its  tactical  advantages  were  acknowledged, 
but  the  previous  failures  to  make  a  practical  example  had  consistently  reinforced  the 
paradigm  of  the  two-observer  instrument.  Despite  Barr  and  Stroud's  success  in  the 
41  Great  Britain,  Army,  Handbook  of  the  Mekometer  (London:  HMSO,  1911)  pp.  9-13  describe  the 
instrument's  operation.. 32 
March  trials,  the  failure  in  August  was,  to  the  cultural  framework  of  the  Trials 
Committee,  predictable  on  the  basis  of  past  experiences  and  the  expected  outcome 
reinforced  the  existing  rangefmding  paradigm,  not  only  because  it  confirmed  the  notion 
that  such  designs  were  intrinsically  unsuited  but  also  because  it  originated  outside  the 
military  society  that  defined  expectations  of  it.  What  McBride  described  as  `inherent 
paradigmatic  inertia'  then  deflected  attention  away  from  the  potential  tactical  advantages 
in  Barr  and  Stroud's  design  and  directed  the  selection  process  towards  the  Mekometer 
despite  its  operational  drawbacks. 
1.3  The  War  Office  and  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons 
The  Mekometer  was  `introduced  into  service'  in  October  1891.42  It  was  produced  by 
Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  who  must  have  been  given  a  contract  slightly  earlier,  because  by 
April  1891  they  had  already  prepared  the  necessary  drawings  to  commence 
manufacture.  3  Production,  or  at  least  its  issue  to  troops,  went  ahead  slowly,  with  the 
School  of  Musketry  commenting  in  its  Annual  Report  for  1892-1893  that  the  only 
rangefinders  in  service  with  the  Infantry  were  still  the  older  Watkin  and  Weldon  types 
which  the  Mekometer  was  intended  to  supersede.  44  It  was  by  no  means  the  first  optical 
device  the  firm  had  made  for  the  Army,  and  Cooke's  had  an  acquaintance  with  its 
designer  that  went  back  at  least  to  the  1870s  when  as  a  Captain  in  the  Royal  Artillery 
Watkin  had  designed  his  Depression  Rangefinder  for  coastal  artillery.  45  Its  selection  had 
been  protracted,  with  trials  taking  place  between  1876  and  June  1881  when  it  was  finally 
adopted  and  ordered  from  Cooke's  who  produced  it  `under  a  cloak  of  great  secrecy'.  46 
42  Great  Britain,  Army,  School  of  Musketry.  Annual  Report  (London:  HMSO,  1893)  p.  18. 
43  University  of  York,  Borthwick  Institute  of  Historical  Research,  Vickers  Instruments  Archive,  Company 
Records  of  Cooke,  Troughton  &  Sims  (subsequently  VIA),  AJB  070/1.3/  Box  1,  Drawings  Index  1882- 
1921,  drawings  number  369  and  370. 
44  For  instruments  in  service,  see  Great  Britain,  Army,  School  of  Musketry.  Annual  Report  (London: 
HMSO,  1893)  p.  18,  and  for  obsolescence  of  earlier  types  see  Great  Britain,  Army,  List  of  Changes  in  War 
Material  (London:  HMSO,  1891),  entry  24.8.1891. 
45  For  general  background  on  Cooke's  early  involvement  with  optical  munitions,  see  McConnell  (1992)  pp. 
64-65.  For  the  Depression  Rangefinder,  PRO  WO  32/8902  provides  the  source  material  for  the  following 
section,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
"  McConnell  (1992)  p.  64  provides  the  quotations  associated  with  Watkin  in  the  rest  of  this  section. 33 
The  Depression  Rangefinder  also  fitted  the  Army's  rangefmding  paradigm,  being  a 
sophisticated  derivation  of  the  surveyor's  level  intended  to  be  used  in  gun  batteries  which 
were  sited  well  above  sea  level.  It  could  only  be  used  from  a  permanent  mounting  whose 
height  above  a  mean  sea  level  was  precisely  known  and  which  formed  the  extended 
measuring  base  for  the  system.  Its  optical  component  was  a  high  magnification  telescope 
incorporating  an  aiming  mark  that  was  similar  to  those  which  Cooke's  already  produced 
for  survey  instruments;  the  device's  sophistication  came  in  a  complex  system  of  cams 
and  gears  that  translated  the  depression  angle  into  a  range  reading  and  target  bearing  for 
the  guns.  The  combined  `Depression  Range-and-Position  Finder'  formed  a  key 
component  in  the  network  of  coastal  forts  and  batteries  that  had  been  set  up  since  the 
1860s  as  a  strategic  defence  system  against  attack  and  invasion  and  it  was  vital  to  the 
doctrine  of  engaging  an  enemy  at  long  range  before  he  could  approach  closely  enough  to 
deploy  his  own  armament.  47  Watkin's  device  was  considered  important  enough  for  the 
Crown  to  award  him  £25,000  in  1888,  for  `transferring  his  patents  to  the  War  Office.  '  It 
is  difficult  to  resist  the  idea  that,  given  Watkin's  personal  standing  at  the  time  of  the  1889 
trials,  their  outcome  might  have  been  a  foregone  conclusion. 
In  1891  Cooke's  had  become  sole  maker  of  Watkin's  devices  which,  to  the  British  Army, 
were  state-of-the-art  rangefinding  instruments.  Their  commercial  worth  to  Cooke's  is  not 
easy  to  determine  accurately  as  no  directly  relevant  material  from  the  company  has 
survived,  but  some  idea  can  be  formed  from  other  sources.  The  Army's  contemporary 
scales  of  issue  for  Infantry  rangefinders  meant  that  only  300  Mekometers  were  likely  to 
have  been  ordered,  plus  a  small  number  for  spares,  so  that  with  a  selling  price  of  £7,  its 
total  value  could  scarcely  have  exceeded  E2,500.48  The  Depression  Rangefinder  is  harder 
to  assess  without  knowing  how  many  were  needed  or  its  price,  but  some  details 
preserved  by  Cooke's  bankers  give  clues,  as  well  as  telling  a  good  deal  about  the  firm's 
financial  condition  in  the  early  1890s. 
47  M.  J.  Bastable,  Arms  and  the  State:  Sir  William  Armstrong  and  the  Remaking  of  British  Naval  Power, 
1854-1914  (Aldershot:  Ashgate  Publishing,  2004)  pp.  68-69. 
41  The  scale  of  issue  and  cost  are  supplied  by  National  Archives,  Kew,  Records  of  the  Treasury 
(subsequently  PRO)  TI  /11223,  Proceedings  of  the  Ordnance  Council,  12.6.1908,  p.  4. 34 
Anita  McConnell's  history  of  Cooke's  makes  clear  that  although  the  business  had  a  large 
domestic  and  export  trade  it  had  a  record  of  liquidity  problems  that  ran  from  the  late 
1860s  into  the  1890s,  caused  largely  by  losses  from  the  mismanagement  of  large 
contracts  for  astronomical  telescopes  49  By  the  early  1890s,  despite  an  expanding  market 
for  survey  apparatus,  profits  from  general  instrument  making  were  inadequate  to  cover 
losses  on  the  astronomy  side  and  the  firm  saw  optical  munitions  manufacture  as  a 
potential  solution  to  its  financial  difficulties.  In  January  1891,  when  the  Mekometer 
contract  was  obtained  and  the  Depression  Rangefinder  was  in  production,  Cooke's 
current  account  with  the  Yorkshire  Banking  Company  was  overdrawn  by  £1,914  against 
an  agreed  limit  of  £1,000.50  In  September,  the  firm  asked  for  its  overdraft  to  be  raised  to 
£6,000  to  cover  current  liabilities,  and  for  a  further  £4,000  to  purchase  additional 
premises.  Cooke's  assured  the  bank  that  the  money  was  required  only  until  February 
1892  when  `the  account  would  be  put  in  credit  by  moneys  to  come  to  them  from  the 
Government'.  If  Cooke's  was  truly  expecting  War  Office  business  to  rectify  its  financial 
difficulties  then  the  Depression  Rangefinder  was  worth  approximately  £7,500  over  the 
next  year.  The  bank  turned  down  the  application,  and  in  June  1892  the  firm  was  forced  to 
ask  for  `a  three  month  extension  of  credit  to  £5,000'.  Either  the  War  Office  payments  had 
failed  to  come  in  or  trading  had  deteriorated  markedly,  but  optical  munitions  work  had 
not  significantly  changed  the  company's  overall  financial  condition  as  expected.  Cooke's 
may  have  been  excessively  optimistic  about  its  prospects,  anticipating  orders  that  failed 
to  materialise.  The  amount  of  business  likely  to  result  from  optical  munitions  in  the 
1890s  was  limited  by  the  Army's  very  limited  employment  of  them  and  although 
Cooke's  had  a  monopoly  of  manufacture  for  the  two  Watkin  rangefinders,  neither  was 
likely  to  be  bought  in  large  numbers  over  a  protracted  period;  the  reality  was  that  their 
capacity  to  generate  a  continuous  and  substantial  income  hardly  existed  at  all. 
Although  the  Army,  via  the  War  Office  made  the  first  move  towards  adopting  a 
rangefinder,  it  did  relatively  little  to  encourage  the  development  of  an  optical  munitions 
49  McConnell  (1992)  p.  61. 
50  HSBC  Bank  Group  Archives,  Abstract  of  entries  in  the  Yorkshire  Banking  Company  Board  Minutes 
relating  to  T.  Cooke  &  Sons,  1882-1900,  references  X19  to  X24,  provides  the  source  for  the  financial 
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industry.  It  was  the  Royal  Navy  that  did  most  to  stimulate  growth  through  its  own  efforts 
to  find  a  rangefmder  that  began  shortly  before  the  Army  decided  to  adopt  the  Mekometer 
and  continued  over  several  years  until  a  suitable  instrument  had  been  developed. 
1.4  The  Admiralty  and  the  Rangefinder 
Unlike  the  Army,  the  Royal  Navy  had  never  officially  employed  any  instruments  for 
measuring  distances  at  sea  and  had  evolved  neither  an  intellectual  nor  a  technological 
paradigm  on  rangefinding.  The  Navy  was  directed  towards  the  problem  by  the  same 
emerging  weapons  and  propellant  technologies  that  had  affected  the  War  Office,  as  well 
as  the  growing  in  attention  to  naval  policy  after  1884  that  led  to  the  large  spending 
programme  of  the  Naval  Defence  Act  of  1889.51  Faced  with  the  prospect  of  new  ships 
armed  with  improved  guns  which  could  shoot  further  and  quicker,  52  the  Admiralty 
decided  to  investigate  whether  a  satisfactory  rangefinder  for  shipboard  use  could  be 
obtained.  This  is  one  situation  where  it  may  be  claimed  that  `hard'  technological 
determinism  in  the  shape  of  new  guns  and  propellants  was  indeed  `driving'  the  process 
of  change,  at  least  in  the  Navy.  There,  the  combination  of  rapid-firing  guns  with  far 
greater  effective  ranges  than  anything  previously  made  created  a  situation  where  the 
advances  were  so  great  as  to  overcome  any  social  factors  of  resistance  within  the 
professional  community  faced  with  the  implications  of  change.  Irrespective  of  the  nature 
of  the  evolution  of  those  new  technological  innovations,  once  they  attained  a  condition  of 
practical  utility  (or  stabilisation)  their  advantages  were  so  manifest  that  the  next  stage  in 
the  progress  of  naval  gunnery  was  set  in  motion.  That  process,  though,  was  effected 
through  a  combination  of  circumstances  whose  explanation  resists  a  deterministic  model 
and  which  is  most  appropriately  achieved  through  the  ideas  of  Thomas  Hughes'  systems 
approach. 
In  1889,  the  Royal  Navy  still  depended  on  the  War  Office  for  its  supplies  of  guns,  and  it 
was  to  the  Director  of  Artillery  at  Woolwich  that  the  Navy  first  took  the  issue  of 
S'  For  background  to  the  1889  Act,  see  Bastable  (20(4)  pp.  189-192,  and  C.  Trebilcock,  The  Vickers 
Brothers:  Armaments  and  Enterprise  1854-1914  (London:  Europa  Publishers,  1977),  pp.  52-55. 
52  For  details  of  the  new  guns,  see  E.  W.  Lloyd  and  A.  G.  Hadcock,  Artillery:  Its  Progress  and  Present 
Position  (Portsmouth:  J.  Griffin  &  Co.,  1893)  Chapter  VII. 36 
rangefinding  in  June  that  year.  53  The  first  Infantry  rangefinder  trials  had  just  been  held 
and  the  second  set  was  due  to  start  soon  when  the  Navy'  Ordnance  Committee 
announced  on  June  14th  that  `the  question  of  a  naval  rangefinder  is  one  of  pressing 
importance'.  The  Navy's  gunnery  school,  HMS  Excellent,  was  also  asked  for  an  expert 
opinion.  Its  captain's  reply  on  the  260'  was  that  he  did  `not  attach  great  importance  to 
rangefinders'  as  `a  far  more  practical  means  of  obtaining  the  ranges  quickly'  was  by 
observing  the  splashes  made  by  misses  from  the  new  quick-firing  guns  that  were  then 
being  introduced.  He  thought  there  was  no  need  for  the  Ordnance  Committee  to  pursue 
the  matter.  The  Director  of  Naval  Ordnance  (DNO)  was  but  little  impressed  with 
Excellent's  advice  and  on  July  9t'  told  the  Director  of  Artillery  that  it  would  be  a  `great 
advantage'  to  have  an  effective  ship-borne  rangefinder  and  asked  for  the  benefit  of  his 
experience.  The  Director  passed  on  the  names  of  the  entrants  to  the  current  trials  but 
offered  neither  advice  nor  comment.  54  A  year  later,  the  DNO  asked  him  to  set  in  motion 
the  process  of  finding  a  suitable  naval  rangefinder,  and  on  April  8th  1891  sent  a  set  of 
conditions  which  the  successful  instrument  must  achieve. 
Although  the  War  Office  was  responsible  for  instigating  the  selection  process,  it  took  no 
part  in  the  actual  trials  which  were  conducted  entirely  by  the  Navy,  and  there  were 
significant  differences  in  the  way  that  the  Admiralty  competition  was  managed.  Firstly,  a 
number  of  inventors  were  specifically  invited  to  submit  designs  for  it,  including  the 
entrants  to  the  1889  trials  . 
55  And  secondly,  the  specification  itself  was  framed  in  such  a 
way  as  to  seek  a  solution  rather  than  define  the  nature  of  what  was  expected  in  the  way 
the  War  Office  had  done.  56  The  technical  demands  were  considerable:  the  device  had  to 
measure  ranges  to  an  error  no  greater  than  3  per  cent  at  3,000  yards,  irrespective  of  ship 
motion,  speed,  or  the  course  of  either  its  own  vessel  or  its  target,  it  had  to  take  ten 
readings  per  minute  (to  produce  a  mean  range)  and  have  provision  for  `some  system  of 
instantaneous  communication'  to  send  them  to  the  guns,  and  it  had  to  be  as  simple  and  as 
s'  Hampshire  County  Record  Office,  Priddy's  Hard  Material,  collection  reference  109W91  (subsequently 
HCRO)PQ2,  Great  Britain,  Admiralty,  Gunnery  Department.  Monthly  Record  of  Principal  Questions  Dealt 
with  by  the  Director  of  Naval  Ordnance  July-December  1889,  provides  the  source  material  for  this  section 
unless  otherwise  indicated.  Dates  are  given  in  the  text. 
54  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  25. 
ss  HCRO/PQ6,  Recommendation  of  Director  of  Naval  Ordnance,  9.2.1892. 
56  See  Appendix  for  the  full  list  of  conditions. 37 
durable  as  possible  to  withstand  conditions  at  sea.  William  McBride  suggested  that  in 
late  19"'  century  navies,  although  `officers  had  become  members  of  a  technology-based 
profession'  they  did  not  necessarily  accept  new  technologies  automatically  as 
improvements.  57  HMS  Excellent's  Captain  of  two  years  previously,  who  considered  that 
observing  shell  splashes  was  the  best  way  to  find  the  target's  range,  may  have  been  an 
extreme  example  of  `filters  against  adoption'  of  the  new,  but  the  1891  specification's 
demand  for  transmission  of  data  suggests  that  the  Royal  Navy  was  looking  for  new 
technology  by  asking  not  just  for  a  rangefmding  device  but  for  what  amounted  to  a 
system  for  gunnery  control  centred  on  an  optical  instrument. 
Submissions  were  made  by  a  mixture  of  private  inventors  and  serving  officers.  The 
Admiralty  trials  in  1892  and  their  favourable  result  for  Barr  and  Stroud  have  been 
described  by  Moss  and  Russell,  but  it  is  worth  noting  that  once  again  the  outcome  may 
not  have  been  as  straightforward  as  they  imply.  58  The  two  strongest  contenders  were  Barr 
and  Stroud  and,  once  again,  Major  Watkin  whose  submission  was  a  derivation  of  his 
successful  coastal  range-and-position  finder.  He  had  integrated  his  two-observer  design 
into  an  electrical  circuit  which  supplied  two  angle-readings  from  widely  separated  points 
to  a  central  control  station  which,  like  the  depression  type,  converted  them  into  ranges  for 
transmission  to  the  guns.  59  This  was  an  attempt  to  transfer  the  Army's  rangefinding 
paradigms  to  naval  use,  and  in  the  context  of  a  technologically  conversant  society  might 
have  been  expected  to  find  favour.  Its  failure  was,  officially  at  least,  due  to  its  inferior 
accuracy,  but  in  the  light  of  later  attitudes  shown  towards  similar  ideas  for  integrating 
gunnery  direction,  the  fact  that  it  demanded  the  installation  of  a  whole  system  was  likely 
to  count  against  it,  and  not  just  with  those  gunnery  officers  who  espoused  the  philosophy 
of  HMS  Excellent's  captain.  60  Watkin's  system  demanded  the  installation  of  cabling  and 
a  control  room,  both  of  which  were  likely  to  be  expensive  and  also  difficult  to  arrange 
S7  McBride  (2001)  p.  4. 
sa  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  pp.  24-26. 
s'  A.  Pollen,  The  Great  Gunnery  Scandal  (London:  William  Collins  &  Co.  Ltd,  1980)  pp.  66  and  260. 
6o  See  Pollen  (1980)  Chapter  2,  and  I.  T.  Sumida,  In  Defence  of  Navel  Supremacy:  Finance,  Technology, 
and  British  Naval  Policy  1889-1914  (London:  Routledge,  1993)  Chapter  5  for  attitudes  towards  shipboard 
instrumentation. 38 
with  existing  ships.  The  Barr  and  Stroud  design  made  little  impact  on  a  ship's  structure. 
It  was  only  five  feet  long  and  could  be  used  -  literally-  as  a  `stand  alone'  item  capable  of 
being  moved  around  from  one  mounting  point  to  another,  almost  like  a  telescope.  61 
Although  the  Royal  Navy's  gunnery  branch  recognised  the  need  for  integrated  fire 
control,  the  still-evolving  state  of  gunnery  and  weapons  together  acted  as  filters  amongst 
some  officers  to  resist  changes  whose  immediate  application  seemed  of  little  import62 
The  absence  of  any  rangefmding  paradigm  in  the  Navy,  together  with  a  still  imperfectly 
defined  one  for  gunnery  would  have  combined  to  favour  Barr  and  Stroud  even  if  their 
rangefinder  had  not  shown  a  superiority  in  accuracy. 
1.5  Barr  and  Stroud  -  from  Cottage  Industry  to  Manufactory 
Winning  the  competition  was  still  no  guarantee  of  financial  reward.  On  June  10t'  1892 
the  Admiralty  wrote  to  Barr  about  what  might  happen  next  about  the  rangefinder.  63  The 
letter  raised  the  question  of  terms  and  conditions  in  the  light  of  Barr  and  Stroud 
proposing  to  sub-contract  manufacture  and  asked  what  `you  and  Mr  Stroud  [sic]  are 
willing  to  accept  for  these  instruments'  should  Navy  adopt  them.  There  were  three  points 
which  the  Admiralty  wanted  answered  before  it  would  consider  whatever  price  the 
inventors  might  ask.  Was  the  rangefinder  patented?  Had  its  details  been  made  public? 
Could  secrecy  be  guaranteed?  The  final  issue  materially  affected  the  terms  to  be  offered. 
If  secrecy  could  be  assured,  then  the  Government  was  interested  in  acquiring  the  sole 
rights  to  the  rangefmder,  either  by  a  lump  sum  or  a  royalty  on  each  one  bought.  Moss  and 
Russell  said  that  after  further  trials  in  June  `the  Admiralty  then  asked  [the  inventors]  to 
offer  their  patents  to  the  Crown',  a  privilege  for  which  Barr  demanded  £75,000  in  view 
of  their  `enormous  commercial  potential'  and  which  was  subsequently  declined.  64  As  the 
Admiralty's  main  pre-occupation  was  secrecy  rather  than  buying-up  a  potential 
commercial  investment,  there  can  have  been  little  chance  of  Barr  being  paid  such  a  large 
sum,  irrespective  of  the  accuracy  of  his  valuation.  Having  set  aside  any  ideas  of  buying 
61  For  details  on  the  uses  of  telescopes,  see  PRO  ADM  116/407,  `Long  distance  telescopes:  trials  and  issue 
to  H.  M.  Ships',  1893  to  1896. 
62  For  examples  of  19'"  century  naval  attitudes,  see  P.  Scott,  Fifty  Years  in  the  Royal  Navy  (London:  John 
Murray,  1919)  Chapters  2  to  5. 
63  UGD  295/16/1/5,  Correspondence,  Admiralty  to  Professor  Barr,  10.6.1892. 
"Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  26 39 
sole  rights,  at  the  end  of  November  the  Admiralty  asked  Barr  to  quote  for  six  of  his 
`improved  single-observer  rangefinders  for  further  trials'  marking  the  start  of  a 
commercial  relationship  that  was  to  outlast  the  naval  life  of  the  optical  rangefinder. 
The  procession  from  inventors  to  successful  entrepreneurs  by  Archibald  Barr  and 
William  Stroud  between  1888  and  1899  accords  well  with  Thomas  Hughes'  ideas  in  his 
systems  approach  to  development,  and  in  particular  with  his  three-stage  model  of 
technological  innovation  which  stressed  the  importance  of  contextual  influences  outside 
the  immediate  field  of  a  particular  technology.  65  Hughes  modified  Joseph  Schumpeter's 
earlier  analytical  model,  which  divided  technological  change  into  the  three  phases  of 
invention,  innovation  and  diffusion,  by  first  defining  invention  as  an  idea  that  may  solve 
a  problem  rather  than  it  necessarily  being  a  working  artefact.  He  then  fused  the  notions  of 
innovation  and  diffusion  into  what  he  called  the  development  stage,  where  the  proposed 
solution  was  tested  and  modified  until  it  became  viable.  And  finally  he  re-defined 
innovation  to  mean  its  transfer  first  into  an  appropriate  commercial  marketplace  and 
subsequently  into  a  wider  contemporary  `social  and  cultural  context'.  66  In  that  phase, 
entrepreneurial  factors  became  paramount  in  building  up  what  he  called  the  `momentum' 
of  the  technology  which  enabled  it  to  exert  a  progressive  influence  over  external  contexts 
such  as  political  or  economic  factors.  The  growth  of  Barr  and  Stroud's  rangefinder 
business  in  the  1890s  was  the  most  important  aspect  of  optical  munitions  manufacture  in 
Britain  and  its  examination  in  the  light  of  Hughes'  ideas  also  gives  an  understanding  of 
why  there  was  little  development  in  other  areas  during  these  years. 
In  February  1893  Archibald  Barr  and  William  Stroud  had  neither  the  means  to  make  the 
instruments'  parts  themselves  nor  even  a  workshop  in  which  to  assemble  bought-in 
Barr  was  by  then  Regius  Professor  of  Engineering  at  the  University  of  components  67 
Glasgow  and  Stroud  still  at  the  Yorkshire  College  in  Leeds,  a  separation  of  some  250 
65  Hughes,  T.  P.  "Technological  Momentum.  "  In  Does  Technology  Drive  History?  The  Dilemma  of 
Technological  Determinism,  edited  by  M.  R.  and  L.  Marx  Smith  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  MIT  Press,  1995)  pp. 
103-113. 
"  Bastable  (2004)  p.  8. 
67  UGD  295/4/11,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Director  of  Naval  Contracts  acknowledging  receipt  of  Admiralty 
acceptance  of  tender  for  contract  CP  NS4886-927383/1620. 40 
miles  which  complicated  the  production  of  the  first  batch  of  rangefinders  for  the  Royal 
Navy.  68  The  instruments  to  be  made  reflected  the  research  done  by  the  pair  since  1888, 
which  had,  in  the  meantime,  produced  another  five  rangefinder-related  patents.  69  The 
new  model  had  advanced  considerably  since  1889,  having  a  longer  measuring  base  of 
five  feet,  a  stronger  double-tube  body  of  non-ferrous  metals  to  avoid  influencing  ships' 
compasses,  and  finally  a  revised  optical  system  that  avoided  the  use  of  the  problematic 
large  end-reflecting  prisms  by  the  substitution  of  speculum-metal  reflectors  that  were 
intrinsically  more  stable  than  glass  mirrors.  The  components  were  all  made  by  outside 
contractors  and  gathered  together  for  final  assembly  in  Glasgow,  this  time  not  on 
University  premises  but  in  Barr's  own  home  under  circumstances  that  Moss  and  Russell 
described,  engagingly  enough,  as  a  `cottage  industry'. 
The  fabrication  of  mechanical  parts  was  done  by  James  White  &  Co.  in  Glasgow,  but  the 
optical  work  was  spread  between  Adam  Hilger  in  London  and  Chadburn  Brothers  in 
Sheffield,  Yorkshire.  70  Chadbum's  is  not  mentioned  at  all  by  Moss  and  Russell,  but  the 
firm  was  an  important  supplier  of  the  simpler  optical  components  in  Barr  and  Stroud's 
rangefinders  from  at  least  1892  until  well  into  the  Great  War.  Founded  late  in  the  18th 
century,  Chadburn's  made  a  wide  range  of  optical  instruments,  as  well  as  lenses  for  the 
ophthalmic  trade.  71  Although  the  main  telescope  part  of  the  rangefinder  demanded  high- 
grade  lenses,  its  aiming  viewfinder  and  some  other  parts  could  be  made  satisfactorily 
with  simple  ophthalmic  lenses,  and  it  made  no  sense  to  pay  Hilger's  or  Cooke's  for 
higher  quality  components  when  they  were  not  needed.  For  the  more  sophisticated 
achromatic  lenses  and  the  small  complex  eye-piece  pentagonal  prisms,  orders  continued 
to  go  to  Hilger's  who  supplied  some  of  the  components  directly  to  Glasgow  and  others  to 
68  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  pp.  25-31  provides  source  material  for  this  section  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
69  UGD  295/22/1/8,  patent  specifications,  includes  British  Patents  11025/1889,4185/1890,12448/1890, 
12736/1890,  and  3172/1891. 
70  UGD  295/4/11,  Letter  Book  1893,  contains  a  series  of  eighteen  letters  from  Barr  to  Chadbum's  ordering 
n  assortment  of  lenses.  See  in  particular  3.3.1893  requesting  piano-convex  lenses,  and  25.5.1893  ordering 
eight  different  types  of  piano-convex  lenses. 
.  11  The  Century's  Progress:  Yorkshire  Industry  and  Commerce  1893  (London:  The  London  Printing  and 
Engraving  Co.,  1893.  Reprint,  Brenton  Publishing  1971)  p.  141. 41 
Stroud  in  Leeds.  72  He  then  built  up  the  complicated  central  arrangement  of  prisms  and 
lenses  that  presented  the  separate  images  to  the  operator's  eye  before  despatching  each 
finished  component  to  Glasgow  for  assembly  in  the  rangefinder  body  and  final 
adjustment. 
This  method  of  sourcing  and  assembling  components  was  adequate  only  for  orders  for 
small  numbers  of  instruments,  and  Barr  was  aware  that  once  demand  grew  a 
transformation  would  be  required.  The  first  stage  in  the  progression  from  cottage 
industry  to  a  manufacturing  organisation  came  when  Barr  hired  one  of  his  own 
university  students,  Harold  Jackson,  as  his  full  time  salaried  administrative  and  technical 
assistant  in  1893.73  Although  then  only  21,  Jackson  quickly  came  to  occupy  a  key  role  in 
the  progress  of  the  business,  and  to  play  a  part  scarcely  less  important  than  Barr  himself. 
The  second  step  was  the  negotiation  of  a  sales  agency  agreement  the  same  year  with  the 
Newcastle-on-Tyne  armaments  maker  and  warship  builder,  W.  G.  Armstrong  Mitchell  & 
Co. 
The  circumstances  of  this  agreement  are,  once  again,  not  as  straightforward  as  the 
published  account  suggests.  For  an  informal  partnership  of  two  academics  whose  total 
business  to  date  amounted  to  just  one  order  for  six  rangefinders,  the  need  to  set  up  an 
international  marketing  structure  so  soon  seems  premature.  However,  as  William  Stroud 
noted  later,  once  the  Admiralty  had  announced  its  decision  to  buy  rangefinders,  foreign 
interest  rapidly  burgeoned  and  `within  a  few  months  enquiries  poured  in  from  places  as 
far  apart  as  Tokio  [sic]  and  Washington'  74  Naval  and  military  attaches  arrived  `to  study 
the  instrument'  and  the  prospects  for  foreign  business  quickly  seemed  encouraging. 
According  to  Moss  and  Russell,  Barr  approached  Armstrong's  in  April  1893  to  ask  if 
they  would  become  `sole  agents'  for  sales  to  foreign  navies,  but  in  fact  it  was  the 
company  that  first  approached  Barr  through  one  of  its  technical  staff,  Commander  E.  W. 
72  UGD  295/16/1/5,  Correspondence,  Strang  papers,  Stroud  to  Hilger  on  methods  of  making  pentagonals 
for  the  rangefinder,  6.10.1890  and  UGD  295/4/11,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Hilger  complaining  of  incorrect 
angles  of  pentagonals. 
73  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  29. 
74  Stroud,  Early  Reminiscences,  marginal  note  in  Stroud's  own  handwriting  on  p.  12  of  the  copy  in  UGD 
295/26/1/55. 42 
Lloyd.  In  late  March,  Armstrong's  had  set  matters  in  train  by  asking  Barr  whether  he  was 
able  to  supply  rangefinders  and  at  what  price.  Having  quoted  a  figure,  he  followed  it  up  7s 
by  enquiring  in  May  whether  or  not  Armstrong's  would  be  able  to  get  any  orders,  which 
seems  to  have  prompted  Lloyd  to  arrange  a  meeting  at  which  he  put  the  question  of  an 
agency  to  Barr.  76 
Lloyd,  who  had  recently  retired  from  the  Royal  Navy,  already  knew  about  the  Barr  & 
Stroud  rangefinder  and  had  mentioned  it  in  his  recently  published  work  Artillery:  its 
Progress  and  Present  Position,  although  when  he  wrote  it  he  was  still  -  like  the  Captain 
of  HMS Excellent  some  two  years  earlier  -  unconvinced  of  the  instrument's  value.  77 
However,  when  the  Admiralty's  decision  triggered  foreign  interest,  Armstrong's  would 
have  recognised  that  orders  were  likely  from  their  overseas  clients  and  moved  to 
concentrate  the  export  sales  of  the  rangefinder  in  their  hands  rather  than  any 
competitor's.  The  discussions  with  Lloyd  led  Barr  to  prepare  a  draft  agreement  which  he 
returned  to  Armstrong's  after  some  amendments  in  early  July  with  an  accompanying 
letter  that  said: 
One  of  my  chief  concerns  for  desiring  to  come  to  some  such  agreement  as  you 
had  proposed  was  that  we  had  not  the  machinery  for  securing  prompt  payment 
in  the  case  of  business  being  done  with  the  Smaller  States.  This,  Captain  [sic] 
Lloyd  said  would  be  no  difficulty  to  you  and  I  understood  that  you  are  willing  to 
undertake  the  financing  of  foreign  business  in  so  far  as  the  securing  of  payment 
is  concerned.  " 
Barr  may  have  been  stimulated  by  the  idea  of  foreign  sales,  but  financing  them  would 
indeed  have  been  problematic.  By  1893  the  expenditure  on  research  and  patenting  had 
become  considerable,  and  according  to  Stroud  `We  were  now  approaching  the  end  of  our 
'S  UGD  295/4/11,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell  quoting  for  supply  of  thirteen  rangefinders  at 
£700  less  12.5  percent  commission. 
76  UGD  295/4/11,  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell  9.5.1893,  and  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell  3.7.1893. 
7'  E.  W. Lloyd  and  A.  G.  Hadcock,  Artillery:  Its  Progress  and  Present  Position  (Portsmouth:  J.  Griffin  & 
Co.,  1893)  p.  9  for  the  rangefinder  and  p.  10  for  the  spotting  the  fall  of  shot  as  an  aid  to  ranging.. 
78  UGD  295/4/11,  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell,  3.7.1893.  Emphasis  added. 43 
financial  tether'.  9  Their  losses  so  far  were  at  least  £1,247,  all  of  which  except  for  £300 
had  come  from  their  own  resources.  80  Barr's  income  at  Glasgow  University  in  1893  was 
£468,81  and  Stroud's  salary  at  Leeds  was  unlikely  to  have  been  greater,  so  that  their 
situation  in  the  absence  of  outside  financing  must  indeed  have  been  difficult.  Work  done 
for  the  British  government  was  `safe'  in  the  sense  that  payment  was  guaranteed  and 
could  be  financed  through  eking  out  suppliers'  credit  terms,  but  foreign  sales  were  a 
different  matter,  as  Barr's  letter  to  Armstrong's  made  clear. 
The  ten-year  agreement  that  was  signed  in  September  1893  was  potentially  advantageous 
to  Barr  and  Stroud.  82  Armstrong's  would  promote  the  Barr  and  Stroud  rangefinder  to  the 
exclusion  of  any  other  by  using  their  influence  on  foreign  navies  who  were  their  clients 
for  ships  or  guns.  Barr  and  Stroud  would  fix  the  selling  prices,  and  Armstrong's  would 
guarantee  payment  within  three  months  of  taking  delivery,  irrespective  of  whether  or  not 
the  foreign  client  had  paid  for  them.  In  return,  Armstrong's  would  earn  a  12.5  per  cent 
commission  on  all  sales  from  foreign  enquiries  except  -  at  Barr's  insistence  -  those  from 
Germany.  Almost  at  a  stroke,  and  at  no  cost,  Barr  had  acquired  both  a  foreign  sales 
department  and  a  guarantee  of  payment  within  a  set  time  limit,  a  combination  he  might 
well  have  been  pleased  with. 
Despite  the  expectation  that  Armstrong's  would  generate  new  trade,  few  orders  resulted 
until  well  into  1894,  when  Barr  and  Stroud's  total  business  amounted  to  just  thirteen 
rangefinders,  eight  of  which  were  for  the  Admiralty.  Despite  Stroud's  insistence  that 
there  was  much  foreign  interest,  there  was  little  concrete  to  show  from  it.  Navies  - 
including  the  Royal  Navy  -  were  still  to  be  convinced  that  the  rangefinder  worked 
efficiently  or  was  even  necessary,  and  Barr  was  keen  to  get  the  Admiralty  to  commit 
"  Stroud  Early  Reminiscences  p.  10. 
80  This  figure  is  taken  from  J.  M.  Strang's  research  material  for  the  unpublished  history  of  Barr  &  Stroud 
cited  by  Moss  and  Russell.  Both  the  material  and  typescript  are  in  UGD  295  Unclassified  Material,  Strang 
papers. 
Extracted  from  UGD  F2/16,  University  of  Glasgow  Records,  Ledger  II,  pp.  80-87. 
82  UGD  295/4/11,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell,  7.7.1893  and  9.8.1893  detail  the  terms; 
28.9.1893  confirms  signature  of  agreement. 44 
itself  in  order  to  gain  what  he  rightly  saw  as  a  valuable  endorsement.  83  In  late  May, 
Jackson  asked  the  Admiralty  whether  the  Navy  thought  the  rangefinder  was  `suitable'  for 
adoption,  and  encouraged  a  favourable  answer  by  saying  further  improvements  had  been 
made  and  offering  a  discount  of  10  per  cent  for  orders  of  50  or  more.  84  Eventually  in 
February  1895  the  Admiralty  confirmed  that  the  instrument  had  been  `definitely  adopted' 
by  the  Navy.  85 
Foreign  interest  was  still  not  stimulated  to  the  point  where  large  orders  were  being  placed 
and  the  stance  of  the  Imperial  German  Navy  perhaps  sums  up  contemporary  attitudes.  In 
April  1894,  the  German  Naval  Attache  in  London,  Captain  Tülick,  had  asked  about 
delivery  of  a  sample  to  Berlin,  asking  if  someone  could  be  sent  to  demonstrate  it  `without 
charging  anything,  or  only  a  moderate  sum'.  86  The  response  to  that  has  not  survived  but  a 
fortnight  later,  undeterred  by  what  he  had  been  told,  the  Attache  wrote  again  to  enquire 
`if  you  are  doing  any  other  interesting  work  for  the  British  Admiralty'.  Irrespective  of 
whatever  he  learned  from  that  attempt  at  espionage  by  post,  a  rangefinder  was 
subsequently  ordered,  to  be  collected  by  a  German  `expert'  in  July,  but  only  after 
payment  had  been  made.  The  correspondence  illustrates  some  of  the  problems  that  Barr 
was  having  promoting  sales.  Tülick  had  asked  to  visit  what  he  thought  was  Barr's  factory 
in  Glasgow  to  see  for  himself  not  only  the  rangefinder  but  whatever  else  Messrs  Barr  and 
Stroud  were  making,  and  he  also  wanted  a  firm  delivery  date  for  the  one  just  ordered.  87 
The  reply,  sent  over  Barr's  signature  but  from  its  style  composed  by  Jackson,  neatly 
juggled  assurance  and  embarrassment.  Firstly,  Barr  and  Stroud  were  specialists;  they 
only  made  rangefinders,  a  subject  with  which  `few  men  are  acquainted'.  On  delivery 
times,  the  `peculiar  nature'  of  the  work  meant  that  `unforeseen  accidents  might  slightly 
retard  completion',  but  once  finished  it  would  be  best  to  gather  as  many  experts  in  Berlin 
as  could  be  managed  at  one  time  to  show  them  the  rangefinder.  As  for  a  factory  visit,  the 
83  For  the  influence  that  Royal  Navy  had  on  foreign  powers,  see  C.  Trebilcock,  The  Vickers  Brothers: 
Armaments  and  Enterprise  1854-1914  (London:  Europa  Publishers,  1977)  chapters  3  and  4. 
84  UGD  295/4/12,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Admiralty,  26.5.1894. 
$S  UGD  295/4/13,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Armstrong  Mitchell  informing  them  of  the  decision. 
86  UGD  295/16/1/13,  Foreign  Letters,  German  Embassy,  London,  to  Barr  and  Stroud,  provides  the  source 
material  for  the  following  quotations  in  this  paragraph,  2.4.1894,20.4.1894,23.6.1894,  and  12.7.1894. 
87  UGD  295/4/12,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Captain  TUlick,  23.4.1894  provides  the  source  material  for  the  rest 
of  this  paragraph. 45 
letter  confessed  `We  have  not  a  workshop  of  our  own,  except  a  small  one  in  Professor 
Ban's  house...  '  and  that  `the  important  parts'  were  made  in  various  locations.  This  did 
not  deter  German  interest,  and  the  rangefinder  was  duly  delivered  on  time  and  sent  to 
Berlin  where,  instead  of  Barr  being  to  show  it  off,  it  was  (according  to  Stroud) 
immediately  `forwarded  to  Zeiss  to  be  copied'.  88 
Orders  were  slow  to  come  in  from  sources  other  than  the  Admiralty  and  income 
remained  modest  until  1896. 
Table  1.1:  Barr  &  Stroud,  comparison  of  British  and  foreign  orders  1893-1899.89 









1893  5  1  6  400 
1893  8  5  13  2,700 
1895  20  9  29  3,025 
1896  41  14  55  13,409 
1897  50  7  57  11,668 
1898  Nil  29  29  14361 
1899  105  26  131  8,556 
The  slowness  of  growth  up  to  1895  was  influenced  by  both  the  Admiralty  and  the 
Professors  still  being  in  the  early  phases  of  developing  both  its  application  and  design,  a 
combination  of  social  and  technical  factors.  For  the  Navy,  the  question  was  one  of  how 
to  employ  the  rangefinder,  and  for  Barr  and  Stroud  the  problem  was  how  to  refine  the 
instrument  to  produce  a  satisfactory  product  that  could  be  marketed  with  the  endorsement 
of  large-scale  adoption  by  the  British  Admiralty.  In  Hughes'  model  of  technological 
change,  the  development  stage  has  the  proposed  solution  to  a  requirement  being 
88  Stroud,  Early  Reminiscences  p.  14. 
89  These  figures  are  extracted  from  UGD  295/26/1/93,  Personal  papers  of  Dr.  W.  Strang,  'rough  notes',  and 
UGD  295/26/1/27  and  28,  `historical  notes'  prepared  for  Dr  Strang's  proposed  history  of  the  firm.. 46 
redesigned  and  re-tested  until  a  satisfactory  state  is  reached,  a  case  that  describes  what 
was  happening  with  Barr  and  Stroud.  The  two  inventors  had  not  only  to  develop  the 
rangefinder  but  also  to  evolve  a  commercial  structure  that  would  be  appropriate  to  how 
they  thought  the  business  should  develop. 
Moss  and  Russell  hinted  at  the  rangefmder's  gradual  technical  evolution,  but  it  is  clear 
that  up  to  1895  each  instrument  delivered  differed  slightly  from  its  predecessor.  90  Only  in 
that  year  was  the  `FA2'  model  introduced,  representing  the  reaching  of  a  plateau  where  a 
standardised  product  could  be  manufactured  to  a  fixed  specification  rather  than 
individual  examples  being  modified  as  they  were  produced.  91  In  April  1895  the 
Admiralty  asked  for  a  quotation  for  twenty,  92  so  that  with  the  design  having  reached  a 
stage  of  stability  and  a  substantial  order  from  the  Admiralty,  it  became  feasible  to 
advance  the  development  of  the  business  by  acquiring,  for  the  first  time,  workshop 
premises  and  operatives  to  do  part  of  the  manufacturing.  The  previous  year,  the  inventors 
had  created  the  formal  partnership  of  `Barr  &  Stroud's  Patents'  to  exploit  the  value  of  the 
designs  already  registered.  93  That  had  allowed  for  either  licensing  or  manufacturing,  but 
by  early  1895  the  partners'  attention  was  concentrated  on  the  latter,  not  least  because  the 
earlier  question  of  producing  some  means  of  transmitting  data  electrically  from  the 
rangefinder  to  the  ship's  guns  had  been  resurrected. 
The  original  specification  had  called  for  the  provision  of  such  a  system  even  though  it 
had  not  been  required  at  the  trials,  and  in  November  1893  the  Admiralty  had  finally 
asked  for  the  submission  of  the  necessary  `electrical  apparatus'.  A  set  of  these  `Range  94 
and  Order'  instruments  was  tested  by  mid-April  1894,  but  no  decision  about  them  had 
been  made  when  in  early  1895  Armstrong  Mitchell  had  raised  the  question  on  their  own 
90  UGD  295/4/12,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Captain  Hall  on  HMS  Resolution,  compares  differences  between 
individual  rangefinders  delivered,  27.8.1894. 
"  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  33. 
92  UGD  295/4/13,  Letter  Book,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Director  of  Naval  Contracts,  tender  dated  22.4.1895. 
93  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  31. 
94  UGD  295/16/1/5,  Admiralty  Correspondence,  Admiralty  to  Barr,  11.11.1893. 47 
account  in  the  context  of  incorporating  them  into  ships  under  construction.  "  The 
possibility  of  extra  business  coming  from  Armstrong's  sooner  than  from  the  Admiralty 
must  have  impressed  on  Barr  the  increasing  urgency  of  having  some  workshop  premises 
of  his  own. 
Although  Barr's  University  of  Glasgow  contract  left  him  free  to  undertake  whatever 
consultancy  work  he  wished,  the  earlier  unsettling  experience  of  Stroud  at  the  Yorkshire 
College  emphasised  the  need  to  keep  different  domains  clearly separated.  96  In  June  1895 
he  signed  a  lease  for  a  700  square-feet  workshop  in  Byres  Road,  conveniently  equidistant 
between  the  University  and  his  home.  97  The  move  marked  the  start  of  a  substantial 
increase  in  activity,  but  with  a  workforce  of  only  six,  including  Harold  Jackson  and  two 
boy-workers,  Barr  &  Stroud's  Patents  was  still  almost  wholly  dependent  of  out-sourcing 
for  almost  all  its  components  and  only  equipped  to  do  assembly  work  and  some  fine 
machining  for  experimental  work  like  the  Range-and-Order  (R&O)  instruments. 
At  the  same  time,  Barr  began  to  put  pressure  on  Armstrong's  to  produce  some  substantial 
business,  showing  that  he  had  made  himself  aware  of  naval  and  military  affairs  generally. 
At  the  end  of  April  he  warned  Armstrong's  that  the  move  to  Byres  Road  would  cause 
short-term  delays,  but  subsequently  delivery  times  would  improve.  Five  days  later  he 
suggested  promoting  the  idea  of  rangefinders  to  shipping  lines,  and  in  the  same  letter 
asked  if  there  was  not  an  opportunity  to  sell  more  to  the  Imperial  Japanese  Navy,  whose 
Naval  Attache  he  had  just  met.  In  early  May,  he  urged  that  they  should  persuade  the 
Chilean  Navy  to  order  rangefinders,  and  reminded  them  of  their  contractual  obligation  to 
`influence  prospective  clients'.  98  In  August,  he  badgered  Armstrong's  again,  expressing 
`disappointment'  that  no  orders  had  come  in.  He  reminded  them  that  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Navy  was  ordering  `large  quantities  of  new  material'  and  hoped  for  `an  order 
for  a  considerable  number'  as  a  result,  particularly  as  he  had  provided  a  rangefinder 
9S  UGD  295/4/12,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Admiralty,  25.4.1894  summarises  submission  dates  and  trial  results; 
UGD  295/4/13,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell,  7.5.1895,  summarises  work  done  and  the 
Admiralty's  current  attitude. 
96  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  24  describes  his  terms  of  employment. 
Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  pp.  31-33  describe  the  premises  at  Byres  Road 
98  UGD  295/4/13,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell,  24.4.1895,29.4.1895,  and  5.5.1895. 48 
gratis  for  demonstrations.  Five  weeks  later  he  told  Armstrong's  that  he  could  not 
understand  why  foreign  navies  for  whom  they  were  building  ships  were  not  buying 
rangefinders,  and  suggested  promoting  them  for  land  artillery  as  well.  By  November, 
Barr  wanted  pressure  putting  on  the  French  and  American  governments,  and  then  in  the 
following  January  pointed  out  that  Armstrong's  orders  were  far  less  than  the 
Admiralty's.  99  In  fact,  they  were  not  doing  as  badly  as  Barr  implied  and  had  sold  fifteen 
rangefinders  to  seven  different  foreign  powers  since  the  agency  was  set  up,  but  what  he 
wanted  was  large  orders,  rather  than  small  trial  purchases. 
Armstrong's  apparent  lack  of  success  resulted  from  circumstances  that,  ironically,  the 
firm  had  created.  The  problem  was  not  with  the  rangefinder,  but  with  the  question  of 
what  was  to  be  done  with  it  by  its  purchasers.  There  was  still  no  intellectual  paradigm  to 
direct  its  tactical  use,  not  least  because  of  Armstrong's  success  in  promoting  the  'quick- 
firing,  (QF)  gun  which  was  one  of  their  main  ordnance  specialities.  loo  The  tactics  of  the 
QF  gun  prescribed  large  volumes  of  fire  delivered  rapidly  at  relatively  short  ranges, 
rather  than  deliberately  aimed  shots  at  greater  distances.  So  long  as  Armstrong's  were 
building  warships  whose  main  armament  was  the  QF  gun,  the  tactics  of  the  weapon 
tended  to  diminish  the  usefulness  of  the  rangefinder  which  seemed  more  appropriate  to 
the  largest  ships  with  the  biggest  (and  slowest-firing)  guns.  The  British  Admiralty  was  as 
interested  in  the  rangefmder's  role  for  navigation  and  ship  station-keeping  as  it  was  for 
gunnery  control  in  the  large  cruisers  and  battleships  it  was  tried  on.  '0' 
Despite  Barr's  frustrations,  business  continued  to  grow.  In  1896  the  Admiralty  ordered 
another  forty  FA2  rangefinders,  and  foreign  business  added  another  fifteen  to  the  total. 
The  year  saw  another  stage  in  the  firm's  enlargement,  with  seven  staff  added  and,  for  the 
first  time,  some  optical  work  being  done  in-house.  102  Moss  and  Russell  paid  little 
attention  to  1896,  but  it  was  an  important  year  for  the  firm.  They  omitted  completely  the 
long  trip  that  Barr  made  to  the  USA,  ostensibly  on  University  business  but  largely  as  a 
"UGD  295/4/14,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Armstrong  Mitchell,  9.8.1915,9.8.1895,6.11.1895,  and  20.1.1896. 
goo  Lloyd  and  Hadcock  (1893)  Chapter  VII. 
101  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  29. 
102  UGD  295/4/14,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  confirming  he  had  obtained  an  optical  worker. 49 
research  and  marketing  exercise  for  Barr  &  Stroud's  Patents,  lasting  from  mid-April  until 
late  June  and  taking  in  `sixteen  colleges  and  many  engineering  works'  as  well  as  the  US 
Army  and  Navy.  '03  Apart  from  studying  engineering  methods  and  business  management 
practice,  he  gave  quotations  to  the  US  Army's  Chief  of  Ordnance  and  even  got  a  US 
Navy  order  for  a  trial  rangefinder,  before  coming  home  convinced  that  if  Barr  &  Stroud 
wanted  to  sell  in  quantity  to  the  US  Government,  then  arrangements  to  manufacture  there 
would  be  essential  because  of  a  prohibition  on  the  purchase  of  war  materiel  abroad.  He 
returned  to  a  situation  that,  despite  the  growth,  had  underlying  difficulties  that  demanded 
attention. 
There  were  two  particular  difficulties  retarding  growth:  the  development  of  the  electric 
range-and-order  instruments  was  bogged  down,  and  the  problem  of  obtaining 
consistently  high-grade  optical  work  from  Hilger's  was  getting  worse.  Matters  came  to  a 
head  in  January  1897,  revealing  serious  tensions  in  the  firm  that  were  not  touched  on  by 
Moss  and  Russell.  Shortly  before,  Adam  Hilger  had  raised  with  Barr  the  possibility  of 
`an  amalgamation  of  some  kind'  that  would  benefit  both  firms.  '°4  That  did  not  wholly 
appeal  to  Barr,  who  thought  that  nevertheless  some  kind  of  working  agreement  could  be 
reached  if  Hilger  moved  part  of  his  business  to  Glasgow  into  vacant  premises  close  to  the 
Byres  Road  workshop.  This,  he  told  Stroud,  would  ease  matters  by  avoiding  the  `the 
great  delays  we  now  have  in  sending  things  back  and  forward  and  writing  to  and  fro  - 
just  as  we  now  have  in  writing  about  [range-and-order]  recorders  instead  of  talking  the 
matter  over  with  you  on  the  spot'. 
It  was,  he  continued,  `a  very  serious  matter'  about  the  slow  progress  being  made  with  the 
complex  stepping  motors  and  circuitry  needed  for  the  control  system  that  was 
evolving.  '05  It  was  `quite  impossible'  to  continue  under  current  conditions,  and  `the 
whole  position  requires  to  be  well  talked  over  and  the  course  of  the  future  mapped  out'. 
103  UGD  295/4/14,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Capt.  W.  S.  Cowles,  US  Navy,  US  Legation  London,  announcing 
his  proposed  itinerary;  Barr  to  Armstrong's  from  New  York  announcing  he  was  there  on  University 
business,  24.4.1896;  Barr  to  Jackson,  24.6.96,  and  Barr  to  Colonel  Ludlum,  13.4.96. 
104  UGD  295/16/1/9,  Archibald  Barr,  Personal  Correspondence,  Barr  to  Stroud,  26.1.1897,  provides  the 
source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
los  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  pp.  34  and  35  describe  and  illustrate  the  equipment. 50 
Stroud  should  come  to  Glasgow  without  delay  -  `Make  some  arrangement  whereby  you 
can  come  down'  he  concluded  peremptorily.  Three  things  drove  Barr  to  lecture  his 
partner  so  strongly  and  atypically.  He  saw  the  R&O  system  as  crucial  to  the  Royal  Navy 
adopting  the  rangefinder  on  a  large  scale,  and  so  opening  an  even  larger  foreign  market. 
It  was  not  a  diversion  from  rangefinder  manufacture,  but  an  extension  of  it,  so  the  delay 
in  the  process  of  invention  was  unacceptable.  Jackson,  upon  whom  Barr  was  increasingly 
relying,  was  `quite  down  in  the  mouth'  about  the  lack  of  progress;  if  he  left  the  business 
replacing  him  would  be  far  from  easy.  And,  for  reasons  that  are  far  from  clear,  Stroud 
was  loathe  to  visit  Glasgow,  a  reluctance  that  meant  every  detail  of  design  had  to  be  sent 
by  letter  which  resulted  in  misunderstandings  and  further  delays  because  Jackson  and 
Barr  found  themselves  dealing  separately  with  him  on  aspects  of  the  same  problem.  106 
The  proposed  association  with  Hilger  did  not  go  through,  possibly  because  Stroud 
thought  Hilger's  standards  would  not  automatically  improve  through  moving  to 
Glasgow,  but  more  likely  because  Hilger's  skilled  workers  were  unwilling  to  go  with 
him.  The  tensions  between  the  partners  then  seem  to  have  relaxed,  although  what 
remedies  were  taken  is  unknown.  Some  of  Barr's  letters  to  Stroud  from  1897  and  1898 
were  removed  posthumously  from  his  private  papers  because  they  contained  `some 
details  that  should  not  be  published'.  107  Business  also  improved,  and  although  Barr 
continued  to  tell  Armstrong's  that  they  were  not  `pushing  the  matter  [of  rangefinders] 
sufficiently',  108  the  workload  increased  enough  to  justify  taking  additional  premises  and 
the  Admiralty  ordered  another  fifty  rangefinders  before  the  end  of  1897.  Most 
importantly,  by  June  the  following  year,  the  R&O  problem  was  finally  solved  and  a 
viable  system  introduced  which  was  offered  to  the  Admiralty.  109 
The  R&O  system  was  also  offered  to  foreign  clients,  and  the  Imperial  Japanese  Navy 
acted  quicker  than  the  Admiralty,  deciding  in  July  1898  to  install  the  equipment  in  every 
ship  already  fitted  with  Barr &  Stroud  rangefinders.  This  was  the  marketing  break- 
106  Neither  Barr's  nor  Stroud's  surviving  papers  give  any  reason  for  this  reluctance. 
lo'  Typescript  note  initialled  `JWF'  on  an  empty  envelope  labelled  `  Letters  from  Dr  Barr  of  period  1897- 
98'  in  UGD  295/16/1/2,  Barr's  Personal  papers. 
tos  UGD  295/4/15,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Armstrong's,  26.4.1897. 
109  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  34. 51 
through  that  Barr  had  been  seeking.  Firstly,  equipping  a  battleship  with  R&O 
installations  as  well  as  rangefinders  doubled  the  value  of  business,  adding  approximately 
£800  to  the  £750  cost  of  the  rangefinders.  11°  Even  more  importantly,  the  system  removed 
one  of  the  main  obstacles  to  persuading  navies'  gunnery  specialists  to  adopt  the 
rangefmder  on  a  larger  scale  by  providing  an  effective  means  to  convey  range  readings 
around  the  ship,  irrespective  of  weather  or  battle  conditions.  In  overcoming  a 
technological  `reverse  salient',  Barr  &  Stroud  had  also  dealt  with  a  tactical  one,  so 
creating  for  themselves  the  possibility  of  moving  forward  on  a  much  broader  commercial 
front. 
Both  foreign  sales  and  the  expectation  of  greater  domestic  business  grew  in  1898, 
although  the  total  orders  actually  received  fell  from  the  previous  year's  57  to  only  29. 
The  Admiralty  bought  none  that  year,  mainly  because  it  was  preparing  to  fit  rangefinders 
on  every  capital  ship  in  the  war  fleet.  In  anticipation  of  the  very  large  order,  and  in 
response  to  the  growing  foreign  interest,  the  firm  looked  for  larger  premises  where  the 
growing  business  could  be  better  handled.  In  May  1899  Barr  &  Stroud  moved  into  a 
factory  building  of  3,360  square  feet,  only  a  hundred  yards  from  the  existing  premises. 
New  machinery  was  installed,  increasing  the  range  of  work  that  could  be  done  and 
reducing  the  dependency  of  outside  supplies  of  mechanical  components,  although  the 
need  to  buy-in  optical  components  was  still  not  reduced.  By  late  1899,  Barr  and  Stroud 
was  running  as  the  world's  only  `naval  rangefinder  manufactory'  with  a  workforce  of 
about  sixty,  six  of  whom  were  university  graduates. 
1.6  Conclusion 
The  story  of  the  optical  munitions  industry  from  1888  to  1899  is  largely  about  the 
growing  importance  of  one  instrument  -  the  rangefinder  -  and  of  one  maker  in  particular. 
Where  there  had  been  no  identifiable  optical  munitions  industry  eleven  years  earlier,  by 
the  close  of  the  19th  century  there  was  a  small,  concentrated,  and  distinctive  British 
manufacturing  base  for  a  device  whose  sole  application  was  for  use  in  warfare.  Its 
10  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  35. 52 
emergence  had  been  governed  not  just  by  the  deterministic  influence  of  advancing 
weapons  technologies,  but  also  by  a  set  of  evolving  social  forces  that  influenced  the  scale 
and  variety  of  demand  as  well  as  the  predicted  use  for  optical  devices  in  war.  These 
forces  lacked  the  experience  of  combat  to  act  as  an  evaluator  of  either  technological  or 
intellectual  paradigms,  and  as  only  the  lessons  of  battle  could  be  an  effective  arbiter  of 
both  equipment  and  tactics  there  was  still  no  definite  understanding  of  the  utility  of 
optical  munitions.  The  next  chapter  examines  the  effect  of  the  Boer  War  on  the  industry 
and  considers  the  influence  of  increasingly  rapid  developments  in  armaments  technology 
and  the  interaction  between  manufacturers  and  the  armed  forces. 53 
Chapter  2 
The  growth  in  importance  from  the  Boer  War  to  1906 
2.1  Introduction 
Before  the  start  of  the  Boer  War  in  1899,  the  optical  instruments  employed  by  the  British 
armed  forces  had  yet  to  be  used  on  active  service,  and  there  had  been  no  experience  to 
demonstrate  their  effectiveness.  By  the  end  of  1906  the  British  Army  had  not  only 
accrued  experience  of  how  its  optical  munitions  performed  in  the  Boer  War  but  had 
started  to  consider  more  carefully  its  needs  for  them,  even  though  its  expenditure  on 
them  remained  small.  The  Admiralty  continued  to  be  the  industry's  more  important 
British  service  client,  its  demands  increasingly  driven  by  a  combination  of  both  social 
and  deterministic  factors  evident  in  evolving  attitudes  to  gunnery,  improvements  in 
ordnance,  and  the  emergence  of  what  amounted  to  entirely  new  weapon  systems  in  the 
submarine  and  the  Dreadnought  battleship.  The  optical  munitions  industry  grew  during 
this  period  partly  through  those  developments  in  the  Royal  Navy,  and  partly  through 
growing  foreign  demand.  The  Royal  Navy's  example  in  adopting  the  Barr  &  Stroud 
rangefinder  stimulated  foreign  attention  and  helped  to  create  a  substantial  export  market 
which  was  further  encouraged  by  the  Russo-Japanese  war  of  1904,  so  that  by  late  1906 
most  major  navies  were  either  using  or  evaluating  rangefmders,  almost  all  of  which  were 
supplied  by  Barr  &  Stroud.  This  chapter  examines  how  British  service  attitudes  to  optical 
munitions  evolved  during  this  time  and  affected  manufacturers,  and  considers  how  Barr 
&  Stroud  came  to  dominate  the  British  industry. 
2.2  The  Army's  experience  of  optical  munitions  in  the  Boer  War,  1899  -  1902,  and 
the  reactions  to  it. 
The  Boer  War  was  the  first  to  see  optical  munitions  employed  to  any  significant  extent. 
Although  fought  on  land,  it  nevertheless  provided  experience  for  both  services  which 
indicated  the  benefits  to  be  gained  from  the  use  of  optical  aids  in  warfare  whilst 
simultaneously  demonstrating  the  shortcomings  of  those  then  in  service.  Although  the 
war's  lessons  were  of  greater  relevance  to  the  Army,  the  Royal  Navy's  involvement  in  the 
fighting  ashore  with  'naval  field  artillery  provided  some  useful  education  about  the  need 54 
for  efficient  telescopic  gun  sights  in  an  era  when  the  war  fleet  had  no  opportunity  for 
action  at  sea.  ' 
The  guns  used  in  South  Africa  reflected  recent  progress  in  weapons  technology  and 
design.  In  particular,  a  new  nitro-glycerine  based  propellant  had  displaced  the  less 
efficient  black  powder,  substantially  extending  the  ranges  of  both  small-arms  and 
artillery.  2  These  longer  distances  demanded  more  exact  sight  setting,  for  which  the 
Infantry  and  the  Artillery  used  variants  of  the  Mekometer  rangefinder  which  had  been 
adopted  in  1891.  Criticisms  of  its  effectiveness  had  been  quick  to  emerge,  and  its 
eventual  performance  in  action  fell  far  short  of  expectations.  3  The  topographical  and 
climatic  conditions  of  the  veldt  were  unlike  any  experienced  previously,  and  the 
Mekometer's  shortcomings  soon  became  evident  in  the  clear  air  which  permitted 
visibility  at  far  greater  distances  than  the  British  Army  was  used  to.  The  Boers  regularly 
opened  fire  at  long  ranges,  inflicting  casualties  on  British  troops  who  were  frequently 
exposed  with  little  cover.  Problems  using  the  Mekometer  to  find  the  range  quickly  for 
effective  retaliatory  fire  soon  became  apparent.  The  1889  trials  had  been  conducted  using 
`clearly  defined'  targets  under  conditions  which  posed  no  threat  to  the  operators'  safety, 
but  in  South  Africa  the  enemy  dressed  to  blend  in  with  the  background  making  it  hard  to 
identify  a  rangefinding  mark,  and  was  able  to  shoot  at  the  Mekometer  teams  because  they 
had  to  stand  in  the  open  while  taking  readings.  4  Range  readings  were  erratic,  and  the 
ever  present  risk  of  high  casualty  rates  led  to  the  instrument  being  little  used.  s 
'  For  an  account  of  the  involvement  of  the  Royal  Navy,  see  P.  Padfield,  Aim  Straight:  a  biography  of  Sir 
Percy  Scott  (London:  Hodder  &  Stoughton,  1966)  Chapters  6  and  7. 
2  For  details  of  the  artillery  weapons  used,  see  H.  C.  B.  Rodgers,  Artillery  through  the  Ages  (London: 
Seeley,  Service,  1971),  Chapter  X. 
For  more  extensive  comments  on  conditions  generally,  and  problems  in  rangefinding  particularly,  see  C. 
Callwell  and  J.  Headlam,  History  of  the  Royal  Artillery,  3  volumes  (Woolwich:  The  Royal  Artillery 
Institution,  1937)  Vol.  2,  Chapter  III. 
4  Callwell  &  Headlam  (1937),  Vol.  2,  p.  46  supplies  content  about  South  Africa.  For  details  of  the  method 
of  using  the  Mekometer,  see  Great  Britain,  Army,  Regulations  for  Musketry  Instruction  1896  (London: 
HMSO,  1896). 
S  William  Stroud,  Early  Reminiscences  of  Barr  and  Stroud  Rangefinders  (privately  printed,  ca.  1932-1936) 
p.  9,  refers  to  high  casualties;  George  Forbes  Experiences  in  South  Africa  with  a  New  Infantry  Rangefinder 
(London:  J.  J.  Keliher  &  Co.  Ltd,  1902),  p.  4  refers  to  the  Mekometer's  lack  of  use. 55 
The  earlier  criticisms  during  the  1890s  indicated  both  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
Mekometer  and  an  awareness  that  something  better  was  needed,  even  before  the  fighting 
began.  6  Barr  &  Stroud  had  been  promoting  their  own  design  for  infantry  and  artillery  use 
since  1892,  and  the  German  firm  of  Zeiss  had  recently  introduced  a  model  which 
competed  with  it.  7  Officers  set  about  acquiring  these  instruments  privately,  either  buying 
or  borrowing  them  from  their  makers,  and  their  published  comments  invariably 
emphasised  the  superiority  of  the  commercial  products  over  the  service  ones.  8 
The  Mekometer  was  unsatisfactory  in  South  Africa  for  both  the  Artillery  and  the 
Infantry,  who  subsequently  followed  separate  paths  in  seeking  replacements.  The 
'functional  failure'  experienced  in  the  Boer  War  affected  the  two  branches  differently;  the 
Artillery  remained  wedded  to  the  existing  type  of  instrument  whilst  the  Infantry  began  to 
reconsider  what  might  best  serve  its  needs.  9  In  the  Artillery,  the  existing  paradigm  of  the 
long-base  two-observer  rangefinders  continued,  despite  the  Mekometer's  acknowledged 
deficiencies.  This  supported  William  MacBride's  suggestion  that,  when  presented  with 
new  technology,  established  military  hierarchies  can  react  in  a  manner  that  is  hostile  to 
change.  10  Despite  the  favourable  impression  made  by  the  Barr &  Stroud  single-observer 
rangefinder  in  trials  for  fortress  use  in  1899,11  the  Artillery  not  only  ignored  its  potential 
as  a  mobile  instrument  but  subsequently  set  out  to  'reconsider  the  claims  of  the  telemeter' 
(an  earlier  long-base  device)  simply  because  it  was  'undoubtedly  more  accurate  than  the 
Mekometer'.  12  This  completely  ignored  the  South  African  experience  that  had  shown  the 
difficulties  in  operating  a  similar  instrument  outweighed  any  potential  increase  in 
6  Great  Britain,  School  of  Musketry,  Annual  Report  1893  (London:  HMSO,  1893)  p.  89. 
Gleichen,  A.  The  Theory  of  Modern  Optical  Instruments:  A  Reference  Book  for  Physicists,  Manufacturers 
of  Optical  Instruments  and  for  Officers  in  the  Army  and  Navy.  Translated  by  H.  Emsley  and  W.  Swain. 
(London:  HMSO,  1918)  p.  196. 
$  Michael  Moss  and  Iain  Russell,  Range  and  Vision:  the  f  irst  100  years  of  B  arr  &  Stroud  (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream  Publishing,  1988)  p.  42,  and  G.  Forbes,  Experiences  in  South  Africa  with  a  new  Infantry 
Range-finder  (London:  Keliher  &  Co.  Ltd.,  1902). 
'  Callwell  and  Headlam  (1937)  Vol.  2  pp.  107  and  108. 
10  W  M.  McBride,  Technological  Change  and  the  United  States  Navy  1865-1945  (Baltimore:  Johns 
Hopkins  University  Press,  2000)  p.  4. 
"  University  of  Glasgow  Archives,  Barr  &  Stroud  collection  reference  UGD  295,  (subsequently  UGD 
295):  UGD  295/4/744,  Letter  Book  1897-1911,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  War  Office  asking  for  details  of  W.  O. 
requirements,  29.8.1899. 
12  Callwell  &  Headlam  (1937)  Vol.  2  p.  108  provides  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  paragraph. 56 
accuracy.  Although  the  Artillery  would  eventually  adopt  the  single  observer  rangefinder 
for  general  service  in  1913,  the  persistence  in  clinging  to  the  older,  and  already 
discredited,  two  observer  types  can  be  explained  through  the  idea  of  an  intellectual 
paradigm  being  strong  enough  to  overcome  the  'presumptive  anomaly'  formed  by  the 
internal-base  design.  13 
Edward  Constant's  conceptualisation  of  a'presumptive  anomaly'  provides  an  appropriate 
explanation  for  the  Royal  Artillery's  attitudes  and  policies  relating  to  the  rangefinder 
during  this  period.  The  notion  involves  an  alternative  technology  being  presumed  to  be 
superior  to  an  existing  technological  paradigm.  14  That  paradigm,  according  to  Constant, 
involves  'an  exemplary  artefact  and  a  cultural  framework  devoted  to  sustaining  that 
artefact.  '  The  Royal  Artillery's  exemplary  artefact  was  the  two-observer  rangefinder,  and 
the  cultural  framework  sustaining  it  was  the  regimental  mind-set  which  regarded  the  use 
of  artillery  as  the  sole  domain  of  the  professional  artillerymen  within  that  society.  The 
two-observer  long-base  rangefinder  had  been  the  only  pattern  used  by  the  Artillery  since 
the  1860s,  and  repeated  consideration  of  the  problems  in  rangefinding  had  emphasised 
that  such  instruments  were  the  only  ones  that  could  be  expected  to  give  accurate  distance 
readings;  the  failure  of  early  single-observer  designs  reinforced  this  belief  and  by  the 
early  1880s  it  had  become  accepted  as  a  canon  that  such  designs  were  bound  to  be 
inferior  and  unacceptable  to  the  Artillery.  The  Infantry  rangefinder  trials  of  1889 
apparently  confirmed  this,  and  the  Mekometer  was  subsequently  taken  up  by  both 
Service  branches. 
In  the  years  immediately  after  1902  the  Royal  Artillery  clung  to  the  idea  of  inherent 
technical  superiority  in  the  long-base  instruments  justifying  their  retention  and 
refinement,  using  as  a  basis  for  its  justification  the  tactical  philosophy  -  or  intellectual 
paradigm  -  for  the  employment  of  its  guns  in  action  which  had  evolved  since  the 
introduction  of  rifled  artillery  in  the  1860s.  That  philosophy  held  that  speed  of 
deployment  was  the  prime  requirement  and  if  range  readings  were  to  be  taken,  then  their 
13  Edward  Constant  II  (1980)  p.  15 
14  Edward  Constant  1T  (1980)  see  Chapter  1. 57 
accuracy  was  paramount  and  they  needed  to  be  made  as  guns  were  being  brought  into 
action  in  order  to  deliver  immediately  effective  fire.  In  the  late  1850s,  the  presumptive 
anomaly  of  greater  accuracy  in  rifled  weapons,  as  compared  with  the  existing  smooth- 
bored  ones,  had  successfully  overcome  any  latent  resistance  to  change.  In  1903,  however, 
even  though  the  existing  technological  rangefinding  paradigm  had  been  proven  wanting, 
the  Royal  Artillery  clung  to  the  intellectual  component  of  its  rangefinding  philosophy 
and  for  the  present  rejected  the  presumptive  anomaly  that  the  Infantry  began  to  consider. 
To  the  artillerists,  the  technical  benefits  apparent  to  the  Infantry  were  much  less  apparent. 
The  South  African  war  had  been  largely  fought  by  the  Infantry,  and  the  experiences  of 
the  Artillery  had  not  provided  the  same  degree  of  stimulus  for  change. 
There  was  considerable  significance  in  this  rejection  of  the  concept  of  superiority  of  the 
single  observer  instrument.  Although  an  assortment  of  optical  devices  would  be  taken  up 
by  the  Army  in  the  next  ten  years,  after  approval  by  committees  made  up  largely  of 
artillerymen,  none  of  these  instruments  challenged  any  technological  or  intellectual 
paradigm.  The  new  observation  instruments  adopted  in  small  quantities,  such  as  the 
prismatic  binocular  telescope,  caused  no  controversy  because  they  did  not  impinge  on  an 
existing  tradition  and  because  they  had  no  influence  of  the  performance  of  the  guns 
themselves.  15  No  decision  on  the  large-scale  adoption  of  the  self-contained  artillery 
rangefinder  was  finally  made  until  1913.  Such  sustained  conservatism,  which  at  the  time 
effectively  denied  the  opportunity  for  any  firm  to  build  up  a  business  in  optical  munitions 
optimised  to  the  Army's  needs,  was  in  contrast  to  the  Admiralty's  attitude  in  taking  up  the 
rangefinder.  In  essence,  the  Artillery's  policy  towards  rangefinding  remained  scarcely 
modified  from  1889  almost  up  to  the  start  of  the  Great  War,  reflecting  the  ability  of 
internal  social  factors  to  resist  external  technological  progress. 
Like  the  Artillery,  the  Infantry  had  found  the  Mekometer  greatly  lacking  but,  instead  of 
looking  to  improve  an  exemplary  artefact,  it  set  about  finding  its  replacement  even  before 
the  war  was  over.  Less  influenced  by  the  existing  technological  paradigm,  the  Infantry 
turned  more  readily  towards  the  single-observer  rangefinder  as  the  preferred  type  and  in 58 
the  autumn  of  1902  began  trials  to  select  a  new  instrument.  16  However,  that  was  not  to 
say  the  Infantry  was  free  of  a  cultural  framework  influencing  the  selection  process,  and 
the  conduct  and  outcome  of  the  1902  trials  suggests  that  the  Army's  pre-disposition  to 
prefer  solutions  originating  within  its  own  hierarchical  structure  could  have  just  as 
inhibiting  effect  on  progress  as  commitment  to  an  existing  application  of  an  individual 
technology. 
There  were  three  principal  contenders  in  the  1902  trials,  two  from  outside  the  Army  and 
one  from  a  serving  officer.  The  first  of  the  civilian  designs  was  submitted  by  Professor 
George  Forbes  as  a  private  venture,  and  the  other  by  Barr  &  Stroud  who,  at  the  War 
Office's  request,  had  prepared  `two  specially  constructed  instruments'  that  were 
essentially  smaller  versions  of  the  firm's  well-established  naval  models.  17  The  third  was 
designed  by  Captain  A.  H.  Marindin,  an  infantry  officer  who  had  been  interested  in 
rangefinders  since  1895  and  had  produced  his  first  working  model  in  1901,  entirely  at  his 
own  expense  without  any  assistance  from  the  Army.  18  Barr  &  Stroud,  having  acquired 
unmatched  rangefinder  experience  and  having  being  specifically  asked  to  submit  for 
trials,  ought  possibly  to  have  been  encouraged  as  to  its  chances  of  success  but,  as  in 
1889,  its  partners  had  doubts  that  were  to  be  fully  justified. 
After  its  earlier  failure  to  get  War  Office  orders,  the  firm  had  turned  its  attention  to  naval 
rangefinders,  not  least  because  it  considered  any  infantry  model  it  made  would  be  -  to 
the  Army  -  `prohibitively  expensive'  compared  to  the  Mekometer.  19  Having  this  in  mind, 
William  Stroud  was  uncertain  about  what  type  was  most  likely  to  win  the  competition, 
being  particularly  worried  by  Forbes'  entry.  George  Forbes's  rangefinder  first  came  to 
Barr  &  Stroud's  attention  when  an  account  of  it  was  published  in  the  journal  Nature  late 
'S  Callwell  and  Headlam  (1937)  Vol.  2,  p.  109. 
16  PRO  U11223,  Proceedings  of  the  Ordnance  Council,  12.6.1908,  Question  of  Reward  to  Captain  A.  H. 
Marindin,  p.  3. 
'UGD  295/4/26,  Letter  Book,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  Major  Guinness,  25.10.1902.  The  request  must  have  been 
made  in  1901  -  see  UGD  295  16/1/10,  Correspondence  from  William  Stroud,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  Stroud, 
29.11.1901. 
1°  PRO  TI/11223  (1908),  p.  8. 
"UGD  295/1611/10,,  letter  to  H.  D.  Jackson,  26.5.1902. 59 
in  July  1901.20  The  device  was  quite  unlike  the  company's  own  design  and  used  the 
principle  of  stereopsis  (binocular  vision)  to  measure  distances.  21  Although  the  German 
Zeiss  company  already  made  a  patented  rangefinder  working  on  the  same  basic  idea, 
Forbes'  design  did  not  clash  with  any  of  its  patents  and  he  had  persuaded  them  to  make 
the  special  prismatic  binocular  which  formed  the  basis  of  his  instrument.  A  folding 
lightweight  accessory  unit  was  attached  to  the  binocular  to  give  the  stereoscopic  images, 
the  binocular  itself  providing  a  series  of  measuring  marks  that  were  used  to  judge  the 
range  of  a  target.  The  Forbes  instrument  worried  Stroud,  who  was  entirely  responsible 
for  the  firm's  optical  design,  because  it  offered  light  weight,  accuracy  and,  he  believed, 
relatively  low  cost.  By  late  November,  he  was  so  convinced  of  its  advantages  that  he 
suggested  taking  it  up  because  in  his  opinion  Barr  &  Stroud  could  `lick  Forbes  at  his  own 
game'  and  there  was  `no  justification'  for  making  a  short-base  rangefinder  of  lesser 
accuracy.  22  Stroud's  concerns  were  not  taken  up.  Harold  Jackson  immediately  reminded 
him  that  the  firm  had  not  been  asked  to  design  a  rangefinder  on  a  new  principle,  but  to 
produce  one  on  their  established  pattern:  `It is  what  the  War  Office  has  asked  for 
... 
'  he 
wrote,  23  anxious  to  restrain  Stroud  from  being  diverted  into  efforts  that  would  inhibit  the 
production  of  satisfactory  competition  instruments. 
Between  November  1901  and  the  late  summer  of  1902,  Forbes  promoted  his  design 
vigorously,  presenting  papers  to  the  Society  of  Arts,  the  Royal  Society,  and  the  Royal 
United  Service  Institution.  The  final  one,  delivered  after  his  return,  recounted  his 
experiences  and  claimed  wide  endorsement  by  officers  in  the  field,  including  the  theatre 
commander,  Lord  Kitchener.  24  Much  encouraged  by  his  field  trip,  Forbes  dismissed  the 
20  UGD  296/16/1/10,  Stroud  to  Jackson,  26.7.1901. 
21  For  an  explanation  of  this  principle,  see  F.  Auerbach,  The  Zeiss  Works  and  the  Carl  Zeiss  Stiftung  in 
Jena.  Translated  by  F.  Cheshire  and  S.  Paul.  2nd  ed.  (London:  Marshall  Brookes  &  Chalkely,  1904,  (pp.  66 
and  67,  and  G.  Smith  and  D.  A.  Atchison,  The  Eye  and  Visual  Optical  Instruments,  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1997)  pp.  450  and  451. 
u  UGD  296/16/1/10,  Stroud  to  Jackson,  27.11.1901  and  29.11.1901. 
23  UGD  296/16/1/10,  Jackson  to  Stroud,  29.11.1901. 
24  VIA  AJB  210.2.5,  lecture  to  the  Society  of  Arts,  18.12.1901,  paper  read  in  absentia  to  the  Royal 
Society,  20.3.1902,  and  lecture  to  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution,  13.5.1902.  Professor  G.  Forbes, 
'Experiences  in  South  Africa  with  a  new  Infantry  R  angefinder'  in  Journal  oft  he  Royal  United  Service 
Institution,  13th  May  1902,  describes  his  experiences  and  test  results  in  detail  and  provides  the  source  for 
the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 60 
Mekometer  out  of  hand,  saying  it  was  never  actually  used  by  the  Infantry  because  of  its 
inconvenience  and  danger  to  its  operators,  and  hardly  ever  by  the  Artillery  as  'officers 
seldom  rely  on  it'.  All  this  worried  Stroud,  who  continued  to  suggest  ways  of  beating 
Forbes  stressing  the  need  to  produce  a  rangefinder  costing  no  more  than  £25  (less  than 
half  the  price  of  the  fum's  own  instrument)  to  `win  the  day'.  25  Although  no  one  else  at 
Barr  &  Stroud  agreed  with  him,  Stroud's  concerns  were  by  no  means  misplaced  even  if 
he  was  not  absolutely  correct  in  his  reasoning.  The  third  competitor  in  the  trials,  the 
Marindin  rangefinder,  was  to  deny  the  firm  War  Office  business  through  a  combination 
of  factors  that  embraced  both  cost  and  institutional  bias. 
Marindin  had  approached  the  London  firm  of  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  Ltd.  in  1900  for  help 
in  making  up  his  design.  26  Hilger's  were  by  then  making  optical  parts  for  Barr  &  Stroud 
which  formed  `a  very  important  part'  of  the  firm's  activities  and  absorbed  most  of  the 
attention  of  its  senior  staff.  27  Hilger's  close  involvement  with  Barr  &  Stroud  meant  the 
firm  knew  as  much  about  the  instruments  as  anyone  else  in  the  country  and  was  well- 
placed  to  assist  Marindin  in  developing  his  ideas.  Frank  Twyman,  then  Hilger's  manager 
and  later  its  managing  director,  recognised  the  problems  posed  by  existing  patents  and 
translated  Marindin's  plans  into  a  design  which  not  only  avoided  the  protected  features 
of  Barr  &  Stroud  and  Zeiss,  but  had  sufficient  novelty  to  patent  in  its  own  right.  28 
Irrespective  of  Twyman's  contribution,  British  Patent  16647/1901  was  in  Marindin's 
name  alone,  probably  because  Twyman  was  uncertain  about  Barr  &  Stroud's  reaction  to 
his  involvement  and  unwilling  to  prejudice  the  relationship  between  the  two  firms  which 
was  not  always  harmonious,  but  on  which  Hilger's  relied  for  a  substantial  part  of  its 
business.  29 
25  UGD  296/16/1/10,  Stroud  to  Jackson,  6.7.1902. 
26  Science  Museum  London,  Library,  Adam  Hilger  Collection  (subsequently  HILG),  3/1,  Typescript  of  Mr 
Twyman's  Lecture,  August  1944,  p.  15. 
27  HILG  3/1,  p.  24. 
28  H1LG  3/1,  p.  15. 
29  UGD  295/4/21  Letter  Book,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  Hilger,  a  series  of  letters  between  3.10.1900  and  3.12.1900 
describes  how  relations  fluctuated. 61 
By  June  1901,  Marindin  was  involved  `in  earnest',  and  Hilger's  was  building  a 
functioning  rangefinder.  30  Between  then  and  June  1902,  Hilger's  submitted  thirty  three 
invoices  to  him  totalling  £416.00,  and  by  August  1902  had  manufactured  a  number  of 
prototypes,  the  first  of  which  Marindin  had  been  sent  to  the  Chief  Inspector  of 
Rangefinders  as  early  as  December  20th  1901.31  Having  experimented  with  them  over  the 
next  seven  months,  and  before  the  start  of  the  rangefinder  trials  scheduled  for  the 
autumn,  the  Chief  Inspector  reported  `satisfactory  results'  and  on  August  26th  the  War 
Office  formally  asked  Marindin  `to  state  on  what  terms  he  was  prepared  to  offer  his 
invention  for  the  use  of  the  Crown'.  32  This  suggests  that  the  Infantry  had  already 
signalled  its  wish  to  adopt  the  Marindin  as  its  standard  instrument  and  that  the  War 
Office  was  prepared  to  adopt  it  without  necessarily  giving  serious  consideration  to  any 
other  instrument.  None  of  this  was  known  to  either  Forbes  or  Barr  &  Stroud,  although  the 
latter  was  certainly  not  over-optimistic  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  trials. 
In  late  September,  George  Forbes  had  sufficient  confidence  to  propose  to  Archibald  Barr 
that  they  should  each  concentrate  on  one  of  the  Services.  33  Without  revealing  his 
production  plans,  he  suggested  that  he  should  supply  rangefinders  to  the  Army,  and  that 
Barr  &  Stroud  should  continue  with  the  Admiralty.  Barr's  reply  showed  some  caution  as 
to  the  outcome  of  the  tests.  Having  had  dealings  with  committees  at  Woolwich  before,  he 
pointed  out  that  there  was  no  guarantee  that  either  of  them  would  actually  get  any  orders, 
and  any  agreement  would  be  premature.  And,  he  said,  even  if  there  were  orders  the 
financial  benefits  were  uncertain  as  `the  War  Office  can  claim  the  use  of  any  patented 
invention  with  or  without  the  consent  of  the  inventor',  implying  -  quite  incorrectly  -  that 
the  State  had  powers  of  sequestration  without  reward.  34  Under  the  circumstances,  he  saw 
no  possibility  of  coming  to  any  accommodation  with  Forbes  and  declined  to  go  further. 
30  PRO  TI/11223  (1908),  p.  8 
31  PRO  TI/11223  (1908),  p.  13,  List  of  payments  received  by  Adam  Hilger  Ltd.,  and  PRO  TI/11223  (1908), 
32 
3. 
PRO  TU11223  (1908),  p.  3. 
33  UGD  295/4/744  Letter  Book,  Barr's  reply  to  Forbes'  undated  proposal,  2.10.1902  provides  source 
material  for  the  rest  of  this  paragraph. 62 
Perhaps  endorsing  Barr's  caution,  efforts  to  enhance  the  firm's  chances  by  endorsement 
were  not  accompanied  by  any  success.  In  early  December  -  when  the  testing  programme 
was  almost  complete  and  the  Rangefinder  Committee  was  starting  to  evaluate  the  results 
-  Jackson  attempted  to  organise  the  appearance  before  it  of  Major  C.  D.  Guiness  of  the 
Royal  Artillery  as  an  expert  witness.  5  The  Committee's  president  had  already  agreed  to 
this  in  principle,  but  on  the  10th  Guiness  telegraphed  Jackson  to  say  he  could  not  appear 
without  the  direct  authority  of  the  War  Office.  36  Three  days  later,  Jackson  wrote  in 
terms  suggesting  either  he  did  not  expect  Guiness  to  give  evidence,  or  that  whatever  he 
said  would  be  of  limited help:  `We  have  noted  what  you  say  concerning  the  probable 
tone  of  your  evidence  before  the  Committee.  We  quite  understand  the  position...  '.  7 
Barr's  earlier  caution  was  entirely  justified.  In  January  1903,  the  Committee  reported  its 
unanimous  endorsement  of  the  Marindin  rangefmder's  suitability,  and  its 
recommendation  that  `at  least  100  instruments  should  be  provided  for  tests...  '.  8  Barr  & 
Stroud  believed  the  choice  was  based  on  price,  echoing  Stroud's  earlier  concerns,  but 
Frank  Twyman  thought  it  was  rather  because  of  lighter  weight  39  Neither  was  apparently 
aware  of  the  preference  shown  for  it  before  the  trials,  and  Twyman  may  actually  have 
been  surprised  by  the  decision.  He  later  noted  that  the  `government  experts'  on  the 
Rangefinding  Committee  were  convinced  that  the  Marindin  was  `much  more  imperfect 
than  its  competitors,  an  opinion  with  which  I  may  say  I  privately  agreed'  40  That  the 
design  was  not  wholly  satisfactory  is  partly  borne  out  by  the  failure  to  place  any 
substantial  order  in  1903,  despite  the  recommendation.  The  Army  asked  Marindin  for 
further  trial  models  in  1903,  and  then  carried  out  more  rangefinder  testing  in  October 
's  See  Patents,  Designs  and  Trade  Marks  Act  1883,  Section  27  (2)  which  refers  to  terms  between  inventors 
and  the  Crown. 
'S  UGD  295/4/26,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Guiness,  8.12.1902. 
36  UGD  295/4/26,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Guiness,  acknowledging  receipt  of  his  telegram,  10.12.1902. 
"  UGD  295/4/26,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Guiness,  13.12.1902. 
38  PRO  TU11223  (1908),  p.  3. 
"  For  Barr  &  Stroud's  opinion,  see  GUA  UGD  295  Unclassified  Material,  Russell  Research  Notes: 
9.1.1903,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  Archibald  Barr.  Russell  cites  a  Letter  Book'BS4/21'.  UGD  295/4/31  is  noted  as 
having  an  earlier  designation  as  '21',  but  this  book  covers  April  to  June  1904.  Russell's  notes  were  made 
before  the  University  acquired  the  Barr  &  Stroud  records,  and  some  of  the  material  which  Russell  quotes  is 
not  now  present  in  the  University  Archives.  For  Twyman's  interpretation,  see  HILG  3/1,  p.  15. 
40  H1LG  3/1,  p.  15. 63 
1904,  February  1905  and  July  1906,  each  time  asking  for  modifications  to  his  design.  41 
None  were  ordered  for  troop  trials,  and  a  final  decision  to  take  it  into  general  service  was 
not  made  until  early  1907,  an  account  of  which  will  be  given  in  the  succeeding  chapter. 
Given  Twyman's  reservations,  it  is  possible  that  the  choice  was  influenced  by  factors  not 
unlike  those  bearing  on  the  1889  trials.  In  its  separate  evaluation  of  the  Marindin  before 
the  official  trials,  the  Infantry  chose  it  without  reference  to  any  of  its  civilian  designed 
competitors,  an  apparently  premature  decision  that  might  be  explained  through  the 
tendency  of  `social  groups  [to)  identify  with  and  champion'  artefacts  emanating  from 
within  themselves,  and  the  accompanying  characteristic  of  favouring  one  artefact  over 
another  through  social  rather  than  purely  technological  pressures.  42  In  such  cases,  the 
`appropriate  solutions'  to  perceived  problems  are  coloured  by  the  nature  of  the  evaluation 
process,  and  in  this  case  the  intra-societal  origin  of  the  Marindin  may  have  encouraged 
its  ready,  and  perhaps  inadequately  questioned  acceptance.  Even  though  the  Infantry 
successfully  avoided  the  Royal  Artillery's  inclination  to  maintain  an  existing  inferior 
technological  paradigm,  by  prematurely  endorsing  a  design  which  originated  from  within 
their  own  society  they  may  have  encouraged  the  adjudicating  committee  to  succumb  to  a 
parallel  latent  instinct  which  was  predisposed  to  attain  closure  of  the  issue  and  attain 
`relative  social  tranquility'  in  respect  of  the  rangefinding  question.  Whatever  the 
motivations  or  intentions,  the  Marindin  rangefmder  was  to  prove  a  far  from  stable  entity, 
and  will  be  encountered  again  later  in  this  story. 
2.3  The  effects  of  Army  demands  on  the  optical  manufacturers 
The  effects  of  the  Boer  War  were  of  little  long-term  significance  for  the  optical 
munitions  industry.  War  Office  Contracts  Department  records  show  that  purchases  of 
telescopes  and  binoculars  increased  greatly  during  the  war  itself,  peaking  in  1902  but 
41  PRO  T1111223  (1908),  p.  12  and  PRO  T1111223,  Proceedings  of  the  Ordnance  Council,  8.6.1909,  pp.  5 
and  10. 
42  W.  McBride,  Technological  Change  and  the  U.  S.  Navy  1865-1945  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University  Press,  2000)  p.  234. 64 
tailing  off  sharply  once  the  war  had  ended  and  contracts  had  been  filled.  43  Roy  and  Kay 
MacLeod  suggested  that  during  the  war  government  orders  for  'quantities  of  magnifying 
devices  (particularly  field  glasses  and  telescopes)'  and  'new  types  of  optical  munitions 
[rangefinders]'  led  to  the  creation  of  additional  manufacturing  capacity  within  the  optical 
instrument  manufacturing  trade  but  that  this  capacity  did  not  last  once  War  Office  orders 
were  discontinued,  and  much  of  the  new  machinery  was  then'...  sold  for  little  more  than 
scrap  value  .  44  The  implication  is  of  substantial  business  being  placed  and  firms  being 
encouraged  to  expand,  but  the  evidence  for  this  is  not  convincing.  The  MacLeods  cited  in 
support  just  two  editorials  from  trade  magazines  published  in  1916  when  the  optical 
industry  was  lobbying  hard  for  the  creation  of  an  institute  for  optics  in  London  and 
pointing  out  past  failures  to  gain  support  for  British  optical  manufacturing.  45  Neither  did 
more  than  assert  that  such  events  took  place  and  gave  no  corroborative  evidence.  46  It  is 
more  likely  that  War  Office  orders  during  the  Boer  War,  even  if  much  larger  than 
previously,  were  still  relatively  small,  issued  piecemeal  and  by  no  means  confined  to 
domestic  makers,  so  that  the  possibility  of  a  substantial  enlargement  of  the  optical 
industry  was  never  great. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  sudden  surge  in  demand  caught  the  War  Office  unprepared, 
without  sufficient  stocks  of  many  optical  stores.  To  make  good  those  shortages  the 
Director  of  Army  Contracts  began  issuing  `Requests  for  Tender'  to  firms  on  its  list  of 
approved  makers,  irrespective  of  whether  they  had  experience  in  producing  any 
particular  product.  47  The  notice  sent  to  Barr  &  Stroud  in  July  1901  included  the 
Mekometer,  the  Watkin  Depression  Rangefmder,  observation  telescopes  and  telescopic 
"  These  figures,  and  others  in  this  section,  are  extracted  from  PRO  WO  395/1,  Annual  Report  of  the 
Director  of  Army  Contracts,  Financial  Years  ending  31.3.1899  to  31.3.1902,  and  PRO  WO  395/2,  Annual 
Reports  31.3.1903  to  31.3.1906,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
"  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod,  'War  and  economic  development:  government  and  the  optical  industry  in 
Britain,  1914-18'  in  J.  M.  Winter,  ed.  War  and  Economic  Development  (Cambridge:  University  Press, 
1975)  p.  168. 
as  For  the  background  to  this,  see  Great  Britain,  Ministry  of  Munitions,  History  of  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions:  Vol.  XI  The  Supply  of  Munitions;  Part  III  Optical  Munitions  and  Glassware.  (London:  HMSO, 
1922). 
"The  optician,  editorial  articles  in  issues  31"  March  1916  and  14'"  July  1916. 
47  These  procedures  remained  unchanged  until  after  the  Great  War  began:  for  details  see  OH  Vol.  I,  Part  1, 
pp.  53  to  58 65 
sights,  all  of  which  the  firm  subsequently  tendered  to  supply,  with  varying  degrees  of 
success  48  In  August  the  War  Office  rejected  a  tender  for  observation  telescopes,  but  in 
September  accepted  bids  for  the  Mekometer  and  Depression  Rangefinders.  The  same 
month,  the  company  told  the  Director  of  Contracts  that  an  order  offered  for  a  hundred 
telescopic  sights  was  'not  of  sufficient  magnitude'  to  be  profitable,  and  in  November  that 
it  would  not  even  tender  for  them  in  smaller  numbers.  By  February  1902,  Barr  &  Stroud 
was  clearly  unhappy  about  the  way  the  War  Office  was  issuing  contracts  for  only  parts  of 
tenders,  and  scaling-down  or  cancelling  orders  already  issued.  49  The  total  value  of 
business  resulting  from  the  Boer  War  between  1901  and  1903  came  to  little  more  than 
£1,020,  a  figure  too  small  to  justify  creating  any  additional  capacity.  S°  Indeed,  the  theme 
of  the  correspondence  was  that  Barr  &  Stroud's  existing  capacity  was  being  under-used 
by  the  War  Office  whose  Contracts  Department  seemed  oblivious  of  how  best  to 
organise  the  distribution  of  orders. 
It  is  also  clear  that  orders  were  placed  outside  Britain,  particularly  for  binoculars,  so  that 
far  from  generating  new  capacity,  the  chance  to  open  up  a  new  branch  of  the  industry 
was  completely  ignored.  The  Annual  Report  of  the  Director  of  Contracts  for  1901-1902 
noted  that  `a  considerable  number'  of  the  5,810  binoculars  bought  that  year  were  made 
`on  the  continent',  and  the  next  year  that  `a  considerable  proportion'  of  the  13,500 
obtained  was  bought  `as  usual,  from  the  continent'.  The  average  unit  price  of  £1.25 
shows  that  these  were  simple  non-prismatic  instruments,  but  numbers  of  the  more 
complex  (and  expensive)  prism  types  of  commercial  production  were  also  bought  in 
South  Africa  by  the  Army  Ordnance  Department  and  regimental  commanding  officers 
for  issue  directly  in  the  theatre.  sl  Reports  from  troops  receiving  these  commercial  types 
(mostly  German,  made  by  Zeiss)  showed  how  much  better  they  were  than  the  non- 
48  UGD  295/4/23,  Letter  Book,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  War  Office  stating  that  Barr  &  Stroud  could  produce  those 
types  if  asked,  30.7.1901.  This  letter  book  provides  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless 
otherwise  indicated. 
49  UGD  295/4/24,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Director  of  Army  Contracts,  12.2.1902. 
so  UGD  295/19/2/1,  Customer  Order  files  1901  to  1903,  order  numbers  CO  193,215,235,245,291,294  and 
348. 
s'  PRO  WO  395/1,  Annual  Reports  of  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts,  Financial  Years  ending  31.3.1899  to 
31.3.1902  provide  the  unit  prices:  such  instruments  sold  commercially  at  prices  between  £1.00  and  £1.50. 66 
prismatic  ones  issued  officially  by  the  War  Office.  Only  10  percent  of  those  reporting  on 
the  latter  were  satisfied  with  them,  whilst  95  percent  of  those  commenting  on  the  prism 
patterns  gave  favourable  reports. 
The  overall  benefit  of  War  Office  business  to  the  optical  manufacturers  from  1899  to 
1906  seems  to  have  been  very  small.  The  immediate  fillip  given  by  the  Boer  War  was  not 
on  a  scale  large  enough  to  justify  the  creation  of  new  businesses  specifically  for  optical 
munitions,  or  to  set  up  special  departments  within  existing  businesses.  Nor  did  any 
increase  in  demand  last  much  longer  than  the  war  itself.  52  If  there  was  the  kind  of 
expansion  that  the  MacLeods  suggested  during  the  war,  any  firm  that  had  been  so 
optimistic  as  to  invest  in  plant  or  tooling  would  have  been  disappointed  after  1902.  But 
to  have  made  any  such  investment  without  thought  as  to  the  long  term  prospects  for 
military  business  would  have  been,  at  best,  commercially  imprudent.  Without  any 
significant  permanent  expansion  in  the  size  of  the  British  Army,  and  in  the  absence  of 
any  tendency  to  adopt  new  patterns  of  optical  munitions  on  a  large  scale,  there  could  not 
have  been  any  reasonable  expectation  of  new  opportunities  for  business  with  the  War 
Office. 
2.4  The  Admiralty  and  its  approach  to  optical  munitions 
In  1899  the  Royal  Navy  was  the  British  industry's  largest  customer  for  complex  optical 
munitions  such  as  the  rangefinder,  even  though  it  employed  them  on  a  relatively  small 
scale.  Up  to  then  it  had  bought  123  Barr  &  Stroud  rangefinders  out  of  the  189  the  firm 
had  sold,  53  but  in  the  next  seven  years  its  purchases  of  rangefinders  and  other  optical 
gunnery  instruments  grew  substantially  as  more  attention  was  paid  to  accurate  shooting 
at  increasingly  long  ranges. 
PRO  WO  108/278,  Extracts  from  Reports  by  Officers  Commanding  Units  in  South  Africa  during  1899  - 
1901:  Signalling  Equipment,  Telescopes  and  Binoculars,  provides  the  data  regarding  local  purchases. 
SZ  Barr  &  Stroud's  last  War  Office  order  is  recorded  on  8t'  October  1903,  and  was  for  seven  shillings'  worth 
of  Mekometer  spares  GUA  UGD  295/19/2/1  Customer  Order  files  1901,1902  and  1903  (CO  348). 
53  UGD  295,  Strang  papers. 67 
The  subject  of  gunnery  in  the  Royal  Navy  between  1889  and  1906  has  been  examined  by 
Jon  Sumida  in  his  In  Defence  of  Naval  Supremacy.  54  In  explaining  the  genesis  of  'fire 
control  instruments'  (devices  to  enable  the  gunfire  of  one  moving  ship  to  hit  another  at 
long  ranges),  he  stressed  the  importance  of  understanding  'the  history  of  the  Royal 
Navy's  previous  efforts  to  find  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  naval  range-finding  [sic].  '55 
However,  his  coverage  of  rangefmding  was  largely  confined  to  the  dates  of  introduction 
of  different  Barr  &  Stroud  models,  their  relative  standards  of  accuracy,  and  the 
difficulties  of  using  them.  56  Sumida  correctly  emphasised  that  the  rangefinder  gave 
neither  `a  final  or  complete  solution  to  the  sight-setting  problem',  but  his  emphasis  on  the 
instrument's  limited  utility  because  of  the  lack  of  means  to  transmit  ranges  to  the  guns,  57 
suggested  he  was  unaware  of  Archibald  Barr  and  William  Stroud's  early  understanding 
of  the  need  for  an  integrated  control  system  which  was  demonstrated  in  their 
development  of  `range  and  order'  instruments  to  transmit  range  and  bearing  data 
automatically  either  to  individual  guns  or  a  central  control  point.  58  Sumida  subordinated 
the  importance  of  optical  devices,  and  gave  hardly  any  attention  to  the  essential  need  for 
telescopic  sighting  devices  in  the  system  of  gunnery  then  evolving. 
There  were  problems  in  hitting  even  stationary  targets.  In  1900,  firing  tests  against  a 
battleship  moored  at  1,700  yards  showed  that  more  than  60  percent  of  the  shots  missed.  59 
Two  reasons,  separately  or  jointly,  could  account  for  this  poor  showing;  the  range  had 
been  wrongly  set  on  the  sights,  or  the  guns  had  not  been  aimed  properly  at  the  target, 
both  problems  that  could  be  corrected  by  suitable  optical  apparatus.  Setting  the  range 
correctly  was  important  -  Admiralty  ballistic  tables  showed  that  at  1,700  yards  to  hit  a  20 
foot  high  target  representing  a  ship,  the  permissible  aiming  error  was  142  yards,  at  2,000 
yards  it  was  38  yards,  and  at  3,000  yards  only  24.  Aiming  correctly  was  as  important  as 
having  an  accurate  range,  but  the  `open  sights'  in  general  use  required  the  gun-layer  to 
sa  Jon  T.  Surnida,  In  Defence  of  Naval  Supremacy:  Finance,  Technology,  and  British  Naval  Policy  1889- 
1914  (London:  Routledge,  1993)  see  Chapters  1  and  2. 
ss  Sumida  (1993),  p.  71. 
56  Sumida  (1993),  pp.  72  to  76. 
s'  Sumida  (1993),  p.  73. 
58  Moss  and  Russell  (1988),  pp.  34  and  35. 68 
line  up  two  points  on  the  sight  with  the  target  itself,  giving  considerable  scope  for  human 
error.  60  Although  telescopic  sights  giving  a  magnified  image  and  a  single  aiming  mark 
had  been  in  service  since  1887,  their  use  had  actually  been  discouraged  by  an  Admiralty 
Order  in  March  1896  and  they  were  rarely  used  except  for  occasional  drills  61  An  aiming 
error  coupled  with  a  range  setting  error  could  easily  cause  a  battleship  to  be  missed  even 
at  close  range,  as  the  1900  trials  had  demonstrated. 
Aiming  problems  were  addressed  robustly  after  1898  by  Captain  Percy  Scott,  who 
became  an  eloquent  and  aggressive  advocate  for  the  universal  employment  of  telescopic 
sights  62  Peter  Padfield  suggested  that  Scott  was  responsible  for  the  introduction  of  such 
sights  into  the  navy,  63  but  Scott  rather  revived  their  use.  He  also  became  a  ruthless  critic 
of  the  quality  of  the  existing  types  in  service,  lobbying  for  more  powerful  types  with 
finer  aiming  reticles.  "  His  appointment  to  command  the  gunnery  school,  H.  M.  S. 
Excellent,  in  April  1903,  lead  directly  to  the  Admiralty's  decision  in  1905  to  carry  out  a 
wholesale  revision  of  gun  sighting  and  gunnery  control  arrangements  of  all  fighting  ships 
in  the  fleet. 
In  1904,  Excellent  had  prepared  a  report  on  the  navy's  sighting  equipment  which 
recommended  the  general  introduction  of  new  improved  telescopic  sights.  65  On  11th  May 
1905,  the  First  Sea  Lord  approved  a  programme  to  accomplish  the  `re-sighting'  of  the 
entire  fleet,  a  substantial  programme  to  be  funded  out  of  both  the  current  and  following 
years'  Estimates.  A  circular  in  June  showed  the  extent  of  the  proposals,  detailing  which 
ships  were  to  receive  what  telescopes,  and  pointing  out  that  'These  alterations  will 
necessarily  take  a  considerable  time  to  carry  into  effect  as  the  number  ...  to  be  provided 
S9  D.  K.  Brown,  The  Grand  Fleet:  Warship  Design  and  Development  1906-1922  (London:  Chatham 
Publishing,  1999)  p.  26. 
60  H.  Garbett  Naval  Gunnery  (London:  George  Bell,  1897)  pp.  201  to  203. 
61  Gun  Sighting  Telescope  type  AP  360  had  been  introduced  in  1887,  and  type  AP  700  in  1891: 
PQ  1091M/91/PQ11  details  the  instructions  not  to  use  the  sights. 
62  Sumida  (1993),  p.  46  if. 
63  P.  Padfield,  Aim  Straight:  a  biography  of  Sir  Percy  Scott,  the  father  of  modern  naval  gunnery  (London, 
Hodder  &  Stoughton,  1966),  Chapter  5. 
64  PRO  ADM  116/602  Naval  Armaments  and  Equipment;  experiences  gained  on  active  service  in  South 
Africa,  has  comments  on  the  quality  of  naval  telescopic  sights. 
65  PQ  109/M/91  /PQ  16,16.2.1905. 69 
is  very  large'.  66  The  1905-1907  programme  represented,  numerically,  the  largest  order  for 
optical  instruments  that  the  Admiralty  had  ever  placed,  amounting  to  approximately 
4,000  assorted  telescopes  67  The  Director  of  Naval  Ordnance  (DNO)  had  pointed  out  that 
'as  far  as  efficiency  permits'  existing  telescopes  would  be  used  in  the  programme'68  but 
either  efficiency  did  not  so  permit,  or  the  DNO  was  being  disingenuous,  as  neither  of  the 
two  patterns  of  sighting  telescopes  then  in  service  was  to  be  used.  69 
Five  new  types  were  to  be  ordered:  two  of  fixed  magnification  at  3  and  6  power,  and 
three  of  variable  magnifications  at  3  to  9,5  to  15,  and  7  to  21  power.  They  were  all  of 
straightforward  optical  design,  but  made  to  standards  of  robustness  far  beyond  any  civil 
telescope  and  quite  unlike  anything  being  sold  commercially.  The  standards  of  optical 
design  and  precision  in  manufacture  needed,  though,  were  no  higher  than  any  high  class 
optical  firm  would  have  employed  in  its  regular  production.  The  contracts  were  divided 
between  two  established  London  makers,  Ottway  &  Co.  Ltd.,  and  the  Ross  Optical 
Company.  Design  details  were  left  to  each  firm  within  the  general  specification 
governing  magnification,  angle  of  view  and  connections  for  attaching  them  to  the  guns.  70 
Ottway  received  orders  for  all  five  patterns,  Ross  for  only  two.  Using  the  values  given  in 
the  Admiralty's  Rate  Book  for  Naval  Stores,  71  it  is  possible  to  assess  the  total  contract 
value  as  about  £50,000,  spread  over  the  financial  years  1905-1906,  and  1906-1907.  This 
was  indeed  a  significant  order  (some  £3.5  million  at  1998  values).  72  Some  measure  of  its 
size  and  importance  to  the  optical  munitions  industry  can  be  gained  from  comparison 
with  the  approximately  £22,000  of  rangefinder  orders  Barr  &  Stroud  received  from  the 
66  PQ  109/M191/PQ16,2.6.1905. 
67  This  figure  has  been  extrapolated  from  the  scales  of  issue  in  the  schedule,  and  from  armament  details  in 
Jane's  Fighting  Ships  1905-1906. 
68  PQ  109/M/91/PQ16,16.2.1905. 
69  They  are  not  mentioned  at  all  in  the  Royal  Navy's  Manual  of  Gunnery  for  His  Majesty's  Fleet  Volume  1, 
Part  I  (London:  Eyre  &  Spottiswood,  1907) 
70  Great  Britain,  Admiralty,  Gunnery  Department.  Manual  of  Gunnery  for  His  Majesty  's  Fleet  (London: 
HMSO,  1907). 
71  Rate  Bookfor  Naval  Stores:  Authorised  List  and  PriceList  of  Naval  Stores  (HMSO,  annually  from 
1870). 
72  Calculated  using  data  from  R.  Twigger,  Inflation:  The  Value  of  the  Pound  1750-1998:  (London:  House 
of  Commons  Library,  London.,  1999. 70 
Admiralty  in  the  same  years.  73  In  the  absence  of  company  records  for  either  Ottway  or 
Ross,  the  effects  this  business  had  on  them  must  be  conjectural,  but  Ross'  advertisement 
in  the  1907  edition  of  Jane's  Fighting  Ships  announced  that  they  had  made  extensive 
additions  to  their  works  in  consequence  of  what  they  demurely  described  as  'increased 
demand'  for  their  telescopes,  and  that  their  production  and  prices  would  benefit  as  a 
result. 
Important  as  this  business  was,  it  was  not  sustainable  in  the  way  that  manufacture  of  the 
rangefinder  was.  The  Royal  Navy's  very  size,  and,  it  may  be  argued,  its  earlier 
backwardness  in  failing  to  keep  up  with  the  growing  potential  of  naval  gunnery,  provided 
a  unique  business  opportunity  for  the  firms  who  won  sighting  telescope  contracts  in 
1905.  It  was  a'one-off,  much  in  the  same  way  that  the  War  Office  orders  had  been  in  the 
Boer  War.  Once  the  re-equipment  was  complete,  demand  for  sighting  telescopes  would 
be  geared  to  new  shipbuilding  and  replacement  of  attrition.  The  telescope,  as  an 
instrument,  offered  little  possibility  of  radical  improvement  in  design  or  performance, 
and  so  early  obsolescence  was  unlikely,  and  it  was  not  individually  of  particularly  high 
value.  The  rangefinder,  though,  was  a  much  more  expensive  device  that  was  still 
evolving,  and  new,  improved  designs  had  the  potential  to  render  obsolete  earlier 
versions,  creating  a  self-sustaining  demand.  Welcome  as  the  sighting  telescope  orders 
undoubtedly  were,  they  did  not  presage  the  development  of  a  sustainable  new  branch  of 
optical  munitions  manufacture.  Their  significance  was  that  they  established  Ottway  and 
Ross  as  the  Navy's  telescopic  sight  makers,  a  status  which  was  sustained  (albeit  at  a  low 
level  of  activity)  by  the  shipbuilding  programmes  that  continued  until  the  Great  War. 
At  the  same  time  that  new  sighting  apparatus  was  being  considered,  the  construction  of 
the  novel  battleship  Dreadnought  emphasised  the  pressing  need  for  a  rangefinder  of 
greater  accuracy.  Unlike  earlier  capital  ships,  Dreadnought  had  a  main  armament  of 
uniform  calibre  where  five  turrets  each  mounting  two  12-inch  guns  replaced  a  mixture  of 
73  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/1/2,  Customer  Orders  1900-1910. 71 
turrets  with  guns  of  different  calibres.  74  The  guns  themselves  were  little  different  from 
those  of  immediately  preceding  battleships,  but  the  important  difference,  the  presumptive 
anomaly,  was  the  potential  improvement  in  the  damage  that  the  new  ship's  heavy 
armament  could  inflict  at  longer  ranges.  75  To  hit  at  increased  distances  demanded  greater 
precision  in  the  aiming  process,  errors  in  aiming  and  distance  setting  had  to  be  eliminated 
before  satisfactory  shooting  could  be  expected.  The  whole  question  of  'fire  control',  the 
integration  of  all  the  problems  involved  in  long  range  artillery  fire  at  sea  began  to  be 
studied  seriously  in  late  1903  and  1904,  even  before  the  design  of  Dreadnought  had  been 
finalised.  Once  again,  as  in  the  previous  decade,  technological  advances  were  so  strong 
that  they  not  only  challenged  established  norms  but  demanded  investigation  of  the  way  to 
further  efficiencies  in  gunnery.  The  Royal  Navy  was  unavoidably  faced  with  the  need  for 
'inventing  accuracy',  to  provide  a  targeting  system  that  would  enable  an  unguided 
projectile  fired  from  one  moving  ship  to  hit  another  moving  vessel  whose  course  between 
the  projectile's  despatch  and  arrival  was  unpredictable.  6  The  start  of  the  process  had  to 
be  the  knowledge  of  the  range  of  the  target  vessel,  and  as  any  error  in  range  would 
disrupt  any  possibility  of  accuracy,  the  performance  of  the  rangefinder  was  of  paramount 
importance.  Without  that  instrument,  gunnery  control  would  be  inadequate  and  the 
performance  of  the  entire  weapon  system  that  was  the  battleship  would  be  devalued. 
Serious  as  that  was,  there  was  another  situation  in  which  the  presence  of  optical 
instrumentation  alone  permitted  the  deployment  of  a  new  military  technology. 
2.5  The  Submarine  Periscope 
In  1901,  the  Royal  Navy  acquired  its  first  submarines  to  evaluate  the  menace  posed  by 
the  underwater  vessel  armed  with  torpedoes,  and  to  determine  the  best  ways  to  counter 
74  For  examples  of  earlier  armament  combinations,  see  A.  Preston,  Battleships  of  World  War  1:  An 
Illustrated  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Battleships  of  All  Nations  1914-1918  (New  York:  Galahad  Books,  1972) 
vr.  98  to  111. 
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76  T  he  quotation  is  taken  from  D.  M  ackKenzie,  Inventing  Accuracy:  a  Historical  Sociology  ofNuclear 
Missile  Guidance  (Cambridge,  Mass:  MIT  Press,  1990). 72 
it.  77  The  threat  of  the  underwater  vessel  lay  principally  in  its  invisibility  when 
submerged,  but  to  exploit  its  potential  the  vessel's  crew  needed  to  be  able  to  see  what 
was  happening  above  the  water  in  order  to  navigate  and  position  the  boat  for  an  attack. 
Neither  the  idea  of  the  submarine  nor  a  device  to  see  from  it  was  new;  experimental 
submarines  had  been  built  by  several  navies  in  the  late  19th  century,  and  all  used  some 
kind  of  primitive  device  to  permit  observation  when  under  water.  78  The  effectiveness  of 
these  early  methods  was  far  from  satisfactory,  many  being  little  more  than  glazed  panels 
in  an  extension  of  the  boat's  hull  that  projected  above  the  water  when  the  vessel  was 
below  the  surface.  In  other  cases,  combinations  of  simple  lenses  and  mirrors  were 
employed  in  a  tube  passing  from  the  crew  space  through  the  hull  to  reach  above  the 
water.  These  `periscopes'  were  more  useful,  but  by  no  means  widely  adopted  in  the  early 
submarines  partly  because  of  their  optical  limitations  and  partly  because  of  the 
mechanical  problems  of  making  them  watertight  and  durable.  The  early  development  of 
the  submarine  as  a  weapon  was  inhibited  as  much  by  the  lack  of  the  means  to  see  as  by 
other  engineering  difficulties. 
All  the  first  British  submarines  had  periscopes  that  were,  by  contemporary  standards, 
effective  enough  to  allow  the  boat  to  be  used  as  a  weapon.  The  earliest  ones  were  made 
up  to  the  specification  of  Captain  Reginald  Bacon  in  1901  or  1902  79  Bacon,  a  leading 
proponent  of  the  military  utility  of  the  submarine  was  subsequently  introduced  by  the 
boats'  builders,  Vickers,  to  Sir  Howard  Grubb,  the  owner  of  the  Dublin  astronomical 
telescope  making  firm,  who  -  according  to  Bacon  -  subsequently  produced  an  improved 
version  of  his  original  design.  8°  Bacon's  claim  may  have  been  mistaken,  as  Grubb's  first 
periscope  patent  was  granted  in  1901.81  The  patent  specification  shows  this  to  have  been 
a  sophisticated  prismatic  design,  providing  an  erect,  normal  image,  unlike  earlier  devices 
which  either  reversed  or  inverted  what  the  observer  saw.  Grubb's  good  relations  with 
"  N.  A.  Lambert,  Sir  John  Fisher's  Naval  Revolution  (South  Carolina:  University  of  South  Carolina  Press, 
1999)  p.  38  fl 
78  M.  F.  Suetter,  The  Evolution  oft  he  Submarine  b  oat,  Mine,  and  Torpedo  (Portsmouth:  Griffin,  1908) 
describes  these  in  some  detail  in  the  text. 
"  Cited  in  I.  S.  Glass,  Victorian  Telescope  Makers:  Thomas  and  Howard  Grubb  (Bristol:  Institute  of 
Physics  Publishing,  1998)  p.  206. 
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Vickers  gave  him  a  monopoly  of  supply  for  all  the  Vickers'  submarines  built  in  the  next 
five  years,  and  he  had  the  vast  majority  of  periscope  business  from  the  Royal  Navy  until 
1914.  Norman  Friedman  suggests  that  Grubb  may  have  supplied  periscopes  for  U.  S. 
submarines  built  by  the  Electric  Boat  Company  as  early  as  1902,  and  describes  the  firm 
as  one  of  the  major  manufacturers  `early  in  the  century'.  82  Assessing  Grubb's 
contribution  to  the  early  development  of  the  optical  munitions  industry  is  made  difficult 
by  the  paucity  of  available  records  for  the  fum  and  a  more  extensive  consideration  of  its 
activities  must  remain  contingent  on  the  emergence  of  more  information.  83 
The  importance  of  the  periscope  in  the  development  of  the  submarine  cannot  be 
underestimated.  As  the  rangefinder  made  effective  gunnery  at  long  ranges  possible,  so 
the  periscope  permitted  the  submarine  to  become  a  practical  weapon  delivery  system.  It 
became  not  just  a  navigational  tool  (its  original  purpose)  but  also  the  sighting  device  to 
permit  the  submarine's  offensive  weapon,  the  torpedo,  to  be  aimed  with  precision. 
Proponents  of  the  submarine  were  quick  to  see  the  possibility  of  using  the  periscope  as  a 
type  of  fire  control  system,  and  in  1903  L  Y.  Spear  of  the  Holland  Torpedo  Boat 
Company,  New  York,  asked  Barr  &  Stroud  to  design  a  rangefinder  that  could  be 
incorporated  into  the  periscope.  84  Archibald  Barr  had  reservations  about  the  possibility  of 
doing  this,  because  the  company  had  no  knowledge  of  periscopes,  and  subsequently 
declined  to  take  on  the  project. 
The  Royal  Navy's  willingness  to  consider  an  alternative  paradigm  in  naval  warfare  in 
response  to  an  emerging  technology  permitted  another  branch  of  optical  munitions 
manufacture  to  become  established  in  Britain,  although  without  further  research  it  is  not 
possible  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the  appearance  of  the  essential  optical 
device  and  the  weapon  itself.  Unlike  large  surface  warships,  which  were  typically 
produced  to  meet  a  government  requirement,  the  submarine  was  a  private  venture  which 
1  Glass  (1998)  p.  208 
82  N.  Friedman,  U.  S.  Submarines  through  1945;  an  illustrated  design  history  (Annapolis,  MD:  Naval 
Institute  Press,  1995)  p.  270. 
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was  promoted  by  its  inventors  to  governments.  Possibly  the  desire  to  offer  an  effective 
weapon  stimulated  the  builders  of  submarine  to  hasten  the  development  of  the  periscope, 
the  reverse  of  what  had  happened  in  the  emergence  of  the  rangefinder. 
2.6  Barr  &  Stroud  -  the  principal  optical  munitions  maker 
The  increasing  commitment  to  long  range  gunnery,  and  the  concomitant  necessity  for  fire 
control,  meant  that  Barr  &  Stroud  was  virtually  guaranteed  a  monopoly  of  Admiralty 
rangefinder  business  by  1905.  No  other  British  optical  maker  had  that  firm's  accrued 
expertise  in  the  mechanics  of  rangefinder  construction,  nor  such  an  established  working 
relationship  with  the  Royal  Navy.  Donald  MacKenzie  points  out  that  accuracy  (in 
missile  targeting)  is 'the  product  of  a  complex  process  of  conflict  and  collaboration 
between  a  range  of  social  actors'  and  not  merely  the  'inevitable  consequence  of  technical 
change'.  85  It  was  the  Royal  Navy's  willingness  to  accept  Barr  &  Stroud  as  its  monopoly 
supplier  as  much  as  the  firm's  command  of  technology  that  allowed  the  firm  to  buildup 
not  just  its  domestic  business  but  its  even  more  successful  export  trade  up  to  the  close  of 
1906. 
The  Admiralty  had  indicated  during  1898  that  it  wanted  to  acquire  a  very  substantial 
number  of  rangefmders  and  because  of  concerns  that  prices  were  excessively  high 
through  Barr  &  Stroud's  monopoly,  had  raised  the  question  of  acquiring  the  rights  to 
produce  them,  either  itself  or  through  other  contractors.  86  The  firm's  response  indicated 
how  far  it  had  shifted  from  the  founding  partners'  original  intention  to  derive  an  income 
from  licensing  their  patents  to  others.  87  Having  had  the  potential  value  of  the  rangefinder 
indicated  by  the  growing  interest  from  both  the  Admiralty  and  foreign  enquiries  Barr  & 
Stroud  was  now  much  more  interested  in  supplying  than  in  licensing,  and  had  no 
inclination  willingly  to  relinquish  its  monopoly.  On  May  30th,  the  firm  reiterated  its 
insistence  on  a  royalty  of  £100  per  instrument  made  by  anyone  else,  and  insisted  that  the 
as  D.  MacKenzie  (1990)  p.  3. 
86  UGD  295/5/744,  Letter  Book,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Admiralty,  30.5.1898,  cites  Admiralty  letter 
CP/4919/8720,27.4.1898. 
87  See  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  17  for  details  of  Archibald  Barr  and  William  Stroud's  first  joint  design,  a 
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selling  price  of  £250  for  each  rangefinder  was  absolutely  the  lowest  possible.  The  firm 
refuted  robustly  the  Admiralty's  allegation  that  the  bulk  of  the  selling  price  represented 
'royalty  and  commission',  rather  than  a  more  usual  mark-up  on  manufacturing  costs.  88 
The  company's  riposte  was  that,  besides  materials  costs,  the  final  price  actually  reflected 
the  expenses  of  setting-up,  research  and  development,  and  a  return  on  the  accrual  of 
expertise.  To  this  aggregation,  which  they  termed  their'oncost',  they  added  a  percentage 
to  cover  labour  costs,  operating  overheads,  and  then  a  final  margin  for  profit. 
Faced  with  what  may  be  interpreted  as  either  a  reasonable  commercial  assessment  of 
their  products'  value,  or  as  downright  obduracy  by  the  company,  the  Admiralty 
abandoned  the  idea  of  acquiring  the  manufacturing  rights  and  eventually  issued  a 
contract  for  a  hundred  rangefinders  on  30th  June,  1899,  at  the  price  demanded  by  Barr  & 
Stroud.  The  Admiralty  found  itself  in  an  unusual  position  with  Barr  &  Stroud.  Although 
a  monopsonist  domestic  customer,  the  Admiralty  was  never  able  to  exert  its  'enormous 
market  powers'  over  Barr  &  Stroud.  89  Even  though  the  Patents  Act  gave  the  Crown  the 
right  to  'use  [a  patented]  invention  for  the  service  of  the  Crown'  without  the  prior 
arrangement  of  terms  or  conditions,  90  no  matter  how  much  the  Admiralty  may  have 
objected  to  the  fern's  prices  and  the  proposed  licensing  fee,  it  was  hardly  in  a  position  to 
take  advantage  of  that  right.  The  Act  did  not  give  the  Crown  any  power  to  compel  an 
inventor  to  manufacture  for  it,  nor  was  there  any  other  maker  of  naval  rangefinders  to 
whom  the  Admiralty  could  turn  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  better  deal.  The  scale  of  its 
demand  by  1906  had  been  insufficient  to  support  more  than  one  maker,  even  if  any  other 
firm  had  been  able  to  produce  competitive  instruments.  Barr  &  Stroud's  various  patents 
made  the  task  very  difficult,  and  the  key  one  covering  the  prism  and  range  scale 
arrangements  to  measure  and  display  the  range  remained  in  force  until  1903.91  The  only 
potential  rival  for  Barr  &  Stroud  in  1898  was  the  German  Zeiss  rangefinder,  which  was 
built  on  a  fundamentally  different  principle  and  itself  well  protected  by  patents.  The 
88  UGS  295/5/744,  Letter  Book,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Admiralty,  30.5.1898. 
89  C.  Trebilcock,  The  Vickers  Brothers:  Armaments  and  Enterprise  1854  -  1914  (London:  Europa 
Publications,  1977)  p.  3. 
90  Patents,  Designs,  and  Trade  Marks  Act,  1883,  Section  27(1). 
91  The  provisions  of  British  Patent  9520/1888  were  also  in  force  in  France,  Germany  and  the  USA. 76 
Zeiss  instrument  was  both  foreign,  which  made  it  less  than  desirable  to  the  Admiralty, 
and  exceedingly  demanding  in  manufacture,  which  would  probably  have  made  it  even 
more  expensive  than  the  Barr  &  Stroud  instrument. 
The  Admiralty's  options  were  limited  either  to  agreeing  to  the  company's  royalty 
demands  or  to  paying  the  price  demanded  for  complete  instruments.  The  decision  to 
continue  buying  from  Barr  &  Stroud  rather  than  seeking  another  maker  was  perhaps 
influenced  by  the  company's  emphasis  in  its  riposte  on  setting-up  costs  and  accrued 
expertise.  If  the  Admiralty  wanted  another  and  presumably  cheaper  source  for  its 
rangefinders,  it  would  need  a  contractor  both  willing  and  able  to  manufacture  at  a  lower 
price,  and  would  also  have  to  allow  for  delays  while  such  a  firm  became  proficient  in 
making  a  specialised  instrument  which  was  quite  unlike  anything  else  being  made  by  the 
British  optical  or  scientific  instrument  industry.  No  doubt  these  difficulties  persuaded  the 
Admiralty  to  maintain  the  status  quo,  a  circumstance  that  repeated  itself  some  fifteen 
years  later  and  will  be  described  later  in  this  story.  However,  the  continued  dependence 
of  Barr  &  Stroud  on  outside  suppliers  for  many  of  its  components  was  a  potential 
weakness  for  the  firm  that  might  have  provided  a  means  by  which  another  source  of 
supply  could  have  been  established  had  the  Admiralty  been  so  minded.  So  long  as  the 
patents  remained  in  force,  Barr  &  Stroud  could  dictate  royalty  terms,  but  once  these 
expired  in  1903,  then  the  firm  might  be  vulnerable  to  competition,  particularly  if  it  was 
still  dependent  on  outside  suppliers.  The  Admiralty's  principal  need  in  1899  was  the 
immediate  acquisition  of  rangefinders,  and  short-term  priorities  overcame  any  question 
of  future  alternative  sources  of  supply.  The  company  was  therefore  safely  able  to 
anticipate  the  Admiralty's  new  business  and  proceed  with  plans  to  expand  both  the  scale 
and  scope  of  their  operations. 
By  the  time  the  contract  was  signed  in  mid-1899,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  completed  its 
expansion  into  a  purpose-built  engineering  workshop  equipped  with  a  range  of  machine 
tools  to  allow  the  manufacture  of  some  at  least  some  of  the  components  used  in  the 
rangefinder,  its  mounting,  and  the  Range  and  Order'  instruments  which  formed  part  of 77 
the  rangefinder's  shipboard  operating  system.  92  This  investment  was  in  a  year  when 
turnover  declined  from  over  £14,000  to  £8,500,  and  it  represented  the  anticipation  of 
Admiralty  business  rather  than  a  response  to  orders  already  received.  It  showed  the 
measure  of  confidence  which  the  firm  then  had.  The  move  marked  the  beginning  of  a 
period  of  sustained  expansion  which  was  to  lead  the  firm  into  a  second  move  only  three 
years  later.  This  short  interval  saw  the  company's  business  expand  and  diversify,  not  just 
in  the  products  being  made  but  in  the  clients  to  whom  they  were  supplied.  This  growth 
also  directed  Barr  &  Stroud  towards  an  increasing  level  of  autarky  which  was  achieved 
only  with  some  difficulty. 
The  growth  of  the  business  can  be  measured  from  the  surviving  details  of  orders  and 
turnover.  The  turnover  and  sales  figures  quoted  below  are  partly  from  schedules  prepared 
during  the  late  1960s  in  connection  with  a  proposed,  but  uncompleted,  company  history. 
Other  figures  were  prepared  in  1987  by  Barr  &  Stroud  Ltd  from  then-surviving  cash 
books  in  connection  with  Michael  Moss  and  lain  Russell's  Range  and  Vision,  which  was 
published  in  1988.  Those  books  apparently  did  not  survive  subsequent  company  re- 
structuring,  but  Strang's  draft  material  contains  extensive  details  which,  where 
comparisons  can  be  made,  do  correspond  with  the  abbreviated  material  published  in 
Range  and  Vision.  The  order  figures  before  1901  come  from  Strang's  material  which  was 
produced  from  then-existing  factory  records,  seemingly  now  lost.  Order  records  from 
1901  onwards  survive  in  their  entirety  for  the  period  under  review,  providing  a  wealth  of 
detail  about  quantities,  prices  and  delivery  times.  3 
Moss  and  Russell  suggest  that  the  firm's  order  book  shrank  between  1900  to  1902  to  such 
a  level  that  serious  concerns  were  felt  about  prospects  for  the  immediate  future.  Orders 
had  been  received  for  44  rangefinders  in  1900,33  in  1901  and  26  in  1902,  and 
consequently  turnover  had  shrunk  from  £27,731  in  1900  (largely  composed  of  receipts 
92  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  37. 
93  UGD  295/19/2/1,19,2/2.19/2/3  Customer  Orders  December  1900  onwards. 78 
from  the  Admiralty's  large  order  of  June  1899)  to  £15,070  in  1901,  and  to  £14,522  in 
190194  As  a  result  the  partners  became 
acutely  aware  of  the  over-reliance  of  the  business  on  the  willingness  of  the 
governments  of  the  world  to  continue  to  spend  vast  sums  on  expanding  and 
modernising  their  navies. 
Moss  and  Russell  point  out  that  William  Stroud  was  'particularly  concerned'  that  the 
business  had  failed  to  get  War  Office  to  adopt  its  designs,  and  he  persuaded  the  other  two 
partners  that  'the  time  had  come  to  diversify  the  range  of  products'  the  business  was 
making.  In  1899  Stroud  wrote  a  series  of  letters  from  Leeds  to  Archibald  Barr  revealing 
an  assessment  of  the  firm's  prospects  which  was  much  less  optimistic  than  his  partners'.  95 
He  was  still  living  in  Yorkshire  as  Cavendish  Professor  of  Physics  at  what  had  then 
become  the  University  of  Leeds,  and  spent  very  little  time  in  Glasgow.  In  March,  when 
in  poor  health,  he  wrote  a  letter  revealing  his  thinking.  Referring  to  the  drafting  of  a  new 
co-partnership  agreement  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  bankruptcy  following  the  death  of 
one  partner,  he  wrote 
You  see,  I  regard  the  business  as  a  very  precarious  one.  If  we  had  [vacuum] 
pumps  really  selling,  and  recorders  [range  and  order  instruments]  &c  &c  I 
should  believe  in  the  stability  of  B&S  much  more.  96 
Between  April  and  July,  still  in  poor  health,  he  wrote  a  series  of  generally  pessimistic 
letters  on  the  financial  problems  that  might  result  from  the  death  of  a  partner  but  then, 
probably  recovering  from  his  illness,  he  became  more  positive  and  specifically  urged  on 
Barr  the  need  to  reduce  manufacturing  costs  so  that,  if  necessary,  selling  prices  could  be 
reduced  when  the  original  patents  expired  in  1903  and  other  competitors  might  appear.  97 
The  point  about  the  likely  problems  when  the  original  patents  expired  was  particularly 
94  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  42  provides  the  source  for  figures  and  quotations  in  this  section. 
95  UGD 295  16/1/10  Personal  Correspondence  of  William  Stroud. 
's  UGD  295/16/1/10  Personal  correspondence,  Stroud  to  Barr,  16d  March  1899. 
97  UGD  295/16/1/10  Personal  correspondence,  Stroud  to  Jackson,  7`s  July  1899. 79 
telling,  and  ties  in  with  the  decisions  made  soon  afterwards  to  expand  and  assume  greater 
control  of  components  manufacture. 
This  picture  Moss  and  Russell  paint  is  only  partly  correct,  as  it  can  be  shown  that,  despite 
Stroud's  concerns  about  the  future  prospects  for  military  and  naval  orders,  the  business 
was  actually  starting  to  grow  substantially.  The  subsequent  decision  in  1902  to  move 
again,  this  time  to  a  much  larger  site,  was  taken  because  of  the  developments  in  naval 
business,  and  not  through  any  programme  of  diversification  into  non-military  products. 
The  revenue  from  the  firm's  own  vacuum  pumps,  and  the  licensed  Becker  electric 
clocks,  which  were  sold  from  1899  and  1901  respectively,  was  very  small  indeed.  98  The 
order  records  after  December  1900  show  little  demand  for  them,  their  individual  selling 
prices  were  less  than  a  tenth  of  a  rangefinder  and  their  contribution  to  the  business  could 
at  best  have  been  only  marginal  compared  to  that  from  naval  orders. 
The  value  of  orders  received  for  rangefinders  and  associated  items  grew  steadily  in  value 
from  1901. 
Table  2.1:  Barr  &  Stroud:  comparison  of  British  and  foreign  orders,  1901-1906.99 
Year  British  Orders  £s  Foreign  orders  £s 
1901  2,908  8,776 
1902  6,569  13,906 
1903  11,583  12,525 
1904  36,651  52,975 
1905  11,537  33,162 
1906  24,315  28225 
98  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  43. 
99  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19!  2/1,  Customer  order  file. 80 
Order  values  increased  steadily  through  this  period,  the  peak  in  1904  being  influenced  by 
the  large  amount  of  business  from  the  opposing  navies  just  before  and  during  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war.  However,  even  without  those  atypically  large  orders,  the  value  of  business 
would  still  have  been  substantially  up  on  that  for  1903:  even  excluding  foreign  orders 
from  1904's  figures,  incoming  business  still  rose  by  approximately  52  percent. 
The  overall  growth  came  not  only  foreign  orders  but  also  from  the  Admiralty's  increasing 
investment  in  fire  control  instruments.  The  original  specification  for  the  rangefinder  in 
1891  had  called  for  the  provision  to  relay  ranges  from  the  instrument  to  the  guns,  and 
Barr  &  Stroud  had  begun  work  on  such  apparatus  at  the  same  time  as  the  rangefinder.  In 
1892  the  Admiralty  had  decided  that  there  was  no  immediate  need  for  this  transmission 
device,  but  the  firm  carried  on  and  by  1893  they  had  developed  a  basic  design  which  was 
submitted  for  trials  at  in  1894.100  The  Admiralty's  tests  continued  until  1901,  with  the 
design  of  the  'range  and  order'  instruments  evolving  steadily.  In  that  year,  despite  Barr's 
irritation  at  the  time  taken,  '0'  the  first  of  a  series  of  substantial  orders  was  placed. 
Between  1901  and  the  end  of  1906,  British  contracts  for  fire  control  instruments  totalled 
£33,522  compared  with  £50,318  for  rangefinders.  102 
Important  though  this  was,  it  was  overshadowed  by  the  growth  in  overseas  orders  in  the 
same  period.  In  every  year  from  1901  to  1906  foreign  orders  were  greater  than  domestic 
ones,  as  shown  in  figure  1  above.  The  customer  records  show  that  these  orders  were 
almost  entirely  for  rangefinders,  the  reverse  of  the  pattern  of  Admiralty  ones,  implying 
either  that  foreign  navies  had  failed  to  appreciate  the  need  to  integrate  rangefinding  into  a 
gunnery  control  system,  or  that  the  extensive  (and  expensive)  shipboard  modifications 
needed  to  accommodate  the  electrical  circuitry  were  unacceptable.  Only  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Navy  was  a  regular  purchaser  of  control  instrumentation,  but  by  no  means  on 
the  same  scale  as  the  Royal  Navy.  In  1904,  when  Russian  and  Japanese  purchasing  was 
its  greatest,  less  than  5  percent  of  the  spending  was  on  fire  control  apparatus.  103 
10°  UGD  295/4/12  Letter  Book,  Archibald  Barr  to  Secretary,  Admiralty,  25.4.1894. 
101  UGD  295/4/23  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Stroud,  7.9.1901. 
102  extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/1  Customer  Orders  1901  to  1910. 
103  UGD  295/19/2/1  Customer  Order  files  1901  to  1910. 81 
Moss  and  Russell  considered  that  `when  demand  for  rangefmders  picked  up  in  1903'  this 
was  because  of  the  introduction  of  an  improved  model,  the  FA3.  '°4  There  certainly  was 
an  increase  in  Admiralty  orders  for  rangefinders  after  1903,  but  whether  the  FA3  itself 
was  responsible  for  them  is  not  certain.  By  1904,  the  Royal  Navy  was  increasingly 
accepting  that  gunnery  improvements  were  possible  through  the  better  methods 
emphatically  prescribed  by  Captain  Percy  Scott  when  he  took  charge  of  the  navy's 
gunnery  school,  HMS  Excellent  in  1903,105  and  it  was  the  Navy's  willingness  to  entertain 
a  `paradigm  shift'106  in  its  approach  to  gunnery  that  caused  larger  purchases  of 
rangefinders,  rather  than  simply  the  availability  of  a  better  instrument.  As  for  foreign 
business,  the  escalating  tension  between  Russia  and  Japan  would  have  generated  the 
same  orders,  irrespective  of  recent  technical  advances.  The  Russian  Navy  was  severely 
disadvantaged  in  its  gunnery  methods  compared  to  the  Japanese  and  its  purchases  of  the 
older  (and  less  expensive)  FA  models  suggested  that  it  was  principally  concerned  with 
quantity  rather  than  the  latest  improvements.  '07 
Even  before  this  surge  of  business,  the  actual  and  expected  growth  in  orders  for  a 
increasing  range  of  naval  gunnery  instruments  led,  in  1902,  to  the  decision  to  build  a 
much  larger  factory.  108  The  existing  site  at  Ashton  Lane  was  unsuitable  for  expansion 
because  of  the  density  of  surrounding  building,  and  the  workshops  themselves,  spread 
over  three  levels,  were  increasingly  inconvenient  and  not  big  enough  to  handle  the  larger 
instruments  being  considered  for  development.  The  new  site  was  some  two  miles  from 
the  existing  works,  in  largely  open  country,  adjacent  to  a  railway  station  and  at  the  end  of 
tram  route  which  conveniently  served  the  areas  where  most  of  the  existing  workforce 
lived,  as  well  as  others  from  which  extra  workers  might  be  drawn.  The  firm  hoped  the 
clear  air  of  the  more  rural  setting,  free  from  the  effects  of  Glasgow's  atmospheric 
104  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  43. 
105  Padfield,  P.  Aim  Straight:  A  Biography  of  Sir  Percy  Scott  (London:  Hodder  &  Stoughton,  1966)  p.  135. 
106  W  McBride  (2000)  p.  6 
107  For  the  relative  state  of  gunnery  in  the  two  navies,  see  H.  W.  Wilson,  Battleships  in  Action.  2  vols.  Vol. 
1.  (London:  Conway  Maritime  Press,  1995)  Chapter  XI;  Russian  order  details  extracted  from  UGD 
295/19/2/1,  Customer  Order  files  1901-1910. 82 
pollution,  would  allow  the  final  visual  checking  of  the  rangefinders  to  be  done  more 
efficiently  and  without  interruption.  A  further  benefit,  from  Barr's  point  of  view,  was  that 
the  new  factory  would  be  `a  place  where  workers  could  earn  a  decent  living  under  clean 
healthy  and  happy  conditions'.  109  The  land  for  the  new  works  was  purchased  in  1902, 
and  building  began  in  the  autumn  of  1903.  Additions  to  building  plans  were  made  in 
1904  and  1906,  largely  in  the  expectation  of  more  Admiralty  business.  '  0  The  story  of 
Barr  &  Stroud  between  1899  and  1906  is  largely  one  of  expansion  and  profitability, 
based  partly  on  the  firm's  own  abilities  and  partly  on  a  fortuitous  combination  of 
circumstances  which  saw  a  steady  increase  in  concern  with  gunnery  in  the  Royal  Navy, 
bolstered  by  the  profits  generated  from  supplying  both  protagonists  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war. 
It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  assume  that  the  progression  to  1906  was  straightforward. 
This  was  certainly  not  the  case,  and  although  the  business  grew  substantially  and  was 
generally  profitable  as  shown  in  table  2.2  below,  there  were  problems  to  be  dealt  with. 
Table  2.2:  Barr  &  Stroud,  turnover  and  pre-tax  profits  1899-1906.111 
Year  Turnover  Pre-tax  Profit 
1899  8,556  Loss  (688) 
1900  27,731  11,761 
1901  15,070  3,699 
1902  14,522  920 
1903  20,889  5,906 
1904  49,691  23,924 
1905  77,512  29,196 
1906  64,246  23,586 
108  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  45  provides  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise 
indicated. 
'09  UGD  295,  unclassified  material,  Strang  manuscript,  p.  61. 
110  Sumida  (1993)  discusses  the  reasons  for  the  Admiralty's  policy  about  rangefinder  purchases  in  Chapter 
3. 
111  Extracted  from  UGD  295/26/1/47,  Table  of  Sales. 83 
Some  organisational  weaknesses  became  apparent  in  the  development  of  Barr  &  Stroud 
after  1898.  When  the  firm  moved  into  the  Ashton  Lane  factory,  its  chief  abilities  were  in 
mechanical  and  electrical  engineering,  rather  than  in  optics.  Archibald  Barr's  own 
abilities  lay  firmly  in  those  fields,  and  the  staff  he  had  recruited  in  Glasgow  added  to  this 
strength.  '  12  William  Stroud,  who  was  still  living  in  Leeds,  was  the  only  person  in  the 
firm  who  was  able  to  design  optical  components,  and  he  also  played  a  very  significant 
role  in  the  design  of  the  Range  and  Order  instruments  which  were  to  assume  an 
increasingly  important  part  of  the  business  after  1901.  Stroud's  location,  some  250  miles 
away,  was  to  cause  difficulties  in  the  process  of  product  development. 
Stroud's  letters  to  Glasgow  show  the  volume  and  detail  of  correspondence  between  him 
and  Archibald  Barr  when  new  designs  were  in  progress.  Daily  letters  suggested  ways  to 
overcome  difficulties,  and  arguments  over  the  best  ways  to  proceed  were  conducted  on 
paper.  At  times,  Barr's  frustrations  were  evident.  In  1904,  when  the  War  Office  had 
asked  for  a  design  for  a  new  type  of  artillery  sight,  Stroud  had  dismissed  the  type  of 
instrument  as  being  of  no  value.  Barr  wrote  to  him  bluntly,  saying  `I  do  not  agree  with 
you  [about  the  sight's  utility],  but  we  need  not  discuss  that;  they  are  wanted  and  are  to  be 
introduced  into  the  service  ... 
'113  In  December  1904,  Barr  wrote  `I  do  not  agree  that  you 
can  do  the  best  for  B&S  by  staying  at  home  [in  Leeds]'.  '  4  Stroud  obdurately  refused  to 
visit  Glasgow,  and  the  question  of  his  moving  to  live  and  work  there  was  not  once 
mentioned  directly  in  any  of  the  personal  correspondence  still  preserved  from  this  time. 
His  continual,  and  at  times  seemingly  determined,  absence  could  hardly  have  helped  the 
process  of  optical  design  development.  '  15 
When  the  move  to  the  Ashton  Lane  factory  was  made  in  1899,  Barr  &  Stroud  were 
relying  on  one  principal  supplier  of  mechanical  components  and  two  suppliers  of  optical 
1  12  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  provides  details  of  the  qualifications  of  scientific  staff,  p.  37,38. 
1  13  UGD  295/4  /739,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Stroud,  16.11.1904. 
114  UGD  295/4/739,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Stroud,  14.12.1904. 
115  In  March  1901  he  refused  to  travel  up  to  Glasgow,  citing  the  presence  of  smallpox  in  the  city  as  too 
great  a  risk.  UGD  295/16/1/10,  Stroud's  personal  correspondence. 84 
parts.  James  White,  the  Glasgow  firm  with  which  Lord  Kelvin,  (Barr's  earlier  mentor  at 
the  University  of  Glasgow)  was  closely  associated,  '16  had  supplied  castings  and 
fabricated  parts  for  both  the  rangefinder  and  its  mounting.  Chadburn  Brothers  of 
Sheffield,  Yorkshire,  supplied  both  spherical  lenses  and  plane  glass  panels,  and  Adam 
Hilger  of  Camden,  London,  made  some  spherical  lenses  and  all  the  prisms.  Barr  & 
Stroud  constantly  had  difficulty  with  the  quality  of  the  optical  contractors'  products,  as 
well  as  deliveries. 
The  problems  with  optical  components  were  frequent  and  sometimes  serious.  Chadburn 
Brothers  had  been  suppliers  of  the  simpler  optical  parts  since  1889,  when  they  made 
parts  for  the  very  first  instrument.  '  17  Barr  &  Stroud  used  them  for  the  less  critical 
components  in  the  rangefmder's  optical  system,  such  as  the  optics  for  the  aiming 
viewfmder  and  the  protective  glass  covers  for  the  objectives.  Even  with  these  relatively 
simple  items  Barr  &  Stroud  frequently  returned  parts  to  Chadburn's  with  complaints 
about  inadequate  quality  and  errors  in  execution,  '  18  but  rather  than  looking  for  a 
replacement  supplier  seemed  content  to  instruct  and  educate,  presumably  because  there 
was  no  other  closer  or  more  convenient  source.  119 
The  relationship  with  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  was  particularly  important  because  for  much 
of  this  period  Hilger  was  practically  the  only  company  in  Britain  able  to  provide  the  most 
important  optical  parts  of  the  rangefinder.  The  Barr  and  Stroud  instrument  used  two 
telescopes  which  provided  the  operator  with  separate  images  of  a  target:  these  images 
were  brought  into  alignment  through  a  system  of  prisms  to  provide  a  direct  reading  of  the 
target's  range.  The  telescopes  were  not  particularly  complex  in  design,  but  it  was 
important  that  they  provided  images  of  almost  identical  magnification  as  possible.  They 
16  T.  N.  Clark,  A.  D.  Morrison-Low,  and  A.  D.  C.  Simpson,  Brass  &  Glass:  Scientific  Instrument  Making 
Workshops  in  Scotland  (Edinburgh:  National  Museums  of  Scotland,  1988)  for  an  account  of  this  business 
and  the  connections  with  Lord  Kelvin. 
"7  UGD  295/Unclassified  material/  Russell  research  notes:  Private  Ledger  No.  1  (1888-1902)  is  mentioned 
as  showing  payments  to  Chadburn  Brothers  from  1889  onwards. 
118  For  example,  UGD  295/4/22,  Letter  Book,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Chadburn  Bros,  25.2.1901  complains  that 
'in  almost  every  instance 
...  we  get  a  wrong  lens...  '.  ; 
119  Clark  et  al.  (1990)  gives  no  listing  of  optical  manufacturers. 85 
presented  a  manufacturing  problem  rather  than  a  design  difficulty.  Stroud  specified  their 
necessary  magnifying  power  and  angle  of  view  and  left  Hilger's  to  compute  the  lens 
curves  necessary  to  provide  them.  Stroud's  skill  lay  in  the  design  of  the  prism  systems 
which  provided  for  the  superimposition  of  the  telescopes'  images,  but  as  with  the 
telescopes  he  was  entirely  dependent  on  Hilger's  to  produce  them  accurately;  not 
achieving  precisely  the  specified  angles  would  cause  a  prism  to  fail  in  its  purpose.  120 
Problems  with  both  quality  and  delivery  times  from  Hilger  had  been  evident  almost  from 
the  start  of  the  companies'  relationship.  Sometimes  Hilger's  work  was  praised,  but  often 
it  fell  below  Barr  &  Stroud's  requirements.  As  early  as  February  1893,  Barr  &  Stroud 
were  returning  prisms  as  unsatisfactory  and  difficulties  continued  on  a  regular  basis.  121  In 
1897  Adam  Hilger,  presumably  as  a  result  of  the  increasing  volume  of  business,  mooted 
the  idea  of  moving  the  business  to  Glasgow,  and  Barr  reported  to  William  Stroud  that 
'Hilger  appears  to  favour  an  amalgamation  of  some  kind'.  122  However,  despite  the'great 
delays  in  sending  things  back  and  forward',  neither  partner  was  'disposed  to  favour  this' 
and  nothing  came  of  the  idea.  The  following  year  though,  Barr  &  Stroud  complained  that 
the  defects  in  Hilger's  prisms  were  causing  them'endless  worry  and  expense'.  123  Between 
October  and  December  of  1900  a  series  of  letters  to  Hilger  written  by  Harold  Jackson, 
Barr  &  Stroud's  general  manager,  showed  how  bad  matters  had  become  between  the  two 
firms.  124 
Having  had  yet  more  problems  with  prisms,  Jackson  warned  Hilger's  on  4`h  November 
that  Barr  &  Stroud  now  had  the  means  to  check  precisely  the  standards  of  optical  work 
delivered.  By  the  28`h,  Jackson  was  saying  that  the  Hilger's  proposed  mutually 
acceptable  standards  were  'ridiculous'  and  on  the  30th  he  threatened  to  go  elsewhere  for 
prism  work.  The  threat,  which  was  repeated  on  P  December,  was  really  a  hollow  one 
120  for  a  description  of  prisms  and  their  working  in  the  rangefinder,  see  L.  C.  Martin,  Optical  Instruments, 
their  Construction,  Theory  and  Use  (London:  Blackie  &  Sons,  1924)  p.  113  if. 
121  UGD295/4/11  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Hilger,  23.3.1893  and  4.4.1893. 
12  UGD  295/16/1/9,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Stroud,  26.1.1897. 
123  UGD  295  Unclassified  Material,  Russell  Research  Notes,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  Hilger,  10.9.1898. 
124  UGD  295/4/21  Letter  Book,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  Hilger,  a  series  of  letters  between  3.10.1900  and 
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because  Barr  &  Stroud  no  other  source  to  turn  to  and  although  its  real  purpose  was 
doubtless  to  encourage  Hilger's  to  improve  their  quality,  Jackson  may  have  been 
overzealous  and  pushed  the  London  firm  to  a  point  where  it  wanted  to  cease  doing 
optical  work  for  Barr  &  Stroud.  A  complete  breakdown  in  relations  between  the  two 
firms  during  December  1900  seems  to  have  been  averted  only  by  Barr's  personal 
intervention  in  a  letter  of  13t'  December,  apologising  for  the  'hurt'  which  earlier 
correspondence  had  caused.  125  But,  even  this  conciliatory  letter  reiterated  (if  less  harshly) 
the  possibility  of  taking  orders  elsewhere,  and  difficulties  between  the  firms  over  quality 
control  continued  to  surface  periodically,  although  business  between  them  continued 
without  interruption. 
The  dependence  on  Hilger  clearly  concerned  Barr  &  Stroud,  and  they  periodically 
investigated  obtaining  optical  components  not  just  from  other  domestic  sources,  but  from 
the  German  optical  industry  as  well.  126  In  1897  they  had  made  C.  P.  Goerz  of  Berlin  their 
German  agent,  and  afterwards  periodically  bought  lens  samples  from  them,  as  well  as 
asking  for  quotations  for  the  manufacture  of  prisms.  127  In  1899,  they  attempted  to  buy 
objective  lenses  from  Steinheil  of  Munich,  but  encountered  problems  similar  to  those 
they  had  already  had  with  Hilger:  either  the  very  specific  instructions  given  were  not 
adhered  to  or  the  quality  was  inadequate  and  sometimes  the  price  was  considered 
excessive.  128  In  1899,  Stroud  suggested  asking  Carl  Zeiss  of  Jena  to  quote  for  optical 
components,  but  there  is  no  record  that  his  idea  was  followed  up.  129 
Barr  &  Stroud's  continued  dependence  on  Adam  Hilger  through  to  the  end  of  1906  was 
principally  the  result  of  an  established  relationship  that,  despite  frequent  problems, 
worked  well  enough  to  let  them  produce  satisfactory  rangefinders.  It  was  also  because 
they  still  lacked  the  expertise  to  do  the  work  themselves,  although  after  1904  they  began 
'25  UGD  295/16/1/9  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  Hilger,  13.12.1900. 
'26  UGD  295/4/17  Letter  Book,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Ross  Optical  Co.,  requesting  them  to  tender  for  telescope 
objectives  12.12.1898. 
'I  for  example,  see  UGD  295/4/22  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Goerz,  28.3.1901,  requesting  quotations  for 
'fine  quality  prisms'. 
12$  UGD  295/4/17  Letter  Book,  10  objective  lenses  ordered  31.12.1898.  They  were  returned  faulty  on 
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to  organise  the  means  to  do  this,  partly  from  the  desire  to  control  costs  but  also  to  gain 
greater  control  of  the  quality  and  speed  of  delivery  of  components  for  experimental 
work.  130  Attempts  to  obtain  more  satisfactory  quality  from  German  suppliers  had  failed 
(suggesting  that  contemporary  perceptions  of  the  superiority  of  the  German  optical 
industry  were  not  wholly  justified),  and  even  if  Barr  &  Stroud  had  been  inclined  work 
their  way  through  the  entire  catalogue  of  German  makers,  the  growing  inclination  of  the 
Admiralty  to  be  independent  of  foreign  suppliers  even  for  materials  in  British  made 
products  would  have  been  a  strong  deterrent.  Given  the  lack  of  any  other  British  firm 
who  could  be  relied  on  to  perform  better  than  Hilger,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  little  alternative 
to  becoming  optical  workers  themselves.  This  process  began  in  1904,  but  only  developed 
significantly  after  1907. 
2.7  Conclusion 
The  period  from  1899  to  1906  saw  an  increasing  complexity  in  both  the  industry  and  its 
relationship  with  its  government  clients,  the  War  Office  and  the  Admiralty.  Those 
complexities  were  brought  on  not  simply  by  the  increasing  complexity  of  instruments 
and  their  scale  of  use,  but  also  by  a  range  of  external  and  internal  factors  contingent  on 
both  makers  and  buyers.  Those  included  both  political  and  financial  dimensions,  as  well 
as  the  goals  and  prejudices  of  the  social  groups  that  constituted  the  communities 
producing  and  using  the  apparatus.  At  the  close  of  1906,  the  optical  munitions  industry  in 
Britain  was  both  larger  and  more  important  than  at  the  start  of  the  Boer  War.  The  Royal 
Navy  was  by  far  its  largest  single  customer,  although  providing  less  income  than  the  total 
of  foreign  orders.  When  the  business  placed  by  foreign  navies  up  to  1906  is  added,  it  is 
clear  that  optical  munitions  were  still  predominantly  naval  artefacts.  Driven  by  a 
combination  of  improved  weapons,  an  increasing  realisation  of  the  potential 
effectiveness  of  gunnery,  and  new  types  of  ship,  the  Royal  Navy's  capabilities  were 
becoming  inextricably  connected  to  its  optical  equipment.  That  growth  was  to  confirm 
the  Admiralty  as  the  optical  munitions  industry's  largest  domestic  client,  but  as  the 
129  UGD  295/16/1/10  Personal  correspondence  from  William  Stroud  to  H.  D.  Jackson  7.7.1899. 
130  UGD  295  Unclassified  Material.  Russell  Research  Notes.  Barr's  Private  Letter  Book  No.  1,  Barr  to  Mr 
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succeeding  chapter  will  show,  the  increase  in  European  land  armaments  was  to  start  to 
generate  an  increasing  demand  from  the  War  Office. 89 
Chapter  3 
Expansion  and  consolidation,  1907  to  1914 
3.1  Introduction 
The  period  from  1907  to  the  start  of  the  Great  War  saw  optical  munitions  production 
grow  at  increasing  rate  and  by  1914  a  clearly  identifiable  sector  of  industry  was  engaged 
permanently,  if  not  always  entirely,  in  the  production  of  instruments  which,  with  few 
exceptions,  had  no  civil  applications.  Only  a  small  part  of  the  optical  instruments  trade 
was  engaged  in  this  work,  reflecting  not  just  the  specialised  nature  of  what  was  being 
made  but  also  the  scale  of  demand  for  military  and  naval  optics.  That  demand  grew  after 
1907,  not  so  much  because  advances  in  optical  technology  permitted  the  creation  of  new 
instruments,  but  because  developments  in  weapons  technologies  and  increasing  political 
instability  created  a  climate  that  encouraged  European  states  in  particular  to  increase 
their  expenditure  on  armaments  and  take  up  equipment  which  increasingly  depended  on 
optical  instrumentation  for  its  effectiveness.  For  the  first  time,  the  British  War  Office 
became  a  systematic  buyer  of  optical  munitions,  greatly  increasing  its  spending  in  the 
last  two  years  of  peace.  Even  though  its  budgets  for  such  equipment  were  far  less  than 
the  Admiralty's,  it  brought  firms  regularly  into  munitions  work  and  established  them  as 
regular  contractors.  The  Royal  Navy's  demands  increased  at  a  faster  rate  than  the 
Army's,  although  a  smaller  number  of  firms  produced  its  requirements  and  established 
closer  working  relations  than  with  the  War  Office.  This  chapter  examines  the  extent  to 
which  the  optical  munitions  makers  benefited  from  government  business,  assesses 
existing  conceptions  of  the  industry  at  this  time,  and  compares  the  relative  success  and 
failure  of  the  businesses  that  competed  to  supply  what  continued  to  be  the  single  most 
important  item  in  the  optical  armoury,  the  large  naval  rangefinder. 
3.2  The  industry  and  the  War  Office's  influence  on  it. 
In  1907  the  Army  was  still  a  very  small-scale  user  of  optical  munitions,  most  of  which 
were  already  acknowledged  within  the  service  as  unsatisfactory  and  obsolescent.  Little 
had  been  done  to  rectify  the  shortcomings  demonstrated  in  the  Boer  War  and  the  Army's 90 
spending  on  optics  since  then  had  averaged  only  £1,700  a  year.  '  That  changed  after  1908 
when  decisions  were  made  to  adopt  new  instruments,  causing  spending  to  increase  and 
generating  new  business  for  optical  manufacturers.  It  has  been  previously  suggested  that 
not  only  did  the  War  Office  do  little  to  support  the  domestic  optical  industry,  but  through 
a  combination  of  favouring  foreign  makers  and  distributing  orders  piecemeal  amongst 
British  companies  it  discouraged  the  home  industry  from  becoming  involved  in  military 
contracting.  2  An  examination  of  ordering  patterns  does  not  bear  out  this  view,  showing 
rather  that  War  Office  business  was  concentrated  on  a  few  British  firms  who  thus  became 
progressively  more  experienced  in  optical  munitions  production.  That  is  not  to  say  that 
the  British  Army  was  a  prolific  spender  or  that,  unlike  the  Admiralty,  it  deliberately 
encouraged  the  home  industry,  but  nevertheless  military  orders  were  placed  at  an 
increasing  pace  after  1910.  The  interaction  of  the  War  Office  with  the  optical 
manufacturing  community  can  be  demonstrated  by  examining  the  process  of  selection 
and  purchase  of  three  key  types  of  optical  munitions  -  the  single-observer  rangefinder, 
the  panoramic  artillery  gun  sight  (the  `dial  sight'),  and  the  prismatic  binocular. 
The  records  of  the  Army  Contracts  Department  from  April  1907  to  31"  March  1914, 
show  that  some  £175,000  was  allocated  to  optical  orders  3  Approximately  £49,000  was 
for  rangefinders,  £66,000  for  dial  sights,  and  £45,000  for  binoculars.  Of  the  balance  of 
£15,000,  some  £10,000  was  spent  on  telescopes  for  signallers,  and  the  rest  on  an 
assortment  of  other  telescopes  and  gun  sights.  None  of  those  latter  purchases  were 
recorded  in  sufficient  detail  to  give  any  meaningful  picture  of  their  distribution  amongst 
manufacturers  and  they  are  excluded  from  following  account. 
3.3  The  Rangefinder 
In  1907,  the  Army  still  lacked  a  satisfactory  rangefinder  despite  numerous  trials  which 
had  repeatedly  recommended  that  the  Marindin  design  should  be  adopted  by  the 
'  The  National  Archives,  Kew,  London,  War  Office  records  (subsequently  PRO)  WO  395/2,  Annual 
Reports  of  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts,  financial  years  1903-1904,1904-1905,1905-1906,1906-1907; 
data  extracted  from  Contracts  for  Scientific  Instruments. 
2  R.  and  K.  MacLeod,  "Government  and  the  Optical  Industry  in  Britain  1914-1918.  "  In  War  and  Economic 
Development,  edited  by  J.  M.  Winter.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1977)  p.  170. 
3  Extracted  from  PRO  WO  395/2  and  WO  395/3,  Annual  Reports. 91 
Infantry.  4  Only  in  January  that  year  was  it  finally  considered  necessary  `that  an  infantry 
rangefinder  should  be  immediately  supplied'  and  the  following  month  the  Marindin  was 
formally  approved.  5  The  quantities  needed  were,  however,  uncertain,  because  the  scale  of 
issue  for  rangefinders  was  currently  being  reviewed.  If  the  Marindin  simply  replaced  the 
earlier  Mekometer,  then  the  Field  Army's  Infantry  (the  `front  line'  troops)  would  need 
only  300,  but  if  a  wider  issue  were  adopted  then  the  total  for  the  entire  Infantry  of  the 
Regular  Army  would  be  1,040.  Budgeting  for  either  quantity  was  problematical  because 
no  detailed  costings  had  ever  been  requested  by  the  War  Office. 
Captain  Marindin,  the  inventor,  had  his  trial  instruments  made  by  Adam  Hilger  &  Co., 
but  there  had  been  no  formal  liaison  between  the  firm  and  the  Army  and  the  only  price 
mentioned  had  been  Marindin's  informal  estimate  of  £35  if  `very  large'  numbers  were 
ordered.  The  Master  General  of  the  Ordnance  was  being  pressed  to  organise  the 
rangefinder's  `early  introduction'  even  before  its  formal  adoption,  and  he  proposed  to 
supply  the  Field  Army  with  300  during  the  next  two  years.  He  thought  Marindin's 
estimate  unrealistic  as  the  trial  instruments  had  each  cost  at  least  £85  each,  and  he 
reckoned  the  likely  cost  to  be  `nearer 
...  £50  each',  possibly  using  as  his  yard-stick  the 
current  price  of  the  Barr  &  Stroud  infantry  rangefinder.  Having  decided  on  the  need  to 
buy  300  rangefinders  at  a  cost  likely  to  exceed  £15,000,  the  Master  General  could  only 
allocate  £5,000  in  the  Annual  Estimates  for  the  fiscal  year  1907-1908  but  nevertheless 
was  content  that,  somehow,  `steps  will  now  be  taken  as  to  ...  obtaining  a  supply'. 
Obtaining  any  supply  was  complicated  because  Marindin  and  the  War  Office  were  in 
dispute  about  the  question  of  financial  reward.  7  When  asked  in  1902  about  his  terms  for 
making  the  rangefinder  available  to  the  Crown  he  had  valued  it  at  £25,000,  but  no  further 
discussions  took  place  until  Marindin  learned  in  early  March  1907  of  the  decision  to 
4  See  Chapter  2  above. 
The  National  Archives,  Kew,  Treasury  Records,  (subsequently  PRO)  T1/11223,  Proceedings  of  the 
Ordnance  Council,  12.6.1908,  Question  of  Award  to  Captain  A.  H.  Marindin,  The  Black  Watch  for  One- 
man  Range-finderforlnfantry  (subsequently  Tl/11223  (1908),  p.  5. 
6  PRO  TI/11223  (1908),  p.  4.  This  provides  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise 
indicated. 
7  PRO  T111  1223,  Proceedings  of  the  Ordnance  Council,  8.6.1909,  Question  of  Award  to  Captain  A.  H. 
Marindin,  The  Black  Watch  for  One-man  Range;  finder  for  Infantry  (subsequently  T111  1223  1909)  p.  6. 92 
adopt  his  rangefinder  and  immediately  resurrected  the  matter.  Pending  a  judgement,  he 
refused  to  hand  over  the  its  detailed  drawings  to  the  Chief  Inspector  of  Optical  Stores  at 
Woolwich  Arsenal,  stopping  the  War  Office  from  drawing  up  a  specification  in  order  to 
request  tenders  for  manufacture.  The  impasse  was  only  broken  by  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War  who  reminded  Marindin  that  he  was  `witholding  the  information  necessary  for 
the  manufacture  of  the  instrument  for  His  Majesty's  Service'  and,  in  practical  terms, 
ordered  him  to  surrender  the  details  immediately.  As  a  serving  officer,  he  had  little 
alternative  but  to  acquiesce  and  hand  over  what  was  needed,  trusting  to  fortune  about  his 
eventual  reward. 
A  request  for  tenders  was  issued  by  July  1907,  but  it  was  five  months  before  any  contract 
was  placed.  In  November,  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  was  given  an  order,  not  for  the  hundred 
which  had  been  budgeted  for,  but  for  just  sixteen  instrument  for  troop  trials.  8  That  was 
because  the  War  Office  had  decided  that  Marindin's  claim  could  only  be  judged  after 
seeing  how  well  the  rangefinder  performed  when  issued  to  `ordinary'  infantry  units, 
linking  its  monetary  value  to  its  utility  in  general  service.  Until  the  claim  was  settled,  the 
War  Office  was  reluctant  to  commit  itself  to  further  purchases  until  an  offer  was  been 
made  to  Marindin  in  June  1908,  after  which  only  fifty  were  ordered  despite  funds  for  a 
hundred  already  being  available.  Marindin  rejected  the  offer  and  then  appealed  to  the 
Treasury,  a  process  that  took  a  further  year  and  gave  him  not  £25,000  but  a  royalty  of 
just  15  percent  on  each  rangefinder  accepted  for  service,  plus  his  earlier  expenses. 
The  number  of  Marindin  rangefinders  ordered  up  to  April  1914  was  just  337  at  a  total 
value  of  £22,305,  far  less  than  was  either  needed  or  originally  expected.  It  was  never 
ordered  on  a  scale  large  enough  to  equip  the  entire  Infantry,  partly  because  there  were 
problems  with  it  in  service,  partly  because  Hilger's  were  unable  to  manufacture  at  a  rate 
greater  two  than  per  week,  and  not  least  because  the  War  Office  was  unable  to  persuade 
any  other  maker  to  attempt  its  production.  9  The  only  other  firm  to  tender  and  supply 
a  University  of  Glasgow  Archives,  University  of  Glasgow  Archives,  Barr  &  Stroud,  City  of  Glasgow, 
Optical  Instrument  Makers,  collection  reference  UGD  295  (subsequently  UGD  295)  295/4/744,  Letter 
Book,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  Adam  Hilger  Ltd.,  9.8.1907,  and  20.11.1907. 
9  PRO  TI/11223  (1908)  p.  4  and  p.  10. 93 
sample  instruments  was  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd  in  1908,  but  the  company  never 
received  any  production  contracts.  10  The  Marindin  provided  few  benefits  for  the  industry, 
either  through  large  orders  or  any  kind  of  spin-off  that  might  have  opened  up  new 
avenues  for  its  maker.  Adam  Hilger's  problems  that  restricted  their  benefiting  from  it 
will  be  described  later  in  this  chapter,  but  the  rest  of  the  optical  industry  was  deterred 
from  competing  to  produce  it  principally  because  the  technical  and  logistical  difficulties 
in  setting-up  outweighed  the  guarantee  of  reward;  without  the  assurance  of  continuing 
orders  no  business  was  willing  to  tackle  a  manufacturing  problem  that  was  outside  its 
prior  experience. 
Eventually,  in  1912,  the  War  Office  ordered  a  small  quantity  of  infantry  rangefmders 
from  Barr  &  Stroud  and  the  next  year  followed  almost  every  other  European  army's 
example  and  began  to  buy  them  in  bulk.  Orders  in  1912  totalled  £4,313,  rose  in  1913  to 
£9,724,  and  in  the  first  seven  months  of  1914  leapt  to  £54,000,  almost  two  and  a  half 
times  the  money  spent  on  the  Marindin  in  the  previous  six  years.  "  The  War  Office  also 
spent  £13,055  on  German  Zeiss  rangefinders  for  experimental  issue  to  the  Field  Artillery 
in  1911  and  1913,  apparently  supporting  the  notion  that  domestic  industry  was  being 
discouraged.  However,  no  decision  had  been  made  about  standardising  a  pattern,  and  the 
purchases  demonstrated  the  Artillery's  inability  to  decide  on  what  design  of  rangefinder 
it  actually  wanted  rather  than  discrimination  against  domestic  models.  By  the  summer  of 
1914,  with  a  European  war  looking  ever  more  likely,  the  Infantry  was  finally  starting  to 
be  equipped  with  a  satisfactory  rangefinder,  but  the  Field  Artillery  was  still  deliberating 
over  what  was  required.  The  management  of  rangefinder  procurement  over  the  previous 
seven  years  may  not  have  reflected  well  on  the  War  Office,  but  the  procurement  of 
artillery  sights  and  prism  binoculars  went  far  more  satisfactorily. 
10  PRO  WO  395/3,  Contracts  Department,  Annual  Report  1907-1908. 
"  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/1,295/19/2/2  and  295/19/2/3,  Customer  Order  files. 94 
3.4  The  Artillery  'Dial  Sight'. 
The  Russo-Japanese  war  had  emphasised  that  a  more  effective  means  of  aiming  artillery 
weapons  was  needed  when  the  line  of  sight  was  obstructed.  12  Engaging  obscured  targets 
by  `indirect  firing'  was  not  new  to  gunners,  and  was  accomplished  by  aiming-off  from  a 
proxy  target  whose  angular  displacement  from  the  actual  one  had  been  measured,  so  that 
the  gun's  sight  could  be  set  to  an  appropriate  deflection  in  order  to  point  the  barrel  in  the 
correct  direction.  13  The  displacement  angle  was  measured  using  surveying  techniques, 
and  the  sighting  done  with  an  instrument  using  an  aiming  telescope  fixed  to  a  large, 
precisely  divided  circular  dial  -  the  so  called  `dial-sight'  which  was  awkward  to  use, 
bulky,  and  relatively  fragile.  In  1904,  the  Berlin  company,  Optische  Anstaldt  C.  P. 
Goerz,  introduced  a  radically  new  type  of  optical  sight  that  significantly  improved  on 
previous  designs.  14  This  `panoramic'  dial  sight  was  a  compact  prismatic  aiming  telescope 
that  functioned  as  periscope:  it  traversed  through  a  full  circle  whilst  maintaining  a 
magnified  normal  image  for  the  observer  who  could  now  remain  protected  behind  the 
gun's  shield.  Tests  began  in  Britain  in  1904  and,  as  with  the  Marindin  rangefinder,  went 
-oirfor  several  ycurs  before  the  device  was-+eventualiyapproved  forservice-in  1907  and 
ordered  as  the  `Dial  Sight  No.  7'. 
It  was  taken  into  use  far  quicker  and  more  successfully  than  the  rangefinder,  and  on  a 
larger  scale.  Between  April  1909  and  April  1914  it  accounted  for  more  expenditure  than 
any  other  single  optical  store  purchased  by  the  Army  Contracts  Department  -  £65,698,  or 
37  percent  of  the  total  expenditure  on  optical  munitions,  with  1,662  sights  eventually 
being  contracted  from  six  makers.  ls  Sufficient  were  ordered  to  match  the  gradual 
introduction  after  1904  of  new  guns  which  were  the  principal  recipients  of  the  sight. 
Between  then  and  July  1914,  approximately  1,650  new  guns  were  ordered  for  the  British 
and  Indian  Armies,  and  although  contracts  for  dial  sights  only  began  in  1908  they  did 
12  Callwell,  C.  E.  and  J.  F.  Headlam.  The  History  of  the  Royal  Artillery.  3  vols.  (Woolwich,  London:  Royal 
Artillery  Institution,  1937)  Vol.  II,  Chapters  III  and  X. 
"  Callwell  and  Headlam  (1937)  Vol.  II,  pp.  95  to  101  describe  the  problems  of  indirect  firing  and  aiming 
and  provide  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  paragraph.. 
14  See  B.  K.  Johnson,  "The  No.  7  Dial  Sight,  Mk.  2.  "  Transactions  of  the  Optical  Society  21(1920):  pp. 
176  to  86. 
15  Extracted  from  PRO  WO  395/2  and  395/3,  Annual  Reports  of  Director  of  Army  Contracts. 95 
eventually  match  gun  deliveries.  16  The  scale  of  orders,  unlike  the  Marindin  rangefinder, 
was  therefore  as  much  as  the  optical  industry  could  have  expected  to  receive. 
Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod  suggested  that  before  1914  the  War  Office  did  not  aid  its  optical 
suppliers  in  the  way  it  went  about  doing  business  with  them.  In  particular  it  `was  a 
customer  for  German  dial  sights  which  ... 
led  to  the  active  discouragement  of  British 
firms  in  this  area'.  17  And,  they  said,  the  War  Office  spread  small  contracts  across 
different  firms  `in  a  misguided  effort  to  stimulate  competition'  which  had  the  unfortunate 
opposite  effect  of  forcing  up  prices  and  discouraging  mass  production  through  the  small 
quantities  -just  `tens'  -  of  instruments  involved.  Although  the  War  Office  did  buy  dial 
sights  from  Germany,  and  did  spread  orders  across  a  number  of  makers,  the  evidence  of 
contract  records  leads  to  a  conclusion  rather  different  to  the  MacLeods'. 
The  sight  was  made  in  Britain  under  a  licensing  agreement  with  the  German  Goerz 
company  which  held  international  patents  for  it.  The  arrangement  required  the  purchase 
of  some  instruments  from  Goerz  and  the  payment  of  royalties  for  those  made  in  Britain. 
Only  30  percent  of  the  orders  went  directly  to  Goerz  and,  in  an  apparent  paradox,  the 
War  Office  may  actually  have  considered  Goerz  as  a  British  supplier.  The  Contracts 
Department  identified  all  foreign  purchases  in  its  yearly  reports,  but  only  two  of  Goerz's 
four  contracts  were  so  described,  in  the  financial  years  1910-1911  and  1911-1912;  those 
in  the  next  two  years  were  listed  along  with  domestic  ones.  Goerz  had  set  up  a  London 
subsidiary  company  ('Tochtergesellschaft')  in  1908,  partly  in  response  to  the  new 
requirements  of  the  Companies  (Consolidation)  Act,  1907  which  required  foreign 
businesses  trading  in  Britain  to  disclose  full  details  of  their  parent  company's  financial 
affairs,  and  partly  because  of  the  new  Patents  Act  of  the  same  year.  18  Under  the  latter,  if  a 
British  patent  held  by  a  foreign  patentee  was  not  being  `worked'  on  a  commercial  basis 
in  Britain,  the  patentee  was  obliged  to  grant  a  licence  to  any  `interested  person'  who 
16  For  numbers  of  guns  ordered,  see  Hogg  and  Thurston  (1972)  pp.  58,80,102  and  116,  and  for 
introduction  into  service  see  Callwell  and  Headlam  (1937)  Vol.  II,  p.  101. 
"  MacLeod  (1977)  p.  170  is  the  source  for  this  and  other  quotations  in  this  paragraph. 
'8  A.  Hagen,  Deutsche  Direktinvestionen  in  Grossbritannien,  1871-1918  (Stuttgart:  Steiner  Verlag,  1997) 
pp.  174  and  175  provides  information  about  Goerz,  and  A.  Hagen  "Export  Versus  Direct  Investment  in  the 
German  Optical  Industry.  "  Business  History,  no.  4  October  1996  (1996)  p.  5  details  on  the  effects  of  new 
legislation  on  German  companies  trading  in  Great  Britain.. 96 
wished  to  take  it  up.  The  creation  of  a  British  company  -  the  C.  P.  Goerz  Optical  Works 
Ltd.  -  avoided  the  demands  of  the  Companies  Act  and  opened  the  way  to  side-stepping 
the  Patents  Act  through  the  licensing  arrangement  with  the  War  Office.  The  business  was 
incorporated  with  an  initial  share  capital  of  £5,000  that  was  subsequently  increased  to 
£10,000. 
It  is  not  clear  if  Goerz  actually  made,  or  even  assembled,  instruments  in  Britain.  Antje 
Hagen's  brief  description  of  the  fun's  British  activities  suggests  that,  unlike  the  larger 
firm  of  Zeiss  (which did  set  up  a  manufacturing  business  in  addition  to  its  import  and 
marketing  structure),  it  remained  no  more  than  a  marketing  company  -  `einer 
Vertriebgeselleschaft'.  However,  its  share  capital  of  £10,000  was  the  same  that  Zeiss 
employed  in  both  its  manufacturing  and  distribution,  raising  the  question  of  why  such  a 
large  amount  was  needed  by  a  smaller  business  operating,  according  to  Hagen,  on  a 
lesser  scale.  Without  more  evidence,  any  answer  must  be  conjectural,  but  so  far  as  the 
Army's  purchasing  department  was  concerned,  by  April  1912  the  company  was  being 
treated  as  a  British  supplier. 
The  other  70  percent  of  dial  sight  orders  were  spread  between  six  companies,  again 
seeming  to  support  the  MacLeods'  argument  that  War  Office  contracts  were  spread  too 
thinly  to  be  attractive  to  makers.  Barr  &  Stroud,  Beck,  Cooke's  of  York,  Goerz,  Ross  and 
Vickers  all  received  orders.  However,  Vickers  had  no  optical  capability,  and  the  contract 
would  have  been  carried  out  by  Cooke's  which  had  both  connections  with  Vickers  and 
earlier  experience  making  the  sight.  19  The  orders  given  to  them  and  to  Barr  &  Stroud 
were  very  much  smaller  than  the  others: 
"  A.  McConnell,  Instrument  Makers  to  the  World.  A  History  of  Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms  (York: 
William  Sessions  Ltd,,  1992)  p.  65  describes  the  connections  with  Vickers. 97 
Table  3.4:  Dial  Sight  contracts,  1909-1914.20 
Firm  1909-10  1910-11  1911-12  1912-13  1913-14  Total  % 
Cooke  15  63  78  4.7 
Barr  &  Stroud  55  25  80  4.8 
Beck  15  125  130  '222  492  29.6 
Goerz  168  100  100  124  492  29.6 
Ross  20  100  196  204  520  31.3 
total  85  188  350  489  550  1662 
Over  90  percent  of  the  orders  were  divided  between  just  three  firms,  in  roughly  equal 
proportions.  To  what  extent  this  was  through  a  misplaced  desire  to  `stimulate 
competition'  is  open  to  debate,  but  the  assertion  that  it  drove  up  prices  seems  far  from 
justified.  The  original  Goerz  order  in  1910  was  at  £40.05  per  instrument,  a  figure 
repeated  in  1911  and  1912,  and  the  final  Goerz  contract  in  1913  was  lower  at  £38.00. 
Goerz  was  already  making  the  sight  in  large  numbers  for  the  German  forces,  and 
allowing  for  the  resulting  economies  of  scale  and  lower  German  wage  costs,  it  might  be 
expected  that,  if  the  MacLeods  were  correct,  then  the  British  firms'  prices  would  have 
been  significantly  higher.  Beck's  were  more,  but  only  by  5  percent:  £42.50  in  1911, 
£42.20  in  1912,  and  £40.00  in  1913.  The  prices  from  Ross  were  actually  cheaper  - 
£35.00  in  1910  and  1911,  £37.50  in  1912  and  £37.75  in  1913.  Although  one  of  the 
Contract's  Department's  responsibilities  was  to  ensure  that  prices  charged  were 
reasonable,  it  also  had  to  ensure  deliveries  were  made  at  rates  appropriate  to  service 
requirements,  and  the  division  between  Beck  and  Ross  may  have  been  necessary  to 
obtain  the  numbers  required  to  match  gun  deliveries. 
The  idea  of  distributing  orders  in  small  numbers  primarily  to  stimulate  competition  has  to 
be  questioned.  The  size  of  contracts  was  governed  both  by  the  funds  available  and  the 
timetable  of  need.  Even  under  pressure  to  provide  an  effective  infantry  rangefinder 
`immediately'  at  a  cost  exceeding  £25,000,  the  War  Office  had  only  been  able  to  budget 
20  Extracted  from  PRO  WO  395/3  Director  of  Army  Contracts,  Annual  Reports,  except  for  the  Barr  & 
Stroud  order  1909-10  which  comes  from  UGD  295/19/8/1,  Customer  order  records,  Works  Order  CO 
1115,2.1.1910. 98 
£5,000  in  each  of  the  current  and  following  financial  years  because  that  was  the  limit  of 
funds  available.  21  Spending  on  munitions  contracts  in  1907  was  the  `lowest  for  twelve 
years,  '  and  orders  for  weapons  for  the  Army  until  the  end  of  1910-1911  continued  to  be 
lower  than  even  before  the  Boer  War.  22  The  need  for  dial  sights  was  geared  to  the 
delivery  of  new  artillery  weapons  whose  rates  of  production  were  initially  slow,  so  with 
limited budgets  it  made  no  sense  to  contemplate  ordering  in  advance  the  full  outfit  of 
sights  for  the  whole  gun  programme.  Fiscal  prudence  rather  than  misguidance  would 
better  account  for  the  absence  of  larger-scale  dial  sight  orders.  A  single  large  contract 
might  have  resulted,  as  the  MacLeods  suggested,  in  economies  of  scale  which  could  have 
reduced  production  costs,  but  the  financial  conditions  to  place  such  an  order  simply  did 
not  exist,  even  if  any  single  contractor  had  been  able  or  willing  to  take  on  the  work. 
Although  ordnance  spending  was  low,  the  overall  level  of  commercial  trade  was  good,  23 
and  if  the  War  Office  had  offered  a  very  big  order  it  may  well  have  found  itself  having 
to  persuade  instrument  makers  to  take  the  contract,  rather  than  finding  them  eager  to  bid 
for  government  work,  a  situation  that  would  hardly  have  driven  prices  down.  Many  of 
the  same  factors  also  applied  to  the  prism  binocular,  the  third  category  of  optical 
munitions  ordered  in  substantial  numbers  up  to  1914. 
3.5  The  Prism  Binocular 
The  organisation  of  prismatic  binocular  purchasing  differed  from  rangefinders  and  dial 
sights.  The  quantities  involved  were  greater,  the  unit  pieces  much  lower  and,  importantly, 
the  instrument  was  already  being  made  in  Britain  for  the  commercial  market  so,  unlike 
the  dial  sight  or  rangefinder,  there  was  not  necessarily  any  obstacle  to  persuading  firms 
to  compete  for  contracts.  Military  binoculars  were  little  different  to  civil  ones,  although 
the  high  levels  of  compliance  to  specification  demanded  by  the  War  Office  were 
unknown  in  the  civil  market.  The  MacLeods  placed  prismatic  binoculars  alongside  the 
dial  sight  in  censuring  War  Office  policy,  their  most  serious  criticism  being  that  the 
21  PRO  TI/11223  (1908)  p.  4. 
u  C.  Trebilcock,  The  Vickers  Brothers:  Armaments  and  Enterprise  1854-1914  (London:  Europa 
Publishers,  1977)  p.  12  and  then  p.  11. 
23  Clive  Trebilcock  The  Vickers  Brothers  p.  14. 99 
British  Army  was  actually  a  client  of  the  German  optical  industry  so  that  domestic  firms 
were  consequently  disadvantaged.  24  Once  again,  the  evidence  in  contracts  records  shows 
these  strictures  to  be  unfounded. 
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Between  1908  and  1914,  approximately  11,500  prismatic  binoculars  were  ordered  which 
was  enough  for  the  peacetime  Army  on  a  scale  of  one  for  every  twenty  officers  and 
men.  26  Their  total  value  was  some  £45,000  of  which,  in  contradiction  to  the  MacLeod's 
claim,  only  £7,500  or  17  percent  was  directly  spent  abroad.  Purchases  began  in  1908, 
when  1,500  were  ordered  from  the  German  firm  of  Carl  Zeiss  whose  only  British 
representation  was  then  a  sales  office  in  London.  In  1909,  driven  by  the  same 
considerations  as  Goerz,  Zeiss  set  up  an  additional  British  subsidiary  manufacturing 
company  at  Mill  Hill,  London,  which  `produced  field  glasses'  whose  components  were 
sent  from  Jena.  27  This  new  business,  Carl  Zeiss  (London)  Ltd.,  received  approximately 
24  R.  and  K.  MacLeod  (1977)  p.  170. 
25  PRO  WO 395/3  Annual  Reports  of  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts. 
26  This  proportion  is  obtained  from  PRO  TI/11223,  as  the  scale  of  issue  laid  down  by  the  Master  General  of 
the  Ordnance. 
27  Antje  Hagen,  `Export  versus  Direct  Investment  in  the  German  Optical  Industry'  Business  History  no.  4, 
October  1996,  p.  6. 
1909  1910  1911  1912  1913 100 
£5,600  worth  of  orders  between  1911  and  1914  which,  as  with  Goerz,  the  War  Office 
treated  as  domestic  business.  28  The  Mill  Hill  Zeiss  works  was  jointly  managed  by 
German  and  English  staff,  but  its  workforce  was  predominantly  English  and  its 
binoculars  were  marked  as  though  made  entirely  in  England.  29  Even  if  all  the  business 
placed  with  Zeiss  were  counted  as  foreign,  then  the  approximate  total  of  £13,100  was 
still  less  than  26  percent  of  all  prism  binocular  orders  which  hardly  made  the  Zeiss  the 
chief  supplier,  or  the  War  Office  reliant  on  foreign  instruments. 
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3.6  Summary  of  the  War  Office's  ordering  patterns 
The  War  Office  may  not  have  been  a  large  customer  and  may  have  deserved  censure 
because  of  the  way  it  handled  its  rangefinder  needs,  but  its  business  was  scaled  to  an 
army  only  a  quarter  the  size  of  Germany's  and  it  could  not  have  offered  the  optical 
makers  orders  on  the  scale  that  the  German  industry  received  from  its  own  War 
28  Some  of  the  orders  are  listed  in  the  Director  of  Contracts'  Annual  Reports  as  being  shared  with  other 
companies.  Assuming  an  equal  share  of  contract  values  produces  this  figure. 
29  For  example,  see  Binocular  No.  3  Mk  II,  number  810  marked  `Zeiss  London';  collection  of  William 
Reid. 
30  Extracted  from  PRO  WO  395/2  and  395/3,  Annual  Reports. 101 
Ministry.  31  Its  hesitant  selection  procedures  certainly  retarded  the  placing  of  rangefinder 
orders  but  nevertheless  it  was  still  a  far  better  client  than  the  MacLeods  suggested  and 
generally  ordered  as  many  instruments  as  the  Army  actually  needed.  It  certainly  did  not 
place  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  domestic  industry,  nor  was  it  so  badly  served  by  British 
contractors  that  it  had  to  depend  on  German  imports.  Its  suppliers  were  a  group  of 
specialist  British  makers  who  had  emerged  from  within  the  general  optical  instrument- 
making  community  and  so  far  as  these  devices  were  concerned  were  separate  from  it.  Far 
from  scattering  small  contracts  across  the  greater  optical  trade  before  1914,  the  War 
Office  actually  concentrated  its  orders  on  a  small  number  of  firms  who  accordingly 
became  familiar  with  producing  instruments  to  the  particular  standards  demanded  by  the 
Army.  Although  the  scale  of  War  Office  spending  increased  between  1907  and  1914,  it 
has  to  be  recognised  that  it  was  still  very  much  less  than  the  Admiralty's  which  provided 
both  a  larger  and  different  market  for  optical  munitions. 
3.7  The  Admiralty  and  its  effects  on  the  industry 
The  Admiralty  continued  to  be  a  much  larger  customer  for  optical  munitions  than  the 
War  Office  up  to  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1914,  and  rangefinders  dominated  its  orders.  The 
Royal  Navy's  demand  for  them  was  substantial  and  of  very  considerable  value,  far 
outweighing  that  for  other  optics.  Rangefinder  requirements  were  linked  to  a  substantial 
ship  building  programme  intended  to  maintain  a  margin  of  superiority  over  other  navies, 
and  which  is  usually  associated  with  battleships  and  battlecruisers.  32  However,  the 
cruisers  and  destroyers  that  were  also  built  added  to  the  scale  and  variety  of  demand  for 
optical  munitions.  Although  capital  ships  demanded  the  largest  and  most  sophisticated 
types,  cruisers  were  to  be  provided  with  outfits  of  optical  instruments  which,  only  a 
decade  earlier,  would  have  been  seen  as  lavish  even  on  the  biggest  warships.  In  addition, 
from  1907  the  Admiralty  began  to  ask  for  rangefinders  that  could  be  used  on  the  smaller 
31  D.  G.  Hermann,  The  Arming  of  Europe  and  the  Making  of  the  First  World  War  (Princeton,  New  Jersey: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1996)  p.  234. 
32  J.  T.  Sumida,  In  Defence  of  Naval  Supremacy:  Finance,  Technology  and  British  Naval  Policy  1888-1914 
(London,  Routledge,  1993)  p.  185  to  p.  196. 102 
vessels  such  as  destroyers,  which  carried  weapons  of  lesser  range,  and  lacked  the  space 
to  mount  the  nine-foot  base  models  which  were  becoming  standard  on  larger  vessels.  3 
The  Royal  Navy  not  only  purchased  rangefmders,  it  also  bought  other  optical 
instruments,  particularly  for  its  larger  ships.  Telescopic  sights  and  observation  telescopes 
of  increasingly  sophisticated  design  were  needed  for  the  gun  turrets  of  capital  ships,  as 
well  as  simpler  sighting  telescopes  for  their  secondary  armament.  34  Similar  sights  were 
also  required  for  the  cruisers  and  destroyers  built  during  this  period.  The  massive  're- 
sighting'  programme  of  1905  -  1907  described  in  the  previous  chapter  had  provided  only 
for  ships  in  commission  or  about  to  complete  so  that  the  construction  of  new  ships, 
coupled  with  increasing  attention  to  gunnery,  meant  that  by  mid-1914  the  Admiralty  was 
demanding  greater  numbers  of  more  varied  and  sophisticated  optical  munitions.  These 
orders  continued  to  be  placed  amongst  the  contractors  with  whom  the  Admiralty  had 
already  built  up  working  relationships,  so  that  only  one  firm  -  Barr  &  Stroud  -  supplied 
rangefinders,  two  -  Ottway  and  Ross  -  made  gun  sighting  telescopes  and  three  -  Ottway, 
Ross,  and  Thomas  Cooke's  of  York  (which  supplied  them  to  Vickers)  -  produced 
observation  and  sighting  periscopes  for  surface  vessels.  5  Submarine  periscopes  were 
almost  entirely  made  by  Sir  Howard  Grubb  &  Co.  of  Dublin,  who  made  them  under 
contract  to  Vickers  at  a  time  when  they  had  a  virtual  monopoly  of  submarine  building  for 
the  Navy. 
The  amounts  spent  on  optical  instruments  by  the  Admiralty  were  not  recorded  in  the 
same  way  as  those  by  the  War  Office,  and  it  has  not  been  possible  to  calculate  the  total 
value  of  the  Navy's  optical  munitions  business.  However,  Barr  &  Stroud's  records  detail 
the  sums  spent  with  the  firm  on  rangefinders  and  their  related  instrumentation,  making  it 
at  least  possible  to  indicate  how  much  larger  a  customer  was  the  Admiralty  than  the  War 
Office. 
"  UGD 295  Unclassified  material:  Russell  Research  Notes  refer  to  Barr  &  Stroud  letter  book  BS4/25:  J.  B. 
Henderson,  Naval  College,  Greenwich,  to  Harold  Jackson,  5  October  1907,  describing  the  problems  for 
rangefinding  caused  by  vibration  in  destroyers. 
34  Great  Britain,  Admiralty,  Manual  of  Gunnery  for  His  Majesty's  Fleet,  1915.  (London,  HMSO,  1915) 
Vol.  1,  Chap.  XII,  p.  291  to  p.  304  describe  and  illustrate  various  patterns.  35  Great  Britain,  Admiralty,  Manual  of  Gunneryfor  His  Majesty's  Fleet,  1917,  (London:  HMSO,  1917) 
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Figure  3.3  :  Barr  &  Stroud:  comparison  of  War  Office  and  Admiralty  orders,  1907- 
1913.36 
Value  £s 
 War  Office  orders  QAdmiralty  Orders 
From  1907  to  the  end  of  1913,  the  Admiralty  spent  almost  £313,000  with  Barr  &  Stroud 
alone,  compared  with  the  War  Office's  total  expenditure  on  optics  with  all  suppliers  of 
£47,000. 
Greater  demand  did  not  only  come  from  a  growing  modem  fleet  after  1907,  it  was  also 
driven  by  efforts  to  improve  the  probability  of  hitting  distant  moving  targets  as  fighting 
ranges  of  10,000  yards  and  more  were  being  increasingly  envisaged.  37  Shooting  at  such 
distances  necessitated  some  means  to  predict  where  the  moving  target  would  be  at  the 
end  of  a  projectile's  flight  time,  which  at  10,000  yards  was  more  than  15  seconds.  38  The 
concept  of  `fire  control'  -a  systemised  means  to  direct  a  ship's  guns  against  a  moving 
36  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/1,295/19/2/2  and  295/19/2/1,  Customer  Order  files  1907-1914. 
37  See  J.  T.  Sumida  (1993)  Chap.  5  for  background  material. 
38  Great  Britain,  Admiralty,  Gunnery  Department,  Manual  of  Gunnery  for  His  Majesty's  Fleet  (London: 
HMSO,  1917)  p.  423. 
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and  distant  target  -  became  gradually  accepted  as  essential,  and  increasingly  complex 
electrical  and  mechanical  systems  were  developed  using  the  optical  rangefinder  as  the 
primary  means  for  generating  the  required  data.  The  development  of  fire  control  systems 
has  been  examined  in  detail  by  Jon  Sumida,  but  he  paid  little  attention  to  the  optical 
instrumentation  involved.  He  concentrated  on  the  evolution  of  the  mechanical  computing 
aspects  of  such  schemes,  and  in  particular  the  one  devised  by  the  civilian  inventor  Arthur 
Pollen  which  competed  unsuccessfully  against  another  one  devised  by  a  serving  officer, 
Captain  F.  C.  Dreyer.  39  In  another  instance  of  a  seemingly  deterministic  condition,  fire 
control  needs  drove  the  demand  for  more  accurate  rangefinders,  and  the  Admiralty  began 
to  call  for  instruments  to  measure  accurately  at  distances  considerably  further  than  the 
longest  range  at  which  shooting  was  expected  to  start,  in  order  to  collect  range  and 
bearing  data  from  which  the  target's  future  position  could  be  predicted.  By  October  1907 
the  Admiralty  wanted  to  measure  ranges  of  15,000  yards  with  an  accuracy  of  1  percent, 
in  order  to  open  fire  accurately  when  the  distance  closed  to  10,000  yards  4°  This  standard 
was  beyond  the  capability  of  the  instruments  then  in  service,  although  rangefinders  to  do 
a  similar  task  had  already  been  mooted  by  the  Imperial  Russian  Navy  in  1906  41  The 
growing  stress  on  greater  accuracy  and  longer  ranges  helped  to  stimulate  the 
development  of  larger  and  more  complex  instruments  as  part  of  a  system  of  gunnery, 
emphasising  that  large  naval  rangefinders  could  no  longer  be  seen  as  isolated  from  the 
rest  of  a  ship's  armament.  It  was  this  evolutionary  state  of  fire  control  instrumentation 
that  introduced  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd  of  York  as  potential  commercial  rivals  to 
Barr  &  Stroud,  and  a  comparison  of  their  progress  during  this  period  offers  some  insight 
into  the  variety  of  technological  and  social  forces  acting  on  and  within  optical  munitions 
contractors. 
"  See  J.  T.  Sumida  (1993)  Chapter  3. 
40  UGD  295  Russell  Research  Notes  Box  2:  letter  from  J.  B.  Henderson,  Admiralty  Research  Laboratory, 
to  William  Stroud,  5  October  1907. 
41  UGD  295  Russell  Research  Notes  Box  2:  Acknowledgement  of  order  for  a  4m  57cm  rangefinder  from 
Col.  Petrov,  Imperial  Russian  Navy. 105 
3.8  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd  as  a  competitor  for  Barr  &  Stroud 
Cooke's  of  York  was  no  stranger  to  optical  munitions  in  1907,  although  everything  that  it 
had  made  previously  had  been  relatively  simple  in  optical  design  and  construction.  42  The 
firm's  chief  designer,  H.  D.  Taylor  (1861-1943)  seems  first  to  have  been  directed 
towards  optical  munitions  during  the  Boer  War  when  he  designed  an  optical  sight  to 
improve  accuracy  of  shooting  at  long  ranges.  He  was  granted  a  patent  in  connection  with 
rangefinders  in  1903,  soon  afterwards  obtaining  two  more  relating  to  a  novel  layout  and 
the  use  of  rotating  prisms  to  produce  a  high  level  of  robustness.  3  Between  1904  and 
1906  Cooke's  built  five  different  experimental  models  to  his  designs,  culminating  in  the 
unsuccessful  submission  of  a  ten-foot  instrument  for  Admiralty  trials  against  Barr  & 
Stroud's  latest  nine-foot  model  44  During  this  period,  Cooke's  had  come  into  contact  with 
Arthur  Pollen  through  making  the  optics  for  his  own  abortive  two-observer  rangefinder 
in  1905,45  an  experience  which  seems  to  have  encouraged  the  firm  to  delve  deeper  into 
rangefinder  design  as  the  connection  between  it  and  Pollen  grew  stronger.  In  1907, 
Taylor  began  to  refine  his  earlier  efforts  and  between  then  and  1911  was  granted  seven 
more  patents  covering  a  range  of  increasingly  sophisticated  designs.  46  These  seem  to 
have  produced  only  two  experimental  models,  which  were  superseded  by  a  radically  new 
design  in  1912  that  was  meant  to  form  an  integral  part  of  Pollen's  fire-control  system 
and  to  be  sold  as  a  component  of  it.  7 
The  extent  and  complexity  of  Pollen's  relationship  with  Cooke's  is  outside  this  account 
(and  only  hinted  at  by  both  McConnell  and  Sumida),  but  some  mention  of  it  must  be 
given  to  provide  essential  context.  Pollen's  involvement  with  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd 
came  firstly  through  his  need  for  the  high  precision  mechanical  engineering  that  Cooke's 
employed  in  survey  instruments  and  astronomical  telescope  clock  controls,  in  order  to 
42  See  Chapter  1  above. 
"  British  Patents  1436/1901  for  an  optical  rifle  sight,  and  23038/1903,12735/1904,  and  12902/1905  for 
rangefinders. 
"  VIA  AJB  070  1.3,  Drawing  Office  Index,  drawings  1674/5,1873,1885/6,1898,  and  2175. 
`s  Sumida  (1993)  p.  85. 
46  British  Patents  7322/1907,13562/1907,15200/1907,20315/1908,6082/1910,7392/1910,  and 
9306/1911. 
47  See  British  Patent  30090/1912  for  details  of  the  instrument,  and  McConnell  (1992)  p.  74  for  a  summary 
of  the  evolution  of  Pollen's  system. 106 
produce  the  high  precision  cams  and  intricate  gearing  used  in  the  mechanical  analogue 
computer  he  was  developing.  48  In  1908  Pollen  became  a  shareholder  and  director  of  the 
firm,  49  and  so  created  for  himself  the  opportunity  of  also  using  Cooke's  optical  skills  to 
develop  a  complete  fire  control  system  including  a  sophisticated  rangefmder  which  might 
be  sold  as  a  patented  package.  50  This  provided  potentially  serious  competition  for  Barr 
&  Stroud,  because  of  Cooke's  considerably  greater  optical  design  capabilities.  H.  D. 
Taylor  was  an  internationally  recognised  expert  in  the  design  of  telescope  optics  and, 
unlike  anyone  at  Barr  &  Stroud,  he  was  well  able  to  compute  complex  lens  and  prisms 
systems  which  Cooke's  by  then  were  capable  of  making  entirely  by  themselves.  sl  Barr  & 
Stroud  saw  Cooke's  involvement  with  rangefmder  design,  either  on  its  own  or  through 
Pollen's  Argo  Company  (his  marketing  arm)  as  giving  the  Admiralty  the  prospect  of  an 
alternative  supplier,  and  possibly  ending  the  monopoly  previously  guaranteed  by  being 
the  only  British  maker.  Harold  Jackson,  Barr &  Stroud's  general  manager,  was  taking 
Pollen  seriously  as  early  as  1908,  when  he  told  his  resident  engineer  in  Portsmouth  (who 
had  regular  access  to  the  Royal  Dockyard)  to  find  out  all  he  could  about  Pollen's 
activities  and  plans  as  `we  understand  ... 
he  is  on  with  something'.  52  In  March  1911 
Jackson  believed  that  Cooke's  and  Argo  in  combination  would  `in  all  probability  shortly 
be  serious  competitors'.  53  The  Admiralty,  although  totally  committed  to  buying  British 
made  instruments,  was  by  no  means  contracted  to  one  domestic  supplier  in  perpetuity.  54 
Despite  Barr  &  Stroud's  concerns  over  the  possible  competition  of  the  Cooke/Argo 
rangefinder  it  is likely  that  such  fears  were  misplaced,  because  the  Admiralty  had  a 
number  of  forces  acting  on  it  to  shape  its  policies  concerning  rangefinders.  These 
included  not  just  technological  issues  but  also  cultural  and  political  ones  that  had 
`$  McConnell  (1992),  Chapter  7  describes  the  range  of  Cooke's  engineering  activities. 
49  VIA  AJB  030/1.1.1,  T.  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd.,  Directors'  Minute  Book  entry,  Annual  General  Meeting 
1908. 
so  Pollen  operated  through  the  Argo  Co.  Ltd,  which  Sumida  treats  as  being  the  manufacturer  of  the  Pollen 
instruments.  Argo  was  Pollen's  marketing  company,  and  bought  all  its  apparatus  from  Thomas  Cooke  & 
Sons  Ltd. 
s'  McConnell  (1992)  p.  65  If. 
52  UGD  295/4/1,  Letter  Book,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  J.  Heather,  24.12.1908. 
53  UGD  295/4/3,  Letter  Book,  H.  D.  Jackson  to  J.  Heather,  21.3.1911. 
sa  PRO  ADM  116/3458,  Correspondence  between  Admiralty  and  the  Treasury  on  the  need  for  only  British 
optical  glass  to  used  in  Royal  Navy  instruments:  Admiralty  Report  27.8.1915,  noting  correspondence  1910 
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sometimes  subtle,  but  sometimes  very  direct,  influences  on  its  decisions.  Here,  it  is 
essential  to  consider  simultaneously  both  the  social  and  the  technical  in  understanding 
what  drove  the  Admiralty's  thought  and  actions. 
One  advantage  that  Barr  &  Stroud  undoubtedly  had  over  Cooke's  and  Pollen  was  the 
existence  of  beneficial  contacts  within  the  Navy  itself.  One  of  those  was  Professor  J.  B. 
Henderson,  who  had  earlier  worked  with  William  Stroud  in  Leeds  and  then  with  the  firm 
in  Glasgow  as  head  of  its  scientific  research  department.  Henderson  was  appointed 
Professor  of  Applied  Mechanics  at  the  Royal  Naval  College  at  Greenwich  in  1905.55  He 
subsequently  corresponded  regularly  with  his  old  employers,  and  in  October  1907  wrote 
privately  to  Stroud  to  advise  him  of  the  influence  Pollen's  ideas  were  having  on  naval 
gunnery,  and  in  particular  of  the  problem  of  hitting  moving  targets  at  very  long  ranges. 
Henderson  not  only  told  Stroud  that  a  rangefinder  of  much  greater  accuracy  would  soon 
be  called  for,  but  also  directed  him  diplomatically  towards  the  idea  of  becoming  involved 
in  fire-control  instrumentation  by  saying  `Pollen  is  a  fairly  skilful  mechanical  inventor, 
but  he  is  not  a  scientist  and  cannot  tackle  the  problem'.  56  Stroud  had  previously  worked 
on  the  design  of  the  firm's  electro-mechanical  `Range-and-Order  Indicators'  which 
transmitted  range  and  other  gunnery  information  to  individual  gun  mountings  and  were 
the  rudimentary  precursors  of  what  Henderson  was  now  discussing,  so  he  would  have 
appreciated  the  amount  of  work  and  the  complexity  of  the  problems  likely  to  be 
involved.  57  That  knowledge  may  have  persuaded  him  that  were  the  idea  be  taken  up 
successfully,  it  would  require  more  expertise  than  the  firm.  had  available,  leading  the 
company  to  begin  a  collaboration  with  the  Dutch  artillerist  and  engineer  Admiral  W. 
Mouton  that  proceeded  until  temporarily  interrupted  by  the  outbreak  of  war.  58 
As  with  the  earlier  Indicators,  Barr  &  Stroud  saw  fire  control  instrumentation  as  an 
extension  of  its  activities  rather  than  diversification,  although  to  what  extent  it  saw  the 
ss  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  38. 
36  UGD  295  Unclassified  material,  Russell  research  notes,  Box  2,  Henderson  to  Stroud,  5.10.1907. 
Henderson  was  eventually  proved  quite  wrong,  as  Sumida  clearly  demonstrated. 
57  See  Chapter  1  above  for  the  difficulties  encountered  with  those  far  more  rudimentary  devices. 
58  UGD  295/4/109,  Letter  Book,  J.  W.  French  to  Adm.  Mouton,  Royal  Dutch  Navy,  reviewing  progress 
and  attitudes,  29.7.1914. 108 
Admiralty  as  its  main  client  is  uncertain.  Given  the  Admiralty's  long-running  dealings 
with  Pollen  and  Dreyer,  which  were  certainly  no  secret,  the  firm  may  have  seen  the  new 
product  as  wholly  export-oriented  from  the  outset;  certainly  a  delegation  from  the 
Imperial  Japanese  Navy  examined  one  of  the  earliest  versions  of  the  `predictor' 
mechanism  in  March  1912  at  a  time  when  they  were  ordering  large  amounts  of 
rangefinders  and  Range-and-Order  instruments.  59  Progress  was  as  slow  as  Stroud  might 
have  feared,  and  not  even  a  complete  prototype  had  been  finished  when  the  war  began, 
most  likely  because  the  company  was  wholly  occupied  with  other  projects  that  were 
considered  of  more  pressing  importance. 
Whilst  Pollen's  relationship  with  the  Admiralty  was  frequently  less  than  harmonious, 
leading  to  distrust  and  even  hostility,  Barr  &  Stroud  retained  a  significant  degree  of 
confidence  from  the  Navy,  despite  potential  conflicts  of  interest  over  the  amount  and 
nature  of  foreign  trade  the  firm  carried  out  60  In  1908,  the  Director  of  Naval  Construction 
asked  for  an  assurance  that  foreign  officers  visiting  the  factory  would  not  be  able  to  see 
any  `confidential  work'  being  done  for  the  Royal  Navy,  to  which  Jackson  had  to  reply 
diplomatically  that  there  was  actually  nothing  being  supplied  to  the  Admiralty  that  had 
not  already  been  sold  abroad.  Despite  numerous  earlier  offers  to  keep  designs  secret,  he 
said,  `in  no  case  [had]  our  offer  been  accepted'  and  the  firm  had  repeatedly  been  told  it 
was  free  to  submit  them  to  foreign  governments,  which  it  had  done.  61  Jackson  tactfully 
pointed  out  to  the  Director  that  in  consequence  foreign  trade  had  become  so  important 
that  `we  cannot  ignore  it'.  Irrespective  of  whether  he  was  mollified  or  chastened,  the 
Director  let  the  matter  drop,  but  four  years  later,  on  a  different  tack,  he  asked  Jackson  for 
details  of  what  foreign  navies  were  ordering  and  whatever  else  they  were  asking  about. 
Jackson  responded  that  as  he  had  no  specific  instructions  from  any  overseas  client  to 
observe  confidentiality  he  considered  the  firm  was  `quite  at  liberty'  to  tell  the  director 
whatever  he  wanted  to  know.  62  By  that  time,  much  of  the  Admiralty's  work  was 
sufficiently  different  to  foreign  contracts  that  a  special  department  had  been  set  up  to 
59  UGD  295/4/80,  Letter  Book,  J.  W.  French  to  W.  Stroud,  25.3.1912. 
60  For  examples  of  Pollen's  problems,  see  A.  Pollen,  The  Great  Gunnery  Scandal  (London:  William 
Collins  &  Co.  Ltd.,  1980). 
61  UGD  295/4/53,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Director  of  Naval  Construction,  26.9.1908  and  30.9.1908. 
62  UGD  295/4/4,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Director  of  Naval  Construction,  30.11.1912. 109 
handle  it,  and  soon  after  telling  the  Director  exactly  what  every  foreign  power  had 
ordered  recently,  Jackson  asked  if  he  could  allow  trainee  rangefinder  technicians  from 
the  Imperial  Japanese  Navy  into  the  rest  of  the  factory  as  orders  from  Japan  were  `by  no 
means  inconsiderable'.  3  The  director  was  quite  happy  to  permit  this,  evidence  that  both 
parties  were  tacitly  recognising  the  symbiotic  relationship  that  had  developed  between 
them,  something  that  Cooke's  lacked  and  which  they  were  never  able  to  cultivate,  very 
much  to  their  detriment. 
The  intricacy  of  Cooke's  association  with  Pollen  and  the  Argo  Company  may  not  have 
been  clearly  understood  by  Barr  &  Stroud,  but  the  construction  and  significance  of 
Taylor's  1912  rangefinder  design  mentioned  earlier  most  certainly  was.  M  Jackson 
described  its  principal  features  to  the  firm's  Austrian  agent  in  July  1912,  detailing  its 
novel  optical  design  and  gyro-stabilised  data-transmitting  mounting,  both  of  which  he 
had  to  concede  Barr  &  Stroud  had  nothing  to  compete  with.  Putting  a  brave  face  on  it,  he 
observed  the  rangefinder  was  `very  complicated  and  ...  very  costly'  but  had  to  concede 
that  its  unusual  optical  system  provided  `extra  brightness'  that  made  it  more  useful  in  the 
bad  lighting  conditions  typified  in  the  North  Sea.  He  also  noted  that  the  gyro-stabilised 
mounting  let  the  operator  take  readings  more  quickly  and  certainly  than  either  the 
pedestal  or  turret  mountings  provided  by  Barr  &  Stroud. 
Despite  Jackson's  concerns  about  the  threat  from  the  `Cooke-Pollen'  rangefinder,  it  stood 
little  chance  of  being  adopted  by  the  Admiralty.  There  were  several  reasons.  Firstly,  it 
was  an  integral  part  of  Pollen's  fire  control  system,  which  he  was  struggling  with 
increasing  difficulty  to  persuade  the  Royal  Navy  to  accept.  As  Sumida  has  shown,  by 
1912  the  Navy  was  inclined  to  prefer  a  simpler  and  more  familiar  system  designed  by  a 
serving  officer  -  another  instance  of  an  established  paradigm  resisting  a  destabilising 
anomalous  technology,  and  similar  to  the  War  Office's  circumstances  with  the 
Mekometer  in  1889.6s  By  1914,  when  the  trials  finally  ended,  the  Pollen  system  was 
63  UGD  295/4/4,  Jackson  to  Director  of  Naval  Construction,  7.12.1912. 
64  UGD  295/4/88,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Capt.  A.  H.  Seibert,  20.7.1912,  saying  he  believed  Pollen  was 
Argo's  `designer'.  This  letter  is  also  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  paragraph. 
65  See  Chapter  1  above. 110 
rejected,  and  with  that  went  the  chief  hope  of  selling  the  complex  rangefinder.  However, 
although  the  Argo  system  demanded  the  Cooke-Pollen  instrument,  the  rangefmder  did 
not  need  the  complex  fire  control  system  to  work  with,  and  could  therefore  be  sold 
independently  of  it.  But,  adding  to  the  difficulties  of  association  with  Pollen  in  selling  it 
to  the  Royal  Navy,  Taylor's  design  had  constraints  that  made  it  virtually  impossible  for 
the  Admiralty  to  consider  it  as  a  possible  replacement  for  the  existing  Barr  &  Stroud 
patterns. 
Taylor's  rangefinder  provided  a  brighter  image  of  higher  contrast  than  the  Barr  &  Stroud 
models,  which  enhanced  its  use  in  adverse  lighting  conditions.  6  This  had  been  achieved 
through  Taylor's  ability  entirely  to  re-design  the  telescope  portion  of  the  rangefinder  to 
benefit  from  the  properties  of  new  advanced  optical  glasses  being  made  by  Schott  & 
Genossen  of  Jena  in  Germany,  which  permitted  substantial  improvements  in  the 
performance  of  telescope  lens  systems.  67  Barr  &  Stroud  had  never  used  these  glasses, 
partly  because  the  firm  had  no  designer  of  sufficient  ability  to  compute  systems  around 
them,  and  partly  because  using  the  `old'  flint  and  crown  glasses  it  was  possible  to  make 
telescopes  that,  even  if  less  than  `state-of-the-art',  were  still  satisfactory  for  most 
purposes  (such  as  in  a  rangefinder).  Taylor  had  used  the  `new'  Jena  glasses  almost  as 
soon  as  they  became  available,  had  suggested  modifications  in  their  formulation  to  Otto 
Schott,  their  inventor,  and  become  wedded  to  their  employment  wherever  possible.  68 
These  sophisticated  glasses  were  hardly  made  at  all  in  Britain,  which  would  have  posed  a 
considerable  difficulty  in  selling  the  rangefinder  to  the  Admiralty  in  view  of  its  insistence 
on  domestically  made  glass  for  all  its  optical  instruments. 
That  policy  was  rooted  in  the  desire  to  be  independent  of  foreign  suppliers  in  time  of 
war.  In  1910,  fearing  that  relying  on  imported  optical  glass  would  lead  to  severe 
problems  if  supplies  were  interdicted  by  an  enemy,  the  Admiralty  had  begun  to  stipulate 
66  E.  W. Taylor,  The  New  Cooke-Pollen  Rangefinder'  Journal  of  the  United  States  Artillery,  Vol.  41,  No. 
3,  May-June,  1914  describes  and  illustrates  the  instrument. 
67  F.  Auerbach,  The  Zeiss  Works  and  the  Carl  Zeiss  Stiftung  in  Jena.  Translated  by  F.  Cheshire  and  S.  Paul. 
2nd  ed.  (London:  Marshall  Brookes  &  Chalkely,  1904)  describes  the  advances  in  optical  design  in  this 
period  and  the  benefits  of  the  new  glasses  that  were  constantly  being  introduced. 
68  VIA  AJB  220/2.6:  H.  D.  Taylor's  1895  paper  on  the  adjusting  and  testing  of  telescope  objectives  made 
clear  his  espousal  of  the  new  types. 111 
that  British  optical  glass  should  be  used  wherever  possible  69  Consultations  were 
encouraged  between  the  instrument  makers  and  the  only  British  optical  glass  maker, 
Chance  Brothers  of  Birmingham,  to  assure  supplies  of  both  the  established  and  new 
formulations.  Chance  already  made  a  wide  range  of  `old'  glasses  but  attempts  to  get  them 
to  produce  domestic  alternatives  to  the  new  Jena  glasses  met  with  only  limited  success. 
The  firm  saw  optical  glass  as  an  unprofitable  aspect  of  its  business,  it  lacked  both  the 
technical  staff  and  facilities  to  make  rapid  headway  in  catching  up  lost  ground,  and  was 
unwilling  to  invest  heavily  in  its  development.  70  This  greatly  restricted  the  `new'  glasses 
available  in  Britain  but  represented  little  difficulty  for  Barr  &  Stroud  who  had  already 
given  a  categorical  assurance  in  1911  that  they  were  independent  of  imported  material. 
Taylor  may  not  have  been  aware  of  the  problems  he  had  created  in  producing  a 
rangefinder  that  depended  on  what  were  in  effect  proscribed  raw  materials  for  its  much 
of  its  optical  superiority,  but  in  the  end  the  Cooke-Pollen  rangefinder  was  rejected  for  an 
altogether  different  reason.  Its  failure  to  gain  Admiralty  endorsement  came  not  because  it 
was  part  of  a  larger  rejected  system,  had  unfavourable  associations  with  Pollen,  or  used 
unacceptable  materials,  but  simply  because  in  its  1914  trials  it  consistently  failed  to  read 
ranges  accurately.  Its  obituary  notice  pronounced  by  the  Admiralty  read  that  `It  is  a 
beautiful  instrument  but  it  has  one  serious  defect,  namely  that  it  will  not  measure 
distances'.  "  Taylor's  sophisticated  rangefinder  failed  through  mechanical  difficulties 
that  might  well  have  been  remedied  by  revision  and  modification,  but  the  declaration  of 
war  only  three  months  later  ended  its  chances  of  success  and  Cooke's  were  kept  out  of 
the  business  of  making  large  naval  rangefinders. 
Cooke's  failure  to  break  into  the  rangefinder  market  was  not  because  the  firm  lacked 
optical  expertise,  but  because  it  was  coming,  at  an  inopportune  moment,  late  into  a  field 
where  the  Barr  &  Stroud  models  had  already  established,  in  Thomas  Hughes'  expression, 
a  considerable  technological  momentum.  For  the  Taylor-designed  instrument  to  have 
69  PRO  ADM  116/3458  Correspondence  between  Admiralty  and  Treasury  on  optical  glass  supplies,  1910- 
1913  provides  the  source  material  for  the  following  section  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
70  J.  F.  Chance,  A  History  of  the  Firm  of  Chance  Brothers  &  Co.  (London:  Spottiswoode,  Ballantyne  & 
Co.,  1919)  p.  182  to  p.  184. 
"  UGD  295/4/107,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  S.  Vronski,  quoting  from  an  unidentified  Royal  Navy  officer, 
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displaced  them  would  have  required  firstly  the  clear  demonstration  of  superiority  and 
secondly  the  institutional  willingness  to  accept  it  as  a  `presumptive  anomaly'  -  an 
alternative  technology  presumed  to  be  superior  to  the  existing  technological  paradigm 
which  had  become  wholly  identified  with  the  Barr  &  Stroud  models  in  service.  72  Given 
that  they  apparently  functioned  well,  in  the  absence  of  failure  there  was  little  incentive 
for  the  Navy  to  discard  the  familiar  and  adopt  a  new  pattern,  particularly  when  it  was 
associated  with  a  novel  technology  which  the  Navy  was  culturally  and  institutionally 
disposed  to  reject.  It  was  perhaps  ironic  that  Barr  &  Stroud,  a  business  far  less  able  in 
optical  design,  should  enjoy  a  conspicuously  greater  degree  of  success  selling  complex 
optical  munitions. 
3.9  Barr  &  Stroud's  evolution 
Barr  &  Stroud  did  indeed  enjoy  business  considerable  success  between  1907  and  1914, 
both  in  sales  and  profits,  and  its  domination  of  the  rangefinder  market.  The  development 
of  Barr  &  Stroud  between  1907  and  the  start  of  the  Great  War  has  been  described  by 
Michael  Moss  and  lain  Russell,  who  observed  that  the  business  `grew  steadily...  as  the 
fum  brought  improved  instruments  onto  the  market'.  73  There  was  indeed  growth,  as 
figure  4.8  shows:  the  firm  made  a  substantial  profit  every  year,  and  although  pre-tax 
margins  on  turnover  slipped  between  1909  and  1912  to  an  average  of  25  percent  they 
recovered  in  1913  to  32  percent.  For  the  seven  years,  turnover  was  almost  £806,000  and 
earnings  after  tax  £240,381,  equal  to  a  healthy  net  margin  of  29.8  percent  74 
72  See  W.  McBride,  Technological  Change  and  the  U.  S.  Navy  1865-1945  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University  Press,  2000). 
"  M.  Moss  and  and  I.  Russell,.  Range  and  Vision:  The  First  Hundred  Years  of  Barr  &  Stroud.  (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream  Publishing,  1988)  p.  69. 
74  The  figures  up  to  1912  have  been  extracted  from  UGD  295/26/1/27  `Correspondence  and  notes',  and 
UGD  295/26/1/47  Table  of  Barr  &  Stroud  sales  1901-1912.  The  later  figures  come  from  UGD  295/11/1, 
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A  substantial  proportion  of  those  earnings  came  from  foreign  business.  Moss  and  Russell 
referred  to  the  extent  of  the  firm's  overseas  sales  efforts,  describing  particularly  how  Barr 
&  Stroud  went  about  securing  European  orders  for  infantry  and  artillery  rangefinders,  but 
they  gave  no  indication  of  the  relative  size  of  foreign  and  domestic  business.  The 
company's  Customer  Order  files  record  the  distribution  of  orders,  and  provide  a  picture 
of  the  extent  of  the  company's  dependence  on  foreign  armies  and  navies. 
75  Sources  as  note  74  above. 
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Figure  3.5:  Barr  &  Stroud,  orders  received  from  the  British  Admiralty  and  War  Office, 
and  all  Foreign  clients,  January  1907-July  1914:  76 
 GB  ADM  QGB  WO  QForeign 
Apart  from  1907,  when  foreign  orders  accounted  for  27  percent  of  the  total  received, 
overseas  business  formed  the  majority  of  the  value  of  work  coming  in  to  the  firm  from 
1901  (when  the  detailed  records  started)  until  the  end  of  1913.  Between  January  1907 
and  December  1913,  British  orders  amounted  to  £335,583  and  foreign  ones  £623,217,  a 
total  of  £958,800  excluding  repairs  and  spare  parts.  Moss  and  Russell  have  described  in 
some  detail  the  efforts  made  by  the  firm  to  secure  this  business  and  the  effects  of 
competition  by  the  German  makers  Hahn,  Goerz  and  Zeiss,  but  they  gave  little  attention 
to  how  Barr  &  Stroud  actually  managed  the  growing  amount  of  trade,  and  in  particular, 
they  passed  over  the  efforts  that  the  company  made  to  extend  its  optical  capabilities.  77 
The  production  of  lenses  and  prisms  was  still  largely  done  by  outside  contractors  in 
1907,  with  most  the  simpler  lenses  bought  from  Chadburn  Brothers  in  Sheffield  and  the 
76  Extracts  from  UGD  295/19/2/1,295/19/2/2,  and  295/19/2/3,  Customer  Order  files  1907-1914. 
77  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  pp.  59-72 115 
more  complex  ones  and  prisms  from  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  in  London.  Most  of  the  optical 
work  done  at  Glasgow  was  still  connected  with  the  building  up  prism  assemblies  and  the 
mounting  of  lenses  into  their  cells  for  incorporation  in  the  rangefinder  bodies,  rather  than 
the  grinding  and  polishing  of  optical  glass  into  finished  components.  This  was  a 
difficulty  that  had  vexed  the  firm  since  it  began,  and  despite  two  previous  attempts  to 
achieve  some  degree  of  self-sufficiency  through  integrating  the  Adam  Hilger  business, 
Barr  &  Stroud  remained  dependent  on  remote  suppliers  who  frequently  failed  to  deliver 
parts  promptly  and  of  adequate  quality.  78 
The  possibility  of  acquiring  the  Hilger  business  reappeared  in  1907  through  the  decision 
of  the  War  Office  to  adopt  the  Marindin  rangefinder  which  has  been  described  earlier  in 
this  chapter.  Being  well-placed  by  the  existing  association  with  both  the  instrument  and 
its  designer  to  bid  for  whatever  contract  was  offered,  Hilger's  managing  director,  Frank 
Twyman,  moved  to  establish  a  collaboration  with  Barr  &  Stroud  for  production  on  a 
scale  which  his  company  could  not  undertake  on  its  own.  79  Barr  and  Stroud  had  made 
most  of  the  mechanical  components  for  the  experimental  rangefmders  that  Hilger's  had 
built,  and  had  dealt  personally  with  Marindin  on  several  occasions.  Having  learned  of  the 
War  Office's  selection,  Harold  Jackson  wrote  to  him  on  July  12th  1907  observing, 
perhaps  a  little  sourly,  that  as  it  had  been  `impossible'  to  work  with  the  War  Office  Barr 
&  Stroud  would  in  future  concentrate  on  foreign  armies.  Soon  afterwards,  Twyman 
approached  Jackson  with  the  idea  of  tendering  jointly  for  anticipated  business,  a  proposal 
which  Jackson  accepted  on  July  26`'  but  quickly  set  aside  in  favour  of  a  plan  to  set  up  a 
completely  new  business.  On  August  9th  a  detailed  draft  proposal  was  sent  to  Twyman 
under  which  each  firm  would  provide  half  the  capital  for  a  venture  to  `erect  and 
complete'  rangefinders  using  mechanical  parts  from  Barr  &  Stroud  and  optical  ones  from 
Hilger's. 
At  first  sight,  the  proposal  looked  simply  to  establish  a  cartel  to  market  the  Marindin 
design.  The  draft  agreement  noted  that  it  was  `to  their  mutual  advantage  to  work  in 
78  See  Chapters  1  and  2  above  for  examples. 
79  UGD  295/4/46,  Letter  Book,  provides  the  source  material  for  the  following  section  unless  otherwise 
indicated.  Dates  and  correspondents  are  given  in  the  text. 116 
association',  and  that  in  its  seven  year  life  Barr  &  Stroud  would  not  make  the  instrument 
on  their  own  behalf  and  Hilger's  would  not  make  `rangefinders  or  parts  for  rangefinders' 
for  anyone  except  the  new  company  and  Barr  &  Stroud.  The  failure  to  fulfil  any  of  the 
agreement's  clauses  by  either  party  would  incur  a  penalty  of  £5,000.  Despite  Twyman's 
acceptance  within  a  week,  the  draft  was  very  much  to  his  disadvantage  because  it 
committed  Hilger's  to  not  making  any  rangefinder  products  at  all  on  the  firm's  own 
account.  Jackson's  draft  did  not  limit  the  prohibition  to  the  Marindin,  which  precluded 
Hilger's,  or  Twyman  individually,  from  benefiting  from  any  opportunities  of  spin-off 
that  the  rangefinder  might  generate.  That  sat  slightly  at  odds  with  the  covering  letter 
Jackson  sent  with  the  draft,  which  hoped  that  the  project  would  `enable  the  intimate 
relationship  ... 
between  us  to  be  continued'.  During  September,  Twyman  began  to  have 
second  thoughts  and  requested  changes  that  would  let  him  exploit  any  new  skills  or 
opportunities  that  arose,  only  to  be  rebuffed  by  Jackson  who  refused  point-blank  to  give 
way.  His  letter  on  October  2°d  said  Barr  &  Stroud  would  not  continue  to  give  Hilger's 
optical  work  while  Twyman  was  free  for  work  that  might  `seriously  tell  against  [Barr  & 
Stroud's]  interests'.  He  closed  by  saying  that  he  would  nevertheless  be  `best  pleased'  if  a 
closer  working  arrangement  could  be  achieved  and  invited  Twyman's  suggestions. 
Between  October  and  mid-November,  proposals  for  a  `wider  agreement'  were  prepared, 
but  nothing  had  been  signed  either  for  it  or  the  earlier  idea  when  it  became  clear  that 
there  was  not  going  to  be  any  large  order  for  the  Marindin.  80  In  November  20th  Jackson 
congratulated  Twyman  on  his  War  Office  contract  for  just  sixteen  rangefinders,  and 
although  assuring  him  that  Barr  &  Stroud  would  supply  the  parts,  cast  him  adrift  to 
handle  the  work  alone,  saying  `I  hope  you  will  be  entirely  successful'.  Jackson  then 
raised  issues  which  suggest  that  despite  the  pleasantries,  he  was  actually  seeking  to  annex 
Adam  Hilger's.  Twyman  was  reminded  that  the  failure  to  win  a  large  order  `only 
postponed'  the  earlier  proposal  to  form  a  joint  production  company  which  would  be 
immediately  implemented  if  a  big  contract  eventually  emerged,  or  if  `the  suggested  wider 
agreement'  was  not  carried  through.  This  apparently  left  Twyman  in  a  difficult  situation, 
where  failure  to  accept  Jackson's  proposals  would  require  him  to  find  half  the  capital  for 
8°  The  agreement  is  referred  to  in  Jackson's  letter  of  November  20th,  but  no  details  of  it  were  given. 117 
a  new  company  and  works  which  would  subsequently  have  nothing  to  do  except  make 
sixteen  rangefmders.  If  he  demurred  and  sought  to  avoid  that  expense,  then  he  would  be 
liable  to  pay  Barr  &  Stroud  a  very  substantial  penalty  of  £5,000  that  would  possibly  have 
left  him  seriously  harmed  financially.  Jackson's  assurance  that  the  `wider  agreement' 
would  not  change  either  the  name  or  the  character  of  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  Ltd  was 
doubtless  of  little  consolation  to  him. 
Having  brought  Barr  &  Stroud  to  a  position  where  it  looked  likely  to  gain  practical 
control  of  Hilger's,  Jackson's  next  action  comes  as  a  surprise.  With  Twyman  in  a 
situation  where  he  seemingly  could  do  little  but  agree  to  whatever  was  being  put  to  him, 
on  December  P  Jackson  wrote  that  Barr  &  Stroud  now  wished  to  withdraw  from  the 
matter  and  retain  the  status  quo.  His  reason  was  that  `Mrs  Hilger'  (the  widow  of  the 
firm's  founder  and  Twyman's  fellow-shareholder)  might  suffer  if  Barr  &  Stroud 
encountered  poor  trading  which  would,  under  the  proposed  arrangements,  `seriously 
affect  Hilger's  financial  position'  and  even  wipe  out  its  profits  completely.  Barr  & 
Stroud,  said  Jackson,  had  previously  had  years  of  trading  at  an  `absolute  loss'(by  which 
he  was  referring  to  the  early  1890s)  and  `we  would  not  like  to  contemplate  such  a 
contingency'.  He  ended  with  the  comment  that  under  the  circumstances  it  would  be 
better  for  the  firms  to  remain  independent  `unless  you  are  willing  to  consider  the  sale  of 
your  business  outright,  which  I  do  not  think  likely',  a  remarkable  volte-face. 
This  curious  outcome  has  only  one  likely  explanation,  which  relates  to  the  firm's 
management  structure  and  the  characters  of  its  owners.  Although  the  business  was  a 
partnership  wholly  owned  by  its  two  founders,  Jackson  was,  in  Moss  and  Russell's 
words,  its  `commercial  manager  in  all  but  name  [who  was]  undoubtedly  the  architect  of 
the  business  organisation'  and  also  a  man  who,  in  his  own  words,  believed  that  good 
management  involved  someone  with  `the  power  of  putting  his  foot  down'  and  being 
prepared  to  get  things  done.  8'  His  frequent  letters  to  Twyman  at  Hilger's  show  the  extent 
of  the  complaints  he  made  about  workmanship  and  delivery  times,  and  the  frustrations 
were  sometimes  evident  -  on  one  occasion  he  wrote  that  `We  cannot  express  ... 
how 
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strongly  we  have  been  annoyed  by  the  way  you  have  neglected  us  [over  an  order]'.  82  Nor 
was  he  alone;  William  Stroud  also  had  strong  feelings  about  their  chief  optical 
contractor's  abilities,  writing  in  early  1907  that  he  doubted  if  Hilger's  knew  `one 
hundredth  of  what  Zeiss  knows'.  83  Given  Jackson's  philosophy  of  business  management, 
his  letters  to  Twyman  suggest  that  he  believed  improvements  could  be  made  by 
reconstructing  Hilger's  direction,  which  was  solely  under  Twyman's  control.  The  careful 
phrasing  of  the  proposed  agreement  in  1907  indicates  that  Jackson  intended  to  achieve  a 
situation  where  Barr  &  Stroud  would  have  management  control,  if  not  outright 
ownership  of  its  principal  optical  contractor.  His  change  of  mind  may  have  been  dictated 
by  pressure  from  the  Professors  Stroud  and  Barr,  although  each  of  them  might  have  been 
motivated  by  quite  different  reasons.  Stroud  thought  little  of  Hilger's  or  Twyman,  and 
although  always  unable  to  suggest  any  alternative,  had  previously  resisted  suggestions  of 
any  formal  connection.  84  Barr,  on  the  other  hand,  had  had  a  long  acquaintanceship  with 
the  now-dead  Hilger  brothers,  both  of  whom  he  had  respected  and  seen  as  friends,  as 
well  as  a  largely  amicable  attitude  towards  Twyman.  85  Jackson's  efforts  to  badger  the 
latter  into  relinquishing  control  of  Hilger's  would  have  been  unlikely  to  appeal  to  either 
partner  -  to  Stroud  because  of  his  low  opinion  of  the  firm,  and  to  Barr  because  of  his 
previous  personal  involvement.  Despite  his  energy  and  commitment  to  the  business, 
Jackson  lacked  the  power  to  force  his  principals  into  acquiescing  in  his  proposals  and  he 
was  obliged  to  extricate  himself  as  well  as  he  could  from  a  situation  that  had  escaped  his 
control,  leaving  the  firm  still  with  an  unresolved  problem  about  optical  components. 
Relations  with  Hilger's  reverted  to  their  earlier  pattern,  and  not  until  1912  did  conditions 
force  Barr  &  Stroud  seriously  to  reconsider  their  arrangements  for  high-grade  lens  and 
prism  work.  By  then,  the  large  pentagonal  prism  end-reflectors  which  had  become 
standard  in  the  rangefinders  were  being  flat-polished  at  Glasgow  from  pre-moulded 
82  UGD  295/4/4  1,  letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Hilger,  7.6.1906.  See  also  index  entries  in  other  Letter  Books  in 
the  UGD  295/4  series  for  evidence  of  the  volume  of  correspondence. 
$'  UGD  295  Unclassified  material,  Russell  Research  Notes,  Folder  `Private  Letter  Books,  BS4/21'  Stroud 
to  Barr,  24.1.1907.  (`BS4/21'  is  not  listed  among  the  re-classified  material  now  in  the  UGD  295 
collection.  ) 
84  See  chapters  1  and  2  above. 
$s  UGD  295/4/744,  letter  Book,  Barr  to  Twyman  expressing  condolences  on  Otto  Hilger's  death,  and 
explaining  the  sense  of  loss  he  felt,  20.12.1902. 119 
blocks  supplied  by  Chance  Brothers  in  Birmingham,  with  nineteen  glass-workers 
employed  full-time.  86  Most  of  the  spherical  lens  work  was  still  done  by  outside 
contractors.  Orders  increased  substantially  that  year  and  Jackson  began  to  seek  suppliers 
besides  Hilger's,  not  just  because  of  quality  problems  or  limited  capacity  there  but  also 
because  the  Admiralty  had  begun  to  suggest  that  Barr  &  Stroud  should  reduce  its 
dependency  on  a  single  supplier.  87  He  approached  the  Dallmeyer  Optical  Company,  the 
Ross  Optical  Company,  and  Taylor,  Taylor  &  Hobson  Ltd  for  lenses,  as  well  as  ordering 
more  from  Chadburn  Brothers.  88  In  an  effort  to  acquire  a  full  complement  of  skilled 
workers  and  all  the  expertise  needed  to  let  Barr  &  Stroud  attain  self-sufficiency  in 
spherical  lens  production,  Jackson  took  the  bold  step  of  attempting  to  recruit  (or  poach) 
simultaneously  the  entire  workforce  of  the  Periscopic  Prism  Company  in  London,  a  firm 
with  which  he  had  been  doing  business  since  April  1911.89  He  told  his  contact  there,  Paul 
de  Braux,  that  if  Barr  &  Stroud  could  get  an  `energetic  and  capable  foreman'  the  firm 
would  enlarge  its  optical  shop  and  be  `quite  willing'  to  employ  as  many  skilled  men  as 
could  be  persuaded  to  leave  the  Periscopic  Company.  As  de  Braux  was  the  firm's 
proprietor,  he  was  (perhaps  understandably)  somewhat  unwilling  to  give  up  his  own 
business  to  be  Jackson's  energetic  foreman,  and  he  declined  the  offer  leaving  Jackson  to 
carry  on  the  search. 
The  problem  was  made  worse  for  Jackson  because  there  was  no  comparable  work  being 
done  in  Glasgow  (or  anywhere  else  in  Scotland),  nor  any  facilities  for  training  in  optical 
manufacturing  outside  London.  Starting  a  spherical  lens  shop  from  scratch  could  not  be 
done  without  a  nucleus  of  skilled  labour,  and  all  efforts  to  tempt  workers  from  England 
had  so  far  been  almost  wholly  unsuccessful.  Then  unexpectedly  in  November  1912, 
seven  optical  workers  from  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  approached  Barr  &  Stroud  and 
offered  to  move  to  Glasgow  because  work  at  the  York  factory  had  `become  slack' 
86  UGD  295/4/80,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Chance  Brothers,  urging  delivery  of  pentagonal  blocks;  Jackson 
to  Twyman  on  wage  rates  for  polishers,  3.4.1912;  and  Jackson  to  P.  de  Braux  3.4.1912.. 
87  Science  Museum  Library,  Hilger  Collection,  History  of  Adam  Hilger  (subsequently  HILG)  3.1, 
Typescript  of  `Mr  Twyman's  lecture,  August  1944'. 
as  UGD  295/4/81,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Dallmeyer,  23.4.1912,  to  Ross  23.4.1912,  to  TT&H  23.4.1912, 
to  Chadbum  6.4.1912. 
89  UGD  295/4/81,  Jackson  to  P.  de  Braux,  3.4.1912. 120 
following  Arthur  Pollen's  delays  in  selling  his  fire  control  system  to  the  Admiralty.  9° 
Welcome  as  the  recruits  doubtless  were,  the  increasing  level  of  orders  throughout  1912 
and  1913  meant  that  the  lack  of  optical  capacity  continued  to  cause  delays  in  output. 
Jackson  added  the  London  firm  of  W. Watson  &  Sons  to  his  lens  and  prism  suppliers  and 
even  began  buying  large  pentagonal  prisms  from  the  German  firm  of  J.  D.  Moeller  in 
response  to  their  unsolicited  offer  of  supplies,  presumably  to  meet  overseas  orders  in 
view  of  the  Admiralty's  proscription  of  foreign  glass  91 
Barr  &  Stroud's  efforts  to  integrate  backwards  into  lens  and  prism  and  production  by 
1914  were  still  not  enough  to  make  the  firm  independent  of  suppliers  over  whom  it  had 
little  direct  control.  Had  Jackson's  moves  to  annex  Hilger's  been  allowed  to  proceed  in 
1907,  then  the  firm  would  have  been  able  to  develop  its  capacity  either  by  wholesale 
removal  of  the  factory  and  workers  or,  more  likely,  by  the  acquisition  and  transfer  of 
technology  and  the  savoir-faire  of  craft  technique  that  was  still  part  and  parcel  of  optical 
manufacture  in  the  early  20th  century.  Passing  over  the  opportunity  delayed  that  phase  of 
development,  and  the  Admiralty's  later  emphasis  on  the  dilution  of  suppliers  temporarily 
diverted  attention  away  from  the  need  for  self-sufficiency  with  the  result  that  the  firm 
failed  to  match  optical  capacity  with  that  for  mechanical  engineering  and  assembly,  a 
situation  that,  as  the  following  chapter  will  show,  posed  serious  (though  not  insuperable) 
difficulties  when  the  Great  War  began. 
3.10  Conclusion 
By  1914,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  become  the  world's  largest  maker  of  optical  munitions,  and 
was  far  closer  in  character  to  the  armaments  industry  than  to  the  scientific  instruments 
industry  where  it  has  usually  been  thought  to  belong.  92  Clive  Trebilcock  has  defined  the 
characteristics  of  armaments  firms  just  before  the  Great  War  in  terms  that  endorse  the 
90  UGD  295/4/86,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  J.  W.  French,  26.11.1912. 
91  UGD  295/4/95,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Watson,  12.5.1913,  and  Jackson  to  Moeller,  14.5.1913. 
92  See  M.  E.  W.  Williams,  The  Precision  Makers:  A  History  of  the  Instruments  Industry  in  Britain  and 
France,  1870-1939  (London:  Routledge,  1994)  Chapter  2,  and  R  and  K.  MacLeod,  "Government  and  the 
Optical  Industry  in  Britain  1914-1918.  "  In  War  and  Economic  Development,  edited  by  J.  M.  Winter. 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1977). 121 
inclusion  of  businesses  making  military  and  naval  optics  amongst  them.  93  Compared  to 
commercial  manufacturing,  military  supply  was  `a  terrain  both  unwelcoming  and  largely 
unrecognisable'  and  those  who  catered  for  it  bore  little  resemblance  to  `their  peaceable 
contemporaries.  '  He  noted  that  private  enterprise  rather  than  government  was  responsible 
for  `the  major  part  of  advanced  weaponry  design'  and  included  in  a  list  of  such 
innovations  the  rangefinder.  The  bulk  of  these  innovations  were  `as  far  removed  from 
articles  of  general  commerce  as  the  best  of  contemporary  science  ...  could  take  them.  ' 
The  `real  forte'  of  the  arms  industry,  according  to  Trebilcock,  lay  in  its  ability  to 
combine  such  disparate  skills  as  heavy  engineering  and  `the  most  delicate'  engineering 
work.  The  last  sentence  might  have  been  written  especially  to  describe  the  kind  of  work 
done  by  Barr  &  Stroud,  who  fitted  prisms  as  small  as  an  inch  long  into  massive  metal 
structures  fifteen  feet  in  length  and  so  heavy  that  they  required  lifting  gear  to  move  them 
around  the  assembly  shop.  Even  if  large  rangefinders  were  not  wholly  typical  of  optical 
munitions  manufacture,  other  instruments  like  the  dial  sight  and  submarine  periscope 
nevertheless  conformed  equally  well  to  Trebilcock's  characterisation  of  armaments,  in 
that  they  had  no  civil  market  and  their  demand  was  inseparably  linked  to  the  State's 
needs  at  any  time,  so  that  attempts  to  sell  them  were  constrained  by  factors  quite  different 
to  those  in  civil  markets. 
By  the  beginning  of  August  1914,  Britain  had  evolved  an  optical  munitions  industry  that 
had  the  capacity  to  supply  not  only  all  the  nation's  own  peacetime  demands,  but  many  of 
those  of  foreign  powers  besides.  It  was  a  numerically  small  but  distinct  industry 
specialising  in  the  manufacture  of  optical  goods  for  the  armed  forces  that  the  majority  of 
optical  companies  were  unable  or  unwilling  to  tackle.  Most  of  the  constituent  firms 
produced  military  optics  in  addition  to,  but  separately  from,  other  unrelated  commercial 
products,  deriving  only  a  proportion  of  their  incomes  from  government  contracting,  but 
the  largest  one  relied  entirely  on  the  international  demand  for  armaments  to  provide  its 
business.  None  of  these  firms  had  been  given  any  State  assistance  in  developing  what 
they  made,  but  neither  had  they  been  discriminated  against  as  has  been  previously 
93  See  C.  Trebilcock,  The  Vickers  Brothers:  Armaments  and  Enterprise  1854-1914  (London:  Europa 
Publications,  1977)  pp.  1-7  for  the  following  quotations  in  this  section. 122 
suggested.  The  armed  forces  most  certainly  did  not  rely  on  imported  instruments;  they 
could  -  and  did  -  draw  their  whole  requirements  from  an  independent  and  generally 
capable  domestic  industry  that  was  geared  to  the  level  of  peace-time  demand. 
The  factors  bearing  on  the  shaping  of  the  industry  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War 
may  be  interpreted  at  first  as  showing  the  characteristics  of  technological  determinism, 
with  inexorable  advances  in  gunnery  and  weapons  systems  driving  the  need  for  more 
complex  optical  support  systems,  but  on  closer  examination  it  becomes  clear  that  the 
industry's  evolution  was  governed  by  a  combination  of  social  and  technological  issues 
whose  understanding  is  crucial  in  understanding  the  path  that  was  taken  by  all  the  actors 
on  both  sides  of  the  story.  It  is  not  possible  properly  to  comprehend  the  industry  without 
grasping  the  complexities  of  the  forces  driving  clients  as  well  as  suppliers. 
The  ability  of  the  optical  munitions  industry  to  deal  with  the  challenges  and  problems 
that  followed  the  declaration  of  war  in  August  1914  will  be  considered  in  the  next  three 
chapters,  the  first  of  which  charts  the  first  stage  of  industrial  mobilisation  up  to  the 
middle  of  1915. 123 
Chapter  4 
The  impact  of  war,  August  1914  to  mid-1915 
4.1  Introduction 
The  optical  munitions  makers,  like  almost  all  of  British  industry,  were  unprepared  for 
war  and  encountered  problems  between  August  1914  and  the  early  summer  of  1915. 
These  difficulties  were  partly  outside  the  industry's  own  control  but  came  also  from  the 
structure  of  optical  instrument  making  generally.  The  principal  difficulty  was  an 
unanticipated,  increasing  demand  from  an  Army  that  was  expanding  on  an  unprecedented 
scale  and  which  had  been  inadequately  equipped  with  optical  apparatus  before  the  war. 
The  War  Office  failed  both  in  not  quantifying  its  own  requirements  and  not  concentrating 
its  orders  on  the  makers  who  were  best  suited  to  deal  with  them,  and  there  was 
consequently  an  inability  to  recognise,  let  alone  come  to  terms  with,  the  strengths  and 
limitations  of  both  the  general  and  specialised  optical  sectors  of  the  industry.  The 
strengths  were  largely  ignored  during  1914  and  early  1915,  and  historians  have 
subsequently  emphasised  the  ensuing  shortcomings  as  signifying  a  chronic  weakness, 
particularly  in  having  failed  to  keep  up  with  German  competitors.  In  fact,  the  problems  in 
optical  munitions  output,  were  more  rooted  in  the  problems  of  industrial  mobilisation 
than  in  any  backwardness  of  the  industry.  The  procurement  process  was,  initially,  the 
greater  difficulty. 
Of  the  two  British  services,  the  Army's  equipment  with  optical  munitions  was  by  far  the 
more  unsatisfactory,  with  the  large-scale  ordering  of  rangefinders  having  only  just  begun. 
Most  of  the  problems  met  by  the  optical  munitions  makers  in  the  first  year  of  war  were  in 
trying  to  satisfy  the  War  Office's  rapidly  developing  needs.  The  Navy's  requirements 
were  geared  to  the  quantities  and  types  of  ships  in  service  rather  than  its  manpower,  but 
the  Army's  was  directly  related  to  its  numerical  strength  which  grew  with  extreme 
rapidity  in  contrast  to  the  Navy's  ship  strength  which  increased  far  more  slowly. 
Emphasising  the  differences,  the  Admiralty  had  previously  been  a  regular  and  substantial 
purchaser  of  optical  instruments  and  had  established  an  efficient  supply  chain  with 124 
makers  who  were  familiar  with  its  needs,  whereas  the  Army  had  never  been  either  a  large 
or  consistent  buyer  from  the  optical  community. 
4.2  The  capability  and  capacity  for  optical  munitions  manufacture 
Even  before  1914,  there  had  been  concerns  about  the  Army's  ability  to  get  the  optical 
apparatus  it  would  need  in  the  event  of  war.  These  worries  focussed  on  the  British  optical 
instruments  industry  as  a  whole,  which  was  seen  by  some  as  inadequate  to  meet  possible 
requirements  should  Britain  be  drawn  into  a  European  war.  The  British  Science  Guild 
considered  that  under  such  circumstances  British  firms  `could  not,  unaided,  produce 
sufficient  quantities'  of  the  optical  devices  that  would  then  be  wanted  by  the  armed 
forces.  '  These  sentiments  echoed  others  already  voiced  by  some  of  the  members  of  the 
optical  industry  itself. 
According  to  the  account  subsequently  left  by  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  which  was 
created  in  the  spring  of  1915,  the  capacity  for  the  supply  of  optical  instruments  to  the 
British  Army  in  late  1914  became  a  matter  of  grave  concern.  The  official  History  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  described  British  optical  manufacturing  as  then  being  both 
`seriously  undercapitalised'  and  `very  conservative',  with  `such  machinery  as  existed 
[being]  antiquated'.  There  was  also  `a  singular  lack  of  comprehension'  of  the  benefits  of 
machine  tools,  suggesting  that  a  serious  or  even  chronic  lack  of  capacity  to  manufacture 
quickly  and  in  quantity.  2  That  gloomy  depiction  was  echoed  by  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod 
who  considered  that  the  industry  was  `a  fragmentary  collection  of  craft  based  family 
firms'  which  suffered  from  a  `scarcity  of  capital  for  investment  and  research.  3 
Furthermore,  they  believed  that  British  makers  had  actually  been  discouraged  from 
making  some  key  optical  munitions  because  `the  War  Office  was  a  customer  for  German 
dial  sights  and  prism  binoculars 
..  .' 
Mari  Williams  shared  this  view,  considering  that 
once  the  war  began  `it  was  vividly  brought  home  to  the  British  government  ...  that  they 
1  British  Science  Guild;  Report  of  the  Technical  Optics  Committee  respecting  the  Proposed  Establishment 
of  an  Institute  of  Technical  Optics,  June  1914,  Appendix  C  to  the  Ninth  Annual  Report  of  the  BSG  (June 
1915)  pp.  29-31.  Cited  in  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod;  `Government  and  the  optical  industry  in  Britain,  1914- 
18',  in  J.  M.  Winter,  ed.  War  and  Economic  Development  (Cambridge:  University  Press,  1975)  p.  170. 
2  Great  Britain,  Ministry  of  Munitions;  History  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  (subsequently  OH)  Vol.  XI 
`The  Supply  of  Munitions',  Part  III.  (London:  HMSO,  1922)  p.  13,  p.  9,  and  p.  18. 
3R  and  K.  MacLeod  (1975)  p.  170  provides  this  and  the  subsequent  quotation. 125 
were  heavily  dependent  upon  Imperial  Germany  both  for  finished  precision  instruments 
and  for  many  component  parts.  '4  The  domestic  industry's  ability  to  meet  even  the 
immediate  demands  of  the  Anny  was  clearly  doubted  by  contemporary  accounts  which 
have  been  uncritically  accepted  subsequently. 
This  impression  is  far  from  correct.  In  mid-1914  there  was  a  viable  British  optical 
munitions  manufacturing  base  which  was  more  than  adequate  for  all  the  requirements  of 
the  peace-time  armed  forces.  Its  constituents  were  well  able  to  manufacture  high 
precision  complex  military  optics,  frequently  progressively  minded,  and  far  from 
antiquated.  The  Army's  problems  in  obtaining  its  optical  requirements  after  August  1914 
ought  not  to  be  laid  solely  at  the  industry's  door.  They  came  about  from  the  combination 
of  a  totally  unprecedented  scale  of  demand,  shortcomings  in  the  War  Office's 
procurement  mechanisms,  and  limitations  in  the  optical  munitions  sector  which  were 
principally  -  though  by  no  means  exclusively  -a  consequence  of  the  British  Army's  pre- 
war  attitude  towards  its  optical  inventory. 
The  first  stage  in  the  industry's  war-time  growth  was  largely  concerned  with  increasing 
output  to  meet  the  growing  demands  of  the  Army.  Most  of  the  pressure  exerted  on  the 
makers  from  August  1914  to  the  summer  of  1915  was  to  produce  more  of  what  was 
already  being  made.  The  Admiralty  and  War  Office  competed  for  manufacturing 
capacity  without  any  co-ordination,  each  exerting  pressures  on  makers  to  satisfy  its  own 
requirements  and  apparently  ignorant  of  conflicts  of  interest,  with  the  greater  pressure 
coming  from  the  War  Office.  In  addition,  the  Army's  need  for  new  types  of  optical 
munitions  began  to  emerge  early  in  1915  in  response  to  specific  requirements  shown  by 
the  fighting,  and  the  design  of  items  like  the  telescopic  rifle  sight  was  passed  by  the  War 
Office  to  firms  who  usually  did  not  have  the  expertise  to  design  for  large  scale 
manufacture,  compounding  delivery  problems  still  further.  There  was,  as  Roy  and  Kay 
MacLeod  rightly  pointed  out,  little  in  the  way  of  co-ordination  of  research,  design  or 
4  Mari  Williams;  The  Precision  Makers:  a  History  of  the  Instruments  Industry  in  Britain  and  France  1870- 
1939  (London:  Routledge,  1994)  p.  8. 126 
output  during  this  stages  The  optical  industry  -  unlike,  for  example,  the  small  arms 
industry  -  was  left  entirely  to  its  own  devices  in  organising  its  industrial  mobilisation.  6 
4.3  The  industry  that  was  available  to  meet  increased  War  Office  requirements 
Although  the  British  Army  was  no  stranger  to  optical  munitions,  its  pre-war  deployment 
of  them  had  hardly  been  lavish.  The  relatively  small  scale  of  War  Office  purchasing  has 
already  been  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  and  in  the  financial  year  to  3  1St  March 
1914  only  £49,000  had  been  spent. 
Table  4.1:  War  Office  optical  munitions  contracts  1913-1914:  7 
Maker 
Financial  Year 
1913-1914 
Aitchison  &  Co.  Ltd  London  £1,752 
Barr  &  Stroud  Ltd  Glasgow  £8,720 
Beck  &  Co.  Ltd,  London  £8,880 
C.  P.  Goerz,  Berlin'  £4,712 
Ottway  &  Co.  Ltd,  London  £  640 
Ross  Optical  Co.  Ltd,  London  £10,865 
Troughton  &  Simms,  London  £  214 
W.  Watson  &  Sons  Ltd,  London  £4,279 
Carl  Zeiss  (London)  Ltd  £8,850 
*  The  business  was  part  of  a  licensing  arrangement  for  artillery  dial  sights  that  included  their  manufacture 
by  Beck  and  by  Ross. 
Irrespective  of  the  small  value  of  recent  business,  there  was  nevertheless  a  core  group  of 
makers  experienced  in  producing  specialist  instruments  to  War  Office  requirements. 
Those  included  strict  conformity  to  specifications  and  quality  at  a  level  not  required  in 
the  civil  markets  where  almost  all  the  contractors  except  Barr  &  Stroud  also  competed.  In 
'MacLeod  1975,  p.  175. 
6  For  details  of  the  organisation  of  private  sector  small-arms  production,  see  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  4,  `Rifles', 
pp.  3-21. 
Details  extracted  from  The  National  Archives,  Kew  (subsequently  PRO)  Records  of  the  War  Office,  WO 
395/3,  Director  Army  Contracts  Annual  Report  1914. 127 
the  preceding  three  years,  ten  British  companies  had  supplied  seven  categories  of  optical 
munitions  to  War  Office  contracts: 
Figure  4.2:  British  optical  munitions  contractors  to  the  War  Office,  1911-1914:  8 
Manufacturer  Products 
Aitchison  &  Co.  Ltd,  London  Prismatic  binoculars 
Barr  &  Stroud  Ltd,  Glasgow  Single-observer  rangefinders 
Beck  &  Co,  Ltd,  London  Panoramic  gun  sights  (Dial  sights) 
Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd,  York  Depression  rangefinders,  Panoramic  gun  sights 
A.  Hilger  &  Co.  Ltd,  London  Single-observer  rangefinders 
W.  Ottway  &  Co.  Ltd,  London  Sighting  telescopes 
Ross  Optical  co.  Ltd,  London  Panoramic  gun  sights,  Prismatic  binoculars, 
Si  allin  telescopes 
Taylor,  Taylor  &  Hobson  Ltd, 
Leicester 
Signalling  telescopes 
Troughton  &  Simms,  London  Sighting  telescopes,  Signalling  telescopes 
W.  Watson  &  Sons  Ltd,  London  Prismatic  binoculars 
In  addition  the  German  Carl  Zeiss  company  had  established  a  `branch  factory'  in  London 
in  1909,  setting  up  a  British  company  called  Carl  Zeiss  (London)  Ltd.  It  produced 
prismatic  binoculars  principally  for  sale  to  the  War  Office  which  by  1914  regarded  the 
business  as  a  domestic  manufacturer.  9 
These  companies  manufactured  all  the  types  of  optical  instruments  used  by  the  Regular 
Army.  Their  apparent  failure  to  meet  the  Army's  needs  can  be  explained  through 
examining  the  course  of  events  after  the  declaration  of  war. 
$  Extracted  from  PRO  395/3,  Director  of  Army  Contracts  Annual  Reports,  1912,1913,  and  1914. 
9  Antje  Hagen;  `Export  versus  Direct  investment  in  the  German  Optical  Industry',  Business  History  Vol.  38 
No.  4,  October  1996:  see  also  chapter  4  above. 128 
4.4  Procurement  Problems 
The  despatch  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  to  France  started  a  process  which  was  to  lead  to 
the  creation  of  an  unfavourable  image  of  the  optical  munitions  industry  in  the  light  of  its 
apparent  lack  of  success  in  meeting  demands.  This  was,  in  fact,  largely  due  to  a  failure  of 
the  War  Office  in  organising  procurement  rather  than  a  breakdown  of  production.  There 
were  two  problems  facing  the  War  Office.  Firstly,  the  equipment  of  the  peace-time  Army 
with  up-to-date  optical  apparatus  was  still  far  from  complete  because  some  of  the  most 
important  orders  had  only  recently  been  placed.  Earlier  contracts  (described  in  the 
preceding  chapter)  were  still  being  filled,  so  that  initial  deficiencies  in  numbers  resulted 
not  from  failure  on  the  makers'  part,  but  from  the  timing  of  War  Office  orders.  The 
second  difficulty  compounded  the  first;  the  immediate  calling-up  of  reserves  drew  into 
the  Army  large  numbers  of  men  who  were  largely  un-provided  with  optical  instruments 
of  any  kind. 
The  peace-time  strength  of  the  Army  was  approximately  234,000,  of  whom  192,000 
were  front-line  troops.  1°  From  these,  an  Expeditionary  Force  of  150,000  was  meant  to  be 
despatched  to  the  continent.  The  domestic  Territorial  Force  of  256,000  men  was  to  be 
mobilised  to  `take  over  the  defence'  of  the  British  Isles.  "  The  only  optical  munitions 
available  for  the  latter  were  those  which  had  earlier  been  released  from  the  front-line 
units  as  new  patterns  came  into  service,  and  those  left  over  from  acquisitions  made 
during  and  immediately  after  the  Boer  War.  Nothing  else  had  been  done  to  provide 
optical  instruments  for  the  Territorial  Force  because  no  pressing  need  had  been 
recognised  and  because  funds  were  more  urgently  needed  to  supply  front-line  units. 
Then,  there  were  additional  reserves  of  200,000  men  of  whom  56,000  formed  a  `Special 
Reserve'  intended  to  `feed  the  Expeditionary  Force'  with  replacements  and 
reinforcements.  These  soldiers  needed  the  same  equipment  as  the  Regulars,  but  once 
again  no  provision  had  been  made  for  optical  munitions.  The  Army  thus  had  the 
immediate  prospect  of  mobilising  for  front-line  service  150,000  men  who  were 
inadequately  supplied  with  optical  stores,  plus  another  56,000  who  were  totally  without 
10  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I,  Appendix  2,  p.  145,  and  David  G.  Hermann,  The  Arming  of  Europe  and  the  Making  of 
the  First  World  War  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1996)  p.  234. 
11  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I,  p.  8,  provides  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  paragraph. 129 
up-to-date  instruments.  Besides  those,  another  400,000  men  in  the  Territorial  and  general 
reserves  almost  entirely  lacked  optical  equipment,  constituting  a  problem  that  would 
have  to  be  addressed  if  they  were  to  be  committed  to  action. 
The  supply  problem  almost  immediately  worsened  as  it  became  apparent  that  a  much 
larger  field  force  than  150,000  was  going  to  be  required.  12  On  August  6th  Parliament 
approved  the  provision  of  an  extra  500,000  men,  of  whom  100,000  enlisted  before  the 
end  of  the  month.  A  further  half  million  was  voted  for  on  September  106x,  and  before  the 
end  of  November  approval  was  given  for  another  million,  increasing  the  Army's  pre-war 
strength  eightfold,  to  around  2.5  million.  By  the  beginning  of  November,  enlistments  of 
one  million  since  the  declaration  of  war  were  starting  to  impose  a  massive  burden  on  the 
supply  of  all  types  of  munitions.  All  these  factors  constituted  a  recipe  for  chronic 
problems  in  optical  munitions  supply. 
The  scale  of  the  Army's  need  for  optical  devices  had,  like  much  else,  rapidly  multiplied 
beyond  anything  ever  envisaged  -  `nobody  had  planned  for  an  expansion  of  the  army  on 
the  scale  undertaken  by  Kitchener'.  13  The  head  of  Woolwich  Arsenal's  Optical 
Inspection  Department  quantified  the  Army's  requirements  in  November  1914.14  His 
department  was  responsible  for  inspecting  all  optical  stores  and  he  was  fully  conversant 
with  their  scales  of  issue.  These  meant  that  excluding  gun  sights  and  signal  telescopes,  7 
percent  of  the  Army  would  require  binoculars  and  every  hundred  men  would  want  a 
rangefinder.  In  mid-November,  the  Army  had  reached  a  million,  so  that  70,000 
binoculars  and  10,000  rangefinders  were  already  required  in  addition  to  what  the  pre-war 
Regular  Army  and  reserves  still  needed.  The  provision  for  another  million  men  meant  the 
figures  would  double  by  the  following  July  when  those  new  soldiers  had  all  been 
inducted,  making  a  total  shortfall  of  140,000  binoculars  and  20,000  rangefinders, 
excluding  telescopes  and  gun  sights.  15 
12  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I  pp  9  and  10  provide  the  data  for  the  rest  of  this  section  on  the  enlargement  of  the  Army. 
13  H.  Strachan,  The  First  World  War:  Volume  1:  To  Arms.  (  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2001)  p. 
1067. 
14  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod  (1975),  p.  171,  and  A.  C.  Williams,  "The  Design  and  Inspection  of  Certain 
Optical  Munitions  of  War.  "  Transactions  of  the  Optical  Society  XX,  no.  4  (1919),  pp.  97-100. 
15  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I,  p.  10. 130 
The  responsibility  for  procuring  all  munitions  supplies  lay  jointly  with  the  Master 
General  of  the  Ordnance  (MGO)  and  the  War  Office  Contracts  Department.  The 
historian  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  provided  an  explanation  of  their  respective 
functions  which  can  hardly  be  bettered: 
The  size  of  the  Army  being  determined  by  Parliament,  and  the  scale  of 
equipment  being  approved,  the  formulation  of  definite  requirements  was  a 
straight-forward  matter.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  Master  General  of  the 
Ordnance  and  his  officers  to  prescribe  what  equipments  should  be 
supplied  and  the  duty  of  the  Contracts  Department  was  limited  to 
procuring  from  the  armaments  firms  such  portions  as  might  be  definitely 
requisitioned.  16 
The  MGO  ought  to  have  been  able  to  calculate  what  `definite  requirements'  in  optical 
stores  were  needed  according  to  the  growing  size  of  the  Army,  and  then  issue 
instructions  -  `contracts  demands'  -  to  the  Contracts  Department  to  procure  the 
quantities  needed.  The  latter  should  then  have  sought  tenders  from  manufacturers  before 
awarding  contracts.  17  Because  the  instruments  needed  in  late  1914  were  all  of  existing 
patterns,  and  because  established  sources  of  supply  already  existed,  it  might  be  expected 
that  sufficiently  large  orders  would  have  been  placed  to  meet  the  immediately  emerging 
demands.  In  fact  this  was  not  done,  so  that  by  mid-1915  there  was  both  a  substantial  and 
growing  deficit  in  orders  to  meet  the  growing  demand  and  a  shortfall  in  deliveries  of 
optical  munitions  already  required.  "  The  pattern  of  ordering  was  as  much  responsible  for 
the  failure  of  the  industry  to  provide  adequate  supplies  as  were  the  shortcomings  in  its 
structure  and  background  suggested  by  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  Unlike  rifles,  small- 
arms  ammunition  and  artillery  shells,  where  the  ever  increasing  and  massive  orders 
eventually  led  to  the  re-organisation  of  the  supplying  industries,  large  contracts  for 
16  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I,  p.  53. 
17  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I,  pp  53  to  58  supplies  the  contract  procedures  in  the  rest  of  this  section. 
"  PRO  MUN  4/745,  Orders  Placed  for  Scientific  and  Optical  Instruments  &c.,  1.8.1914  to  31.3.1917, 
illustrates  the  state  of  outstanding  orders. 131 
optical  munitions  were,  with  one  important  exception,  never  placed.  19  This  was  the  exact 
reverse  of  most  other  munitions.  20 
The  problems  of  industrial  mobilisation  certainly  did  apply  to  the  optical  sector.  Clive 
Trebilcock  has  said  that  `the  requirements  of  modem  hostilities 
...  create  unique 
problems  of  supply',  pointing  out  that  complex  artefacts  need  to  be  made  to  standards  of 
`precise  replication'  in  quantities  not  normally  required  in  peace  time.  1  In  addition, 
Trebilcock  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  normal  times  such  items  are  usually  made  by 
only  a  small  number  of  specialists.  The  pressures  of  war  create  the  need  for  their 
products  to  be  turned  out  `in  the  greatest  quantity  possible  and  at  the  highest  possible 
speed  -  adding  the  difficulties  of  mass  production  under  crisis  demand  to  those  of  quality 
and  reiteration'.  22  This  is  a  near-perfect  description  of  the  situation  which  the  optical 
munitions  makers  faced  during  late  1914  and  early  1915,  but  the  true  state  of  their 
problem  was  obscured  by  the  failure  of  the  MGO  and  Contracts  Departments  to  place 
orders  large  enough  to  expose  the  real  nature  of  the  situation  and  meant  that  the  ability  of 
the  optical  industry  to  supply  war  demands  was  never  properly  examined  until  mid-1915 
when  it  fell  under  the  aegis  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions. 
At  first  glance,  this  failure  seems  inexplicable.  The  scales  of  issue  were  known,  as  was 
the  rate  and  extent  of  the  Army's  expansion.  The  items  needed  were  not  novel  and  a  list 
of  `approved  contractors'  already  existed,  amongst  whom  orders  could  have  been 
distributed.  Furthermore,  funding  was  available  to  cover  whatever  munitions  stores  the 
MGO  put  out  to  contract.  The  reasons  why  large-scale  ordering  across  the  industry  did 
not  take  place  were  not  to  do  with  incompetence,  but  are  to  be  found  in  the  operating 
system  imposed  on  the  Contracts  Department  by  the  regulations  governing  the 
organisation  of  the  War  Office  as  a  whole.  23 
19  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  4,  `Rifles',  chapters  2  and  3. 
20  R.  J.  Q.  Adams,  Arms  and  the  Wizard;  Lloyd  George  and  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  1915-1916.  (London: 
Cassell,  1978)  Chapters  1  to  3  illustrate  the  events  leading  up  to  this. 
21  Clive  Trebilcock,  'War  and  the  failure  of  industrial  mobilisation:  1899  and  1914'  in  J.  M.  Winter,  ed. 
War  and  Economic  Development  (Cambridge:  University  Press,  1975)  p.  140. 
22  Clive  Trebilcock,  'War  and  the  failure  of  industrial  mobilisation:  1899  and  1914'  in  J.  M.  Winter,  ed. 
War  and  Economic  Development  (Cambridge:  University  Press,  1975)  p.  140. 
23  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I,  pp.  46  to  71  provides  the  basis  for  this  section  relating  to  the  handling  of  contracts. 132 
The  War  Office  procurement  system  was  hedged  around  with  safeguards  to  protect 
against  exploitation  and  default  by  contractors,  and  to  ensure  that  the  Army  obtained 
goods  of  consistently  good  quality  which  conformed  strictly  to  specifications  and  for 
which  the  State  paid  no  more  than  necessary.  In  summary,  the  system  meant  that  priority 
was  to  be  given  to  the  lowest  price  tendered  from  an  already  approved  supplier.  To 
acquire  that  status,  a  manufacturer  had  to  apply  to  go  on  the  `approved  list'  and  be  vetted 
to  ensure  he  was  actually  capable  of  carrying  out  the  work  involved.  The  MGO's  office 
issued  instructions  to  place  orders  whose  total  levels  it  determined  to  the  Contracts 
Department,  which  then  sent  `invitations  to  tender'  only  to  those  who  were  on  the 
approved  list.  The  system  worked  well  in  peace-time  but  had  serious  defects  in  war. 
These  were  explained  in  1916  by  the  civilian  head  of  the  Contracts  Department,  U.  F. 
Wintour.  24 
His  remarks  highlight  the  mind-set  of  those  responsible  for  munitions  procurement  and 
partly  explain  the  inadequate  levels  of  ordering  for  almost  all  optical  munitions  between 
late  1914  and  mid-1915  when  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  took  over.  Understanding  the 
constraints  under  which  his  department  operated  helps  to  explain  the  allegedly  poor 
performance  of  the  optical  industry  in  this  period. 
Wintour  asserted  that  being  forced  by  high  levels  of  demand  to  obtain  tenders 
simultaneously  from  all  on  the  approved  list  had  `several  vicious  consequences'  for  the 
War  Office.  These  included  revealing  to  the  supplying  industry  the  actual  scale  of  the 
Army's  needs  and  letting  the  industry  see  for  itself  `the  relation  of  [Army]  demand  to  the 
probable  supply'.  The  urgency  in  1914  and  1915  meant  that  `all  or  most  offers'  had  to  be 
accepted,  so  that  there  was  absolutely  no  chance  `to  keep  prices  down  to  a  reasonable 
level'  by  refusing  tenders  considered  too  expensive.  Because  one  of  the  department's 
chief  obligations  was  to  secure  the  lowest  practicable  prices,  attempts  were  made  to  force 
them  down.  This  was  done  at  first  by  issuing  requests  for  tender  in  quantities  lower  than 
actually  needed.  That  proved  counter-productive  because  bidders  quoted  higher  unit 
24  OH  Vol.  I  Part  I,  p.  53. 133 
prices  reflecting  the  lost  economies  of  scale  on  very  large  quantities.  Another  ploy 
involved  asking  for  prices  based  on  whatever  quantity  could  be  offered  by  a  specified 
date.  That,  according  to  Wintour,  created  an  impression  of  a  potential  demand  larger  than 
it  really  was,  and  encouraged  the  makers  to  keep  prices  at  a  high  level.  The  Contracts 
Department  seemingly  worked  from  the  premise  that  contractors  would  over-charge  in 
the  absence  of  any  control  mechanism. 
Whether  the  optical  suppliers  fitted  this  pattern  is  uncertain.  Barr  &  Stroud's  records  (the 
only  detailed  ones  available  for  this  period)  suggest  that  prices  only  increased  in  line 
with  actual  costs.  25  There  certainly  were  increases  in  the  price  of  raw  materials, 
particularly  glass,  and  because  much  of  the  optical  industry  was  concentrated  in  London 
there  may  have  been  opportunity  for  collusion  over  pricing  levels,  but  the  remaining  War 
Office  contract  records  do  not  give  enough  detail  safely  to  reach  any  conclusion.  26 
Another,  more  insidious,  effect  of  these  attempts  to  manipulate  market  forces  was  the 
effect  on  the  prices  and  apparent  availability  of  raw  materials.  Wintour  said  that  when  all 
the  firms  on  an  approved  list  were  simultaneously  asked  to  tender  for  large  quantities 
they  all  `went  into  the  market  at  the  same  time  for  the  raw  materials'  needed,  by  which 
he  meant  that  they  took  options  on  what  they  might  need.  In  consequence,  the  apparent 
demand  `multiplied  several  times  over'  causing  `complete  chaos  in  the  market  and 
[forcing  up  prices]  to  quite  fictitious  and  unwarranted  level'.  With  optical  munitions, 
something  on  these  lines  may  indeed  have  taken  place  with  optical  glass,  whose  price 
rose  considerably  and  which  was  periodically  in  very short  supply  during  1914  and 
191527 
Shortcomings  in  the  quality  control  role  of  the  tendering  system  also  affected  deliveries. 
When  a  supplier  was  given  a  contract  for  an  instrument  not  supplied  previously,  samples 
25  Data  extracted  from  prices  charged  in  UGD  295/19/2/4  and  /5,  Customer  Order  files  1914  and  1915. 
26  PRO  MUN  4/745,  Orders  placed  for  Scientific  and  Optical  Instruments  &c,  l'  August  1914  to  31 
March  1917,  does  not  give  any  prices. 
27  For  examples  of  Barr  &  Stroud's  efforts  to  maintain  supplies,  see  UGD  295/4/113,  H.  D.  Jackson  to 
Chance  Bros.,  11.11.1914,  and  Jackson  to  LePersonne  &  Co.,  9.12.1914;  UGD  295/4/118,  Jackson  to 
Chance  Bros,  18.5.1915;  UGD  295/4/119,  Jackson  to  Parra  Mantois  &  Cie.,  16.6.1915. 134 
had  to  be  submitted  for  approval  before  a  decision  to  order  was  made.  This,  according  to 
Wintour  frequently  caused  delays  as  samples  went  `astray'  and  replacements  had  to  be 
obtained.  Further  delays  occurred,  as  the  contractor  had  to  be  told  of  any  shortcomings 
and  given  an  opportunity  of  correcting  and  re-submitting  them,  when  the  whole  cycle 
would  be  repeated. 
For  the  Contracts  Department,  there  was  to  be  neither  an  open  cheque  book  nor  any 
relaxation  in  the  procedural  system  despite  earlier  clear  signals  from  Government  to  the 
MGO's  department  that  changes  were  necessary  to  speed  the  machinery  of  procurement. 
The  tendering  system  had  already  been  effectively  made  redundant  in  October  1914 
when  Lloyd  George,  then  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  had  given  the  Ordnance 
Department  `virtual  carte  blanche  approval'  for  the  purchase  of  munitions  stores,  28  but 
little  difference  became  apparent  at  the  Contracts  Department.  The  existing  system  of 
competitive  tendering  and  its  now  largely  redundant  safeguards  for  the  public  purse 
continued,  even  after  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  was  created  in  1915.  As  late  as  February 
1916,  Wintour  complained  that  conditions  of  supply  had  become  such  that  there  was  `no 
real  competition'  between  prospective  suppliers  so  that  even  the  allocation  of  orders 
according  to  price  could  not  ensure  `that  the  Department  gets  the  best  value  for  its 
money.  ' 
The  tenacity  with  which  the  Contracts  Department  held  on  to  its  peace-time  procedures 
suggests  that  William  McBride's  notion  of  military  hierarchical  structures  tending  to 
show  inertia  and  resisting  any  change  that  challenges  an  established  stability  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  the  technological  context  that  he  cited  as  evidence.  29  Wintour, 
although  a  civilian,  was  summarising  the  Department's  practices  prior  to  the  changes 
caused  by  the  creation  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  which  effectively  took  over  the 
placing  of  contracts  once  requirements  had  been  produced  by  the  War  Office.  Despite  the 
then-manifest  shortcomings  in  earlier  procedures,  and  the  political  will  to  disregard  the 
emphasis  on  competitive  tendering,  he  was  emphasising  that  the  Department  considered 
28  Adams  (1978)  p.  18. 
29  W.  McBride,  Technological  Change  and  the  U.  S.  Navy  1865-1945  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University  Press,  2000)  p.  4. 135 
its  problem  was  essentially  that  the  market  was  failing  to  conform  to  previous 
expectations,  and  that  what  had  been  perceived  as  necessary  was  some  means  to  re- 
establish  the  earlier  familiar  stability  in  the  procurement  process.  Whether  or  not 
institutional  inertia  was  all  that  encouraged  the  Contracts  Department  to  maintain  the 
status  quo,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  tendering  system  had  an  unfortunate  effect,  at  least 
on  optical  munitions  procurement.  In  fairness,  though,  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  the 
month  before  Lloyd  George  sanctioned  the  relaxation  of  procurement,  von  Donop  had 
deliberately  concealed  from  the  armaments  industry  the  provision  of  £20  million  by  the 
Treasury  for  plant  extensions,  `fearing  a  great  onrush  of  supplicants  for  the  funds',  and 
that  he  was  generally  reluctant  to  sanction  large-scale  expenditure  3°  It  is  not 
inconceivable  that  the  implications  of  Lloyd  George's  removal  of  strict  scrutiny  in 
munitions  purchasing  in  October  1914  never  actually  reached  the  Contracts  Department. 
The  net  result  of  all  this  for  the  optical  munitions  suppliers  was  that,  apart  from  Barr  & 
Stroud,  they  were  never  asked  even  to  attempt  to  provide  sufficient  capacity  to  cope  with 
the  massive  demands  for  the  growing  Army.  The  case  of  Barr  &  Stroud  is  particularly 
interesting  because  it  shows  simultaneously  some  of  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
present  in  the  early  war-time  industry,  and  suggests  that  had  the  War  Office  approach  to 
ordering  been  modified  to  reflect  the  needs  of  the  Army  rather  than  the  desire  to  preserve 
an  existing  administrative  structure,  then  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  might  well  have 
found  an  altogether  different  picture  to  the  one  it  claimed  to  discover  in  mid-1915. 
4.5  Barr  &  Stroud's  experience  in  the  first  year  of  war 
By  August  1914  Barr  &  Stroud  was  the  world's  only  company  devoted  exclusively  to  the 
manufacture  of  optical  munitions,  and  had  become  Britain's  largest  producer  of  high 
precision  optical  apparatus.  The  Admiralty  depended  wholly  on  the  company  for  its 
rangefinders,  and  the  firm  had  achieved  a  monopoly  in  supplying  rangefinders  to  the 
navies  of  France,  Italy  and  Japan,  as  well  as  an  hegemonical  position  in  virtually  every 
other  modem  navy  except  Germany's.  Its  sales  of  rangefinders  to  the  world's  armies 
were  also  very substantial,  with  France  being  the  largest  single  client  between  1912  and 
30  Adams  (1978)  p.  18,  and  then  pp.  21-23. 136 
1914.  This  success  had  been  achieved  without  any  substantial  orders  from  the  War  Office 
before  1914,  and  there  was  no  well-established  relationship  between  the  company  and 
the  Army. 
The  fin  had  been  dependent  on  foreign  orders  for  most  of  its  profitability  since  1901.  In 
its  financial  year  ending  31's  December  1913,64  percent  of  the  turnover  of  £268,000 
came  from  overseas  business,  compared  with  34  percent  from  the  British  Admiralty  and 
only  2  percent  from  the  War  Office.  31  Profit  margins  on  overseas  business  were  higher 
than  on  similar  items  sold  to  the  British  forces  -  infantry  rangefinders  for  France  were 
sold  at  £66.50  when  the  same  item  was  priced  at  £55  to  the  War  Office,  for  example.  32 
Output  was  divided  between  large  naval  instruments,  principally  for  the  Royal  Navy,  and 
the  smaller  portable  models  for  land  service  which  had  been  sold  almost  entirely  abroad. 
For  these,  the  principal  customers  were  European  armies,  with  France  being  by  far  the 
biggest  client  with  over  £100,000  of  orders  in  1913  alone. 
It  was  only  in  the  spring  of  1914  that  Barr &  Stroud  received  its  first  large  War  Office 
orders.  33  These  were  not  awarded  through  the  usual  competitive  tendering  process 
because  the  firm  was  effectively  a  monopoly  supplier.  No  other  British  maker  could 
supply  anything  similar  in  quantity,  and  the  only  foreign  competitors  were  both  German. 
The  uncertain  political  climate  in  Europe  meant  there  was  no  possible  source  other  than 
Barr &  Stroud  and  the  Contracts  Department's  duty  to  obtain  best  value  was  accordingly 
redundant.  The  first  War  Office  orders  were  certainly  large,  but  by  no  means  unusually 
so  for  Barr  &  Stroud.  Between  January  and  July  1914  four  separate  contracts  were  placed 
for  £54,000-worth  of  rangefmders,  compared  with  over  £185,000  of  foreign  business  and 
£73,000  from  the  Admiralty.  The  War  Office  orders  did  not  represent  a  complete  outfit 
of  instruments  even  for  the  Regular  Army's  front  line  Infantry  strength  of  150,000  men 
where  at  least  1,500  were  needed  but  only  680  were  ordered.  Similarly,  only  150  were 
ordered  for  the  whole  of  the  field  Artillery,  which  was  also  inadequate.  The  declaration 
'1  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/3,  Customer  Order  files  1913,  and  UGD  295/11/1,  audited  accounts  and 
balance  sheet  1913. 
32  UGD  295/19/2!  4,  Customer  Order  files,  sample  French  contracts  1913  and  War  Office  ones  1914. 
"  UGD  295/19/2/4,  and  /5,  Customer  Order  files  1914  and  1915  provide  the  source  material  for  this 
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of  war  prompted  an  increase  in  ordering,  with  new  contracts  before  December  31st  for 
£119,000-worth  of  instruments,  followed  by  orders  for  over  £300,000  by  the  end  of  July 
1915.  These  later  contracts  were  indeed  very  large.  The  firm's  greatest  annual  peacetime 
orders  had  been  £268,000  in  1913,  but  by  the  end  of  1914  new  business  totalled  over 
£491,000.  Both  the  Ministry  of  Munitions'  own  history  and  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod 
noted  that  rangefinder  supplies  alone  of  optical  stores  for  the  Army  were  `assured'  right 
from  the  outbreak  of  war,  34  suggesting  that  the  company  had  little  difficulty  coping  with 
the  new  War  Office  business.  Although  Barr  &  Stroud  did  indeed  keep  up  with  demand, 
this  came  about  only  through  a  combination  of  fortuitous  circumstances  and  the  firm's 
largely  successful  management  of  a  diverse  set  of  problems. 
The  company's  growth  in  1912  and  1913  came  through  the  rapid  increase  in  demand  for 
infantry  and  artillery  rangefinders,  a  market  encouraged  by  growing  political  tension  in 
Europe.  France  had  been  the  largest  buyer,  and  the  company  had  increased  its  capacity  to 
handle  the  extra  business.  During  the  same  years,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  courted  business 
from  the  Austro-Hungarian  and  Russian  armies,  and  by  mid-1914  already  had  its  first 
contracts  from  the  former  and  was  close  to  finalising  matters  with  the  latter.  35 
Manufacture  for  Austro-Hungary  had  begun,  but  the  declaration  of  war  saw  the  client 
become  an  enemy,  and  put  the  Russian  negotiations  into  abeyance,  freeing  space  and 
manpower  already  allocated  for  the  anticipated  business.  The  French  contracts  were 
coming  to  an  end,  all  of  which  meant  that  spare  capacity  was  available  when  the  new 
War  Office  contracts  arrived. 
Factory  space  and  tooling,  although  essential,  by  no  means  defined  the  limits  of 
manufacturing  problems.  Despite  making  optical  instruments,  Barr  &  Stroud  regarded 
itself  primarily  as  a  mechanical  engineering  company.  The  bulk  of  its  shop  space,  tooling 
and  workforce  were  allocated  to  fabricating  the  rangefinder's  mechanical  structure. 
Optical  components  were  at  the  instrument's  heart,  but  it  also  depended  on  skilled  and 
precise  mechanical  engineering  for  its  efficient  working.  Optical  and  mechanical 
34  MacLeod  (1975)  p.  171. 
35  M.  Moss  and  I.  Russell.  Range  and  Vision:  The  First  Hundred  Years  of  Barr  &  Stroud  (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream  Publishing,  1988)  pp.  65-67. 138 
engineering  were  absolutely  interdependent  in  a  successful  rangefinder.  Barr  &  Stroud 
was  entirely  self-sufficient  in  the  mechanical  side,  but  still  depended  heavily  on  sub- 
contractors  for  many  of  its  optical  components.  The  way  the  business  sought  to  manage 
the  sudden  increase  in  requirements  for  them  provides  a  useful  illustration  of  the  ability 
of  the  optical  industry  as  a  whole  to  cope  with  war-time  demands  in  1914. 
Although  Barr  &  Stroud  rangefinders  all  shared  a  basically  similar  optical  design,  the 
different  models  required  their  own  outfits  of  lenses  and  prisms,  depending  on  the  base- 
length  and  magnification.  Some  were  made  in-house,  but  many  were  still  being  done  by 
outside  contractors  who  frequently  failed  to  reach  the  specified  standards  needed  for  the 
instruments  to  work  properly.  Barr  &  Stroud's  problems  with  increasing  output  in 
response  to  demands  for  rapid  delivery  were  largely  centred  on  maintaining  the  quality  of 
externally-sourced  components  from  suppliers  over  whom  there  was  no  direct  control. 
The  scale  of  demand  for  lenses  and  prisms  was  governed  by  the  requirements  of  the  two 
British  armed  services,  which  in  turn  influenced  the  extent  to  which  Barr  &  Stroud  had  to 
depend  on  contractors  who  were  both  far  distant  and  pre-occupied  with  their  own 
business. 
Once  war  was  seen  as  inevitable,  the  directors  began  to  put  themselves  on  a  `war 
footing'.  On  31'  July  they  assured  the  Admiralty  that  priority  would  be  given  to  Royal 
Navy  contracts  over  foreign  ones  and,  apparently,  over  War  Office  ones  as  well  36  On  3'd 
August  general  manager  Harold  Jackson,  wrote  to  his  optical  subcontractors  urging 
immediate  attention  to  `all  our  orders  in  hand'.  37  When  war  was  declared  the  following 
day  he  sent  the  Admiralty  a  detailed  list  of  all  rangefinders  on  order,  for  both  allies  and 
enemies  alike,  and  specifically  requested  an  assurance  that  there  was  no  objection  to 
continuing  supplies  to  France.  The  company  accepted  that  the  Admiralty  had  the  ability 
to  direct  exactly  what  it  could  and  could  not  do,  which  stood  to  affect  the  firm's 
requirements  for  optical  components  from  outside  suppliers.  Having  been  assured  on  the 
36  UGD 295/4/6,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Director  of  Navy  Contracts,  31.7.1914. 
37  UGD 295/4/109,  Letter  Book,  a  series  of  almost  identical  letters  was  sent  out  between  3.8.1914  and 
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6th  that  there  were  no  objections  to  deliveries  for  the  French  army  and  navy,  Jackson 
began  attempting  to  arrange  for  adequate  supplies  of  lenses  and  prisms.  38 
The  correspondence  in  the  following  months  illustrates  the  problems  that  the  optical 
munitions  makers  had  to  deal  with,  and  shows  that  irrespective  of  capacity,  skill  or 
ability,  there  was  indeed  a  lack  of  organisation  in  the  optical  industry.  The  firm's  efforts 
were  ultimately  successful  not  through  obtaining  larger  deliveries  from  existing 
suppliers,  but  through  the  expansion  of  internal  capacity  and  the  establishment  of  a  new 
relationship  with  one  particular  maker. 
Barr  &  Stroud's  oldest  optical  supplier  was  Adam  Hilger  Ltd,  and  it  was  their  Managing 
Director,  Frank  Twyman,  that  Jackson  first  approached.  The  two  companies  had  been 
associated  since  1889,  and  on  at  least  two  previous  occasions  a  merger  had  been 
discussed.  39  Nothing  had  resulted,  and  by  1914  Hilger's  -  although  still  the  principal 
British  maker  of  complex  prisms  -  had  lost  the  near  monopoly  of  Barr  &  Stroud  optical 
components  it  once  had.  Hilger's  had  felt  the  diminution  of  Barr &  Stroud  orders  very 
keenly  after  1913  when  the  effect  had  been  `very  bad'.  0  This  reduction  may  partly  have 
been  because  Barr  &  Stroud  was  becoming  more  self-sufficient  but  Twyman  later 
considered  the  real  cause  was  Admiralty  pressure  on  Barr  &  Stroud  to  insure  against  the 
dangers  implicit  in  the  possible  failure  of  one  key  sub-contractor,  which  had  led  the 
company  not  only  to  expand  its  own  optical  output  but  to  engage  other  suppliers  as 
well  41  Whilst  the  Admiralty  certainly  was  aware  of  dangers  in  interruptions  to  its  supply 
of  optical  munitions,  it  is  equally  possible  that  the  stimulus  for  self-sufficiency  may  have 
been  encouraged  by  Hilger's  continued  inability  to  maintain  sufficiently  high  and 
consistent  standards.  Although  orders  were  still  being  placed  for  lenses  and  prisms  in 
38  UGD  295/4/6,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  6.8.1914. 
39  See  Chapter  2  and  Chapter  4  above. 
40  Science  Museum  Library,  Adam  Hilger  Collection  (subsequently  SML):  HILG  3/1,  typescript  `Mr 
Twyman's  lecture  August  1944,  p.  17. 
41  SML  HILG  3/1,  typescript  p.  27. 140 
1914,  complaints  of  poor  quality  were  frequent.  Nevertheless,  it  was  on  Hilger's  that 
Barr  &  Stroud  at  first  intended  to  rely  for  the  expansion  of  deliveries.  2 
Scarcely  a  week  after  the  war  began,  Jackson  asked  Twyman  for  delivery  dates  for 
everything  on  order.  Jackson  emphasised  that  the  size  and  the  new  urgency  of  existing 
orders  meant  Twyman  must  hire  as  many  optical  workers  as  possible,  and  visit  Glasgow 
to  discuss  the  situation  with  Barr  &  Stroud's  directors.  That  letter,  dated  the  10`",  must 
have  been  written  knowing  that  an  urgent  War  Office  order  for  558  infantry  rangefinders 
was  already  on  its  way  to  Glasgow.  43  A  meeting  was  held  on  21  t  August,  when  the  firm 
presented  Twyman  with  a  proposition  he  may  well  have  felt  unable  to  refuse. 
Barr  &  Stroud  proposed  to  give  Hilger's  `all  the  [optical]  orders  that  we  cannot  undertake 
ourselves'.  44  These  were  greater  than  Hilger's  own  capacity,  so  the  directors  knew 
Twyman  would  have  to  subcontract  many  of  them.  As  Barr  &  Stroud  was  already  out- 
sourcing  a  substantial  amount  of  optical  work  to  firms  besides  Hilger's,  the  offer 
suggests  that  either  the  directors  wished  to  simplify  their  own  administration  or,  more 
likely,  that  such  a  desire  was  combined  with  the  knowledge  that  their  existing 
subcontracting  network  would  very  soon  be  insufficient.  Tywman  could  subcontract, 
provided  he  would  be  responsible  for  the  prompt  delivery  and  quality  of  the  work.  The 
directors  thought  that  Hilger's  was  `at  the  centre  of  the  optical  trade'  and  therefore 
`probably  better  able  to  subcontract  [and]  control  the  quality  of  the  work  than  we  are'.  To 
assist  Twyman,  they  would  help  to  obtain  optical  glass  from  the  sole  British  makers, 
Chance  Brothers  of  Birmingham,  as  well  as  providing  advice  on  manufacturing  methods. 
This  was,  at  first  sight,  a  substantial  vote  of  confidence  in  Hilger's  which  -  if  justified  - 
would  have  left  Barr  &  Stroud  free  to  concentrate  on  its  own  manufacturing  without  the 
burden  of  co-ordinating  the  work  of  numerous  subcontractors.  It  was,  however,  still  short 
of  a  total  endorsement  and  by  no  means  gave  Twyman  any  guarantee  of  subcontracted 
work  because,  irrespective  of  the  proposed  agreement,  Barr  &  Stroud  reserved  the  right 
42  UGD  295/4/110,  Letter  Book,  contains  a  series  of  letters  from  Jackson  to  Twyman  which  provides  the 
material  concerning  Adam  Hilger  for  the  rest  of  this  section  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
43  UGD  295/19/2/3,  Customer  Order  file. 
44  UGD  295/4/110,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Twyman,  21.8.1914. 141 
to  extend  its  own  optical  department  as  it  thought  necessary.  Jackson's  summary  of  the 
meeting  noted  that  `for  the  present  neither  you  nor  we  can  undertake  [unaided]  the  work 
in  hand',  implying  that  that  he  saw  no  reason  why  his  firm  should  not  move  closer  to  that 
condition. 
Whether  or  not  Barr  &  Stroud  meant  to  flatter  Twyman  by  saying  that  Hilger's  were  `at 
the  centre  of  the  optical  trade',  the  statement  was  literally  correct.  In  1914  London 
remained  the  principal  locus  of  the  optical  instruments  (but  not  necessarily  optical 
munitions)  industry.  Apart  from  Barr  &  Stroud,  the  only  substantial  companies  not  based 
in  London  were  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd  in  York  and  Sir  Howard  Grubb  &  Co.  in 
Dublin,  both  of  whom  were  directly  involved  in  optical  munitions.  There  were  other 
optical  makers  in  the  provinces,  but  none  of  them  were  either  large  or  substantially 
engaged  in  making  for  the  armed  forces.  The  London  businesses  ranged  from  relatively 
large  and  successful  ones  such  as  the  Ross  Optical  Co.  Ltd  which  employed  over  350 
workers,  45  down  to  small  firms  which  were  mainly  engaged  in  ophthalmic  optics  and 
sometimes  employed  only  one  or  two  workers.  6  There  was  a  concentration  of  makers  in 
the  Clerkenwell  district  where  Hilger's  was  located,  so  that  Twyman  was  indeed 
conveniently  placed  to  liase  with  many  optical  manufacturers  although  his  competence  to 
do  so  was  not  so  readily  apparent. 
Twyman's  interests  lay  principally  with  the  development  of  new  types  of  optical 
instruments  for  science,  particularly  the  spectrometer.  47  His  company's  other  main  area 
of  expertise  was  the  making  of  complex  prisms,  in  which  it  had  something  approaching  a 
monopoly  in  Britain.  Both  were  essentially  small  scale  operations  reflecting 
contemporary  levels  of  demand,  so  that  Hilger's  remained  a  small  business  of  less  than 
thirty  workers  and  Twyman  had  no  experience  either  of  volume  production  or  the 
organisation  of  subcontracting  on  the  scale  that  was  now  necessary.  Barr  &  Stroud's 
directors  knew  this,  and  it  is  unclear  why  they  so  readily  devolved  the  task  to  him.  The 
4s  A.  B.  Dewar,  The  Great  Munition  Feat  1914-1918.  (London:  Constable,  192  1)  p.  221. 
"Hugh  Barty-King,  Eyes  Right:  The  Story  ofDollond  &  Aitchison  Opticians  1750-1985  (London:  Quiller 
Press,  1986)  p.  125. 
47  SML  HILG  7/1,  Twyman  obituary  reprint  (unidentified),  p.  270. 142 
most  probable  explanation  is  that  Twyman,  through  his  prism  work, was  well  acquainted 
with  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  London  firms  who  regularly  did  the  high  grade  spherical  lens 
work  used  in  the  scientific  instruments  that  employed  Hilger's  prisms.  These  firms,  few 
of  which  Barr  &  Stroud  had  ever  dealt  with,  were  now  likely  suppliers,  if  they  could  be 
persuaded  to  take  on  the  work.  Personal  persuasion  and  cajolery  might  have  been 
recognised  as  more  effective  recruiters  than  Jackson's  letters  and  telegrams  from 
Glasgow. 
Whatever  Barr  &  Stroud's  thinking,  by  the  end  of  October  it  was  apparent  that 
Twyman's  efforts  were  not  going  well.  Although  none  of  Hilger's  surviving  records 
relate  to  this,  Barr  &  Stroud's  letter  books  document  the  problems  and  the  frustrations 
they  caused.  Despite  offering  to  make  Hilger's  responsible  for  all  orders  beyond  Barr  & 
Stroud's  own  capacity,  the  firm  not  only  excluded  Taylor,  Taylor  &  Hobson  Ltd  from 
Hilger's  remit,  but  also  continued  to  deal  directly  with  three  London  firms  who  were 
already  supplying  parts.  R.  &  J.  Beck,  the  Periscopic  Prism  Company,  and  W.  Watson  & 
Sons  all  had  contracts  which  continued  to  be  administered  from  Glasgow  subsequent  to 
the  arrangement  with  Twyman.  48  Nor  did  Barr  &  Stroud  leave  Twyman  alone  to  get  on 
with  his  task;  Jackson  repeatedly  intervened  with  instructions  as  to  how  the 
subcontracting  should  be  organised. 
Twyman's  instructions  to  exclude  Taylor  Hobson  resulted  from  Archibald  Barr's 
acquaintance  with  Wilfred  Taylor  and  his  high  opinion  of  Taylor  Hobson's  workmanship 
and  methods  that  dated  from  1903  49  The  Leicester  company  moved  into  lens  making  as 
part  of  a  programme  of  diversification  from  the  manufacture  of  small  precision  machine 
tools  and  doing  fine  mechanical  work,  had  begun  contracting  for  the  War  Office  from 
1910,  and  by  1914  had  expanded  its  optical  side  into  the  series-production  of  high  quality 
photographic  lenses  to  designs  licensed  from  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd  of  York.  5°  On 
48  UGD  295/4/11,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Beck,  26.10.1914;  Jackson  to  Periscopic  Prism  Co.,  6.10.1914; 
Jackson  to  Watson,  14.10.1914 
"  UGD  295/26/1/25,  Barr  to  William  Taylor,  3.6.1903  requesting  help  in  obtaining  optical  workers  and 
endorsing  Taylor  Hobson's  small  machine  tools. 
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August  9th,  Taylor  offered  Archibald  Barr  his  firm's  `assistance'  in  the  production  of 
rangefinder  object  lenses,  and  this  was  quickly  accepted  after  a  meeting  of  the  two  firms' 
directors.  sl  Whether  this  was  a  deliberate  hedge  against  Hilger's  failure  is  uncertain,  but 
in  view  of  how  the  other  subcontracting  exercise  turned  out,  it  was  a  propitious  move. 
Taylor  told  Barr  &  Stroud  on  25th  August  that  he  had  received  third-party  enquiries 
(which  he  did  not  identify)  for  quotations  for  lenses  to  be  supplied  directly  to  Hilger's. 
Then,  on  September  2"d,  he  was  asked  by  Cooke's  of  York  to  quote  for  objective  lenses 
to  be  delivered  to  Adam  Hilger  &  Co.  Their  specification  identified  them  as  being  for 
Barr &  Stroud  rangefinders  and  Taylor  consequently  declined  the  business.  52  Cooke's 
were  one  of  the  country's  best  known  lens  and  telescope  makers,  and  were  not  currently 
engaged  on  any  large  scale  British  government  contracting.  The  referral  of  the  order  to  a 
third  party  could  hardly  to  have  been  because  of  a  lack  of  capacity  or  ability,  but  was 
more  likely  because  they  were  attempting  to  sell  rangefmders  of  their  own  design 
intended  for  use  with  the  Pollen  fire-control  system  to  the  Admiralty  and  the  Russian 
governments,  as  well  as  promoting  smaller  versions  for  land-service  use.  53  Whatever 
Cooke's  reasons  or  motives,  Taylor's  letter  warned  Jackson  that  if  Twyman's 
subcontractors  were  passing-on  work,  it  could  pose  threats  to  maintaining  quality  control, 
and  he  promptly  gave  Twyman  specific  instructions  to  tell  them  that  they  were  not  to 
pass  orders  on  to  a  third  party. 
This  division  and  sub-division  of  manufacture  highlights  a  problem  facing  firms  seeking 
to  increase  optical  output  in  late  1914  and  early  1915.  The  capacity  of  most  optical 
manufacturers  to  expand  production  rapidly  and  substantially  was  constrained  by  the 
structure  of  the  pre-war  industry  which  had  operated  on  a  scale  geared  to  domestic  and 
export  demands  that  generally  lacked  urgency.  The  optical  munitions  component  of  the 
larger  optical  instruments  industry  had  no  significant  peace-time  problems  in  meeting  the 
demand,  whether  through  in-house  manufacture  or  outsourcing.  Even  where  the  scale  of 
demand  had  been  consistently  large,  as  with  Barr &  Stroud's  business,  the  required 
S'  UGD  295/4/109,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Taylor,  Taylor,  Hobson,  11.8.1914  and  18.8.1914. 
S2  UGD  295/4/110,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  acknowledges  advice  from  Taylor,  Taylor,  Hobson,  25.8.1914. 
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delivery  rates  had  usually  been  leisurely  enough  to  allow  supplies  to  keep  up  with 
schedules.  The  expansion  of  orders  and  the  need  for  increased  speed  of  output  strained 
the  opticians  to  whom  Barr  &  Stroud  and  Hilger's  immediately  turned.  Beck,  Cooke  and 
Watson,  for  example,  were  already  producing  both  optical  munitions  components  and 
complete  instruments  but  were  not  wholly  devoted  to  those  fields;  they  also  had  a 
substantial  involvement  in  the  general  commercial  market  for  optical  goods  which  they 
were  initially  loathe  to  relinquish.  Increasing  output  for  Barr  &  Stroud  meant  either 
reducing  output  of  something  else  or  investing  in  new  tooling  and  labour.  Early  in  the 
war  there  was  a  general  reluctance  to  do  this  when  its  duration  -  and  hence  commercial 
value  -  was  expected  to  be  short  rather  than  long,  and  when  there  was  no  avalanche  of 
orders  from  the  War  Office  to  counteract  this  view.  Faced  with  such  uncertainties  and  the 
lack  of  any  centralised  State  direction,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  firms  attempted  to  cope 
with  what  they  saw  as  a  short  term  phenomenon  by  equally  short  term  measures  such  as 
further  sub-contracting. 
For  Barr &  Stroud,  that  reasoning  was  secondary  to  the  immediate  problem  of  obtaining 
enough  components  of  a  sufficiently  high  standard.  Throughout  September  Harold 
Jackson  complained  to  Twyman  about  slow  deliveries  and  erratic  quality.  54  By  the  14`'', 
-he  was  so  worried  about  Hilger's  prism  output  that  he  urged  Twyman  to  approach  the 
Periscopic  Prism  Company  (with  whom  Barr  &  Stroud  was  already  dealing)  for  extra 
supplies  of  the  rangefinder  pentagonal  prisms  which  had  previously  been  one  of  Hilger's 
specialities.  On  the  25th,  he  provided  Twyman  with  a  list  of  firms  to  approach,  suggesting 
there  had  been  little  headway  in  organising  deliveries.  Matters  deteriorated  further 
throughout  October,  and  by  the  end  of  the  month  were  so  bad  that  Jackson  travelled  to 
London  to  try  to  resolve  the  problem. 
There  were  two  difficulties  for  Barr  &  Stroud.  Firstly,  in  Jackson's  words,  Hilger's  could 
not  supply  `even  our  minimum  demands  for  optical  parts'  and  secondly,  the  War  Office 
had  asked  Hilger's  to  re-start  production  of  the  unsatisfactory  Marindin  rangefinder 
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which  it  had  bought  in  small  numbers  between  1907  and  1913.55  To  Barr  &  Stroud,  that 
idea  was  wholly  unacceptable.  Many  of  the  parts  for  the  Marindin  had  actually  been 
made  in  Glasgow,  and  Jackson  knew  that  Hilger's  had  constantly  struggled  to  maintain 
output  and  quality;  its  resurrection  threatened  to  affect  Barr  &  Stroud's  output  by 
diverting  Hilger's  efforts.  56  Ignoring  the  War  Office's  right  to  order  what  it  chose, 
Jackson  wrote  bluntly  that  `We  do  not  see  how  you  can  undertake  the  manufacture  ... 
', 
and  threatened  that  `if  we  cannot  get  from  you  the  supplies  on  which  we  have  been 
counting  we  shall  be  forced  immediately  to  get  our  supplies  elsewhere.  '  Exactly  where 
they  might  come  from  Jackson  did  not  say,  but  the  threat  persuaded  Twyman  to  convince 
the  War  Office  that  re-starting  Marindin  production  was  not  feasible,  probably  because 
its  mechanical  components  would  be  unobtainable.  57 
Hilger's  inabilities  were  to  some  extent  lessened  by  the  Barr  &  Stroud's  growing  self- 
sufficiency.  Jackson  complained  yet  again  to  Twyman  about  shortcomings  on  December 
9th,  pointing  out  that  Barr  &  Stroud  had  now  increased  its  optical  capacity  to  the  point 
where  `we  are  held  back  by  you,  and  only  by  you'.  58  In  consequence,  Barr  &  Stroud 
would  start  making  the  parts  which  Twyman  had  failed  to  deliver,  and  the  ultimate 
outcome  would  be  Hilger's  exclusion  altogether.  Jackson  possibly  misled  Twyman  by 
implying  that  optical  output  at  Glasgow  had  increased;  although  new  equipment  had 
been  ordered  from  the  Standard  Optical  Company  in  Switzerland  in  mid-September, 
there  had  been  little  enough  time  for  it  to  be  made,  delivered  and  installed,  and  operatives 
trained  to  use  it  S9  Indeed,  the  building  extensions  needed  to  accommodate  the  extra  plant 
were  only  started  in  November  and  could  not  yet  have  been  finished.  60  It  is  likely  that  the 
increased  optical  capacity  was  actually  Taylor  Hobson's  in  Leicester,  whose  ability  to 
handle  large  orders  was  becoming  established,  so  that  the  need  to  employ  subcontractors 
at  third-hand  through  Hilger's  was  starting  to  diminish. 
ss  UGD  295/4/110  Jackson  to  Twyman,  30.8.1914. 
56  UGD  295/4/744,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Hilger,  9/8/1907. 
57  UGD  295/4/112,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Twyman,  thanking  him  for  his  co-operation,  7.11.14. 
S8  UGD  295/4/112,  Jackson  to  Twyman,  9.12.1914. 
59  UGD  295/4/112,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Standard  Optical  Company,  17.9.1914. 
60  UGD  295/4/112  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Sir  William  Arrol  &  Co.  (builders),  5.11.1914. 146 
According  to  Barr  &  Stroud,  Hilger's  performance  was  indeed  greatly  deficient.  Jackson 
refused  to  give  Twyman  any  further  orders  on  90'  December,  pending  `reliable 
information'  about  what  improvements  would  be  made  61  The  reply  to  this  has  not 
survived,  but  Jackson's  riposte  has.  2  The  unfortunate  Twyman  was  given  a  piece  of 
Jackson's  mind;  less  than  35  percent  of  1,393  items  ordered  had  been  delivered  on 
schedule,  804  others  which  had  not  been  ordered  at  all  had  been  sent  in  error,  and 
Twyman's  claims  for  Hilger's  output  were  `if  you  excuse  us  saying  so  ...  all  nonsense'. 
Despite  this,  Barr  &  Stroud  wanted  to  carry  on  with  Hilger's,  and  would  provide  weekly 
requirements  lists  so  Twyman  could  prioritise  his  own  deliveries.  Even  if  alternative 
sources  were  becoming  available,  Hilger's  were  clearly still  essential  to  maintain  output. 
Sentiment  certainly  had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  Although  well  aware  that  costs  were 
escalating,  Jackson  flatly  refused  to  tolerate  a  proposed  price  increase,  countering  that  he 
hoped  Twyman  would  instead  be  able  to  reduce  costs  through  `the  experience  you  are 
now  gaining  with  manufacturing  large  quantities'.  His  dependence  on  Barr  &  Stroud  left 
Twyman  little  choice  but  to  accept  both  criticisms  and  demands.  Jackson's 
acknowledgement  of  his  assurances  twisted  the  knife  still  further  by  pointing  out  that 
quality  was  as  important  as  quantity  and  speed,  and  that  before  the  war  the  bulk  of 
Hilger's  current  output  would  have  been  rejected  at  Glasgow.  63 
In  January  1915,  Barr  &  Stroud  began  to  concentrate  its  outside  orders  on  Taylor  Hobson 
because  the  Leicester  firm  consistently  worked  to  high  enough  standards  and  was  willing 
to  adopt  `novel'  methods  in  both  optical  and  mechanical  engineering  to  improve  quality 
and  output  TM  Jackson  conceded  that  Leicester-made  objectives  were  better  than  those 
being  made,  or  likely  to  be  made  at  Glasgow,  and  asked  Taylor  Hobson  substantially  to 
increase  production.  65  At  the  same  time,  orders  placed  with  other  previously  substantial 
suppliers  began  to  be  cancelled  or  not  renewed.  Complaints  were  made  to  both  Beck  and 
Watson,  both  of  whom  had  earlier  been  given  large  orders  for  lenses,  about  late 
deliveries  and  poor  quality,  and  ordering  from  both  firms  apparently  ended  by  June  of 
61  UGD  295/4/112,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Twyman  9.12.14. 
62  UGD  295/4/112,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Twyman  14.12.14. 
63  UGD  295/4/112,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Twyman  17.12.14. 
64  UGD  295/4/110,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Edward  Taylor,  10.9.1914,  records  novel  methods. 
6s  UGD  295/4/114,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Taylor,  Taylor  Hobson,  8.1.1915. 147 
19  15  66  This  shifting  of  emphasis  and  reduction  of  dependency  on  a  multiplicity  of 
outside  suppliers  resulted  principally  from  establishing  an  accommodation  with  a  firm 
that  was  prepared  to  innovate  to  aid  Barr  &  Stroud's  output.  The  firm's  letter  books  show 
that  Jackson  had  never  hesitated  to  complain  about  suppliers,  so  the  lack  of  critical 
correspondence  strongly  supports  the  assumption  that  the  working  relationship  with 
Taylor  Hobson  went  well  during  the  first  half  of  1915.  Rather  than  simply  complaining 
about  inadequate  quality,  problems  which  arose  led  to  collaboration  in  solving 
manufacturing  difficulties,  with  both  fines  contributing  equally  to  the  effort67  That 
deliveries  from  Leicester  met  requirements  for  both  speed  and  quality  must  have 
encouraged  Barr  &  Stroud  to  dispense  with  less  satisfactory  suppliers,  particularly  if,  as 
Jackson  had  claimed,  the  firm's  own  output  was  also  starting  to  increase.  68 
The  problems  of  achieving  adequate  optical  production  were  also  eased  by  the  plateau  in 
Army  rangefinder  orders  that  followed  those  in  the  autumn  of  1914.  Unlike  the  other 
optical  munitions  makers,  Barr  &  Stroud's  monopoly  supplier  status  meant  that  it  was 
not  faced  with  tendering  for  a  multiplicity  of  small  contracts,  and  during  the  first  six 
months  of  1915  the  company  could  organise  its  production  (albeit  not  without 
difficulties)  in  the  light  of  a  known  level  of  demand.  As  a  result,  its  deliveries  for  War 
Office  contracts  kept  largely  on  schedule,  something  that  could  not  be  said  for  most  of 
the  optical  munitions  industry.  69 
To  increase  optical  output,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  at  first  been  able  to  employ  a  number  of 
experienced  makers  who  performed  with  varying  degrees  of  success.  Then  it  had 
embarked  on  a  subcontracting  exercise  designed  to  supplement  supplies  without 
increasing  its  own  burden  of  administration  and  co-ordination.  When  this  proved 
unsuccessful  the  fum  fostered  relations  with  a  new  supplier  which  it  helped  to  reach  a 
position  where  it  could  replace  virtually  all  the  other  subcontractors.  That  there  was 
66  Entries  in  the  Letter  Books  cease  after  this  date,  the  last  one  being  to  Beck. 
67  UGD  295/4/112,  Letter  Book  entries  for  early  1915. 
68  UGD295/4/118,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Taylor  Hobson,  18.5.1915  confirming  that  Taylor  Hobson  is 
now  the  sole  outside  supplier  of  FT20  objective  lenses,  and  2.6.1915  asking  for  quotation  for  another  1,100 
similar  lenses. 
69  From  examination  of  progress  details  recorded  in  UGD  295/19/2/3  and  /4,  Customer  Order  files  1914 
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sufficient  capacity  in  the  optical  industry  be  able  to  pick  and  choose  before  selecting  one 
prime  sub-contractor  suggests  that  the  demands  being  placed  on  the  industry  were 
insufficient  even  to  occupy  its  capacity  let  alone  overwhelm  it,  a  situation  that  could  only 
have  resulted  from  the  War  Office's  failure  to  place  substantial  contracts  across  the 
optical  manufacturers.  In  December  1914,  the  Periscopic  Prism  Company  had  asked  Barr 
&  Stroud  for  more  work,  despite  already  getting  business  directly  from  Glasgow  and  via 
Hilger's,  and  was  also  able  to  take  on  the  design  of  a  telescopic  rifle  sight  for  the  War 
Office.  Aldis  Brothers  in  Birmingham  also  had  sufficient  spare  capacity  to  take  sub- 
contract  work  from  Hilger's  and  to  start  making  telescopic  rifle  sights  of  their  own 
design.  70 
4.6  Labour  shortages 
Barr  &  Stroud's  problems  were  by  no  means  confined  to  obtaining  components  from 
outside  suppliers.  Like  other  manufacturers,  the  firm  was  affected  by  the  loss  of  men  who 
left  to  `join  the  colours'  in  response  to  the  government's  recruiting  campaign, 
particularly  those  who  had  skills  essential  to  the  production  of  optical  components.  71  As 
early  as  13th  August  the  Jackson  warned  the  War  Office  that  optical  workers  (who  made 
up  just  6  percent  of  the  workforce)  were  vital  to  production.  If  they  left,  they  could  not  be 
replaced  in  Glasgow  which  would  seriously  compromise  production.  72.  Even  though 
some  of  the  Territorial  Army  members  in  the  workforce  were  called  up  and  others 
volunteered  for  the  Army,  there  was  a  net  increase  in  workers  from  1,200  in  July  to  1,400 
by  late  October'73  although  most  of  them  were  likely  to  have  been  unskilled  or  semi- 
skilled.  The  greatest  labour  problem  in  August  and  September  1914  turned  out  to  be  the 
temporary  loss  of  `all  our  best  rangefinder  adjusters',  the  highly  skilled  men  who  were 
`lent'  to  the  Royal  Navy  in  July  to  check  the  rangefinders  of  the  fleet  before  it  was 
dispersed  to  war  stations  74  Three  days  after  the  declaration,  Jackson  flatly  refused  to 
70  I.  Skennerton,  The  British  Sniper  (Margate,  Queensland,  Australia:  I.  D.  Skennerton,  1984)  pp.  41  and 
47. 
"  Moss  &  Russell  (1988  p.  73. 
72  UGD  295  Unclassified,  Russell  research  notes,  Barr  &  Stroud  Letter  book  Vol.  99,  and  UGD  295/4/625, 
Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Ministry  of  Munitions,  20.7.1915. 
"  UGD  295/4/11,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Glasgow  Tramways,  28.10.1914. 
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provide  any  more  of  them,  asked  for  the  speediest  return  of  those  in  English  ports,  and 
warned  that  Admiralty  deliveries  would  be  `impossible'  unless  his  request  was  met. 
The  loss  of  skilled  labour  in  the  munitions  industry  and  its  subsequent  replacement  has 
been  discussed  by  R.  J.  Q.  Adams,  particularly  the  efforts  in  1914  and  1915  to  employ 
skilled  Belgian  mechanics  who  had  been  displaced  by  the  German  invasion.  75  In  mid- 
December  1914,  Barr  &  Stroud  told  the  Board  of  Trade  that  although  extra  workers  were 
urgently  needed  in  all  departments,  it  declined  to  take  any  of  the  `skilled'  Belgian 
workers  which  the  Board  had  offered  to  provide.  6  The  reason  given  was  that  the 
Admiralty  had  forbidden  the  employment  of  foreign  workers  in  the  factory,  but  this  was 
a  half-truth;  what  the  Admiralty  insisted  on  was  that  no  foreign  workers  were  allowed 
into  the  area  where  its  contracts  were  being  worked  on.  There  was  no  reason  why  such 
workers  could  not  have  been  employed  elsewhere,  and  in  fact  Japanese  naval  personnel 
`workers'  were  already  present  in  the  factory  taking  part  in  the  assembly  of  rangefinders 
for  the  Imperial  Navy.  77  Presumably  the  shortage  was  not  critical  if  the  company  could 
afford  to  turn  away  skilled  mechanical  engineers.  The  complaint  about  a  shortage  of 
workers  may  have  been  a  pro-active  device  intended  as  a  hedge  against  the  possibility  of 
future  difficulties  rather  than  an  immediate  problem.  What  Jackson  wanted  was  to  keep 
men  who  were  skilled  in  Barr  &  Stroud's  methods,  not  to  have  to  train  and  integrate 
foreign  workers.  His  dealings  with  Hilger's  illustrate  a  pronounced  willingness  to 
emphasise  or  deliberately  exaggerate  the  severity  of  a  problem  in  order  to  obtain  a  result 
beneficial  to  the  company. 
4.7  Barr  &  Stroud  and  Anglo-French  friction 
The  first  year  of  war  produced  other  problems  that  were  unique  to  Barr  &  Stroud.  Before 
the  war,  the  firm,  regarded  the  Admiralty  as  its  most  important  client,  not  necessarily 
because  the  Admiralty  was  always  the  largest  spender,  but  because  the  Royal  Navy  had 
come  to  involve  the  company  regularly  in  its  requirements  for  rangefinders  and  tended  to 
influence  other  navies  by  its  adoption  of  new  equipment.  Where  the  Royal  Navy  went, 
'S  Adams  (1978)  Chapter  7. 
76  UGD  295  unclassified,  Barr  &  Stroud  Letter  book  Vol.  103,16.12.1914. 
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others  tended  to  follow  and  for  Barr  &  Stroud  the  cachet  of  being  the  Navy's  sole 
rangefinder  supplier  was  invaluable.  When  European  armies  began  to  buy  smaller,  man- 
portable  rangefinders  in  growing  quantities,  Barr  &  Stroud  developed  another  kind  of 
relationship  with  the  French  Army  as  it  became  by  far  the  largest  client  for  them.  This 
differed  from  that  with  the  Royal  Navy  in  being  principally  one  of  supplier  and  client 
rather  than  the  more  complex  and  symbiotic  one  of  design  and  production  interaction  that 
existed  with  the  Admiralty.  Nevertheless,  Barr  &  Stroud  developed  a  sense  of 
responsibility  towards  its  French  client,  because  as  with  the  Royal  Navy  there  was  the 
benefit  of  endorsement,  besides  the  considerable  income  from  French  government 
business.  The  Admiralty  had  always  recognised  Barr  &  Stroud's  need  for  overseas 
customers,  allowing  the  company  to  balance  its  domestic  and  foreign  commitments  and 
obligations.  The  outbreak  of  war  and  the  ascendancy  of  the  War  Office  as  a  new  major 
client  had  a  significant  effect  on  these  arrangements  and  eventually  came  close  to 
compromising  Barr  &  Stroud's  relationship  with  its  French  patron. 
The  possibility  of  conflicts  of  interest  over  new  government  business  and  existing  private 
contracts  between  munitions  suppliers  and  their  customers  became  a  matter  of  concern 
soon  after  the  war  began.  The  Board  of  Trade  feared  that  firms  might  not  give  absolute 
priority  to  government  orders  when  they  already  had  existing  orders  to  meet,  as  doing  so 
might  place  them  in  breach  of  contract  under  civil  law.  78  The  Defence  of  the  Realm  Act 
already  gave  the  Admiralty  and  the  Army  Council  powers  to  take  over  part  or  all  of  the 
output  of  `any  factory  or  workshop  in  which  arms,  ammunition,  or  warlike  stores'  were 
produced,  or  even  to  take  possession  of  the  premises  themselves.  79  Rangefinders  were 
`warlike  stores'  and  at  the  outbreak  of  war  almost  all  those  still  in  Barr  &  Stroud's 
factory  had  been  claimed  by  the  Admiralty  and  the  War  Office.  The  only  exceptions 
were  French  orders,  for  which  the  firm  had  already  negotiated  with  the  Admiralty  what 
amounted  to  an  immunity.  By  December  though,  the  War  Office  had  told  Barr  &  Stroud 
to  limit  French  deliveries  to  no  more  than  fifteen  per  week,  causing  an  embarrassed  Barr 
&  Stroud  to  explain  to  the  French  Military  Attache  that  supplies  would  be  delayed  by 
79  OH  Vol.  I,  Part  II,  pp.  58,59. 
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several  months  and  depended  entirely  on  the  permission  of  the  War  Office.  0  This 
interference  with  foreign  business  was  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  company,  not  just 
because  of  its  perception  of  responsibility  to  the  French,  but  because  of  the  overall 
importance  of  its  foreign  trade. 
The  firm's  frustrations  over  such  restrictions  were  evident  in  Jackson's  letter  of  January 
4th  to  the  Secretary  of  the  War  Office.  81  Jackson  pointed  out  that  although  `The  whole  of 
our  output  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  British  Government'  the  War  Office  had  actually 
failed  to  take  all  the  rangefinders  it  had  been  offered.  Those  not  taken  were  still  in  the 
factory,  but  they  could  not  be  sold  elsewhere  despite  the  firm  still  having  uncompleted 
and  urgent  orders  (for  identical  instruments)  for  Greece  and  France.  Jackson  complained 
of  the  ambiguity  of  War  Office  instructions  which,  if  taken  at  face  value,  meant  that  no 
foreign  orders  at  all  could  be  dealt  with  until  every  British  contract  had  been  completely 
filled.  He  followed  this  with  a  second  letter  concerning  a  request  from  the  United  States 
Army  to  quote  for  rangefinders,  which  he  had  been  forced  under  the  War  Office's 
instructions,  to  decline.  2  With  ill-disguised  spleen,  Jackson  stressed  that  it  had  taken 
`several  years  of  trials'  to  get  so  far,  and  as  a  result  `The  order  for  these  instruments  will 
probably  be  placed  with  an  American  fine  [Bausch  &  Lomb]  who  are  agents  for  a 
German  firm  [Zeiss]  to  the  detriment  of  the  British  trade'.  Having  got  the  bit  between  his 
teeth,  he  wrote  again  the  following  day  about  a  new  Russian  naval  enquiry  for  32  large 
rangefinders  which,  he  complained,  Barr  &  Stroud  would  not  be  able  to  accept  because 
of  the  War  Office  policy,  despite  the  fact  that  it  `would  not  affect  the  production  of  small 
rangefinders  for  the  War  Office'.  None  of  these  letters  had  any  effect  on  the  War  Office; 
the  rangefinders  earmarked  for  Greece  remained  in  store  until  1918,  and  the  embargo  on 
foreign  business  continued  in  force,  even  after  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  was  created.  83 
so  UGD  295/4/110,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  French  Military  Attache,  1.12.1914. 
81  UGD  295/4/110,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Secretary,  War  Office,  2.1.1915. 
82  UGD  295/4/110,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Secretary,  War  Office,  4.1.1915. 
83  For  deliveries  to  Greece,  see  UGD  295/19/2/3,  Customer  Order  files  1913-1915,  and  for  prohibition  of 
exports  see  PRO  BT/55/23,  Evidence  to  Engineering  Industries  Committee  of  Enquiry,  evidence  of 
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4.8  Conclusion 
The  first  nine  months  of  the  war  saw  the  optical  munitions  industry  make  a  by  no  means 
uniformly  successful  transition  from  peace  to  war.  It  was  beset  by  problems  that  were 
rooted  in  the  context  of  a  war  for  which  planning  was  virtually  non-existent  and  had  to 
cope  simultaneously  with  technical,  political,  economic  and  social  problems  that  truly 
made  up  the  `plethora  of  variables'  in  which  the  industry's  artefacts  had  to  be  made  and 
placed.  84  In  this  stage  the  industry  functioned  as  a  number  of  un-coordinated  and 
disparate  units,  a  collection  of  small  communities  that  were  rather  pushed  apart  rather 
than  drawn  together  by  the  pressures  of  war. 
This  period,  unlike  elsewhere  in  the  industry,  went  relatively  smoothly  for  Barr  &  Stroud 
and  the  process  of  industrial  mobilisation  was  more  successful  than  elsewhere  in  the 
optical  munitions  community.  In  a  sense,  the  business  was  already  mobilised  because 
unlike  every  other  business,  all  it  made  was  optically-based  systems  for  warfare  and  the 
lack  of  civil  products  meant  that  the  conversion  to  war  conditions  was  simpler  than  for 
anyone  else  in  the  optical  industry.  The  most  noticeable  change  at  Glasgow  was  the 
disappearance  of  almost  all  the  foreign  clients  and  their  replacement  by  the  War  Office 
rather  than,  as  happened  with  much  of  the  rest  of  the  optical  industry,  the  phasing-out  of 
civil  markets  and  products  and  their  replacement  by  a  State  client  whose  requirements 
were  inadequately  formulated  for  products  that  were  often  unfamiliar,  and  whose 
procurement  system  entirely  unfamiliar  to  those  having  to  deal  with  it.  The  rest  of  the 
optical  industry,  or  at  least  the  part  of  it  for  which  records  are  available,  fared  less  well 
than  Barr  &  Stroud,  irrespective  of  the  external  factors  bearing  on  it.  As  a  result,  the 
output  of  optical  munitions  other  than  rangefinders  was,  by  the  spring  of  1915,  far  less 
than  needed.  In  this,  the  optical  sector  was  no  worse  than,  say,  small-arms  or  artillery 
shells,  and  the  same  remedy  proposed  for  them  by  the  government  would  be  applied  to 
instrument  manufacture.  85  The  creation  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  in  May  1915  was  to 
influence  the  optical  trades  significantly,  and  the  next  chapter  examines  the  mechanisms 
"  J.  Law,  `Technology  and  Heterogenous  Engineering:  The  Case  of  Portuguese  Expansion',  in  Bijker  et  al. 
112.  P; 
For  the  difficulties  of  small  arms  manufacture,  see  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  4. 153 
by  which  a  large-scale  and  largely  effective  optical  munitions  industry  was  constructed 
out  of  an  existing  infrastructure  that  at  first  seemed  reluctant  to  make  the  transition. 154 
Chapter  5 
Industrial  Mobilisation  -  The  Ministry  of  Munitions  and  its  creation  of 
an  image  for  the  industry 
5.1:  Introduction 
The  second  stage  of  the  optical  munitions  industry's  war  was  one  of  industrial 
mobilisation,  and  is  inextricably  interwoven  with  the  policies  and  attitudes  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  towards  it.  The  creation  of  that  Ministry  in  the  late  Spring  of  1915, 
and  in  particular  the  setting  up  a  department  dedicated  to  optical  output,  was  responsible 
for  increasing  both  the  volume  and  diversity  of  production  between  then  and  the  end  of 
the  Great  War  in  1918,  and  so  bringing  into  being  what  can  be  best  described  as  a 
`conscript'  optical  munitions  industry  that  submerged  the  identity  of  what  existed  during 
the  first  ten  months  of  war.  The  story  of  this  mobilisation  is  complicated  by  the  existence 
of  parallel  aims  for  both  short  and  long-term  change  within  the  Ministry's  Optical 
Munitions  and  Glassware  Department  (OMGD)  that  simultaneously  looked  back  at  the 
pre-war  optical  instruments  industry  and  forward  to  a  new,  reconstructed  post-war  one 
that  would  replace  both  the  old  and  the  temporary  conscript  one  that  the  OMGD  was 
required  to  create.  These  `socially  constructed'  aims  were  sometimes  in  conflict  with 
each  other,  and  struggled  to  find  expression  within  a  framework  of  problems  that  were 
essentially  technical  in  character,  being  grounded  in  shortages  of  materiel  and  what  may 
be  called  a  technological  infrastructure.  The  account  of  how  these  dimensions  were 
managed,  as  left  by  the  OMGD,  has  been  responsible  for  colouring  later  perceptions  of 
both  pre-1915  optical  manufacturing  in  Britain  and  the  effectiveness  of  war-time 
measures.  This  account  of  mobilisation  in  this  and  following  chapter  therefore  looks  as 
closely,  or even  more  so,  into  the  motives  and  actions  of  the  OMGD  as  into  those  of  the 
industry  itself  in  order  to  account  for  the  process  of  mobilisation.  It  is  here  that  the 
process  of  the  creation  of  a  `system'  of  optical  munitions  production  is  better  explained 
through  the  ideas  of  Thomas  Hughes,  which  were  introduced  earlier  in  the  story,  than 
through  other  models  of  explanation  for  the  development  of  technology. 155 
5.2  Agendas  and  attitudes 
The  creation  of  the  Optical  Munitions  and  Glassware  Department  marked  the  start  of  an 
expansion  in  output  as  well  as  a  considerable  transformation  in  the  industry.  According 
to  the  Department's  own  records  and  its  printed  account  in  the  Ministry's  official 
History,  this  constituted  a  major  achievement  which  contributed  greatly  to  the  war  effort 
and  was  attained  in  the  face  of  problems  within  the  industry  that  had  been  brought 
forward  from  peacetime.  Although  acknowledging  the  efforts  made  by  almost  all  the 
companies  it  was  involved  with,  the  History  made  the  point  that  most  -  if  not  all  -  the 
improvements  could  not  have  come  about  without  OMGD's  initiatives.  This  has  been 
accepted  by  later  writers,  particularly  by  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod,  and  Mari  Williams, 
who  concluded  that  the  industry  was  indeed  generally  inadequate  in  education,  training, 
organisation  and  equipment  in  early  1915.1  Some  of  this  is  true,  but  the  deficiencies  did 
not  all  apply  across  the  whole  of  the  industry,  and  parts  of  it  had  as  much  to  teach 
OMGD  as  the  department  had  to  tell  them.  The  story  of  optical  munitions  manufacture 
after  mid-1915  is  really  of  a  demand-led  and  conscripted  industry  that  benefited 
principally  from  the  co-ordination  and  allocation  of  resources  provided  by  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions,  rather  than  being  transmogrified  through  the  direct  action  of  the  Optical 
Munitions  and  Glass  Department. 
Even  allowing  for  partiality  in  the  official  History  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Ministry's 
optical  section  acquired  a  chaotic  and  thoroughly  unsatisfactory  procurement  structure, 
whose  origins  have  been  considered  in  chapter  S.  The  severity  of  the  problems  was 
considered  to  be  so  great  that  delivery  prospects  for  optical  items  were  then  `more 
unsatisfactory  than  in  any  other  class  of  munitions'  and  the  entire  optical  manufacturing 
industry  was  `in  a  critical  position'.  The  condensed  version  of  subsequent  events  in  the 
official  History  gives  little  sense  of  the  difficulties  that  were  encountered. 
'  R.  &  K.  MacLeod,  "Government  and  the  Optical  Industry  in  Britain  1914-1918"  in  War  and  Economic 
Development,  edited  by  J.  M.  Winter  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1977)  p.  165  ff;  M.  E.  W. 
Williams,  The  Precision  Makers:  A  History  of  the  Instruments  Industry  in  Britain  and  France,  1870-1939. 
(London:  Routledge,  1994). 
2  PRO  BT  66/2IMMW  11,  Col.  Wedgwood  to  Mr  Booth  CMG/5315,20.8.1915,  and  Great  Britain,  Ministry 
of  Munitions,  History  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  (subsequently  OH),  12  vols.  (London:  HMSO,  1922), 
Vol.  XI  `The  Supply  of  Munitions',  Part  3  Optical  Munitions  and  Glassware,  p.  1. 156 
5.3  The  influence  and  policies  of  Frederick  Cheshire. 
One  of  OMGD's  first  personnel  was  Frederick  Cheshire  (1860-1939)  who  was  recruited 
by  the  Ministry  from  the  Patents  Office  initially  as  `an  expert  on  optical  questions'. 
When  the  Optical  Munitions  and  Glassware  Department  was  formally  established  he  was 
appointed  as  its  joint  head  with  particular  responsibility  for  what  the  official  historian 
coyly  described  as  the  `technical  side'  of  its  operations.  According  to  the  official  History 
he  had  `an  extensive  knowledge  of  the  [optical]  trade  and  of  the  difficulties  under  which 
it  worked',  but  this  description  hardly  did  him  justice.  Professor  Cheshire  had  entered  the 
civil  service  in  1880,  joined  the  Government  Laboratory  in  1882  and  then  transferred  to 
the  Patent  Office  in  1885  where  he  rose  to  become  Examiner  of  Patents,  the  senior  post 
which  he  held  on  joining  the  Ministry.  He  was  also  lecturer  in  physics  at  Birkbeck 
College,  London,  a  position  he  took  in  1895  and  still  occupied  in  1915,  by  which  time  he 
was  an  Associate  of  the  Royal  College  of  Science  and  a  Fellow  of  the  Institute  of 
Physics.  Cheshire's  work  at  the  Patent  Office  had  placed  him  in  a  privileged  position  to 
keep  abreast  of  optical  developments.  He  saw  all  the  specifications  received  from  British 
and  foreign  applicants,  as  well  as  the  British  ones  suppressed  from  public  view  relating 
to  military  and  naval  applications  of  optics  which  the  State  wished  to  conceal  in  order  to 
maintain  secrecy.  s  In  1913  he  had  delivered  the  Royal  Photographic  Society's  annual 
Traill  Taylor  Memorial  Lecture  on  the  subject  of  rangefmding  instruments  and  its  text 
was  subsequently  published  as  The  Modern  Rangefinder,  one  of  the  very  few  works  on 
the  subject  in  the  English  language.  6  Cheshire  was  better  placed  than  almost  anyone  else 
in  Britain  to  know  the  current  state  of  optical  instrumentation  for  warfare,  and  his 
appointment  allowed  him  to  exert  a  profound  influence  in  the  way  energy  was  directed 
towards  British  optical  manufacture  during  the  war.  He  become  the  driving  force  in  the 
optical  department's  efforts  to  reconstruct  technical  education  and  training  in  the 
industry,  working  towards  achieving  what  he  saw  as  essential  changes  in  its  constitution 
and  performance. 
3  OH  Vol.  11,  p.  1  to  7  provides  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
4  Who  Was  Who  1929-1940  (London:  A.  and  C.  Black,  1941). 
S  For  secret  patents,  see  T.  H.  ODell,  Inventions  and  Official  Secrecy;  a  History  of  Secret  Patents  in  the 
United  Kingdom  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1994),  especially  chapters  4  and  5. 
6  F.  J.  Cheshire,  The  Modern  Rangefinder  (London:  Harrison  &  Sons,  1916). 157 
His  involvement  with  optics  was  not  confined  to  Britain.  He  had  long  established 
connections  with  the  influential  German  optical  instrument  firm  of  Carl  Zeiss  at  Jena.  In 
1902  he  had  co-translated  Felix  Auerbach's  history  of  Zeiss  and  the  neighbouring  optical 
glass  manufacturer  Schott  &  Genossen  which  was  effectively  its  subsidiary.?  The  Zeiss 
Works  drew  attention  not  only  to  the  size  and  diverse  manufacturing  programmes  of  the 
two  companies,  but  also  to  their  emphasis  on  scientific  training  and  investment  in 
technology.  It  was  the  first  widely  available  detailed  account  in  English  of  German 
optical  engineering  practice  and  appeared  at  a  time  when  concerns  over  the  condition  of 
British  `opto-technics'  were  beginning  to  be  voiced  in  England.  8  The  book  revealed  the 
extent  and  variety  of  the  firm's  activities,  giving  details  of  staff  and  workers  as  well  as  its 
output  and  turnover,  showing  that  no  single  British  instrument  maker  was  comparable  in 
size,  diversity  or  scale  of  trading.  Auerbach  was  not  a  Zeiss  employee  but  a  close  friend 
of  Ernst  Abbe,  the  principal  motivating  force  behind  Carl  Zeiss,  9  and  the  book  was  meant 
to  be  a  statement  of  Abbe's  business  philosophy  and  its  translation  into  practice.  To 
many,  it  emphasised  the  differences  between  German  and  British  optical  manufacturing, 
although  in  fact  Zeiss  was  by  no  means  typical  of  German  (or  any  other)  instrument 
makers,  particularly  in  scale  and  the  extent  of  its  vertical  integration.  That  Cheshire  was 
greatly  impressed  by  Zeiss  is  certain;  he  referred  to  his  `Jena  friends'  in  a  foreword  to  a 
subsequent  printing  of  The  Zeiss  Works  and  freely  acknowledged  their  pre-eminent 
importance  in  the  fields  of  technical  optics  and  instrument  manufacture. 
Cheshire's  high  opinion  of  Zeiss  was  echoed  by  many  in  Britain  who  had  come  to  see 
German  optical  firms  and  their  methods  as  inherently  superior.  This  sense  of  inferiority 
was  not  new  in  1915.  There  had  been  unease  amongst  the  optical  instrument  makers  for 
over  a  decade  that  German  companies  were  taking  an  increasingly  large  share  of  the 
United  Kingdom's  optical  market.  10  Matters  reached  a  head  in  1911  when  the  London 
County  Council's  Education  Committee,  under  sustained  pressure  from  members  of  the 
'  Felix  Auerbach,  The  Zeiss  Works  Trans  from  2°d  German  Edition  by  S.  F.  Paul  and  F.  J.  Cheshire 
(Marshall,  Brookes  and  Chalkey,  London,  1902) 
8Sylvanus  P.  Thompson,  "Opto-Technics.  "  Journal  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Arts  (1902),  pp.  518-27. 
9  Personal  communication  from  Dr  Wolfgang  Zimmer,  Archive  der  Carl  Zeiss  Jena  GmbH,  12.11.2004. 
1°  See  K&K.  MacLeod  (1977)  pp.  169  and  170. 158 
largely  London-based  optical  industry,  held  an  enquiry  into  the  need  for  organised 
scientific  training  in  technical  optics.  "  This  concluded  that  the  establishment  of  an 
institute  for  training  on  the  lines  of  the  German  system  would  be  highly  beneficial,  but 
no  funding  was  forthcoming  either  locally  or  nationally,  let  alone  from  the  industry  itself, 
so  the  matter  was  left  in  abeyance.  The  problems  of  munitions  supply  that  led  to  the 
creation  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  gave  those  subsequently  involved  in  the  production 
of  military  optics  an  unprecedented  opportunity  to  remedy  what  they  saw  as  crucial 
shortcomings  in  the  whole  of  the  British  optical  industry. 
The  remedial  process  began  almost  immediately  after  the  OMGD  was  created.  At  the 
start  of  August  `the  whole  trade  was  in  a  critical  position'  regarding  deliveries.  12  Because 
of  this,  the  War  Office  Contracts  Department  `was  quite  unable  to  meet  the  [Army's] 
demands  for  optical  munitions'  and  the  optical  section  had  to  deal  with  `the  shortage  of 
optical  instruments'.  The  official  historian  was  re-iterating  what  subsequently  became 
OMGD  orthodoxy,  that  the  lack  stemmed  from  inadequate  output,  and  was  a  production 
rather  than  a  procurement  problem.  Shortages  resulted  from  a  lack  of  organisation  in  the 
manufacturing  industry,  inadequate  technical  equipment,  and  a  scarcity  of  raw  materials. 
To  make  matters  even  worse,  there  was  a  lack  of  working  capital  which  had  not  been 
properly  addressed  by  the  War  Office  Contracts  Department  in  the  preceding  months. 
The  situation  was,  by  this  account,  at  the  least  problematical.  In  Cheshire's  privately 
expressed  opinion  it  was  even  worse. 
On  August  13th  he  wrote  to  his  immediate  military  superior,  Colonel  Wedgwood, 
summarising  the  severity  of  the  difficulties  the  optical  branch  faced.  13  It  did  not  make 
good  reading.  Cheshire  began  by  saying  that  `for  many  years  before  the  war  broke  out, 
the  optical  [instruments]  trade  in  England  was  a  dying  one.  He  went  on  to  say  that  very 
few  of  the  makers  were  paying  dividends  and  in  his  opinion  `it  would  be  surprising  to 
London  Metropolitan  Archives,  LCC/MIN/2967/1911  "Report  of  the  Education  Committee  of  the 
London  County  Council:  Proposed  Establishment  of  a  Technical  Institute  for  Optics,  March  Ist  1911.  " 
(subsequently  LCC  Report)  London,  1911. 
12  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  p.  1  supplies  this  and  the  following  quotations. 
"PRO  MUN  4/55,  Control  of  Optical  Firms  1915-1916,  Cheshire  to  Col.  Wedgwood,  War  Office: 
13.8.1915  provides  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section. 159 
learn  that  a  single  one  ...  was  in  a  satisfactory  and  prosperous  condition'.  When  the  war 
began,  the  trade  was  in  no  condition  to  meet  the  demands  suddenly  made  on  it.  By 
August  1915  output  was  only  half  of  current  needs,  and  his  prognosis  was  that  supplies 
would  fall  further  behind  as  demands  continued  to  grow  from  the  Army's  expansion  and 
battlefield  attrition.  What  Wedgwood  received  was  a  discouraging  picture  of  a  moribund 
industry  in  desperate  need  of  assistance. 
Cheshire  must  have  known  that  his  description  of  the  pre-war  optical  trade  did  not 
accord  with  reality.  His  assertion  that  only  `a  few  firms  had  been  more  less  kept  alive' 
was,  to  say  the  least,  misleading.  Leaving  aside  the  firms  already  involved  in  optical 
munitions  manufacture  in  1914  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  there  were  at  least 
fifteen  more  optical  instrument  makers  who  were  very  much  in  business  producing 
optical  instruments.  14  Whatever  his  reasons  for  writing  in  such  a  vein,  that  it  was  no 
temporary  aberration  is  shown  by  a  later  draft  report  written  on  the  progress  made  up  to 
October  1917.15  This  said  that  when  the  war  began  the  country  had  been  in  a  `deplorable 
condition'  regarding  its  ability  to  produce  optical  munitions  on  a  large  scale,  and  that  the 
machinery  employed  within  the  optical  trade  was  inadequate  and  antiquated.  Warming  to 
its  theme,  it  went  to  say  that  `The  workshops  were  shanties'  and  the  trade  as  whole  -  in 
the  opinion  of  `many  men  in  a  position  to  judge,  "already  dead  and  damned"  '.  16  Given 
Cheshire's  experience  and  knowledge,  such  remarks  must  raise  the  question  of  motive. 
Why  should  he  project  such  a  misleading  image  in  the  first  place,  and  why  maintain  it 
two  years  later  ? 
His  concerns  for  the  industry  in  1915  were  genuine,  grounded  on  the  fear  that  optical 
manufacturing  in  Britain  would  sooner,  rather  than  later,  be  completely  outclassed  by 
Germany.  With  the  exception  of  Barr  &  Stroud,  all  the  peace  time  optical  munitions 
makers  had  relied  on  their  civil  trade  to  provide  part,  if  not  most,  of  their  incomes. 
Cheshire  realised  their  commercial  trade  was  vital  and  that  if  in  the  future  it  became 
14  Extracted  from  R.  G.  W.  Anderson,  J.  Burnett  and  B.  Gee,  Handlist  of  Scientific-Instrument  Makers' 
Trade  Catalogues  1600-1914  (Edinburgh:  National  Museums  of  Scotland,  1990). 
PRO  MUN  4/55  Draft  Report  19.10.1917 
16  The  draft  gives  no  indication  of  who  were  those  `in  a  position  to  judge'. 160 
unprofitable,  there  would  be  large-scale  failure  in  the  optical  industry  eliminating  much 
or  possibly  all  of  the  capacity  to  manufacture  for  the  nation's  defence.  The  1911  LCC 
Report  had  highlighted  apparently  serious  flaws  in  the  structure  of  the  British  optical 
industry,  the  strongest  evidence  for  which  was  that  the  country  was  a  net  importer  of 
optical  instruments.  17  That  conclusion  was  derived  from  data  published  the  in  Annual 
Statement  of  the  Trade  of  the  United  Kingdom  up  to  1909,  but  was  not  in  fact  properly 
justified.  18  The  Report  recognised  that  the  classification  providing  the  data  -  `Scientific 
Instruments  and  Apparatus  other  than  Electrical'  -  lumped  together  optical  instruments 
with  other  items,  such  as  photographic  film  and  printing-paper,  which  made  it  difficult  to 
identify  the  size  of  the  optical  component.  Despite  that  problem,  the  Report's  authors 
were  content  to  assume  that  because  the  whole  category  was  in  deficit  (£157,000  in 
1909)  then  so  must  be  optical  goods.  In  1910,  however,  Customs  and  Excise  separated 
out  all  the  sensitised  and  related  photographic  materials,  leaving  in  the  category 
telescopes  of  all  kinds,  photographic  cameras  and  their  lenses,  microscopes  and 
ophthalmic  apparatus,  lenses  and  prisms  for  scientific  instruments,  and  survey 
instruments.  19  This  re-arrangement  caused  a  wholly  different  picture  to  emerge,  although 
no  attention  was  subsequently  drawn  to  it,  least  of  all  by  Cheshire,  for  whom  it  would 
have  weakened  the  case  for  reform  in  the  industry. 
Table  6.1:  Balance  of  Trade  of  Scientific  Instruments,  1911-1914:  20 
Year  Imports  Exports  Surplus 
1911  555,106  713,328  158,222 
1912  645,379  707,061  61,682 
1913  710,341  767,402  57,061 
1914  471,525  646,493  174,968 
"  LCC  Report,  p.  11. 
'$  Great  Britain,  Government,  Customs  &  Excise  Department;  Annual  Statement  of  the  Trade  of  the  United 
Kingdom  with  Foreign  Countries  and  British  Possessions  (HMSO,  London,  published  annually). 
Subsequently  Annual  Statement. 
19  These  corresponded  to  the  categories  identified  in  the  1907  Census  of  Production  (London:  HMSO, 
1909)  except  for  spectacle  lenses  which  the  Annual  Statement  recorded  under  a  separate  heading. 
"Extracted  from  Annual  Statement,  1911  to  1914. 161 
Even  though  this  showed  a  declining  trend  up  to  1913,  the  optical  trade  in  toto  was 
clearly  in  a  far  from  a  terminal  condition  using  the  yardstick  of  overseas  trade.  The 
underlying  condition  was  really  one  of  relative  rather  than  absolute  decline,  a  condition 
also  identified  in  other  industries.  21  Although  imports  were  rising,  so  were  exports  and 
the  level  of  domestic  optical  production  was  increasing,  even  without  taking  into  account 
the  figures  for  naval  and  military  rangefinders  which,  as  `munitions  of  war',  were  treated 
separately  in  the  Statement.  22  With  them,  the  recorded  surplus  would  have  been  even 
larger.  Taking  into  account  the  War  Office's  imports  of  all  types  of  optical  munitions, 
and  Barr  &  Stroud's  export  orders  for  rangefinders,  then  an  even  stronger  position 
appears: 
Table  6.2:  Balance  of  Trade  of  Scientific  Instruments  plus  Optical  Munitions,  1911- 
1914:  23 




War  Office 
Imports 
Total 
1911  158,222  50,241  -7,428  201,035 
1912  61,682  160,768  -10,579  211,871 
1913  57,061  185,330  -4,631  237,760 
1914  174,968  114,057  nil  289,025 
These  figures  also  indicate  the  size  of  optical  munitions  exports  relative  to  those  of  the 
whole  optical  instruments  industry.  In  1912  they  accounted  for  22.7  percent  of  the  total, 
and  24.2  percent  in  1913  before  the  declaration  of  war  disturbed  trading  patterns  and 
curtailed  exports  of  optical  munitions. 
21  D.  Edgerton,  Science,  Technology  and  the  British  Industrial  Decline'  1870-1970  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1996)  pp.  3-5  discusses  the  idea  of  relative  decline  and  its  significance. 
22  Although  exactly  where  they  were  buried  is  impossible  to  locate. 
11  Extracted  from  Annual  Statement,  1911  to  1914,  and  PRO  WO  395/3,  Annual  Reports  of  the  Director  of 
Army  Contracts  1911  to  1914,  and  UGD  295/  19/2/2  and  /3,  Customer  order  files,  1911  to  1914. 162 
But  Cheshire  was  not  concerned  in  June  1915  to  point  out  hidden  strengths  in  the  greater 
optical  industry,  rather  he  wanted  to  highlight  and  rectify  the  weaknesses  in  finance, 
scientific  education  and  training,  and  the  slow  adaptation  of  modem  technologies  that 
might  compromise  the  output  of  now  urgently  needed  optical  munitions.  To  go  about 
this,  he  deliberately  built  on  the  existing  idea  that  the  optical  industry  was  inadequate  to 
the  task  it  now  faced.  Whether  or  not  that  notion  was  entirely  justified,  the  scale  of  the 
immediate  problem  demanded  some  sort  of  planned  solution  that  would  quickly 
ameliorate  the  difficult  situation  he  had  to  manage.  What  Cheshire  faced  was  the 
simultaneous  need  for  a  `quick-fix'  to  overcome  what  was  represented  as  a  critical 
situation,  as  well  as  long  term  measures  to  lift  the  industry  out  of  the  circumstances  that 
were  represented  as  having  brought  about  the  predicament.  His  confidence  in  being  able 
to  tackle  the  problem  is  shown  by  the  speed  with  which  he  defined  the  optical  section's 
role.  By  the  time  he  first  wrote  to  Wedgwood  he  had  already  identified  its  intent  as 
falling  under  five  headings:  24 
1.  to  provide  financial  aid  where  necessary 
2.  to  supply  expert  technical  advice 
3.  to  expedite  deliveries  of  raw  materials  and  components 
4.  to  provide  trained  labour 
5.  to  set  up  research  centres  `to  set  the  trade  on  a  sound  basis' 
The  first  three  might  be  implemented  quickly,  but  the  fourth  and  fifth  would  certainly 
require  more  time  to  bring  about.  The  aim  of  setting  up  research  centres  was  in  harmony 
with  the  long  term  goal  of  the  progressives  in  the  industry  since  1902,  which  was  to 
25  provide  advanced  scientific  training  and  establish  systematic  technological  research. 
There  were  major  problems  to  be  addressed  before  the  OMGD  could  begin  to  build  a 
coherent  and  efficient  optical  munitions  industry  out  of  the  chaotic  conditions  in  the 
summer  of  1915.  Firstly,  those  firms  already  involved  in  military  production  lacked  any 
real  motivation  to  increase  output  because  of  previous  War  Office  contracting  policies. 
Then,  making  matters  worse,  many  businesses  felt  threatened  by  the  prospect  of  control 
24  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  p.  1. 
25  Sylvanus  P.  Thompson,  "Opto-Technics.  "  Journal  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Arts  (1902):  518-27;  "The 
Proposed  Establishment  of  an  Institute  of  Technical  Optics.  "  31-34.  London:  British  Science  Guild,  1914. 163 
under  the  Munitions  of  War  Act  which  been  passed  on  2d  July.  Besides  the  question  of 
corporate  morale  there  was  a  shortage  of  machine  tooling  and  skilled  labour,  as  well  as  a 
critical  lack  of  optical  glass.  And  finally  there  was  no  trade  organisation  within  the 
optical  industry  that  might  facilitate  co-ordination  between  its  constituents.  Despite  the 
sweeping  powers  conferred  on  the  Ministry,  and  Cheshire's  optimism,  the  OMGD 
frequently  found  it  hard  to  bring  about  the  influences  on  the  industry  it  regarded  as 
essential. 
5.4:  Immediate  measures  and  the  role  of  Alfred  Esslemont 
To  apply  Cheshire's  five-point  action  plan,  the  OMGD  was  divided  into  technical  and 
administrative  sections.  Although  previous  writers  have  concentrated  on  the  efforts  and 
achievements  of  Frederick  Cheshire's  technical  section,  so  far  as  the  contemporary 
industry  was  concerned  the  head  of  the  administrative  side  had  a  more  immediately 
important  role  to  play.  Little  is  known  about  the  background  of  Alfred  Esslemont  (d.  14`h 
September  1918),  beyond  his  being  a  Fellow  of  the  Optical  Society-,  26  the  official  History 
gives  no  details  of  his  earlier  career  (beyond  telling  us  that  he  came  from  the  `North 
East')  and  he  is  absent  from  any  edition  of  Who's  Who.  His  post  in  the  Ministry  suggests 
he  was  engaged  for  his  combination  of  organisational  abilities  and  technical  knowledge, 
and  throughout  his  work  with  the  OMGD  he  was  constantly  engaged  in  liaison  with  both 
the  instruments  and  glass  industries,  becoming  a  Director  of  the  Department  in  1917. 
Esslemont  not  only  had  to  create  a  departmental  structure  that  could  bring  some  sort  of 
order  from  the  chaos  of  1914  and  early  1915,  he  also  had  to  persuade  the  trade  to  adopt 
new  working  methods  and  to  accept  the  subsequent  imposition  of  the  State's  war-time 
controls.  The  administrative  side  of  the  OMGD  extended  far  beyond  keeping  records  and 
allocating  contracts,  overlapping  Cheshire's  remit  and  spreading  into  technical  matters 
including  instrument  and  machine-tool  design  it  came  to  embrace  a  diplomatic  role 
between  industry  and  the  State.  The  administrative  section  under  Esslemont  was  vital  to 
the  success  of  the  industry  from  1915  until  his  premature  death  in  1918. 
26  Transactions  of  the  Optical  Society,  Vol.  XX  (May  1919),  obituary  notice. 164 
Esslemont  began  by  motivating  the  existing  War  Office  contractors  to  increase  their 
output,  and  in  June  he  called  them  together  to  address  `the  dangerous  condition  of 
affairs'.  27  According  to  the  OMGD,  the  previous  dealings  of  the  War  Office  Contracts 
Department  with  the  trade  had  created  a  `most  paralysing  effect'  on  it,  and  firms  had 
generally  become  `dissatisfied'  with  government  contracting,  acquiring  a  `strong  distrust' 
for  the  methods  used  in  placing  orders.  Their  chief  complaint  was  that  no  company  ever 
received  an  order  large  enough  to  justify  tooling-up  for  quantity  production,  with 
contracts  for  small  numbers  of  instruments  being  scattered  amongst  a  number  of  firms.  28 
In  short,  they  found  it  hard  to  make  money  working  for  the  War  Office.  Its  ordering 
policy,  founded  on  considerations  of  peace-time  fiscal  probity  and  perpetuated  by 
institutional  inertia,  had  created  a  delivery  situation  that  was  unsatisfactory  for  everyone. 
Esslemont  managed  to  re-assure  the  manufacturers  that  under  the  OMGD's  umbrella, 
they  would  now  be  `as  fairly  dealt  with  as  possible  under  the  circumstances'  with  regard 
to  the  distribution  of  orders.  A  subsequent  series  of  `personal  interviews'  with  individual 
companies,  along  with  the  offer  of  some  financial  assistance  were,  perhaps 
optimistically,  thought  to  be  enough  to  ensure  that  `a  maximum  of  effort'  would  now  be 
made,  and  as  evidence  of  this  the  OMGD  noted  in  late  July  that  some  makers  were 
`expending  considerable  sums  on  their  own  initiative,  and  output  began  to  increase  `by 
leaps  and  bounds'  according  to  the  later  words  of  the  Department  29  The  department's 
own  recording  system,  did  indeed  register  a  substantial  increase  during  late  1915,  but  as 
not  infrequently  happened  with  the  OMGD  matters  were  not  quite  all  they  appeared  to 
be. 
27  PRO  MUN  4/5006,  Weekly  Reports  about  Supply,  Design  and  Production,  Box  1,  June  1917  provides 
the  source  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise  noted. 
28  See  Chapter  5  above  for  War  Office  policy  on  placing  contracts. 
29  PRO  MUN  4/55,  DDGC  to  DGMS,  27.7.1915. 165 
Figure  6.1:  Monthly  Optical  Munitions  output  on  War  Office  contracts,  May  1915  to  July 












The  OMGD's  figures  call  for  some  comment.  July's  output,  before  the  department  could 
have  had  any  effect,  was  £9,186  for  all  contractors  employed  on  War  Office  business.  By 
October  that  had  risen  to  £16,588  -  an  increase  of  almost  81  percent  on  July.  This  may 
have  looked  encouraging  as  a  percentage,  but  as  a  proportion  of  the  industry's  total 
capacity  it  was  miniscule.  Gross  exports  alone  of  civil  `scientific  instruments'  in  1913 
had  been  E767,402.  October's  output  equalled  an  annual  total  of  scarcely  £200,000, 
which  is  so  greatly  removed  from  1913's  levels  that  the  OMGD's  figures  need  treating 
with  some  circumspection.  It  is  unlikely  that  commercial  production  still  accounted  for 
the  largest  part  of  output  because  the  Defence  of  the  Realm  (Amendment  Act)  had 
already  empowered  the  Admiralty  and  the  War  Office  to  obtain  precedence  for  their 
orders  by  requiring  makers  to  put  aside  other  work  , 
31  and  by  mid-  1915  it  is  doubtful  if 
any  makers  had  not  been  affected  by  the  changed  circumstances  of  the  war.  A  more 
likely  explanation  for  the  low  figures  is  that  they  referred  to  acceptances  after  inspection 
at  Woolwich  Arsenal,  a  process  which  continually  created  back-logs;  only  then  were 
invoices  passed  for  payment  and  recorded  by  the  OMGD.  Another  possibility,  and  one 
'o  PRO  BT66/6/MMW46,  Optical  Munitions  and  Glassware  Branch,  Financial  Turnover  for  Optical 
Munitions.  There  were  no  figures  recorded  in  August  1915. 
"  PRO  MUN  7/78,  Instructions  to  Contractors,  13.5.1915,  reminded  suppliers  of  this  obligation. 
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that  best  fitted  Cheshire's  agenda,  was  that  the  industry  was  simply  incapable  of  doing 
any  better  without  substantial  assistance. 
However,  Esslemont's  reports  of  his  June  meetings  indicated  that  problems  in  War 
Office  procurement  procedures  had  been  as  much  to  blame  as  any  structural  failings  in 
the  industry,  and  one  way  Esslemont  proposed  to  re-assure  the  trade  was  making  the 
distribution  of  contracts  a  matter  for  the  OMGD  itself.  32  Dealing  with  an  agency  whose 
managers  understood  their  problems  was  doubtless  a  vast  improvement  for  the  makers, 
but  the  OMGD  had  to  argue  strongly  to  justify  this  departure  from  what  was  intended  to 
be  standard  Ministry  practice.  Cheshire  and  Esslemont  asserted  that  optical  munitions 
orders  were  more  complex  than  others  dealt  with  by  the  Ministry  and  were  `enormously 
complicated'  by  shortages  and  changes  to  specifications.  Almost  every  one  required 
`detailed  and  expert  knowledge'  by  the  staff  responsible  for  its  placement  and  subsequent 
oversight  33  The  suggestion  was  that  the  optical  industry  was  so  specialised  that  only 
dedicated  technically  competent  staff  within  the  Ministry  were  properly  able  to  manage 
dealings  with  it.  This  was  not  entirely  accurate,  but  Cheshire  and  Esslemont  had  quickly 
produced  an  image  of  failure  and  chaos  that  let  them  employ  an  argument  that  was 
actually  intended  to  let  them  manage  the  nascent  optical  munitions  industry  and  control 
its  development  so  as  to  maximise  the  benefits  the  optical  instruments  industry  would 
derive  from  the  expansion  in  war-time  business.  Their  lobbying  succeeded,  and  for  the 
rest  of  the  war  the  OMGD  continued,  uniquely,  to  operate  its  contracts  directly  with  the 
trade. 
A  substantial  part  of  Esslemont's  success  in  gaining  assurances  of  co-operation  from  the 
makers  resulted  from  assuring  them  that  orders  would  now  be  placed  on  a  large  scale  and 
for  a  considerable  length  of  time.  The  acceptance  of  the  notion  that  the  war  would  be 
measured  in  years  and  the  accompanying  necessity  to  ensure  a  continual  and  large-scale 
supply  of  munitions  had  together  been  responsible  for  the  creation  of  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions  for  which  Esslemont  now  acted  as  principal  negotiator  with  the  optical 
32  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  p.  2 
33  PRO  MUN  7/96,  Wedgwood  to  DGMS,  23.3.1916.  Cited  by  R.  &  K.  MacLeod  (1977)  p.  176 167 
producers.  The  Ministry's  powers  to  direct  and  control  industry  were  vested  in  the 
Munitions  of  War  Act  which  came  into  force  on  2"d  July  1915  and,  although  the 
legislation  gave  Esslemont  considerable  powers  to  assist  the  optical  industry,  some  of  its 
provisions  quickly  created  considerable  unease  amongst  the  so-recently  mollified 
manufacturers  and  led  to  friction  between  the  OMGD  and  its  political  masters  at  the 
ministry.  - 
5.5  Control  and  Profits 
Industry  had  been  subject  to  controls  even  before  the  Munitions  Act  was  passed.  In 
March  1915,  the  Defence  of  the  Realm  (Amendment)  Act  allowed  the  armed  services  to 
require  manufacturers  `to  give  precedence  to  the  completion  of  all  orders  and  contracts' 
for  government  work,  to  ensure  that  neither  commercial  nor  foreign  government  business 
obstructed  production  for  the  State.  4  The  new  `Regulation  30A'  prohibited  `all  dealing 
in  optical  instruments  which  are  of  service  to  the  Admiralty  and  War  Office 
...  except 
under  special  permit'.  S  This  was  intended  to,  and  in  the  opinion  of  the  OMGD  actually 
did,  bring  about  `the  extinction  of  private  work'  in  the  optical  trade.  36  This  may  have 
been  so;  even  before  the  1915  amendment,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  told  the  London 
instrument  makers  Negretti  &  Zambra  it  could  longer  sell  to  individual  army  officers, 
and  informed  Dollond  &  Co.  that  it  would  be  `many  months'  before  there  could  be  any 
hope  of  supplying  any  non-government  clients.  37  These  constraints  may  have  been 
irksome,  but  they  were  nothing  compared  to  those  embodied  in  the  Munitions  Act. 
Its  broad  purpose  was  to  further  `the  efficient  manufacture  ...  and  supply  of  munitions 
for  the  present  war',  by  imposing  a  body  of  regulation  on  both  employers  and  workers.  38 
For  the  optical  munitions  industry  there  were  serious  implications  in  the  creation  of  what 
"PRO  MUN  7/78,  Instructions  to  Contractors,  13.5.1915. 
's  PROBT  66/61MMW47,  `Government  Control  of  Industry.  Report  on  the  manner  in  which  direct  control 
is  exercised'.  1918. 
31  OH.  Vol.  III,  Part  3,  p.  35. 
"  UGD  295/4/111,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Negretti  &  Zambra  13.10.1914;  UGD  295/4/112,  Letter  Book, 
Jackson  to  Dollond,  27.11.1914. 
33  OH,  Vol.  I,  Part  4,  p.  1,  provides  the  quotation;  for  further  background  information  and  detail  on  the  Act, 
see  OH  Vol.  I,  Part  N,  Chapter  I;  OH  Vol.  III,  Part  3,  Chapter  II;  R.  J.  Q.  Adams,  Arms  and  the  Wizard.  ' 
Lloyd  George  and  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  1915-1916  (Texas  A&M  University  Press,  College  Station, 
Texas  and  Cassell,  London,  1978),  Chapters  4,5,6  and  7. 168 
was  to  be  known  as  the  `controlled  establishment'  and  the  attendant  regulation  of  profits. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  Act  sought  to  remove  restrictive  practices  on  the  part  of  labour  and 
as  a  quid  pro  quo  to  limit  the  profits  employers  might  make  from  war  work.  The 
legislation  gave  the  Minister  of  Munitions  the  power  to  declare  as  a  `controlled 
establishment'  any  business  engaged  on  munitions  production  and  whose  output  was 
considered  as  essential  for  `the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war',  39  so  that  any  business 
involved  in  optical  contracting  for  the  Services  was  likely  to  be  placed  under  Ministry 
control.  The  limitations  on  profits  were  seen  by  both  Cheshire  and  Esslemont  as  an 
obstacle  to  improvements  in  the  industry  and  they  attempted  to  insulate  it  from  direct 
control  in  much  the  same  way  that  they  had  done  with  contracts. 
Control  under  the  Act  `did  not  involve  any  interference  ...  with  the  management  of  the 
firm'.  Rather,  it  `relieved  the  establishment  of  the  restraints  imposed  by  trade  union 
restrictions'  although  `on  the  other  hand'  it  did  very  much  restrict  the  profits  to  be  gained 
from  government  contracting.  40  It  was  that  issue  that  most  worried  the  optical  makers 
who,  having  just  been  assured  that  they  might  expect  a  large  volume  of  business  for 
some  considerable  time,  now  faced  the  prospect  of  having  their  future  earnings  greatly 
diminished.  The  Act  did  not  prohibit,  or  even  restrict,  the  making  of  profits;  instead  it 
incorporated  a  formula  restricting  the  amount  of  profit  that  a  business  could  retain.  A 
`standard  amount  of  profit'  for  a  firm  was  to  be  determined  by  averaging  its  pre-tax 
profits  for  its  last  two  financial  years  before  August  1914.  All  but  20  percent  of  profits  in 
excess  of  that  went  to  the  Treasury,  the  remainder  being  taxed  at  the  same  rate  as  the 
`standard  profit'.  Although  this  was  seen  as  politically  essential  to  maintain  the  co- 
operation  of  the  trades  unions,  it  was  a  disincentive  for  businesses  to  maximise  output, 
particularly  where  increased  investment  was  needed  to  handle  enlarged  volumes  of  war 
work.  Both  Acts  also  demanded  that  contractors  did  not  hinder  production  in  any  way, 
which  meant  that  a  firm  coming  under  control  stood  to  be  locked-in  to  meeting  the 
Ministry's  demands  at  levels  of  profit  that  were  significantly  restrained. 
"  OH  Vol.  III,  Part  4,  p.  17. 
40  OH  Vol.  III,  Part  3,  p.  31  ff  provides  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section. 169 
What  made  matters  worse  for  the  optical  trade  was  that  -  according  to  Cheshire  -  its 
profits  before  the  war  had  been  far  from  good.  41  In  mid-August  he  told  the  Ministry  that 
very  few  companies  had  been  paying  dividends  at  all  and  `indeed,  it  would  be  surprising 
to  learn  that  a  single  one  of  these  important  firms  was  in  a  satisfactory  and  prosperous 
condition'.  In  his  opinion,  the  placing  of  existing  contractors  under  control  would 
disadvantage  them  financially  compared  to  firms  left  outside.  Esslemont  echoed  this 
sentiment,  which  had  already  been  expressed  by  some  of  the  optical  companies,  adding 
that  attempts  to  increase  output  depended  largely  on  their  `goodwill'  and  so  it  was 
important  `to  take  notice  of  their  points  of  view'  if  co-operation  was  to  be  maintained. 
However,  despite  the  firmness  of  Cheshire's  assertions,  the  accuracy  of  his  profit 
assessments  is  open  to  doubt. 
Few  financial  records  survive  for  the  firms  Cheshire  was  writing  about,  but  four  of  them 
have  left  figures  that  allow  some  evaluation  of  his  comments.  Barr  &  Stroud's  audited 
accounts  show  pre-tax  profits  for  1912  and  1913  as  £32,555  and  £59,530  respectively,  on 
turnovers  of  £126,593  and  £188,007,  which  gives  net  margins  of  25.7  percent  and  31.7 
percent,  representing  returns  of  16.3  percent  and  29.8  percent  on  the  share  capital 
employed  and  hardly  those  of  an  ailing  company.  For  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd,  entries 
in  the  Directors'  Minute  Book  for  the  same  years  give  profits  of  £7,287  and  £7,899,  with 
dividends  of  £2,615  and  £5,545  to  be  paid  from  them.  Taylor,  Taylor  &  Hobson's 
Minute  Book  entries  record  pre-tax  profits  of  £2,433  in  the  trading  year  for  1912  after 
payment  of  unspecified  preferential  dividends  and  new  buildings  costing  £3,663.  For 
1913  the  figure  was  £8,130  after  dividends  and  af  rther  factory  extension  costing 
£6,400.42  Although  the  sales  figures  for  the  second  two  firms  are  not  recorded,  both  were 
much  smaller  businesses  than  Barr  &  Stroud  and  their  percentage  margins  seem  to  have 
caused  no  concerns  in  their  records.  These  three  companies  certainly  did  not  fit  the  image 
painted  by  Cheshire. 
PRO  MUN  4/55,  Cheshire  to  Col.  Wedgwood,  13.8.1915  is  the  source  for  this  section. 
42  Sources  for  these  figures:  for  Barr  &  Stroud,  UGD  295/11/1,  Audited  Accounts:  for  Thomas  Cooke  & 
Sons  Ltd,  University  of  York,  Borthwick  Institute,  Vickers  Instruments  Archive  (subsequently  VIA),  T. 
Cooke  &  Sons,  AJB  0301.1.1,  Minute  Book  1897-1924:  for  Troughton  &  Sims  Business  Records,  VIA 
AJB  060  1.2.3,  Balance  sheets  1908-1919:  for  Taylor  Hobson,  Cooke  Optics  Ltd,  Leicester,  unclassified 
records,  Taylor  Hobson  Directors'  Minute  Book  No.  1,  entries  dated  8.10.1912,7.1.1913,  and  11.3.1914. 170 
Troughton  &  Sims'  accounts,  however,  give  a  picture  which  is  less  good.  The  firm  was 
similar  in  size  to  Cooke's  and  produced  a  similar  product  range,  but  had  little  or  no 
previous  background  in  munitions  production.  43  In  1912  there  was  a  pre-tax  profit  of 
£4,347  on  sales  of  £26,292,  but  in  1913  only  £1,169  on  turnover  of  £21,921,  with  no 
indication  of  any  substantial  expenditure  on  plant  or  premises  to  account  for  the 
reduction.  "  Not  only  were  the  end  results  poorer  than  the  others',  but  the  business 
apparently  ran  inefficiently,  at  least  in  comparison  to  Barr  &  Stroud.  Profit  on  turnover 
was  only  16.5  percent  and  5.3  percent,  compared  to  25.7  percent  and  31.7  percent  at  Barr 
&  Stroud,  while  `stock  in  trade'  was  equal  to  47  percent  of  1913's  sales  against  Barr  & 
Stroud's  12.4  percent.  Wage  costs  were  over  57  percent  of  sales,  a  proportion  more  than 
half  as  much  again  as  the  larger  firm.  Despite  all  this,  `less  good'  is  by  no  means  the 
same  as  `bad',  and  Troughton  &  Sims  was  certainly  solvent  in  1913  with  £11,800  cash  in 
its  bank  and  current  trade  debtors  owing  £3,884,  with  trade  creditors  standing  at  only 
£759. 
Cheshire's  woebegone  depiction  of  the  industry's  financial  condition  was  at  odds  with 
these  companies.  To  what  extent  he  was  aware  of  trade's  detailed  economic 
circumstances  is  uncertain,  but  his  connections  with  it  must  have  given  him  some 
indication  of  its  general  state.  This  may  indeed  have  been  less  than  satisfactory,  but  the 
fact  that  three  of  these  four  businesses  were  solidly  profitable  in  1912  and  1913  implies 
that  things  were  by  no  means  as  bad  he  alleged.  The  wording  of  his  minute  to  Wedgwood 
suggests  he  was  leaving  himself  some  latitude  in  what  he  was  saying.  Terms  such  as 
`prosperous'  and  `satisfactory'  could  be  applied  to  other  areas  besides  financial 
performance  and  Cheshire  may  have  had  in  mind  less  easily  quantified  aspects  of 
business  performance  such  as  scientific  and  technological  expertise,  a  theme  to  which 
both  he  and  Esslemont  would  later  return. 
43  A.  McConnell,  Instrument  Makers  to  the  World:  A  History  of  Cooke,  Troughton  &  Sims  (York:  William 
Sessions  Ltd,,  1992)  Chapter  5  describes  Troughton  &  Sims'  activities,  but  the  author's  suggestion  of 
involvement  in  rangefinder  production  lacks  evidence  in  support. 
"  VIA  AJB  02012.3. 171 
Keeping  the  optical  companies  outside  control  in  1915  would  have  given  them  the 
opportunity  to  benefit  from  profits  very  much  greater  than  in  peace-time  or  the  first  year 
of  the  war,  and  would  have  aided  Cheshire's  intention  to  advance  the  scientific  and 
technological  basis  of  the  optical  industry.  Long-term  improvements  would  need 
companies  to  be  financially  sound,  although  State  loans  might  overcome  immediate  cash 
shortages  they  would  ultimately  need  repaying  out  of  future  profits.  Expansion  of  output 
would  require  large  spending  on  new  tooling  and  premises  and  it  was  by  no  means  clear 
in  the  early  form  of  the  Munitions  Act  that  the  State  would  cover  any  portion  of  this 
expenditure  or  permit  businesses  to  derive  any  significant  financial  benefit  from  it. 
Even  though  the  Act  provided  for  the  introduction  of  rules  to  allow  for  `any  special 
circumstances  such  as  increase  of  output,  provision  of  new  machinery  or  plant,  alteration 
of  capital  or  other  matters  which  require  special  consideration'  in  assessing  profits,  none 
had  yet  been  formulated  when  Cheshire  wrote  his  August  minute  about  excluding  the 
optical  industry  from  control.  45  They  only  appeared  in  September,  `after  long  and 
exhaustive  discussion  within  the  Department'  and  would  have  gone  a  long  way  to 
meeting  Cheshire's  aims,  but  `before  any  definite  system  for  treating  special  cases  ... 
was  able  to  take  final  shape'  its  implementation  was  interrupted  by  the  a  Finance  Bill 
which  introduced  the  idea  of  an  Excess  Profits  Duty  (EPD)  to  tax  at  a  higher  than  normal 
level  all  profits  `in  excess  of  a  pre-war  standard'  46 
That  had  serious  implications  for  Cheshire's  desire  to  retain  profits  within  the  industry.  It 
intended  to  take  50  percent  of  all  `excess'  earnings  from  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  unlike 
the  Munitions  Act  allowed  only  for  `exceptional  earnings  and  redundancy  of  plant'.  47 
The  Ministry  of  Munitions  recognised  that  the  EPD  proposals  were  likely  to  overlap  the 
munitions  levy,  with  the  prospect  of  controlled  firms  being  liable  to  pay  both,  an  illogical 
-  and  unreasonable  -  situation.  Negotiations  between  the  Ministry  and  the  Treasury  to 
exempt  controlled  firms  from  the  new  proposals  were  inconclusive,  which  must 
45  OH  Vol.  III,  Part  3,  p.  32.  Pages  31  to  35  provide  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section  on  profits 
and  taxation. 
46  OH  Vol.  III,  Part  3,  P.  33. 
47  OH  Vol.  III,  Part  3,  p.  34. 172 
encouraged  Cheshire  and  Esslemont  to  lobby  persistently  and  tenaciously  to  keep  the 
optical  contractors  outside  control. 
Both  measures  stood  to  deny  the  optical  industry  the  opportunity  for  earnings  whose 
previous  lack  was,  according  to  Cheshire,  responsible  for  much  of  its  woes.  Faced  with 
still-incomplete  rules  in  the  Munitions  Act  and  even  greater  uncertainty  over  the 
proposed  finance  bill,  Cheshire's  only  feasible  strategy  was  to  plead  that  the  optical 
firms'  inclusion  would  result  in  loss  of  co-operation  and  a  consequent  catastrophic 
decline  in  output.  Much  of  his  denigratory  comments  on  the  industry  in  the  confidential 
internal  minutes  could  only  have  been  deliberate  hyperbole  intended  to  increase  the 
strength  of  his  pleadings  whilst  concealing  the  true  reason  for  them,  which  would  have 
been  wholly  unacceptable  in  the  political  context  of  the  Munitions  Act.  The  Ministry  of 
Munitions  was,  as  the  official  History  subsequently  reminded  its  readers,  `primarily 
concerned  with  the  output  of  munitions,  not  with  revenue',  48  but  Cheshire's  tactics 
indicate  that  he  was  much  concerned  with  earnings  for  the  industry  as  with  output  for  the 
State. 
Both  Mari  Williams  and  the  MacLeods  pointed  out  that  the  OMGD  dealt  with  its 
industry  in  ways  different  to  other  sections  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  but  did  not 
identify  this  important  underlying  reason.  Williams  considered  that  Esslemont  opposed 
control  simply  because  `some  instrument  firms  were  reluctant'  to  be  controlled  and  that 
their  wishes  had  to  be  considered,  whilst  Cheshire  wished  to  avoid  what  he  described  as 
`upsetting  a  very  delicate  balance'  between  the  trade  and  his  department  on  the  grounds 
that,  in  his  own  words  to  Colonel  Wedgwood,  `the  manufacturer  is  master  in  his  own 
workshop  and  is  stimulated  ... 
by  the  prospect  of  a  fairly  assured  reward.  But  under  the 
provisions  of  the  Munitions  Bill  [sic]  he  loses 
... 
his  status  as  master  and  no  guarantee 
of  reward  is  given  him  if  he  has  not  been  a  profit  earner  in  the  past'.  9  This  could  only 
have  been  a  deliberate  distortion  of  the  truth;  Cheshire  must  have  known  both  that  the 
Munitions  Act  did  not  interfere  with  routine  management  and  there  was  provision  in  it 
"  OH  Vol.  III,  Part  3,  p.  33. 
49  Williams  (1994)  pp.  63  and  64.  She  cites  PRO  MUN  4/55,  Cheshire  to  Wedgwood,  13.8.1915. 173 
for  dealing  with  previously  unprofitable  businesses.  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod  also  pointed 
out  the  `delicate  relationship'  that  existed,  and  although  recognising  that  the  OMGD  was 
not  in  step  with  general  Ministry  policy  they  did  not  seek  any  other  explanation.  50  The 
reality  was  that  the  joint  directors  of  the  OMGD  were  deliberately  seeking  to  pursue  a 
policy  that  ran  counter  to  the  very  heart  of  the  principles  of  the  Munitions  Act  in  order  to 
let  contractors  derive  substantial  extra  financial  benefits  from  their  war  work  in  order  to 
benefit  the  entire  industry's  efficiency  and  competitiveness  once  the  war  ended. 
These  efforts  enjoyed  some  success.  In  July,  Barr  &  Stroud,  Cooke's,  Heath  &  Co.,  Ross, 
Troughton  &  Simms,  and  Carl  Zeiss  (London)  Ltd  had  been  placed  on  the  list  of  firms  to 
be  controlled,  sl  but  all  were  quickly  (if  only  temporarily)  removed,  despite  reservations 
and  opposition  within  the  Ministry.  In  late  July  the  Ministry  line  was  that  firms  `should 
be  controlled  whether  they  want  [it]  or  not'  and  it  would  be  `difficult  to  avoid  including 
the  [optical]  firms  in  the  controlled  lists'.  2  Opinion  then  hardened  in  favour  of  listing, 
control  being  depicted  as  `a  status  which  carries  with  it  material  advantages'  to  which 
only  Ross  had  so  far  objected.  On  August  9th  a  decision  was  taken  to  go  ahead,  but  by  the 
1e,  Cheshire  had  persuaded  Wedgwood  and  Eric Geddes  to  tell  the  Director  General  of 
Munitions  Supply  that  the  Ministry  now  felt  `a  very  strong  case  was  needed  to  justify 
putting  these  firms  on  the  controlled  list',  a  complete  reversal  of  the  earlier  position.  The 
Director  General,  F.  W.  Black,  conceded  the  point  although  he  excepted  Barr &  Stroud 
because  of  its  `engineering  content'.  53  Cheshire's  pleadings,  perhaps  better  described  as 
lobbying,  on  behalf  of  the  optical  instruments  makers  had  been  -  for  the  moment  - 
successful  in  their  guise  of  creating  an  efficient  optical  munitions  industry. 
The  only  other  optical  firms  taken  under  control  in  the  remainder  of  1915  were  Ross  and 
Carl  Zeiss  (London)  Ltd.,  both  at  their  own  request.  Ross'  change  of  heart  may  have  been 
because  the  Ministry  was  prepared  to  put  up  a  sizeable  proportion  of  the  £25,000  the  firm 
so  Roy  &  Kay  MacLeod  (1977),  p.  176. 
51  PRO  MUN  4/55,  Control  of  Optical  firms,  DDGC  to  DGMS,  27.7.1915. 
52  PRO  MUN  4/55,  Control  of  Optical  Firms,  Wedgwood  to  Sir  H.  Llewellen  Smith,  30.7.1915. 
ss  PRO  MUN  4/55,  Control  of  Optical  firms,  supplies  the  source  material  for  this  preceding  section:  DDGC 
to  DGMS  27.7.1915,  Beveridge  to  Sir  H.  Liewellen  Smith  30.7.1915,  Wedgwood  to  Eric  Geddes 
14.8.1915,  Geddes  to  DGMS  14.8.1915. 174 
had  earlier  decided  to  spend  enlarging  its  works  to  handle  an  order  for  2,000  dial-sights 
worth  over  £110,000  which  the  OMGD  had  placed  in  August.  54  Ross  had  previously 
suggested  that  if  placed  under  control,  the  firm  would  be  unwilling  to  spend  its  own 
money  on  the  project,  so  the  request  to  be  designated  a  controlled  establishment  was  very 
much  a  volte  face.  Carl  Zeiss  (London)  Ltd.  was  a  small  subsidiary  of  the  very  large 
German  Zeiss  organisation  which  since  the  outbreak  of  war  had  been  operating  in  a  kind 
of  limbo,  cut  off  from  its  parent,  unsure  of  its  future  and,  ironically,  assembling 
binoculars  for  the  War  Office  from  dwindling  stocks  of  pre-war  German-made 
components.  55  Matters  came  to  a  head  when  its  directors  and  senior  managers  were 
interned  in  1915,  and  the  business  put  in  the  hands  of  a  controller  from  the  Board  of 
Trade  who  doubtless  found  that  control  represented  a  solution  to  its  current  problems  as 
well  as  removing  any  stigma  that  attached  to  it  being  an  `enemy'  firm. 
In  January  1916,  political  pressure  caused  the  Ministry  to  reconsider  the  status  of  the 
optical  firms  still  outside.  Cheshire's  success  in  presenting  the  optical  industry  as  a 
special  case  was  beginning  to  rebound,  the  comment  being  made  that  that  the  exclusion 
of  such  `an  important  industry'  left  the  Minister  (Lloyd  George)  `with  absolutely  no 
answer  to  any  criticism'  of  the  decision.  On  February  1,  Esslemont  was  reminded  that 
he  had  still  to  provide  the  names  of  firms  to  be  placed  on  the  controlled  list  but  he  still 
prevaricated,  replying  through  OMGD's  liaison  officer  that  the  Department  did  not  see 
`any  sufficient  reason'  to  include  any  other  optical  companies.  He  concluded  with  the 
blunt  statement  that  `I  am  not  satisfied  that  the  Ministry  or  the  firms  have  anything  to 
56  gain  from  control'. 
The  tenacity  with  which  Cheshire  and  Esslemont  sought  to  keep  most  of  the  industry 
outside  control  reflects  how  much  they  were  concerned  that  it  would  hinder  not  so  much 
the  creation  of  a  temporary  war-time  munitions  industry,  but  the  long  term  growth  of  the 
54  PRO  MUN  4!  745,  Orders  placed  for  Scientific  and  Optical  Instruments  &c,  1  august  1914  to  31°  March 
1917. 
55  Anýe  Hagen,  "Export  Versus  Direct  Investment  in  the  German  Optical  Industry.  "  Business  History,  no.  4 
October  1996,  p.  7. 
56  PRO  MUN  4/55,  Control  of  Optical  Firms  provides  the  source  material  for  this  section:  Memorandum  of 
Meeting  17.1.1916,  O.  H.  Smith  to  Esslemont  1.2.1916,  Wedgwood  to  Smith  4.2.1916. 175 
entire  optical  industry,  which  they  saw  as  being  the  future  locus  of  optical  munitions 
manufacture.  Unfortunately  for  them,  the  political  implications  of  what  they  wanted  were 
too  serious  to  allow  success.  Wedgwood's  letter  expressing  Esslemont's  ideas  brought  a 
measured  and  slightly  menacing  riposte  from  the  Ministry's  Owen  H.  Smith,  who  wrote 
that  not  only  were  the  continued  exclusions  exposing  the  Minister  `to  the  possibility  of 
serious  criticism'  but  it  was  `rather  a  grave  decision'  to  continue  them.  `If  there  is  a  real 
reason  for  exclusion,  can  you  send  me  a  short  minute?  '  he  ended.  Wedgwood's  reply  had 
to  admit  there  was  little  to  add  beyond  reiterating  that  only  the  `very  careful  handling'  of 
the  trade  had  permitted  improved  output,  and  that  he  was  `apprehensive  of  the  effect'  of 
anything  disturbing  current  circumstances.  Smith  was  un-moved  and  on  March  1'  told 
the  Director  General  of  Munitions  Supplies  that  he  considered  fears  about  reduced  output 
`groundless'  and  that  `it  seems  there  is  no  justification  for  excluding  an  industry  which  is 
so  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  munitions  work'.  He  finished  by  asking  for 
permission  `to  issue  [immediately]  a  special  list  including  all  the  optical  frms'.  57  That 
marked  the  end  of  attempts  keep  the  optical  trade  outside  the  financial  constraints  of  the 
Munitions  Act  and  Cheshire  and  Esslemont's  energies  were  henceforth  more  closely 
focussed  on  other  efforts  to  transform  the  industry. 
5.6  Scientific  training  and  technical  management 
For  Cheshire,  the  other  pillar  of  support  for  the  optical  industry  was  significantly  better 
scientific  and  technical  education.  In  late  1915  and  1916  the  argument  for  introducing 
new  centres  to  provide  this  was  reinforced  by  the  argument  that  the  existing  industry  was 
constantly  being  held  back  from  meeting  `its  production  targets'  because  there  were  not 
enough  `skilled  workmen,  designers  and  [lens]  computers  available'.  58  This  was 
substantially  correct,  although  other  factors  such  as  the  lack  of  machine  tooling  and 
factory  space  were  greater  and  more  immediate  impediments  to  increasing  output  of 
equipment  already  in  service.  59  The  London  County  Council's  Education  Department 
took  up  the  work  it  had  done  in  1911  and  in  June  1916  its  Education  Officer,  Robert 
s7  PRO  MUN  4/55,  Control  of  Optical  Firms,  Smith  to  Wedgwood  11.2.1916,  Wedgwood  to  Smith 
17.2.1916,  Smith  to  DGMS  13.1916. 
5E  R.  &  K.  MacLeod  (1977)  p.  185. 
59  PRO  MUN  2/la,  Secret  Weekly  Reports  Vol.  1,18.9.1915,23.10.1915  and  6.11.1915. 176 
Blair,  suggested  a  `national  scheme  for  training  in  technical  optics'.  60  The  only  facility 
that  then  existed  was  at  the  Northampton  Polytechnic  Institute  at  Clerkenwell  in  London 
(the  location  of  much  of  the  London  optical  trade),  which  provided  worker  training  for 
the  production  of  optical  components,  rather  than  for  design  and  computation.  "  Despite 
the  need  to  increase  output,  Blair's  consultations  with  the  optical  industry  and  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  had  persuaded  him  that  the  manufacturers  were  `less  preoccupied 
with  the  need  to  train  workmen,  than  with  the  need  to  secure  advanced  postgraduate  and 
research  work',  and  his  recommendations  took  that  requirement  principally  into 
account  62  The  existing  Clerkenwell  scheme  would  be  enlarged  to  take  60  `students'  at  a 
time,  evening  classes  would  be  provided  at  `junior  technical  schools',  but  most 
importantly  a  new  department  would  be  created  at  Imperial  College  to  provide 
undergraduate  and  post-graduate  training,  as  well  as  facilities  for  research  workers.  That 
would  provide  a  centre  of  excellence  for  optics  which,  although  familiar  in  Germany, 
was  still  unknown  in  Britain. 
Blair's  suggestions  were  adopted  and  in  May  the  following  year  Frederick  Cheshire  was 
appointed  as  Professor  of  Technical  Optics  at  Imperial  College.  This  meant  his  stepping 
down  as  joint  head  of  OMGD,  but  he  maintained  a  direct  connection  through  reverting  to 
his  original  Ministry  post  of  `expert  advisor  in  technical  optics'.  The  extent  to  which 
Cheshire  influenced  Blair's  thinking  must  have  been  considerable,  particularly  as  the 
greatest  energies  were  devoted  to  the  area  where  the  immediate  demand  was  least  urgent. 
Despite  the  assertion  that  output  was  threatened  by  a  lack  of  designers,  the  inescapable 
fact  remains  that  in  1915  and  1916  what  the  War  Office  chiefly  wanted  was  instruments 
that  were  already  in  production  such  as  rangefinders,  dial-sights,  prism  binoculars  and 
telescopes.  3  Where  novel  items  were  required,  such  as  the  telescopic  rifle  sight  or  the 
trench  periscope,  the  design  was  done  by  existing  firms  (such  as  Aldis  Brothers,  Beck, 
and  Watson)  who  already  had  competent  optical  designers.  "  What  the  war-time 
munitions  industry  needed  most  was  extra  capacity,  but  the  OMGD  was  convinced  that 
60  R.  &  K.  MacLeod  (1977)  p.  186. 
61  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  p.  109. 
62  R.  &  K.  MacLeod  (1977)  p.  109. 
63  PRO  MUN  4/745,  shows  the  extent  to  which  existing  patterns  made  up  the  bulk  of  orders. 
64  See  Chapter  7  below  for  details  of  Aldis  Brothers. 177 
in  the  context  of  the  long-term,  what  the  optical  instruments  industry  needed  was  quite 
different. 
Once  Blair's  ideas  were  accepted  by  the  LCC,  the  Department  of  Scientific  and  Industrial 
Research  and  Imperial  College,  an  advisory  committee  was  set  up  to  co-ordinate 
progress.  Although  the  OMGD  had  no  official  part  in  what  Blair  proposed,  it  was 
represented  on  this  Technical  Optics  Committee  by  Alfred  Esslemont,  along  with  Frank 
Twyman  from  Adam  Hilger  Ltd,  Conrad  Beck  from  R.  &  J.  Beck  Ltd,  and  T.  Watson- 
Baker  from  W.  Watson  &  Sons  Ltd  from  the  `optical  trades'  65  Twyman,  although  now 
totally  (if  temporarily)  committed  to  munitions  contracting,  was  principally  interested  in 
scientific  instrument  manufacture,  as  were  Beck  and  Watson-Baker.  Before  the  war, 
although  all  had  been  engaged  in  optical  munitions  manufacture,  their  businesses  had  not 
been  as  heavily  involved  as  others;  Ottway  and  Ross  both  did  more  government 
contracting,  and  Barr &  Stroud  was  totally  committed  to  military  and  naval  work.  All 
three  had  been  anxious  to  advance  the  instruments  industry  and  Beck  and  Twyman  had 
both  been  involved  in  efforts  to  establish  a  makers'  association,  continuing  even  after  the 
war  began.  Their  concept  of  what  optical  production  would  benefit  most  from  were 
almost  certainly  more  closely  in  tune  with  Cheshire's  than  anyone  else  in  the  London 
industry.  This  cross-influence  was  also  reflected  in  the  other  appointments  to  the  new 
department  at  Imperial  College,  with  two  of  Watson's  designers  filling  key  posts. 
Just  before  the  first  classes  at  Imperial  College  started  in  1917,  Cheshire  published  an 
open  letter  to  the  trade  in  the  journal  Optician  that  amounted  to  a  summary  of  his  policy 
for  reforming  optical  manufacture  in  Britain,  justifying  it  by  the  experiences  of  the  war-66 
It  was,  he  said,  only  the  pressure  of  war-time  demands  that  had  impressed  on  the  makers 
the  need  for  scientific  method  to  replace  the  old  ways  of  trial  and  error,  and  had  provided 
a  climate  where  changes  would  be  accepted.  The  setting-up  of  the  department  at  Imperial 
College  was  the  start  of  a  systematic  approach  to  optical  design  that,  by  implication,  was 
long  overdue.  There  is  no  doubt  that  much  of  what  Cheshire  wrote  was  true,  but  it  did 
6s  R.  &  K.  MacLeod  (1977)  p.  201. 
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not  apply  universally.  In  particular,  the  three  firms  represented  on  the  advisory 
committee  were  no  strangers  to  scientific  method,  nor  were  companies  such  as  Barr  & 
Stroud,  Ross  and  Taylor  Hobson.  What  the  facilities  at  Imperial  College  were  meant  to 
do  was  provide  a  pool  of  scientifically  trained  opticians  who  would,  it  was  hoped,  bolster 
the  abilities  not  only  of  companies  who  already  employed  such  staff,  but  also  of  those 
who  had  previously  been  unable  to  hire  skilled  designers.  In  June  1918,  the  Technical 
Optics  Committee  summarised  Imperial's  first  optical  academic  year  by  saying  the 
courses  would  meet  `the  urgent  need'  for  `first  class  designers  and  computers'  and  would 
eventually  produce  `a  sufficient  supply  of  men  ... 
for  the  higher  positions  in  the 
industry'. 
Cheshire's  policies  for  long-term  improvements  became  more  relevant  to  optical 
munitions  production  after  late  1916,  and  his  enthusiasm  for  using  short-term  pressures 
to  promote  progress  on  a  broader  front  should  not  be  allowed  to  distract  from  the  benefits 
that  parts  of  the  munitions  industry  gained  from  his  work.  Even  though  he  may  initially 
have  exaggerated  the  size  of  the  `reverse  salient'  of  shortages  in  trained  designers,  the 
problems  embedded  in  the  War  Office's  methods  of  producing  specifications  for  its 
optical  munitions  was  a  reminder  that  he  had  identified  a  significant  problem.  Whether, 
in  the  context  of  immediate  war-time  demand,  he  actually  produced  the  best  short-term 
solution  is  open  to  debate.  The  War  Office  had  never  prepared  any  optical  specifications 
in  detail  so  businesses  coming  into  optical  munitions  manufacture  were  faced  with 
designing  lens  systems  for  themselves.  Once  the  OMGD  began  to  look  for  new  sources 
of  supply  in  late  1915  and  1916,  the  problems  inherent  in  this  situation  made  themselves 
quickly  apparent. 
For  firms  like  Beck  and  Ross,  which  had  optical  designers,  computing  optical  systems 
was  no  problem,  beyond  the  time-consuming  nature  of  the  work.  But,  because  they  were 
already  fully  occupied,  the  OMGD  increasingly  looked  to  newcomers  who  did  not 
always  have  the  abilities  to  do  the  calculations  themselves.  Making  lenses  was  relatively 
easy  once  a  suitable  optical  glass  had  been  selected  and  their  curves  and  thicknesses 
computed,  but  without  those  specifications  nothing  could  be  done,  and  it  was  in  the 179 
efforts  to  bring  in  firms  who  lacked  these  abilities  that  the  shortage  of  lens  computers 
was  first  and  most  keenly  felt.  Cheshire's  planned  three-year  courses,  though,  were  far 
beyond  what  was  needed  to  solve  that  particular  lack,  and  in  recognition  of  that  Cheshire 
and  the  chief  designer  of  Watson  &  Sons,  Eugen  Conrady,  set  up  six-week  `crash 
courses'  at  Imperial  College  in  late  1916.67  These  were  sufficient  to  allow  both  prism 
binocular  and  terrestrial-telescope  systems  for  gunsights  to  be  designed  by  people  with 
no  previous  mathematical  training,  and  proved  adequate  to  set  up  an  entirely  new  factory 
in  Leeds  for  binocular  production  in  1917  without  needing  to  rely  on  any  outside  optical 
design  aid.  68  Despite  the  utility  and  importance  of  these  short  courses  when  they  were 
run,  the  official  History  does  not  mention  them,  nor  do  the  MacLeods  in  their 
examination  of  the  optical  industry's  relationship  with  government  in  the  Great  War. 
Possibly  they  were  not  entirely  successful,  either  in  numbers  trained  or  the  skills 
transmitted.  In  February  1918,  the  Sherwood  Optical  Company,  a  firm  which  had  been 
set  up  in  1915  and  which  had  binocular  contracts,  was  reported  by  the  OMGD's 
Technical  Branch  to  have  suspended  its  output  as  it  was  waiting  for  a  `new  optical 
system  to  be  calculated  by  Mr  Chalmers'.  In  March,  the  binocular  makers  Kershaw,  who 
had  designed  their  own  lens  system  after  training  on  one  of  the  Cheshire-Conrady 
courses,  changed  over  to  making  a  system  designed  by  Taylor  Hobson.  69  The  problem 
with  both  seemed  to  be  rooted  in  design  limitations  rather  than  quality  of  manufacture. 
5.7  The  problems  of  failure  to  standardise  designs 
The  lack  of  standardised  design  for  optical  instruments  was  a  problem  that  the  OMGD 
never  addressed,  despite  the  problems  which  it  caused  in  extending  sources  of  supply. 
Even  the  largest  and  most  competent  of  firms  found  problems  in  dealing  with  it.  In 
August  1916,  after  lengthy  and  detailed  negotiations,  Barr &  Stroud  were  given  a 
contract  to  make  200,000  binocular  prisms  for  supply  to  other  firms  who  were  already 
67  Leeds  Industrial  Museum,  Armley  Mills;  Kershaw  papers  (unclassified),  typescript  by  Norman  Kershaw, 
`The  History  of  Kershaws',  p.  6  gives  details  of  his  lack  of  experience  and  training  and  the  benefits  of  the 
course. 
68  This  is  detailed  in  chapter  6  below. 
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making  complete  instruments.  70  The  `specification  to  govern  manufacture'  gave  no 
information  about  the  prisms  beyond  requiring  that  they  be  made  of  boro-silicate  glass, 
and  the  firm  had  to  consult  OMGD  for  the  necessary  dimensions.  Its  technical  branch 
could  only  confirm  the  glass  type  needed,  and  the  permitted  tolerances  on  the  prism 
angles,  telling  Esslemont  that  `It  would  be  advisable  to  obtain  from  Ross  two  sample 
prisms  to  be  forwarded  to  Barr  &  Stroud,  from  which  they  could  take  their  own 
measurements.  '  71  No  standard  existed  (Ross  presumably  made  prisms  to  fit  their  own 
gauges),  and  a  binocular  was  eventually  sent  directly  from  Woolwich  Arsenal,  the 
OMGD  seeing  no  purpose  in  recording  the  details  for  itself.  It  was  Barr  &  Stroud  who 
provided  the  dimensions  for  incorporation  in  the  contract  to  manufacture.  Then,  having 
set  up  to  produce  prisms  on  a  scale  larger  than  ever  done  previously  in  Britain,  72  the  firm 
found  that  its  two  clients  (Kershaw  and  the  Brimfield  Optical  Company)  made  binocular 
bodies  that  called  for  prisms  of  slightly  different  heights  that  differed  from  the  samples 
provided.  This  complicated  and  slowed  production,  and  eventually  Barr  &  Stroud 
collaborated  with  Kershaw,  by  far  the  larger  client,  to  produce  a  compromise  that  would 
fit  both  firm's  bodies  through  relaxing  the  tolerances  that  had  originally  been  decided  in 
the  contract  issued  by  the  ministry.  Deliveries  went  directly  from  Glasgow  to  the  two 
binocular  factories,  the  prism  were  fitted  and  the  finished  instruments  sent  to  Woolwich 
for  inspection.  Then,  in  October  1918,  the  Ministry's  own  Inspector  of  Optical  Supplies 
became  responsible  for  prism  acceptances,  and  batches  sampled  began  to  be  rejected 
because  they  failed  to  conform  to  the  dimensions  agreed  in  1916.  After  a  series  of  letters 
occupying  a  month,  the  Inspector  finally  agreed  to  accept  the  size  that  had  been  working 
perfectly  for  over  a  year,  and  assembly  of  binoculars  was  resumed.  73 
A  different,  though  related,  problem  was  illustrated  when  Barr  &  Stroud  was  asked  to 
take  on  the  manufacture  of  a  gun  sighting  telescope  in  July  1918.74  This  was  actually  an 
Admiralty  pattern  that  had  been  made  previously  by  Ross  and  by  Watson,  and  unlike 
70  UGD  295/19/2/4,  Customer  Order  files,  CO  2965,23.8.1916. 
"  UGD  295/26/2/49,  Bryson  to  Esslemont  4.4.1916. 
72  PRO  MUN  4/5004,  Weekly  Reports,  8.1.1917. 
73  UGD  295/4/634,  Letter  Book,  Barr  &  Stroud  to  Director  of  Inspection  of  Optical  Supplies,  8.10.1918, 
17.10.1918,  and  8.11.1918  provide  the  source  material  for  this  section. 
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War  Office  practice  there  were  drawings  for  it.  These  were  sent  to  Glasgow,  along  with  a 
sample  of  each  firm's  manufacture.  Difficulties  were  immediately  found,  because  the 
two  samples  were  distinctly  different,  each  having  its  own  set  of  drawings.  A  further 
complication  was  that  the  Watson  telescope,  which  struck  Barr  &  Stroud  as  being 
potentially  easier  to  make,  did  not  actually  conform  to  its  own  drawings  and  used  five 
different  types  of  glass  in  its  seven-component  optical  system,  a  degree  of  complexity 
which  the  firm  thought  un-necessary. 
5.8  Maintaining  output 
Sampling  the  OMGD's  weekly  reports  shows  that  its  staff  spent  a  large  proportion  of 
their  time  getting  round  similar  problems  for  firms  who  were  either  too  small  or  less  able 
to  take  remedial  steps  themselves,  and  dealing  with  failures  in  firms  that  ought  probably 
to  have  been  better  able  to  manage  their  own  affairs.  51L  &  J.  Beck  Ltd,  whose  principal 
Conrad  Beck,  was  associated  with  Frederick  Cheshire's  efforts,  was  criticised  on  October 
18t  1917  for  the  poor  overall  quality  of  their  output,  and  on  7th  February  1918  for 
binocular  deliveries  that  were  so  slow  that  the  contract  might  as  well  be  cancelled.  At  the 
same  time,  the  firm  was  in  dispute  with  the  inspection  department  at  Woolwich  Arsenal  - 
on  which  the  OMGD's  comment  was  (intriguingly)  `It  is  impossible  to  condense  all  that 
our  inspector  has  to  say  about  this  firm  and  the  testing  at  Woolwich'.  On  Adam  Hilger 
Ltd  the  comments  were  even  worse;  on  26th  January  1917  the  firm's  binocular  lens  sets 
were  `unsatisfactory',  on  15`x'  February  they  were  `far  from  satisfactory',  and  on  1' 
November  they  were  still  `not  fit  for  service'  and  the  entire  workshop  was  dirty  and 
`must  be  swept  out'.  The  Dublin  firm  of  Sir  Howard  Grubb  and  Co.  was  far  behind  with 
its  deliveries  and  on  28th  February  1918  the  OMGD  noted  that  not  a  single  telescope 
from  a  contract  placed  in  October  1916  had  yet  been  supplied,  and  for  it  to  get  back  on 
schedule  would  depend  `on  the  help  of  supernatural  agencies'.  Broadhurst  &  Clarkson,  a 
telescope  maker  established  well  before  the  war,  had  been  proposed  as  a  maker  of 
Admiralty-pattern  gun-sighting  telescopes,  but  on  12th  July  1917  the  OMGD  dismissed 
the  suggestion  as  `its  plant  is  inadequate,  its  men  unaccustomed  to  the  work  and  ...  the 
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deliveries  promised  could  not  be  made'.  And  in  early  February  1918  the  Ross  branch 
works  at  Mill  Hill  was  noted  to  `complain  bitterly'  that  binocular  bodies  supplied  by  W. 
Watson  &  Sons  for  fitting  with  graticules  were  so  dirty  that  it  was  impossible  to  work  on 
them. 
These  reports  are  simultaneously  telling  and  misleading.  The  OMGD  staff  making  them 
were  handling  the  day  to  day  problems  of  firms  who  were,  for  the  most  part,  trying  to 
cope  with  large  orders  and  the  pressure  to  deliver  quickly,  whilst  coping  with  shortages 
of  hands  and  building  extensions  to  their  works.  In  August  1917  the  Weekly  Reports 
record  ten  firms  with  construction  work  going  on,  including  Grubb,  Hilger,  and  Ross, 
most  of  whom  were  being  criticised  for  tardy  deliveries  or  poor  quality.  76  The  picture  is 
one  of  struggle  and,  if  not  of  failure,  then  at  best  of  limited  success  that  causes  questions 
to  asked  about  how  effectively  the  OMGD  managed  the  war-time  industry.  But  it  has  to 
be  recognised  that  problems  were  bound  to  feature  more  prominently  than  successes  in 
these  records,  and  that  lack  of  evidence  of  success  is  by  no  means  evidence  of  its 
absence.  Barr  &  Stroud,  for  example,  features  hardly  at  all  (at  least  in  those  sampled) 
except  in  relation  to  its  problems  with  prism  acceptances.  There  is  little  said  about  the 
massive  output  of  rangefinders  in  Glasgow,  although  it  must  be  asked  whether  the 
OMGD  might  have  paid  closer  attention  had  the  firm  been  in  London,  and  provided  more 
information  as  a  result.  It  would  be  as  unsafe  to  assume  failure  in  the  management  of  the 
industry  from  the  records  of  Esslemont's  administrative  department  as  it  would  be  to 
assume  success  for  Cheshire's  efforts  on  the  technical  side  from  his  own  contemporary 
claims. 
5.9  Conclusion 
Whatever  the  image  created  by  the  Weekly  Reports,  there  was  no  breakdown  in  the 
supply  of  optical  munitions  throughout  the  war,  even  before  the  Ministry  of  Munitions 
was  created.  Whether  or  not  the  OMGD  chose  the  best  way  to  organise  the  industry  is 
debatable,  and  a  case  can  be  made  that  Cheshire  in  particular  gave  priority  to  the  long- 
term  interests  of  the  country's  optical  instruments  industry  over  the  short-term  demands 
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to  maximise  output  of  munitions  products.  If  he  did,  his  intention  was  to  produce  a  viable 
industry  that  would  be  able  to  fill  a  role  analogous  to  the  private  pre-war  arms  makers 
who  had  traditionally  been  expected  by  the  State  to  make  up  the  shortfall  from  the 
national  arsenals  in  time  of  war,  a  goal  that  would  in  principle  have  been  acceptable  to 
his  political  masters  in  the  Ministry.  It  cannot  be  said  that  he  succeeded  in  that,  largely 
because  the  conditions  that  provided  his  opportunity  also  combined  to  frustrate  one  of  his 
two  strategies  and  it  proved  much  easier  to  set  up  a  university  programme  in  optics  than 
it  did  to  let  the  trade  profit  financially  from  its  war-work.  His  own  departure  from  the 
Ministry  (even  though  he  retained  an  official  role  in  it)  meant  that  his  ability  to  develop 
any  provincial  training  scheme  was  largely  eliminated,  and  the  centre  for  excellence  in 
optics  remained  a  metropolitan  phenomenon  despite  the  national  distribution  of  key 
optical  munitions  producers.  As  a  later  chapter  shows,  most  of  his  efforts  had  little  long- 
term  effect  on  the  optical  munitions  industry  which,  after  all,  had  remarkably  little  in 
common  with  the  instruments  industry. 
Much  of  war-time  optical  industry  can  perhaps  best  be  described  as  hermaphroditic. 
Those  instrument  making  firms  who  were  conscripted  into  becoming  munitions-makers 
retained  the  characteristics  of  the  former  while  acquiring  those  of  the  latter  with  varying 
degrees  of  completeness  that  subsequently  affected  their  success  in  the  new  role.  That 
Esslemont's  department  was  often  unable  to  make  sword-smiths  from  tinsmiths  should 
not  have  been  a  surprise;  that  he  was  able  to  get  any  of  them  even  to  make  forks  was  an 
achievement  in  itself.  But,  from  the  contract  records  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  bulk  of 
useful  output  actually  came  from  a  small  number  of  firms  who  were  mostly  already 
experienced  in  optical  munitions  work  before  the  war  began,  suggesting  that 
concentrating  resources  and  effort  in  developing  those  businesses  would  have  been  a 
more  effective  route  in  rapidly  expanding  optical  munitions  output  than  the  one  chosen. 
The  next  chapter  examines  the  degree  to  which  success  was  achieved  in  specific  and 
important  areas  of  production  and  considers  to  what  extent  the  Ministry  played  a  part  in 
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Chapter  6 
The  industry's  war-time  performance,  1915  to  1918 
6.1  Introduction. 
Assessing  the  optical  munitions  industry's  performance  after  mid-1915  is  not  an  easy 
task.  War  is  the  critical  test  of  munitions  supply,  but  the  Great  War  so  tested  production 
that  the  choice  of  criteria  by  which  to  evaluate  the  industry  is  somewhat  problematical. 
Because  optical  manufacturing  was  inextricably  linked  to  the  Ministry  of  Munitions' 
Optical  Munitions  and  Glassware  Department  (OMGD)  it  is  impossible  to  chronicle  one 
without  repeated  reference  to  the  other,  and  any  assessment  of  optical  munitions  makers 
must  also  embrace  the  OMGD.  An  appropriate  way  to  consider  the  war-time  industry  is 
how  well,  and  by  what  means,  it  met  the  tasks  imposed  upon  it  by  the  exigencies  of  war, 
focussing  on  three  particular  examples  of  what  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod  called  the 
`individual  optical  technologies',  and  examining  them  in  the  context  of  war  conditions.  ' 
This  facilitates  the  recognition  of  a  distinct  and  largely  temporary  war-time  industry  and 
the  particular  problems  it  encountered.  The  three  examples  selected  -  prismatic 
binoculars,  telescopic  rifle  sights,  and  the  man-portable  single  observer  rangefinder  - 
represent  three  distinctive  approaches  to  war-time  production  and  demonstrate  different 
degrees  of  success.  All  show  an  interaction  of  socially  constructive  characteristics  and 
technical  factors  that  resists  models  of  explanation  that  attempt  to  subordinate  either  of 
them  to  the  other. 
6.2  The  problems  of  large  scale  production. 
Despite  the  importance  of  developing  new  products  in  response  to  the  changing  nature  of 
warfare,  volume  production  was  the  chief  concern  throughout  the  war  and  was  where  the 
greatest  problems  were  encountered.  The  need  to  produce  some  types  of  instruments  in 
numbers  never  previously  envisaged  led  to  circumstances  where  the  problems  of 
obtaining  sufficient  factory  capacity  -  in  effect  a  manufacturing  system  -  were 
complicated  by  the  emergence  of  what  Thomas  Hughes  has  termed  `reverse  salients',  a 
1  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod,  `Government  and  the  optical  industry  in  Britain  1914-1918'  in  J.  M.  Winter,  ed. 
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metaphor  describing  situations  where  parts  of  an  expanding  technological  system  either 
fall  behind  or  become  out  of  phase  with  others.  2  Hughes  suggested  that  in  a 
manufacturing  system,  an  increase  in  output  in  one  section  may  result  in  the  need  to 
modify  some  or  all  of  the  other  components  in  the  system  to  ensure  optimum 
performance,  these  `lagging'  parts  remaining  reverse  salients  until  a  correction  has  been 
achieved.  The  presence  of  such  difficulties,  though,  need  not  necessarily  bring  the  system 
to  a  halt  even  though  its  efficiency  may  be  reduced;  in  such  cases  they  may  be  presumed 
capable  of  solution,  and  then  by-passed  pending  that  solution  in  order  to  permit  interim 
progress  on  a  `broader  front'.  Such  circumstances  were  found  in  all  the  three  areas 
examined  below,  but  particularly  in  the  ambitious  moves  to  expand  prism  binocular 
production.  Unlike  other  applications  of  optical  technologies,  this  effort  was  not  entirely 
successful,  largely  because  the  reverse  salients  which,  in  Hughes'  terminology,  became 
`critical  problems'  which  although  identified  early  were  not  all  adequately  addressed 
until  late  in  the  war,  demonstrating  the  dangers  inherent  in  some  of  the  steps  that  had  to 
be  taken  to  create  a  substantially  new  industry  at  an  accelerated  rate. 
Whether  high  volume  production  in  the  optical  munitions  industry  conformed  to  current 
understandings  of  the  true  nature  `mass  production'  is  a  debatable  point.  David 
Hounshell  has  suggested  that  the  term  must  embrace  not  only  the  manufacture  of  large 
quantities,  but  also  the  `basic  aspect'  of  fully  interchangeable  parts  and  the  absence  of 
hand  fitting  in  their  eventual  assembly  into  a  completely  finished  artefact  3  He  pointed 
out  that  the  incorporation  of  fully  interchangeable  components  need  not  ensure  high  rates 
of  output,  nor  that  the  need  for  adjustments  at  the  assembly  stage  necessarily  precluded 
the  speedy  manufacture  of  very  large  numbers  of  a  complex  product,  citing  the  half 
million  sewing  machines  produced  by  the  American  Singer  company  in  1880  using 
hand-fitting  methods  4  That  mass  production  conforming  to  Hounshell's  prescript  was 
found  in  some  areas  of  British  war-time  munitions  manufacture  is  beyond  doubt  -  an 
2  T.  P.  Hughes,  "The  Evolution  of  Large  Technological  Systems.  "  in  The  Social  Construction  of 
Technological  Systems:  New  Directions  in  the  Sociology  and  History  of  Technology,  edited  by  W.  E. 
Bijker,  T.  P.  Hughes,  and  T.  J.  Pinch.  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  MIT  Press,  1989)  pp.  73  to  75. 
3  D.  A.  Hounshell,  From  the  American  System  to  Mass  Production  1800-1932  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University  Press,  1984)  pp.  3  to  7. 
4  Hounshell  (1984)  p.  6. 186 
excellent  example  being  the  Lee-Enfield  rifle  which  was  produced  at  annual  rates 
exceeding  a  million  in  three  separate  factories,  using  fully  interchangeable  parts 
throughout.  5  However,  with  optical  instruments  matters  were  somewhat  different  and, 
although  some  types  were  made  in  large  numbers,  neither  the  quantities  produced  nor  the 
methods  of  manufacture  mirrored  those  for  rifles,  suggesting  that  even  though  production 
was  far  higher  than  ever  previously  attained,  mass  production  under  the  strict  definition 
adopted  by  Hounshell  was  never  actually  achieved  in  optical  munitions  contracting. 
6.3  Prism  Binoculars. 
The  prismatic  binocular  was  needed  in  far  larger  quantities  than  any  other  item  of  optical 
munitions  and  posed  the  greatest  problem  of  supply.  6  The  War  Office  had  already 
ordered  over  58,000  between  August  1914  and  June  1915,  both  at  home  and  in  France. 
That  was  more  than  all  other  optical  stores  put  together  and  almost  twenty  times  the 
number  ordered  in  the  financial  year  1913-1914. 
The  OMGD  inherited  a  situation  in  which  deliveries  were  already  far  behind  schedule, 
where  estimated  requirements  had  reached  almost  three  times  what  had  already  been 
ordered,  and  where  output  was  so  small  that  the  shortage  could  only  continue  growing. 
This  presented  a  serious  problem  whose  solution  was  both  protracted  and  elusive.  The 
difficulty  was  the  lack  of  capacity.  Although  binoculars  were  regularly  made  in  Britain 
before  the  war,  their  manufacture  had  been  on  a  leisurely  and  relatively  small  scale  that 
was  far  less  than  presently  required.  Ross,  by  far  the  largest  British  maker,  had  taken 
over  fourteen  years  to  produce  no  more  than  25,000,  averaging  approximately  35  per 
week.  8  That  binoculars  could  be  made  on  a  very  large  scale  had  been  amply 
demonstrated  by  Zeiss  at  Jena,  which  had  produced  almost  433,000  between  1894  and 
s  Great  Britain,  Ministry  of  Munitions,  History  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  (subsequently  OH)  Vol.  XI 
`The  Supply  of  Munitions',  Part  4  (London:  HMSO,  1922)  pp.  17  to  31. 
6  OH  Vol.  XI  `The  Supply  of  Munitions',  Part  3,  p.  133,  Appendix  111(a). 
See  Chapter  4  for  the  details  of  British  firms,  PRO  MUN  4/745  for  samples  of  French  contracts  and  Great 
Britain,  Ministry  of  Munitions;  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3.  (HMSO  London,  1922)  p.  133,  Appendix  III(a)  and 
OH  Vol.  I,  Part  1,  Appendix  II  for  details  of  total  orders  placed. 
a  In  the  absence  of  factory  records,  these  figures  are  based  on  serial  numbers  taken  from  surviving 
instruments  whose  dates  of  manufacture  can  positively  be  placed  in  this  period  through  reference  to 
advertisements  and  the  maker's  own  catalogues.  I  am  particularly  grateful  to  William  Reid  for  providing 
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1914,  averaging  50,000  yearly  after  1910.9  However,  this  was  unique,  and  no  other 
maker  anywhere  had  made  anything  like  that  quantity  or achieved  such  high  rates  of 
output.  1°  The  firm  was  extensively  vertically  integrated  so  far  as  the  production  of 
components  went,  even  the  optical  glass  for  its  lenses  and  prisms  coming  from  its  `sister 
company',  the  adjacent  Schott  glassworks.  11  It  had  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  patent 
protection  for  its  binoculars  since  1894  and,  according  to  the  British  optical  trade,  had 
been  materially  assisted  by  the  German  government's  regular  large-scale  purchases.  12 
With  over  5,000  workers  in  early  1914  it  was  by  far  the  largest  optical  manufactory  in 
the  world  and  regarded  universally  as  a  ne  plus  ultra.  Nevertheless,  the  way  Zeiss  made 
binoculars  was  no  secret;  its  works  were  regularly  visited  by  representatives  of  foreign 
instrument  makers  and  its  production  methods  described  in  contemporary  scientific  and 
technical  journals.  Those  methods,  particularly  for  assembly,  could  in  fact  be  replicated 
on  a  smaller  scale  in  factories  properly  set  up  to  perform  the  work,  as  Zeiss  itself  had 
already  demonstrated  with  small  branch  works  in  Austro-Hungary,  Russia,  and 
England.  13 
A  later  claim  that  `We  knew  [in  1915]  how  to  make  binoculars,  but  not  ...  on  a  great 
manufacturing  scale'  was  not  strictly  true.  14  Zeiss  produced  a  thousand  binoculars 
weekly  not  by  employing  secret  or  sophisticated  methods,  but  by  employing  large 
numbers  of  workers  to  assemble  an  assured  supply  of  suitable  components.  The  real 
obstacle  in  Britain  in  1915  was  the  lack  of  capacity  for  optical  components  and  factory 
space  and  workers  for  their  assembly.  Although  Aitchison,  Ross,  Watson,  and  the 
9  These  figures  are  provided  partly  from  data  published  in  H.  T.  Seeger,  Feldstecher:  Fernglaser  im  Wandel 
der  Zeit  (Borken,  Germany:  Bresser  Optik,  1989)  pp.  102  -  104,  and  from  further  personal 
communications  from  Dr  Seeger,  as  well  as  information  provided  by  Thomas  Antoniades. 
10  H.  T.  Seeger  (1989)  Chapter  4,  and  F.  Watson,  Binoculars,  Opera  Glasses  and  Field  Glasses  (Princes 
Risborough,  Bucks:  Shire  Books,  1995)  pp.  13-19. 
1'  F.  Auerbach,  The  Zeiss  Works  and  the  Carl  Zeiss  Stiftung  in  Jena.  Translated  by  F.  Cheshire  and  S.  Paul. 
2°d  edition  (London:  Marshall  Brookes  &  Chalkely,  1904)  describes  the  factory  and  its  methods  in  detail.. 
12  R  and  K.  MacLeod,  "Government  and  the  Optical  Industry  in  Britain  1914-1918.  "  In  War  and 
Economic  Development,  edited  by  J.  M.  Winter  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1977)  pp.  169 
and  170. 
"  Antje  Hagen  `Export  versus  direct  investment  in  the  German  optical  industry'  Business  History  No.  4, 
October  1996. 
14  George  A.  B.  Dewar,  The  Great  Munition  Feat  1914-1918  (London:  Constable,  192  1)  p.  217. 188 
London  subsidiary  of  Carl  Zeiss  Jena  had  all  manufactured  binoculars  before  1914,  none 
of  them  had  the  capacity  to  handle  the  volume  now  needed.  ls 
The  binocular  was  not  easy  to  mass  produce,  even  when  the  methods  were  familiar.  It 
required  great  consistency  in  its  optics  and,  above  all,  care  in  final  assembly  if  it  were  to 
function  correctly.  16  Although  its  lenses  and  prisms  could  be  produced  by  machine  tools, 
the  final  critical  adjustments  aligning  the  two  telescopes  (collimation)  still  had  to  be  done 
individually,  which  meant  using  large  numbers  of  workers  to  avoid  a  bottleneck  and 
obtain  high  output  rates.  In  Britain  this  was  seen  as  skilled  work  for  experienced  men 
who  were  becoming  increasingly  hard  to  find  by  mid-1915.  Many  had  already  joined  the 
Services  and,  as  Cheshire  had  emphasised,  there  were  no  institutions  to  provide  trained 
optical  workers  in  substantial  numbers.  The  existing  makers  accordingly  had  little  chance 
of  vastly  increasing  their  output. 
Ross  and  Watson  were  already  heavily  committed  to  both  the  Army  and  the  Navy.  '7 
Despite  having  a  `beautiful  factory'  Ross  was  by  no  means  large,  employing  only  320 
workers  in  1914  with  a  binocular  capacity  limited  to  around  a  hundred  per  week.  18 
Matters  were  little  different  with  Watson  which  made  gun  sights,  observation  telescopes 
as  well  as  medical  and  radiological  products,  and  its  binocular  capability  was  much  the 
same  as  Ross'.  19  Aitchison  &  Co.  had  even  less  capacity.  Its  binoculars  were  actually 
made  by  the  Wray  Optical  Co.  Ltd  of  Bromley,  Kent,  in  which  Aitchison  held  a  minority 
shareholding.  20  Although  Wray  had  built  a  new  factory  specially  to  handle  Aitchison's 
new  War  Office  contracts,  its  average  weekly  output  was  only  thirty  instruments.  21  It  was 
five  miles  from  the  old  one  and  by  no  means  conveniently  located  for  the  existing 
is  See  Chapter  4  above. 
16  F.  A.  Carson,  Basic  Optics  and  Optical  Instruments  (Mineola,  NY:  Dover,  1997)  pp.  10-32  to  10-45 
explains  the  intricacies  of  binocular  manufacture  and  the  need  for  precise  collimation.. 
'7  National  Archives,  Kew  (subsequently  PRO)  MUN  4/745,  Orders  placed  for  Scientific  and  Optical 
Instruments,  and  PRO  MUN  4/5305  to  5313,  Contract  Cancellation  files,  for  details. 
18  Dewar  (1921),  p.  221.,  and  PRO  MUN  41745,  section  on  Ross  Ltd,  p.  45. 
19  PRO  MUN  4/745,  section  on  W. Watson  &  Sons  Ltd,  p.  57. 
20  A.  W.  Smith,  Wray  (Optical  Works)  Ltd  1850-1971:  a  short  history  (unpublished  MS,  undated,  Bromley 
Local  Archives  Collection  ref.  L37.8/BN  107426),  pp.  1-5  provides  the  source  material  for  this  section 
unless  otherwise  indicated. 
21  PRO  MUN  4/745,  section  on  Aitchison  &  Co.  Ltd,  p.  2. 189 
workforce.  Built  in  a  small  wood  `in  fields  a  long  distance  from  mains  electricity  cables' 
it  depended  for  all  its  power  on  `a  single  12  horsepower  gas  engine'  whose  reliability 
was  uncertain:  `if  the  gas  engine  stopped,  the  [entire]  factory  stopped'.  The  works  was  by 
no  means  self  sufficient,  there  was  no  foundry  for  casting  binocular  bodies  which 
consequently  had  to  be  bought-in,  and  despite  its  recent  opening  the  whole  operation  was 
too  small  to  expand  its  output  substantially  without  large-scale  building  and  extra  plant  22 
Carl  Zeiss  (London)  Ltd,  was  the  British  subsidiary  of  the  German  company  and  had 
been  in  a  kind  of  commercial  limbo  since  the  outbreak  of  war.  23  Most,  if  not  all,  of  its 
German  supervisory  workers  remained  at  the  factory  and  the  War  Office  had  continued 
placing  modest  orders,  but  in  early  1915  all  the  German  nationals  were  interned  and  the 
business  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  Controller  appointed  by  the  Board  of  Trade,  who  then 
engaged  Ross  to  oversee  the  running  of  the  works.  The  small  size  of  the  operation  and  its 
now-fragmented  management  were  quite  unsuited  to  handling  any  greatly  increased 
workload  and,  like  the  other  British  binocular  makers,  the  business  was  unable  materially 
to  increase  overall  output. 
The  main  problem  was  the  lack  of  capacity  in  an  industry  that  was  quantitatively  rather 
than  qualitatively  inadequate.  That  difficulty  was  not  unique  to  British  optical  munitions 
manufacture.  Even  Zeiss,  the  world's  largest  optical  producer,  was  unable  to  keep  up 
with  German  demands.  Although  civil  production  was  abandoned  and  the  total 
workforce  increased  from  5,200  in  1913  to  a  war-time  peak  of  9,800,  Zeiss  could  not 
maintain  the  substantive  monopoly  of  government  supply  it  had  before  the  war.  24  Nor 
could  Goerz,  the  next  largest  optical  munitions  producer,  make  up  the  shortfall.  The 
German  government  was  forced  to  draw  other  companies  into  the  manufacture  of 
binoculars  once  it  became  apparent  that  the  peace-time  capacity  of  the  specialists  was 
inadequate.  25  From  a  situation  of  supposed  surplus  in  August  1915  when,  according  to 
u  PRO  MUN  4/5006,  Reports  on  Optical  Munitions  Output,  Technical  Inspection  and  Labour  Branch, 
Weekly  Reports,  1915-1918:  Report  12.7.1917. 
2'  see  Antje  Hagen.  `Export  versus  direct  Investment  in  the  German  Optical  Industry',  Business  History, 
October  1996,  for  background  material  to  this. 
24  F.  Auerbach,  The  Zeiss  Works  (1924,  )  p.  266. 
25  H.  T.  Seeger  (1996)  pp.  83  to  100. 190 
official  History  the  German  government  offered  to  exchange  binoculars  and  telescopic 
sights  for  supplies  of  rubber,  the  German  optical  munitions  industry  progressively 
worked  harder  to  keep  up  with  its  orders.  26  Despite  having  the  world's  largest  optical 
industry,  Germany  still  experienced  problems  with  binocular  output,  even  though  they 
were  less  severe  than  in  Britain.  27 
Esslemont  had  to  devise  a  suitable  strategy  for  the  British  problem.  It  became  clear  that  a 
radical  approach  was  needed  because  substantial  short  term  improvements  in  deliveries 
were  unlikely.  Efforts  to  purchase  French  binoculars  were  hindered  because  that  industry 
was  no  better  prepared  than  Britain's  to  handle  huge  orders.  28  A  promising  source  of 
supply  in  the  USA  was  thwarted  because  the  War  Office  objected  strongly  to  the  design 
of  the  instruments  being  supplied  by  the  Bausch  &  Lomb  company,  principally  because 
it  did  not  conform  to  the  constructional  details  specified  for  domestic  contractors  since 
1909.  Despite  achieving  a  delivery  rate  averaging  400  hundred  a  week  -  then  more  than 
the  capacity  of  all  the  British  contractors  together  -  on  a  contract  for  20,000,  the  Chief 
Inspector  of  Optical  Stores  refused  to  move  from  the  established  technological  paradigm 
and  would  countenance  no  further  orders,  materially  adding  to  the  supply  problems  of  the 
OMGD,  which  lacked  the  power  to  over-rule  him.  29  By  the  end  of  1915  the  problem  was 
pressing  hard  and  the  industry  itself  was  clearly  incapable  of  providing  a  solution. 
The  OMGD  was  in  favour  of  changing  how  the  optical  industry  worked.  Frederick 
Cheshire  was  convinced  of  the  need  for  transformation  through  economic  and 
educational  changes  directed  at  the  existing  firms  which,  in  his  judgement,  were  held 
back  by  a  combination  of  educational  and  technological  inadequacies.  Esslemont, 
however,  espoused  a  different  approach,  based  on  the  premise  that  the  root  of  the 
problem  lay  less  in  technological  backwardness  than  in  organisational  shortcomings  that 
could  be  overcome  far  more  quickly.  The  radical  solution  proposed  for  `the  supply  of 
26  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  p.  42. 
27  H.  T.  Seeger  (1996)  pp.  19  to  26,  and  pp.  83  to  100. 
28  M.  E.  W.  Williams,  The  Precision  Makers:  a  History  of  the  Instruments  Industry  in  Britain  and  France 
1870-1939  (London:  Routledge,  1994)  pp.  72  to  79. 
29  PRO  MUN  4/745,  section  on  Bausch  &  Lomb,  p.  7,  and  PRO  MUN  4/5528  letter  from  A.  S.  Esslemont 
to  Sherwood,  6.10.1916.  See  chapter  1  above  for  comments  on  the  influence  of  technological  paradigms  in 
the  British  Army. 191 
binoculars  under  the  scheme  for  development  of  home  supply  of  these  instruments' 
envisaged  creating  an  entirely  new  factory  in  which  would  be  concentrated  the  vast 
majority  of  British  binocular  production,  and  its  novelty  is  emphasised  because  the  idea 
originated  neither  within  the  OMGD  nor  the  optical  industry  itsel£3o 
During  late  1915  Esslemont  began  discussions  with  A.  Kershaw  &  Sons  Ltd  in  Leeds, 
West  Yorkshire,  a  business  that  was  not  in  the  optical  trade  at  all.  The  firm  had 
successfully  made  film  projectors  for  the  cinema  trade,  mechanical  components  for 
cameras,  and  complete  camera  bodies  which  were  supplied  to  other  companies  for  sale 
under  their  own  names,  none  of  which  involved  optical  manufacturing  31  When  the  war 
began,  the  firm  began  making  gun  clinometers  for  the  War  Office  and  phased  out  civil 
products  to  cope  with  the  increasing  volume  of  Government  work.  32  By  Spring  1915  the 
business  had  effectively  become  a  munitions  contractor  under  the  Defence  of  the  Realm 
Act,  a  status  confirmed  when  the  Munitions  Act  became  effective  in  July.  The  Ministry 
of  Munitions'  classification  of  products  fortuitously  brought  gun  clinometers  (which 
actually  had  no  optically  worked  parts)  under  the  control  of  the  OMGD,  and  so 
introduced  Abraham  Kershaw  to  Esslemont.  Although  Kershaw  had  clinometer  orders  of 
500  per  week,  the  instrument  was  of  relatively  low  value  (shillings  rather  than  pounds) 
and  could  be  made  by  many  precision  engineering  firms,  so  there  was  no  question  of 
monopoly  in  supply  nor  guarantee  of  an  indefinite  demand.  What  Kershaw  wanted  was  a 
munitions  product  of  substantial  unit  value  which  would  be  required  in  large  numbers, 
because  having  been  designated  a  munitions  contractor  under  the  Munitions  Act  his  firm 
was  unable  to  take  on  commercial  work.  33  By  late  1915  the  binocular  supply  situation 
provided  exactly  the  opportunity  he  wanted. 
Kershaw's  ideas  interested  the  OMGD.  He  proposed  that  high  volume  binocular 
production  could  be  attained  by  applying  the  principles  and  methods  he  had  used 
30  PRO  MUN  4/672,  Agreement  between  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  and  Kershaw,  1916. 
"  N.  Charming  and  M.  Dunn,  British  Camera  Makers;  an  A-Z  Guide  to  companies  and  Products  (Esher. 
Parkland  Designs,  1996)  p.  63. 
32  Leeds  Industrial  Museum  Library,  Armley  Mills,  Leeds,  W. Yorks,  Kershaw  material  (unclassified):  the 
papers  left  by  Norman  Kershaw  (subsequently  LIM/NK)  provide  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this 
section  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
33  PRO  MUN  4/745,  section  on  Kershaw  p.  32. 192 
successfully  to  produce  complex  articles  which  combined  high  precision  components 
with  others  requiring  no  especially  high  standards  of  manufacture.  To  make  the  former 
he  had  used  machine  tooling  and  enforced  rigid  standardisation  of  parts,  relying  on  a 
relatively  small  number  of  skilled  machine  operators  and  the  elimination  of  hand  fitting. 
For  the  assembly  of  parts  he  had  been  able  to  employ  unskilled  and  semi-skilled  female 
labour  which  was  readily  and  cheaply  available  locally.  Thus,  a  relatively  small  (and 
inexpensive)  labour  force  of  200  was  able  to  produce  complex  and  precise  items  at 
competitive  and  profitable  prices. 
Kershaw  had  a  purpose  built  factory  less  than  four  years  old  and  fully  equipped  with 
machine  tooling,  some  of  which  was  housed  in  an  `air  conditioned  and  temperature 
controlled'  environment.  He  had  financed  this  through  selling  a  47  percent  share  in  his 
company  to  the  Marion  Co.  Ltd.,  a  London  photographic  wholesaler  for  whom  he 
already  made  camera  bodies  to  Marion's  own  designs.  34  In  exchange  for  transferring 
some  trade  names  and  a  monopoly  use  of  some  patented  designs,  Kershaw  obtained  a 
substantial  cash  injection  and  a  guaranteed  buyer  for  those  designs  whilst  retaining 
control  of  the  business,  a  deal  that  seems  to  have  been  almost  entirely  to  his  own  benefit 
and  identified  him  as  very  much  the  man  of  `push  and  go'  that  typified  the  then  current 
ethos  at  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  5  Despite  his  enthusiasm  for  applied  technology  and 
his  business  acumen,  Kershaw  had  no  academic  background  or  training  of  the  type  being 
advocated  by  Cheshire  as  essential  for  the  advancement  of  the  optical  industry,  a  lack 
that  seems  to  have  been  no  impediment  to  his  relationship  with  Esslemont. 
Kershaw's  combination  of  character  and  ideas  suited  Esslemont's  needs,  as  well  as 
Cheshire's  wider  aims  to  improve  the  optical  instrument  trade.  The  key  element  in 
Kershaw's  plan  was  the  extensive  association  of  women  workers  and  automated  methods 
which  he  claimed  would  allow  an  eventual  output  of  a  thousand  binoculars  every  week, 
equal  to  the  pre-war  output  of  the  Zeiss  works.  His  proposal  also  accorded  with  the 
Ministry's  desire  to  side-step  labour  practices  that  restricted  output  and  was  firmly 
34  Channing  and  Dunn  (1996)  p.  63. 
35  R  J.  Q.  Adams,  Arms  and  the  Wizard;  Lloyd  George  and  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  1915-1916  (London: 
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committed  to  the  `dilution'  of  labour.  One  of  the  main  purposes  of  the  Munitions  Act  had 
been  to  secure  the  agreement  of  Trade  Unions  to  relax  the  restrictive  practices  that 
excluded  unskilled  and  semi-skilled  labour  -  particularly  women  -  from  craft  trades,  but 
the  largely  London-based  optical  industry  was  finely  against  introducing  female 
workers,  arguing  that  their  use  would  be  seriously  counterproductive  36  The  OMGD  had 
difficulties  overcoming  this  argument  about  maintaining  output,  particularly  as 
Cheshire's  pleadings  to  keep  the  trade  outside  control  used  the  same  underlying  logic  of 
maintaining  production  at  all  costs,  and  its  efforts  to  dilute  workforces  in  London  had 
met  little  success  37  As  Kershaw  was  not  involved  in  the  optical  trade  and  already  used  a 
mixed  labour  force,  his  proposals  provided  the  welcome  promise  of  creating  a  precedent 
to  weaken  the  general  opposition  to  the  widespread  introduction  of  women  into  the 
established  optical  companies. 
Kershaw's  approach  could  not  have  been  better  timed  or  structured.  Esslemont  was 
willing  to  move  outside  the  prevailing  optical  industry  paradigm  which  considered 
instrument  making  to  be  the  province  of  experienced  skilled  workers,  and  was  happy  to 
follow  this  new  initiative.  His  thinking  was  more  broadly  based  than  Cheshire's,  which 
remained  concentrated  on  transforming  the  existing  trade  rather  than  creating  a  new 
purpose-designed  war  industry.  Esslemont  asked  Kershaw  to  `draw  up  a  schedule'  for  the 
construction  of  an  entirely  new  factory  and  its  necessary  tooling,  and  to  define  his  ideas 
about  how  best  to  employ  both  the  machinery  and  labour  in  it.  Subsequent  events 
illustrated  what  could  be  done  when  `The  Ministry  of  Munitions  more  or  less  [provided] 
a  `carte  blanche'  budget...  '.  8  Unlike  the  Aitchison/Wray  expansion  in  1914,  this  venture 
enjoyed  not  only  the  benefit  a  very  large  State  subsidy,  but  also  had  a  significantly  better 
location.  Kershaw  found  a  suitable  site  less  than  a  mile  from  the  existing  factory  (whose 
workforce  would  form  the  nucleus  of  the  new  one)  in  a  populous  area  well  served  by 
public  transport  and  already  providing  a  large  pool  of  female  workers  for  nearby  large 
clothing  factories. 
36  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  p.  18. 
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The  site  purchase  was  completed  on  l  April  1916,  and  on  3`d  May  a  formal  agreement 
was  signed  under  which  the  Ministry  provided  a  `grant'  of  £20,000  for  the  project, 
which  carried  terms  and  conditions.  39  Half  the  money  was  repayable,  and  as  security  a 
charge  was  taken  on  the  land  as  well  as  the  buildings  and  plant  to  be  erected  on  it  40  The 
conditions  included  maintaining  a  `technical  and  commercial  staff  sufficient  to  ensure  the 
manufacture  of  binoculars  in  the  most  scientific  and  skilful  manner  possible'  and  `to 
train  and  use  the  service  of  [British  born]  unskilled  and  female  labour  to  the  utmost 
extent  possible',  both  of  which  were  implicit  in  Kershaw's  original  proposals.  For 
Kershaw,  this  was  a  deal  that  was  potentially  even  better  than  the  one  with  Marion  in 
1910,  and  which  emphasised  the  symbiotic  nature  of  his  relationship  with  the  OMGD. 
The  firm's  share  of  the  starting  costs  could  be  off-set  against  high  war-time  taxation,  the 
expected  volume  of  business  was  considerable,  and  when  the  war  ended  Kershaw  would 
have  a  large  factory  completely  equipped  for  large  volume  high  precision  optical  and 
mechanical  engineering.  In  return,  the  OMGD  hoped  to  obtain  a  resolution  of  its 
binocular  problems. 
The  contract  issued  to  Kershaw  on  15th  June  was  the  largest  single  binocular  order  placed 
by  the  OMGD  during  the  war,  but  its  wording  suggests  that  it  was  meant  to  be  the  first  of 
a  series.  It  called  for  25,000  instruments  to  be  delivered  at  an  escalating  weekly  rate, 
reaching  at  least  600  by  31  '  October  1916  and  running  at  a  thousand  `hereafter'  41 
Ministry  records  show  `running'  contracts  regularly  followed  initial  orders,  often 
prolonging  the  first  one  for  several  years.  2  Contract  94/T/1039  also  points  at  a  `reverse 
salient'  condition  on  whose  solution  Esslemont  was  forced  to  depend  for  the  success  of 
the  Kershaw  project,  which  was  itself  intended  to  form  the  major  part  of  a  broader 
scheme  to  increase  binocular  supply. 
Esslemont's  `broad  front'  was  the  increase  of  binocular  output,  and  his  immediate 
`reverse  salient'  the  inexperience  of  Kershaw  with  optical  work.  The  production  of  a 
s'  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  p.  26  provides  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
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thousand  binoculars  required  ten  thousand  individual  lens  elements  and  four  thousand 
prisms,  besides  two  thousand  individual  body  castings,  four  thousand  lens  cell 
assemblies  and  similar  numbers  of  other  simpler  metal  parts.  43  Although  the  mechanical 
work  was  broadly  familiar,  teething  troubles  were  expected  with  the  lens  work  which 
would  be  new  to  Kershaw.  The  OMGD  expected  pilot  work  to  be  begin  in  the  existing 
factory,  and  to  provide  optical  sets  initially,  Esslemont  intended  to  use  experienced  lens 
makers  who  had  enough  spare  capacity  to  make  binocular  optics.  These  would  feed 
Kershaw  until  its  own  output  built  up  sufficiently  and  then  carry  on  supplying  lenses  to 
another  factory  which  the  OMGD  proposed  as  a  second,  though  smaller,  producer  of 
binoculars. 
The  OMGD  identified  six  potential  makers,  and  the  department's  technical  advisors 
liased  with  them  in  developing  satisfactory  optical  sets.  Cooke's  of  York,  The 
Guaranteed  Lens  Co.,  Adam  Hilger,  the  Hummel  Optical  Co.,  J.  &  H.  Taylor,  and 
Taylor,  Taylor  &  Hobson  were  engaged  to  make  standardised  eyepiece  and  objective 
lenses  after  June  1916.  All  of  them  found  it  difficult  to  satisfy  the  rigorous  inspection 
criteria  imposed  by  the  Army's  Chief  Inspector  of  Optical  Stores  at  Woolwich  (CIOS) 
and  there  were  delays  in  obtaining  enough  even  to  supply  Kershaw's  initial  requirements. 
In  February  1917  Taylor,  Taylor  &  Hobson  were  delivering  enough  sets  to  allow 
Kershaw  to  begin  assembling  complete  instruments  in  the  recently  finished  factory,  but 
the  capacity  to  make  and  assemble  bodies  was  far  in  excess  of  the  supply  of  optics.  By 
April,  just  491  binoculars  had  been  accepted  by  the  CIOS,  and  Kershaw  still  had  to  reach 
the  stage  of  being  able  to  produce  acceptable  lenses  itself.  Only  one  of  the  six  lens 
makers  had  reached  an  acceptable  standard,  and  the  lack  of  lenses  was  threatening  to 
cripple  the  binocular  expansion  programme. 
Esslemont's  `reverse  salient'  had  not  been  dealt  with,  for  reasons  largely  to  be  found 
within  a  second  problem  whose  solution  was  already  assumed  when  the  Kershaw  project 
was  set  in  motion.  The  principal  cause  of  delays  lay  in  the  supply  of  optical  glass,  whose 
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quality  was  still  by  no  means  assured.  The  broad  issue,  of  optical  glass  production  during 
the  war  is  too  large  to  be  covered  in  this  study,  but  some  salient  points  must  be  noted. 
The  official  History  devoted  considerable  space  to  glass  supply  and  the  MacLeods 
accepted  the  History's  verdict  that  early  problems  were  satisfactorily  overcome,  but  this 
picture  is  not  wholly  correct.  Despite  the  progress  made  through  Esslemont's  efforts,  the 
quality  of  certain  glass  types  was  particularly  difficult  to  ensure,  and  during  1917  the 
inconsistency  of  those  needed  for  binocular  lenses  was  a  constant  source  of  trouble.  45 
These  problems  were  mainly  responsible  for  holding  back  output  of  binocular  lens  sets  in 
the  first  part  of  1917,  and  were  only  eased  by  the  OMGD's  eventual  decision  to  seek 
alternative  glasses  from  France,  and  the  subsequent  improvement  in  Chance's  quality 
control  46 
Matters  began  to  improve  after  May,  when  a  Kershaw  trial  lens  set  submitted  to  the 
OMGD  was  judged  `remarkably  good  and  quite  up  to  the  standards  of  any  [yet] 
submitted'.  A  week  later,  the  OMGD  finally  passed  a  similar  trial  set  from  Cooke's, 
noting  that  this  extra  source  `should  ease  the  situation  so  far  as  Kershaw's  troubles  are 
concerned.  47  From  then  on  output  began  to  grow,  with  increasing  numbers  of  binoculars 
being  assembled  using  Kershaw's  own  lenses  besides  sets  from  Cooke's  and  Taylor, 
Taylor  &  Hobson.  By  October  the  factory  was  getting  into  its  stride  using  production 
methods  copied  from  the  former  Zeiss  works  at  Mill  Hill,  as  well  as  numbers  of  specially 
built  machine  tools  designed  in  Kershaw's  own  drawing  office,  based  on  samples 
obtained  from  Mill  Hill  where  they  had  been  redundant  since  Ross  bought  the  works 
from  the  Board  of  Trade  earlier  in  the  year.  48  By  the  autumn  of  1918,  weekly  output  had 
reached  800  and  was  still  increasing  when  the  instructions  to  scale  down  production  were 
issued  by  the  Ministry  when  the  war  ended  as  part  of  the  process  of  industrial 
demobilisation.  49 
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Although  delayed  in  reaching  its  goal,  the  Kershaw  binocular  project  was  a  successful 
collaboration  between  the  OMGD  and  a  firm  that  was  innovative  and  soundly  organised. 
It  proved  that  Kershaw's  faith  in  the  transferability  of  his  working  methods  from  movie 
projectors  to  binoculars  was  entirely  justified.  The  delays  caused  by  glass  problems  were 
outwith  his  control,  and  it  is  clear  that  once  deliveries  improved  the  factory  was  able  to 
work  up  to  the  high  production  rates  that  had  been  promised  at  the  start.  Dilution  was 
achieved  on  a  level  not  found  anywhere  else  in  the  optical  munitions  industry, 
particularly  in  women  workers.  Where  Ross  employed  around  17  percent  female  labour 
and  Barr  &  Stroud  16  percent,  Kershaw's  figure  was  80  percent,  a  substantial  proportion 
of  which  was  `girl  labour'  aged  under  18,  a  figure  which  `seemed  to  astound  the  optical 
trade  at  that  time'.  50  The  earlier  claims  by  London  firms  that  women  would  create 
catastrophic  wastages  in  lens  making  were  refuted  at  Leeds,  where  `very  young'  girls 
were  trained  to  operate  polishing  machines  within  a  matter  of  hours  st  The  cost  of  a 
Kershaw  binocular  was  lower  than  other  makers,  and  by  October  1918  the  OMGD  was 
proposing  to  discontinue  lens  deliveries  from  Cooke's  and  Taylor,  Taylor  &  Hobson, 
partly  because  of  Kershaw's  output  and  partly  because  costs  at  Leeds  were  expected  to 
be  `cheaper  than  other  contractors'  52 
Kershaw's  success  was  not  duplicated  elsewhere  in  war-time  binocular  manufacture. 
Only  one  commercial  company  was  set  up  during  the  war  especially  to  manufacture 
them,  but  five  existing  businesses  became  newly  involved  in  production,  and  one  State- 
sponsored  assembly  factory  was  started.  53  Sherwood  &  Co.  appeared  in  1915  in  response 
to  War  Office  demands  and  continued  to  produce  about  fifty  binoculars  a  week  until  the 
Armistice,  when  soon  afterwards  it  ceased  trading.  The  OMGD  asked  Beck  to  make 
binoculars  in  December  1915,  but  the  contract  was  subsequently  suspended  to  increase 
dial-sight  output  and,  according  to  the  firm,  none  were  actually  made.  Dollond  &  Co. 
began  production  in  mid-1916  producing  about  twenty  a  week,  and  the  ophthalmic  lens 
makers  Theodore  Hamblin  Ltd.  took  an  order  for  2,000  in  June  1916  which  was 
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completed  by  1918,  after  which  they  began  making  for  the  Admiralty.  H.  F.  Purser  Ltd. 
began  production  in  February  1916,  making  around  twenty  per  week  until  the  end  of  the 
war.  E.  R.  Watts  &  Son  had  an  order  for  a  thousand  in  January  in  1916,  which  were 
made  at  only  five  each  week.  The  amounts  these  firms  added  to  output  were  minuscule. 
Apart  from  Sherwood,  all  seem  to  have  been  induced  to  take  up  production  at  the  time 
when  the  OMGD  was  faced  with  a  very  large  shortfall  in  output  and  when,  perhaps, 
anything  was  better  than  nothing.  None  of  them  ever  had  any  large  potential,  but  the  final 
newcomer,  the  State-sponsored  factory  J.  Brimfield  &  Co.,  was  originally  intended  to  do 
much  better. 
Esslemont  had  intended  that  the  lens  makers  feeding  Kershaw  would  quickly  divert 
deliveries  to  another  new  factory  intended  to  supplement  Kershaw's  production.  This 
involved  a  different  approach,  with  the  Ministry  setting  up  a  new  company  known  as  J. 
Brimfield  &  Co.,  not  to  manufacture  parts  but  to  be  a  central  assembly  station  for 
binocular  components.  The  costs  of  `equipping  and  fitting'  the  factory  were  met  by  the 
State,  and  all  its  raw  materials  provided  free  of  charge.  Brimfield  would  subsequently 
invoice  the  Ministry  for  assembly  on  the  basis  of  labour  and  overhead  costs  plus  a  fixed 
percentage  for  profit.  Although  smaller  than  the  Kershaw,  its  output  was  intended  to  be 
considerable,  and  five  thousand  binoculars  were  ordered  on  28"'  July  1916,  to  be 
delivered  at  an  increasing  rate,  with  a  minimum  of  100  weekly  being  attained  in  less  than 
two  months.  54  The  surviving  records  show  even  that  rate  was  never  attained.  The  plant 
was  dogged  by  the  same  lens  delivery  problems  that  had  affected  Kershaw,  and  poor 
mechanical  quality  led  to  very  high  rejection  rates  by  the  CIOS.  SS  Output  seems  to  have 
been  very  small,  and  by  the  end  of  the  war  Brimfield  was  only  taking  in  enough  prisms 
to  make  twenty  five  binoculars  a  week,  a  rate  similar  to  many  of  the  private  contractors.  56 
Brimfield's  failure  to  live  up  to  expectations  was  almost  an  irrelevance  by  the  Armistice. 
The  fine  was  never  intended  as  a  permanent  part  of  what  Cheshire  hoped  would  be  an 
improved  post-war  instruments  industry,  and  Kershaw's  increasing  efficiency  tended  to 
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make  the  venture  redundant.  Binocular  production  in  the  war  had  been  something  of  the 
proverbial  curate's  egg,  and  it  is  probable  that  far  fewer  than  the  300,000  binoculars 
`demanded'  were  actually  delivered  by  the  Armistice.  But,  by  then  a  factory  to  make 
them  on  a  scale  previously  unimagined  in  Britain  was  running  with  increasing  efficiency 
and  the  worst  that  should  be  said  of  binocular  production  was  that  high  volume 
production  came  better  late  than  never. 
6.4  The  telescopic  rifle  sight 
Volume  was  not  the  problem  with  the  telescopic  rifle  sight.  This  was  an  instrument  not 
found  in  the  British  Army  before  1915  and  its  mass  production  was  never  required. 
Intended  for  use  by  specially  selected  soldiers  on  a  small  scale,  it  presented  a  very 
different  manufacturing  problem  than  the  binocular.  57  Accounts  of  its  inception  and 
manufacture  have  been  misleading  and  discredit  the  ability  of  the  optical  munitions 
industry.  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod  asserted  that  the  industry  was  unsuccessful  in  producing 
telescopic  sights  until  the  OMGD  and  the  National  Physical  Laboratory  jointly  attacked 
the  problem  in  1917,  but  that  was  not  so.  58  The  origins  of  its  introduction  in  early  1915 
have  been  examined  by  Ian  Skennerton  who  clearly  demonstrated  that  that  regular  small- 
scale  production  actually  pre-dated  March  1915,  but  failed  to  emphasise  the  achievement 
that  represented.  59  The  telescopic  rifle  sight  (riflescope)  was  one  of  the  most  successful 
applications  of  optical  munitions  technology  during  the  war,  and  showed  that  the  war- 
time  industry  was  capable  of  meeting  design  and  production  requirements  when  an 
appropriate  manufacturing  infrastructure  existed.  Unlike  binoculars,  where  the 
production  capacity  had  to  be  created,  the  riflescope  was  needed  in  small  enough 
quantities  to  be  manufactured  within  the  available  resources. 
In  late  1914  War  Office  issued  an  invitation  to  tender  for  a  telescopic  sight  to  be  used 
with  the  Army's  service  rifle.  This  was  in  response  to  the  German  employment  of 
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specially  selected  marksmen  using  such  sights,  which  was  causing  mounting  casualties 
and  significantly  affecting  morale  in  the  absence  of  any  satisfactory  means  of  retaliation. 
The  requirement  could  hardly  have  come  at  a  more  difficult  time  for  the  optical  industry, 
because  no  such  instrument  was  being  made  in  Britain  on  a  regular  and  organised  basis, 
and  growing  demands  from  the  War  Office  were  increasingly  occupying  its  capacity. 
Imported  riflescopes  were  certainly  sold  through  the  gun  trade,  some  with  British 
makers'  names  on  them,  but  there  was  no  domestic  source  immediately  able  to  supply  in 
quantity.  60  Although  riflescopes  were  similar  in  concept  to  artillery  sighting  telescopes, 
the  firms  making  those  were  pre-occupied  with  a  variety  of  work  and  none  of  the  existing 
patterns  were  suitable  or  adaptable  to  the  new  requirement.  Unlike  either  binoculars  or 
periscopes,  the  immediate  problem  was  one  of  design. 
Although  all  the  optical  munitions  makers  were  capable  of  devising  a  riflescope,  only 
two  companies  actually  submitted  designs  judged  worth  adopting  by  the  War  Office,  and 
neither  had  any  previous  connection  with  optical  munitions.  Aldis  Brothers  of 
Birmingham  made  photographic  lenses,  and  the  Periscopic  Prism  Company  of  Camden 
Town  chiefly  made  lenses  and  prisms  for  the  optical  instruments  trade.  Neither  had  any 
government  orders  in  late  1914  and  unlike  most  of  the  industry  both  were  actively 
seeking  optical  work.  Coincidentally,  each  had  already  done  sub-contracting  for  Barr  & 
Stroud,  and  both  had  been  rejected  by  that  firm  because  of  inadequate  quality.  61 
Despite  its  adverse  testimonial  from  Barr  &  Stroud,  Aldis  was  well  regarded  for  its 
camera  lenses  and  appears  to  have  been  far  distant  from  Cheshire's  depiction  of  an 
industry  whose  workshops  were  little  more  than  shanties.  The  business  had  begun 
manufacturing  in  Sparkhill,  Birmingham  in  1902  and  was  owned  by  two  brothers  who 
were  mathematicians  and  both  graduates  of  Trinity  College,  Cambridge.  The  elder, 
Lancelot,  had  worked  at  the  Dallmeyer  optical  works  and  was  already  an  accomplished 
60  Skennerton  (1984)  p.  34  illustrates  examples  but  leaves  their  manufacturers  uncertain. 
61  UGD  295/4/112,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Chance  Brothers,  7.12.1914,  criticises  Aldis,  and  UGD 
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lens  designer  familiar  with  the  latest  in  glass  technology.  62  His  younger  brother,  Arthur, 
joined  him  in  partnership  soon  after  being  elected  to  a  fellowship  at  Trinity  in  1901,  then 
worked  briefly  for  Dallmeyer  before  returning  to  Birmingham  where  he  became 
interested  in  automated  methods  of  lens  manufacture.  He  subsequently  spent  time  in 
Germany  studying  production  methods,  which  resulted  in  the  partners  investing  in 
automatic  lens  polishing  machinery  bought  from  the  Ahlberndt  company  of  Berlin.  By 
1912  the  business  was  doing  well  enough  to  start  building  a  factory  equipped  for  both 
optical  and  mechanical  work  at  Hall  Green,  away  from  the  polluted  atmosphere  that  was 
63  interfering  with  lens  grinding. 
The  new  works  was  completed  just  before  the  war  began,  and  by  1915  Aldis  Brothers' 
catalogue  included  twenty  seven  different  photographic  lenses  and  two  for  photo- 
micrography,  all  designed  and  made  wholly  in-house.  M  The  OMGD  was  subsequently 
`agreeably  surprised'  to  learn  that  the  fine  had  both  a  `large  and  well  equipped  lens 
factory'  and  a  `scientific  staff'  ble  to  tackle  the  problems  of  optical  design.  5  The 
brothers'  design  of  the  riflescope  can  be  seen  as  endorsing  Cheshire's  emphasis  on  the 
benefits  of  scientific  training  in  optics  and  the  combination  of  a  thorough  grounding  in 
mechanical  engineering  with  a  modem  well-equipped  factory.  Within  weeks  a  design 
(which  was  certainly  not  a  copy  of  any  existing  type)  was  finished  and  satisfactory 
samples  provided  for  the  War  Office,  resulting  in  an  order  for  a  first  `batch'  of  the 
`Pattern  No.  l'  riflescope  in  January  1915  66  Two  hundred  had  been  supplied  and 
accepted  before  July  when  the  OMGD  took  over  responsibility  for  deliveries.  67  By  then, 
Aldis  had  already  suspended  photographic  lens  production  and,  like  Kershaw,  become  a 
de  facto  optical  munitions  contractor.  On  7t'  July  the  OMGD  contracted  to  take  the 
62  J.  S.  Carter,  An  Historical  Analysis  of  the  Development  and  Application  of  Visual  and  Aural  Aids  in 
English  Education  from  1900  to  1970  (unpublished  Ph.  D Thesis,  University  of  Leeds,  1995)  p.  292. 
63  Aldis  Brothers  &  Their  Productions  (Aldis  Bros.,  Sparkhill,  Birmingham,  undated  but  probably  circa 
1920.  )  p.  3. 
64  The  British  Journal  Photographic  Almanac  (Liverpool:  Henry  Greenwood  &  Co.,  1914)  Aldis 
advertisement. 
65  Aldis  Brothers,  p.  5. 
66  Skennerton  (1984)  p.  47. 
67  Skennerton  (1984)  p.  47. 202 
`entire  output'  of  the  works  at  a  minimum  rate  of  60  weekly,  an  arrangement  that  was 
increased  when  Aldis  later  began  making  other  sighting  telescopes.  8 
The  haste  with  which  the  sight  was  designed,  and  Aldis'  unfamiliarity  with  weapons  may 
have  led  to  a  number  of  mechanical  shortcomings  which  affected  the  instrument's 
durability  which  caused  problems  in  service.  The  vibration  of  firing  loosened  the  range- 
adjusting  mechanism,  and  penetrating  moisture  caused  fogging;  either  rendered  the  sight 
unusable  and  the  OMGD's  Technical  Section  recognised  that  re-design  was  necessary  to 
eliminate  them.  The  Aldis  brothers  may  have  been  highly  competent  in  computing  lens 
systems,  but  they  had  no  previous  experience  of  series-producing  telescopes  and  the 
Pattern  No.  1  had  been  put  into  manufacture  without  any  proper  engineering  drawings  - 
not  through  incompetence,  but  almost  certainly  because  the  scale  of  future  demand  was 
not  envisaged.  In  late  summer,  the  likely  requirements  were  far  clearer,  and  OMGD 
decided  to  standardise  an  improved  version  for  larger  scale  production.  By  mid- 
November,  prototypes  of  the  revised  design  had  been  made  by  Aldis  and  accepted, 
production  drawings  were  finished  by  the  Technical  Section  less  than  three  weeks  later, 
and  manufacture  proceeded  without  further  significant  technical  problems  until  a 
decision  in  1918  to  adopt  a  completely  new  design  sponsored  by  the  Army  itself. 
Aldis  was  an  excellent  example  of  how  well  the  war-time  optical  munitions  industry 
could  perform.  By  building  on  a  base  of  existing  sound  scientific  and  technological 
practice,  and  drawing  on  the  resources  of  the  OMGD  to  bridge  gaps  in  its  own  pre-war 
organisation,  the  firm  successfully  moved  from  being  a  small  scale  civilian  maker  of 
photographic  lenses  to  become  a  large  and  highly  specialised  maker  of  complex  service 
optics.  Its  factory  was  extended  twice  during  the  war  and  by  the  Armistice  it  was  six 
times  the  area  of  1914,  producing  not  only  riflescopes  but  derivatives  of  them  for  aerial 
gunnery,  as  well  as  large  numbers  of  artillery  sighting  telescopes.  Experience  gained  with 
them  was  used  to  design  a  novel  electrical  Daylight  Signalling  Lantern  (the  `Aldis 
Lamp')  which  used  a  reflector  and  lens  system  to  create  an  intensely  bright  point  source 
of  light  that  could  be  seen  at  long  range  even  in  the  strongest  daylight.  The  lamp  needed 
68  PRO  MUN  4/745,  section  on  Aldis  Bros.,  p.  2. 203 
to  be  aimed  precisely  to  permit  the  observer  to  see  it,  and  an  inexpensive  but  durable 
aiming  telescope  was  designed  for  it.  By  late  1917,  the  firm's  capacity  was  large  enough 
to  allow  the  Aldis  brothers  to  compute  new  lenses  especially  for  high  altitude  aerial 
photography,  and  to  begin  production  on  a  substantial  scale.  The  spin-off  of  munitions 
contracting  provided  Aldis  with  the  basis  of  its  post-war  civil  products;  the  range  of 
photographic  lenses  was  extended  and  the  Lantern  sold  widely  to  both  merchant  ships 
and  foreign  governments. 
The  second  riflescope  maker,  the  Periscopic  Prism  company,  is  less  well  documented. 
Like  Aldis  it  was  quick  to  produce  a  design  because  one  of  its  directors,  A.  B.  Rolfe- 
Martin,  combined  optical  design  skills  with  an  interest  in  rifle  shooting.  Even  if  the 
quality  of  its  riflescopes  was  less  good  than  Aldis',  it  was  numerically  the  larger  maker 
and  its  products  were  still  adequate  for  the  tasks  set.  Over  4,400  had  been  made  by  April 
1917  and  production  continued  until  the  war's  end,  by  which  time the  firm  had  been 
taken  over  by  the  State  and  was  also  making  sighting  telescopes  for  artillery.  69 
Riflescope  production  hardly  taxed  the  industry  at  all.  Those  used  throughout  the  war 
were  made  by  just  two  firms  who  met  the  Army's  requirements  with  little  trouble  and 
marked  a  success  for  the  optical  munitions  industry.  Their  importance  to  the  psyche  of 
front-line  units  was  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  relatively  small  numbers  made  and  the 
value  of  the  contracts.  The  total  of  around  £70,000  spent  on  the  10,000  or so  purchased 
during  the  entire  war  was  less  than  three-quarters  of  the  first  binocular  contract  placed 
with  Kershaw,  and  only  a  twentieth  of  what  the  War  Office  spent  on  rangefmders  with 
Barr  &  Stroud,  but  the  instrument  was  recognised  as  vital  to  effective  sniping  by  front 
line  officers  and  simply  had  no  substitute.  In  theory,  it  would  have  been  used  most 
effectively  by  a  team  that  included  a  rangefinder  to  determine  distances  precisely,  but  the 
tactics  of  trench  warfare  sniping  meant  that  ranges  were  relatively  short  so  that  precise 
69  PRO  MUN  4/745,  section  on  Periscopic  Prism.  Co.,  p.  41  provides  contract  details,  and  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part 
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sight  settings  were  not  critical,  and  the  need  for  the  portable  rangefinder  to  accompany  it 
never  materialised.  70 
6.6  The  Rangefinder. 
The  man-portable  rangefinder  was  by  far  the  most  complex  item  of  optical  munitions  to 
be  mass  produced  during  the  war  yet,  in  an  apparent  paradox,  it  was  the  instrument  that 
posed  the  least  problems  in  supply.  And,  ironically,  it  may  well  have  been  the  least 
important  optical  device  in  the  static  conditions  of  the  Western  Front  where  the  need  to 
determine  distances  rapidly  was  highly  uncommon.  But,  unlike  the  other  optical  devices 
used  by  the  services  at  the  start  of  the  war,  the  capacity  to  mass  produce  rangefinders 
already  existed  with  Barr  &  Stroud  whose  records  reveal  much  about  its  attitude  to  war- 
time  contracting  and  the  difficulties  encountered. 
Rangefinder  production  was  the  most  successful  part  of  the  war-time  supply  of  complex 
optical  munitions  and  neither  the  Army  nor  the  Navy  suffered  a  shortage  of  instruments. 
Barr  &  Stroud's  pre-war  capacity  was  already  considerable  in  August  1914,  and  the 
suddenly  increased  War  Office  orders  then  were,  to  some  extent,  off-set  by  the  enforced 
termination  of  foreign  business  which  enabled  output  more  or  less  to  keep  up  with 
growing  demand.  As  orders  continued  to  grow,  the  company  expanded  both  its  premises 
and  workforce  and  kept  pace  with  demand  whilst  simultaneously  carrying  on  research 
and  development  into  new  manufacturing  processes  and  instruments,  a  pattern  of  activity 
not  found  elsewhere  in  the  British  industry.  Moss  and  Russell  gave  an  overview  of  the 
firm's  war-time  activities,  but  they  concentrated  on  its  dealings  with  the  Royal  Navy  and 
almost  totally  ignored  the  company's  much  greater  involvement  with  Army  orders, 
firstly  directly  from  the  War  Office  and  later  from  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  71 
Land  service  business  was  indeed  substantial,  being  80  percent  more  in  value  than  the 
Admiralty's  during  the  war.  72  Moss  and  Russell's  total  of  approximately  19,300 
rangefinders  supplied  agrees  closely  with  the  official  History's  figure  of  3,730  artillery 
70  Pegler  (2001)  p.  22. 
"  Moss  &  Russell  (1988)  Chapter  3. 
72  These  figures  have  been  extracted  from  Customer  Order  records  in  UGD  295/19/2/4,  /19/2/5  and  1912/6. 205 
models  and  15,782  infantry  ones,  a  total  of  19,512.73  Prices  varied  but  little  during  the 
war  despite  inflation,  with  their  approximate  average  values  being  £80  and  £58 
respectively.  74  This  gives  a  total  value  of  almost  £1,214,000  which  compares  tolerably 
well  with  the  £1,362,000  extracted  from  the  company's  surviving  order  records. 
The  production  requirements  for  each  service's  orders  were  quite  different  and  handled 
separately.  The  Army's  small  rangefinders  were  needed  in  vastly  greater  numbers  than 
the  large  naval  ones  and  posed  manufacturing  problems  similar  to  the  binocular.  The 
rangefmder  was  far  more  complex,  but  most  of  its  components  could  (in  theory  at  least) 
be  made  rapidly,  as  could  those  for  the  binocular.  Barr  &  Stroud's  serious  problems  in 
getting  enough  optical  parts  in  the  first  year  of  the  war  have  been  discussed  in  Chapter  5, 
but  as  its  own  lens  and  prism  production  increased  the  main  factor  restricting  output 
became  the  assembly  of  completed  parts,  where  large  numbers  of  workers  were  needed 
to  achieve  rapid  deliveries  of  completed  instruments.  Like  the  binocular,  most  of  the 
assembly  could  be  done  by  semi-skilled  workers  with  relatively  little  training,  but  fording 
enough  hands  was  still  a  problem  and  manning  shortages  grew  throughout  1915. 
By  the  end  of  the  year  Harold  Jackson  was  complaining  that  it  was  difficult  `explaining 
to  athletic  young  men  that  ...  making  tiny  prisms  is  as  valuable  to  the  Country  as  sticking 
a  German  with  a  bayonet'.  As  in  other  industries,  it  was  hard  to  keep  men  away  from  the 
colours,  and  the  OMGD  promised  to  send  Barr  &  Stroud  an  open  letter  explaining  to  the 
workforce  how  vital  the  firm's  output  really  was  to  the  war.  75  But  neither  the  letter  nor 
subsequent  posters  could  persuade  the  young  to  eschew  the  bayonet  and  by  Spring  1916 
the  shortages,  although  not  critical,  were  sufficient  to  require  some  urgent  remedy.  The 
only  new  source  of  labour  available  had  never  been  used  previously  by  Barr  &  Stroud, 
to  whom  the  idea  of  having  women  in  the  factory  was  a  somewhat  problematical  novelty. 
73  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  80,  OH  Vol.  I,  Part  1,  Appendix  Up.  145,  and  OH  Vol.  XI,  Part  3,  Appendix 
III,  p.  133. 
"From  UGD  295/19/2/4,  /19/2/5  and  19/2/6. 
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Unlike  much  of  the  London  optical  industry,  it  is  clear  that  the  firm  had  no  prejudice 
against  women,  but  where  Kershaw  employed  them  for  80  percent  of  its  workforce,  Barr 
&  Stroud  never  had  more  than  16  percent  on  its  payroll.  76  Whatever  Trade  Union 
opposition  existed  was  dealt  with  through  the  mechanism  of  the  Munitions  Act,  and  the 
relatively  small  percentage  actually  employed  resulted  from  the  firm's  wish  to  use  female 
workers  to  the  best  advantage.  Unlike  Kershaw,  where  `girl  labour'  was  widely 
employed  and  where  workers  were  expected  to  be  able  to  carry  out  straightforward 
machine-minding  tasks  within  only  hours  of  starting  work,  Barr  &  Stroud  intended  to 
employ  women  on  a  variety  of  work  including  fine  and  skilled  operations  such  as  scale 
dividing  and  engraving.  Because  it  planned  to  draw  on  those  who  had  either  never 
worked  outside  the  home  or  had  been  employed  in  retail  or  similar  trades,  the  firm 
recognised  that  the  first,  and  possibly  greatest,  difficulty  in  employing  women  would  be 
in  their  adjustment  to  a  factory  environment  that  was  greatly  different  to  anything  they 
had  known  previously.  Those  engaged  were  `specially  selected  from  a  large  number  of 
applicants'  and  were  originally  required  to  `go  through  a  short  course  of  training  ...  to 
accustom  [them]  to  factory  life'  before  instruction  began  in  a  special  Training  School 
teaching  skilled  operations  such  as  milling,  scale  dividing  and  even  tool  grinding.  This 
was  far-removed  from  the  earliest  private  initiatives  to  draw  in  female  labour  described 
by  Arthur  Marwick,  when,  for  example,  the  Ladies  Moir  and  Cowan  had  begun  training 
`leisured  ladies'  for  part-time  weekend  work  at  Vickers'  Erith  works  in  Kent  77 
Barr  &  Stroud  saw  women  as  potentially  an  asset  to  be  directed  at  specific  skills 
shortages,  but  they  were  by  no  means  the  first  Glasgow  munitions  makers  to  adopt  such 
ideas  and  might  possibly  have  been  encouraged  by  the  steps  taken  in  1915  by  William 
Beardmore  &  Co.  to  train  women  for  skilled  engineering  work.  78  Even  though  the 
ambitious  training  programme  had  to  be  curtailed  in  deference  to  the  Ministry's  policy  of 
not  delaying  the  `introduction  of  large  numbers',  women  were  still  given  individual 
instruction  in  the  optical  and  fitting  shops  where  their  performance  was  judged  `as 
76  UGD  295/26/1/14,  Strang  Papers,  historical  notes  concerning  women  workers  1916-1918,  provide  the 
source  material  for  Barr  &  Stroud  in  the  remainder  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
"A.  Marwick,  Women  at  War  1914-1918  (London:  Fontana,  1977)  p.  60. 
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efficient  as  men'.  Unlike  some  Glasgow  engineering  firms,  such  as  the  ordnance  makers 
William  Beardmore  &  Co.,  which  took  a  considerable  time  to  provide  even  the  most 
basic  facilities  for  women,  79  Barr  &  Stroud  planned  their  integration  from  the  outset  and 
went  to  considerable  lengths  to  provide  for  it  in  order  to  maximise  the  benefits  of  the 
new  labour  force.  Separate  `Cloak  room'  facilities  were  provided  in  1916  for  the  300- 
plus  women  workers  expected,  and  a  full-time  `Matron'  appointed  to  look  after  `the 
women's  welfare  and  interests  in  every  way'  outside  the  workshops.  According  to 
Harold  Jackson's  post-war  summary  of  the  exercise,  there  were  few  difficulties  in  the 
workshops  themselves,  and  the  quality  of  work  done  by  relatively  inexperienced  female 
operatives  was  generally  highly  satisfactory  and  their  attitude  to  their  jobs  `more 
assiduous'  than  their  male  colleagues. 
Labour  problems  were  managed  more  easily  than  optical  glass.  Its  shortage  and 
inconsistency  was  a  different  sort  of  problem,  and  although  never  so  bad  as  to  bring 
production  to  a  halt  it  caused  difficulties  right  up  to  the  war's  end.  In  late  1916  Barr  & 
Stroud  began  small  scale  production  of  the  most  problematical  glasses  as  part  of  a  policy 
to  make  the  firm  increasingly  independent  of  the  outside  supply  of  raw  materials  and 
components,  measures  which  were  so  successful  that  by  1918  almost  the  only  important 
remaining  external  requirement  was  for  the  most  common  glasses  that  were  required  in 
bulk.  Deliveries  of  these  were  still  difficult  even  in  late  1918  but,  by  careful  management 
and  complaining  vociferously  to  the  OMGD,  stocks  usually  remained  high  enough  to 
keep  production  going.  80 
Rangefinder  supply  ran  continuously  throughout  the  war.  Both  the  Army  and  the  Royal 
Navy  were  adequately  supplied  and  Barr  &  Stroud  had  enough  capacity  to  overhaul  large 
numbers  of  instruments  damaged  in  service,  running  and  staffing  a  workshop  at 
Woolwich  just  to  handle  Army  work.  Far  from  being  worn-out  in  November  1918,  the 
firm  was  fu  ther  expanding  its  works  to  handle  new  Admiralty  orders  and  was 
undertaking  optical  computation  on  an  increasing  scale.  Where  in  1914  the  vast  majority 
"A.  Marwick  (1977)  pp.  61-  67. 
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of  optical  components  were  bought  in,  four  years  later  the  business  was  entirely 
independent  of  other  sources  for  grinding  and  polishing  and  so  well  equipped  to  handle 
large  scale  production  that  it  was  ready  to  begin  supplying  the  U.  S,  forces  in  Europe.  81 
Despite  the  success  of  rangefinder  production  for  both  services,  it  was  initially  seriously 
inhibited  by  the  War  Office's  attitude  to  the  company.;  The  War  Office  proved  a  difficult 
and  obstructive  buyer,  and  a  crisis  in  output  was  averted  only  by  the  creation  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  which  acted  as  a  buffer  between  maker  and  user.  The  subsequent 
relationship  between  the  company  and  the  OMGD  provides  an  alternative  to  the  picture 
painted  in  the  official  History,  where  the  industry  is  portrayed  as  the  beneficiary  of  State 
assistance. 
When  the  War  Office  began  its  large  orders  in  the  Autumn  of  1914,  it  sought  to  impose 
conditions  under  the  provisions  of  the  Defence  of  the  Realm  Act  that  the  firm  considered 
irksome  and  disruptive,  and  which  greatly  prejudiced  the  prospects  for  output.  The  War 
Office  demanded  priority  for  its  orders  over  all  other  work;  the  Defence  Act  gave  it  the 
legal  power  to  do  so,  but  it  seemingly  remained  oblivious  to  the  problems  created  by 
such  insistence,  particularly  when  it  sought  to  extend  its  primacy  over  Admiralty  orders 
as  well.  Firstly,  it  prohibited  the  export  of  more  than  15  rangefinders  each  week  to 
France,  despite  existing  orders  and  that  country's  urgent  need  for  them.  Then  in  January 
1915,  the  War  Office  instructed  Barr  &  Stroud  to  end  its  efforts  to  secure  the  U.  S. 
Navy's  future  rangefinder  business,  in  order  to  concentrate  on  output  for  the  British 
Army.  Objections  were  fruitless:  `The  War  Office  has  even  threatened  to  take  over  the 
control  of  our  works'  wrote  Jackson  to  his  American  agents  with  ill-concealed  bad 
humour.  82  The  next  month  the  War  Office  totally  forbade  the  shipping  of  any 
rangefinders  to  France,  disrupting  an  inter-governmental  agreement  to  obtain  French 
optical  glass  in  exchange  for  uninterrupted  deliveries  of  rangefinders  and  bringing 
81  UGD  295/19/2/6,  Customer  Order  files,  C04000  of  22.8.1918  records  an  order  for  300  artillery 
rangefinders  for  U.  S.  Army. 
82  UGD  295/4/114,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Keuffel  &  Esser,  New  York,  8.1.1915. 209 
repercussions  from  the  French  government  which  temporarily  ended  all  supplies  of  the 
optical  glass  on  which  rangefinder  output  largely  depended.  83 
To  the  company,  the  War  Office  was  a  difficult  and  obdurate  customer.  It  demanded 
priority  in  all  things,  disregarded  all  the  firm's  commitments  to  the  Admiralty  and  Allies 
alike,  frustrated  opportunities  for  new  foreign  business,  and  yet  failed  to  take  up 
everything  that  the  firm  had  available  for  delivery.  By  June  relations  had  deteriorated  to 
the  point  where  there  was  open  distrust  of  the  War  Office's  good  faith  in  Glasgow,  and 
Jackson  believed  that  it  intended  to  buy  artillery  rangefinders  from  Bausch  &  Lomb  in 
the  USA  rather  than  in  Britain.  84  The  War  Office  was  far  from  an  ideal  client,  and  what 
must  have  been  particularly  irksome  to  Barr  &  Stroud  was  that  the  value  of  its  business 
since  August  1914  was  still  only  two  thirds  of  the  Admiralty's  in  the  same  period  and  far 
less  than  France's  had  been  in  1913.85 
The  arrival  of  the  OMGD  ended  this  imbroglio  and  illustrated  the  pragmatic  approach  it 
frequently  adopted.  Cheshire  and  Esslemont  both  understood  that  irrespective  of  their 
duty  to  organise  supplies  for  the  Army,  the  Navy's  need  was  equally  great  and  could  not 
be  obstructed.  The  OMGD  immediately  instructed  that  dealings  with  the  Admiralty 
should  be  done  directly  and  independently  of  contracts  for  the  War  Office.  86  This 
permitted  the  firm  to  keep  the  Navy's  business  adequately  prioritised  and  doubtless  eased 
problems  in  proceeding  with  Admiralty  work.  Then,  in  July,  Cheshire  visited  Glasgow, 
marking  the  start  of  what  seems  to  have  been  an  amicable  and  symbiotic  (if 
asymmetrical)  relationship  between  the  firm  and  the  OMGD  87  So  far  as  control  was 
concerned,  the  company  showed  no  sign  of  opposition  to  it.  Jackson  had  no  doubt  that 
de  facto  War  Office  control  had  existed  since  December,  so  that  the  prospect  of  dealing 
es  PRO  BT  66/1/MMW  11,  Nature  of  Demand  for  Optical  Glass:  minute  from  OMGD  to  Ministry  of 
Munitions,  8.7.1915,  warned  of  a  likely  embargo  on  French  deliveries  if  rangefinder  deliveries  were  again 
suspended. 
"UGD  295/4/10,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Major  Benson,  Royal  Artillery,  Woolwich,  28.6.1915. 
as  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/3,  /19/213  and  /19/2/4,  Customer  Order  files. 
86  UGD  295/4/625,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Director  General  Munitions  Supply,  17.7.1915,  acknowledging 
instructions. 
87  UGD  295/4/625,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Cheshire,  23.7.1915,  acknowledging  arrangements  for  visit. 210 
with  a  new  and  more  accommodating  agency  was  likely  to  have  been  an  agreeable 
prospect.  88 
The  correspondence  between  Cheshire  and  Esslemont  and  the  firm  shows  that  they 
regarded  both  the  company  and  its  senior  staff  as  their  organisational  and  intellectual 
equals,  rather  than  seeing  them,  like  the  rest  of  the  optical  industry,  as  being  in  need  of 
assistance  and  direction.  However,  this  sentiment  was  by  no  means  wholly  reciprocated, 
and  the  company's  records  indicate  that  it  sometimes  felt  that  the  OMGD  itself  required 
instruction  and  correction.  It  may  have  helped  the  firm's  confidence  to  know  that  almost 
its  entire  Board  had  academic  credentials  better  than  the  OMGD's  management  and  that 
the  business  was  indisputably  the  world's  most  successful  maker  of  optical  munitions. 
In  August,  Esslemont  asked  Barr  &  Stroud  for  `private  and  confidential'  details  of  its 
experiences  with  British  optical  glass,  and  Jackson's  reply  dealt  at  length  with  both  the 
commercial  and  technical  difficulties  in  dealing  with  Chance  Brothers-89  His  strong 
assertion  that  unsatisfactory  business  structure  rather  than  scientific  inadequacy  was  the 
root  of  Chance's  manufacturing  problems  went  beyond  what  had  been  asked  for,  and  was 
a  theme  that  Esslemont  subsequently  took  up  not  only  with  the  glass  maker  but  also  in 
his  later  approach  to  binocular  manufacture.  In  September,  Jackson  called  for  a  `fines' 
conference'  to  examine  the  problems  of  overcoming  the  lack  of  optical  glass  and  skilled 
optical  labour,  which  Esslemont  duly  organised-90  Jackson's  summary  perhaps  made 
uncomfortable  reading  for  the  OMGD.  He  questioned  Esslemont's  confidence  in 
guaranteeing  adequate  glass  deliveries  and  reminded  him  that  increased  output  at 
Glasgow  depended  on  Barr  &  Stroud  itself  being  able  to  develop  `machines  and 
methods'  for  the  successful  use  of  unskilled  labour,  in  view  of  which  he  firmly  refused  to 
commit  the  firm  to  further  increases  in  production,  whatever  their  importance  or 
urgency.  91 
°°  UGD  295/4/119,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Senechal,  12.7.1915  complaining  of  effects  of  War  Office 
control  after  December  1915. 
"  UGD  295/4/625,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Esslemont,  9.8.1915. 
90  UGD  295/4/625,  Jackson  to  Esslemont,  18.9.1915. 
91  UGD  295/4/625,  Jackson  to  Esslemont,  21.9.1915. 211 
At  the  same  time  he  promised  to  help  Frederick  Cheshire  to  give  a  lecture  on 
rangefinders  by  providing  background  technical  information  to  fill  gaps  in  his 
knowledge.  Jackson  sent  the  material  and  `a  little  model'  with  the  firm's  compliments 
and  a  gentle  reminder  that  virtually  every  European  army  already  had  both  the 
information  and  the  model,  including  `the  Technische  Militar  Komittee  [sic.  ]  in  Berlin'. 
In  a  tactful  postscript  he  added  `If  Mr  Esslemont  is  jealous  [of  the  model],  I  shall  be 
pleased  to  send  him  a  duplicate'.  Jackson  perhaps  considered  that  Cheshire  just  was 
starting  on  a  steep  learning  curve.  92 
It  is  difficult  to  see  any  other  British  firm  taking  these  attitudes.  But  then  Barr  &  Stroud 
was  in  many  ways  the  embodiment  of  what  Cheshire  was  prescribing  for  the  whole 
optical  industry  -a  soundly  managed,  well  financed  and  profitable  business  that  used 
scientifically  trained  staff,  modem  plant  and  manufacturing  methods,  employed  a 
motivated  and  well  managed  workforce  and  which  was,  above  all,  demonstrably 
successful  against  foreign  competition.  It  was  therefore  ironic  that  Archibald  Barr 
himself  did  not  see  the  firm  as  an  optical  instrument  maker,  or  indeed  any  kind  of 
scientific  instrument  maker;  he  was  absolutely  certain  it  was  an  engineering  company 
that  employed  optical  components  and  the  war  only  served  to  confirm  this  long-standing 
conviction. 
Barr  emphasised  this  by  refusing  to  connect  the  firm  with  other  optical  manufacturers. 
He  repeatedly  turned  down  invitations  to  have  the  firm  represented  at  informal  trade 
gatherings  in  London  early  in  the  war,  and  declined  to  join  a  proposed  scientific 
instrument  makers'  federation  in  July  1915  because 
`honestly  (and  privately)  we  do  not  feel  disposed  to  place  ourselves  in  any  way 
under  obligation  to  abide  by  decisions  made  by  those  who  are  possibly  under 
very  different  conditions  from  our  own'.  93 
"For  the  preceding  quotations  see  UGD  295/4/625,  Jackson  to  Esslemont  9.8.1915.  The  `little  model'  was 
of  an  infantry  soldier  using  a  Barr  &  Stroud  rangefinder.  Cheshire's  lecture  subsequently  won  him  the 
Optical  Society's  Traill-Taylor  Memorial  Medal  for  advances  in  optics.  For  the  learning  curve,  see  UGD 
295/4/625,  Jackson  to  Esslemont,  22.10.1915;  Jackson  to  Esslemont  and  Cheshire,  26.10.1915. 
93  UGD  295/4/118,  Letter  Book,  C.  Beck  to  Barr,  3.6.1915. 212 
Eventually  he  drew  a  line  under  attempts  to  persuade  him  join  similar  bodies  by  very 
firmly  declining  not  only  the  offer  of  the  Vice-Presidency  of  the  newly  formed  British 
Optical  Instrument  Makers'  Association  but  even  membership  of  it.  He  was  not 
`disposed  to  associate'  the  firm  because  `our  work  is  so  very  different...  '  from  other 
optical  makers.  94  With  1,500  metal  workers  to  just  one  hundred  optical  workers  both  the 
firm  and  its  work  were  indeed  as  different  as  the  way  it  achieved  its  success.  95 
6.7  Conclusion 
The  optical  munitions  industry's  efforts  in  the  three  areas  examined  here  embraced 
degrees  of  success  that  differed  in  their  completeness  and  scale.  The  binocular  and 
riflescope  were  both  instruments  not  previously  produced  in  great  quantity  or  at  high 
speed  in  Britain  -  indeed,  the  riflescope  had  only  been  made  in  minuscule  amounts.  Both 
were  manufactured  during  the  war  by  firms  who  had  no  previous  experience  with  them, 
the  riflescope  being  made  with  much  more  conspicuous  success  largely  because  the 
numbers  needed  were  relatively  small  and  well  suited  to  the  sort  of  optical  manufacture 
typical  of  British  pre-war  practice.  But  that  practice  was  not  the  skilfully  distorted  image 
that  Cheshire  deliberately  fostered  to  achieve  a  long-term  goal,  rather  it  embodied  both 
scientific  training  and  commercial  expertise  that  could  adapt  well  to  a  new  specialised 
requirement  when  that  need  fitted  in  with  the  existing  capacity.  Aldis  in  particular  built 
on  its  inherent  skills  to  become  a  much  larger  entity,  making  a  wider  variety  of 
instruments  than  it  did  before  the  war;  it  benefited  from  its  war  work  and  `span'  into  its 
own  growth.  Success  in  volume  binocular  production  was  harder  to  find  because  the 
lack  of  any  adaptable  facility  meant  everything  had  to  be  created  from  scratch,  and 
although  clearly  in  sight  by  the  end  of  the  war  the  promised  high  output  rate  was  still  not 
achieved.  The  characteristic  of  the  riflescope  makers  in  being  strangers  to  the  product 
was  emphasised  in  Kershaw's  manufacturing  background,  and  extended  by  a 
considerable  degree  through  his  complete  unfamiliarity  with  optical  work.  But  Kershaw 
showed  that  his  production  methodologies  could  be  successfully  translated  into  a 
94UGD  29514/740,  Letter  Book,  Barr  to  C.  Beck,  8.5.1916. 
9S  UGD  295/4/625,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Secretary  of  Ministry  of  Munitions,  return  of  workers 
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different  field  and,  had  the  supporting  infrastructure  that  Esslemont  gambled  on  been  in 
place,  the  project  would  have  doubtless  fulfilled  its  promise  sooner.  Unfamiliarity  was 
shown  to  be  no  bar  to  successful  manufacture. 
The  rangefinder  was  a  very  different  case  to  the  others.  Barr  &  Stroud  showed  that  the 
transition  from  peace  to  war  production  was  still  problematical  even  when  the  business 
was  both  experienced  and  well  equipped  to  handle  large  scale  output.  This  was  partly 
because  of  the  unexpected  scale  of  the  war,  but  partly  because  the  firm's  incomplete 
vertical  integration  left  it  vulnerable  to  a  supply  structure  which  was  much  weaker  than 
the  body  it  fed.  The  scale  and  organisation  of  the  business  allowed  a  metamorphosis 
sufficient  to  eliminate  most  of  its  vulnerability  and  it  reached  the  end  of  the  war  in  a 
condition  almost  universally  improved  from  mid-1914,  able  to  design  and  manufacture  a 
wider  range  of  more  complex  instruments  with  a  greater  level  of  efficiency.  Barr  & 
Stroud  needed  little  help  from  the  OMGD,  except  where  issues  were  essentially  political 
such  as  War  Office  policy  in  1915.  If  this  chapter  has  said  relatively  little  about  problems 
in  rangefinder  manufacture  for  the  Army,  it  is  because  there  is  really  little  to  say,  even  if 
the  job  was  problematical,  the  goods  were  delivered  in  sufficient  numbers  to  satisfy  the 
immediate  demand. 
In  early  November  1918,  the  British  optical  munitions  industry  was  working  at  high 
speed  and  full  capacity,  and  in  all  the  cases  examined  preparing  either  to  further  increase 
output  or  introduce  new  and  improved  instruments;  the  Armistice  on  11th  November 
apparently  took  all  the  manufacturers  by  surprise  and  created  what  was  little  short  of 
chaos.  The  next  chapter  examines  the  reasons  why  that  situation  came  about  and 
examines  how  the  industry  dealt  with  it. 214 
Chapter  7 
Industrial  demobilisation  and  implosion,  1919 
7.1  Introduction 
For  the  optical  munitions  industry,  the  end  of  the  war  came  unexpectedly  and 
prematurely.  Irrespective  of  the  political  desire  to  end  hostilities  and  the  sentiments  being 
voiced  in  the  press,  it  had  been  very  much  `business  as  usual'  right  up  to  November  10th 
1918.1  There  had  been  no  scaling-down  of  contracts  and  no  warnings  from  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  of  any  imminent  likelihood  of  cancellations.  All  the  manufacturers  were 
wholly  employed  in  the  war  effort  and  had  not  even  begun  to  consider  in  practical  terms 
their  policies  for  industrial  demobilisation  and  a  return  to  peace-time  trading.  The  efforts 
of  the  Ministry  to  set  the  optical  industry  on  a  better  footing  had  not  yet  reached  a  stage 
where  substantial  improvements  in  organisation  or  infrastructure  had  been  achieved.  The 
pre-war  optical  instruments  industry  had  been  conscripted  and  metamorphosised  into  the 
war-time  optical  munitions  industry  with  some  considerable  success,  but  nothing  had 
been  done  to  cater  for  the  inevitable  end  of  large-scale  government  orders.  For  the  hugely 
expanded  industry,  the  transition  back  to  peace  was  a  difficult  process.  Its  constituent 
firms  had  to  come  to  terms  with  the  disappearance  of  government  business  and  the 
problems  of  making  up  the  lost  demand  from  a  civilian  market  which  had  gone  into 
suspense  in  1914.  The  `demobilisation'  of  the  war-time  industry  highlighted  the 
incomplete  state  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions'  efforts  to  improve  the  condition  of  the 
optical  industry,  and  reflected  the  companies'  collective  inability  to  cope  with  the 
organisational  and  financial  problems  which  the  war  had  generated. 
The  war  had  gone  a  long  way  towards  the  creation  of  an  effective  (and  clearly 
identifiable)  optical  munitions  industry,  or  a  `technological  system'  of  manufacture.  The 
widespread  changes  imposed  by  the  closing-down  of  war-time  demand  may  be 
interpreted  as  being  simply  a  deterministic  outcome  of  returning  peace,  but  they  were  by 
no  means  uniform  across  the  whole  industry  and  the  behaviour  of  Barr  &  Stroud  in 
particular,  suggests  that,  once  again,  the  `more  flexible  mode  of  interpretation'  espoused 
1  See  Lorna  S.  Jaffe,  The  Decision  to  Disarm  Germany  (London:  Allen  &  Unwin,  1985),  Chapters  2  and  4. 215 
by  Thomas  Hughes'  most  closely  accords  with  events.  Even  where  firms  made  the 
transition  back  to  peace  with  little  success  and  much  difficulty,  they  still  had  to  cope  with 
the  `plethora  of  variables'  mentioned  in  the  introduction  to  this  study,  attempting  to 
manage  a  range  of  political,  economic  and  social  factors  besides  the  scientific  and 
technical  ones  relating  directly  to  the  products  of  artefacts. 
7.2  The  problems  of  total  mobilisation 
The  Great  War  had  drawn  into  optical  munitions  manufacture  firms  which  previously 
had  little  or  no  experience  in  the  field.  Their  pre-war  business  had  come  from 
manufacturing  microscopes,  survey  apparatus,  photographic  lenses  and  telescopes,  trade 
which  had  gradually  vanished  as  the  Ministry  involved  more  and  more  of  those 
businesses  in  military  manufacturing.  The  result  was  that  these  `conscript  suppliers'  lost 
not  only  their  pre-war  business,  but  also  close  contact  with  the  markets  for  that  business. 
The  Ministry's  contract  records  show  that  almost  all  the  pre-war  `commercial'  optical 
makers  had  become  so  involved  with  government  contracting  that  by  November  1918 
they  were  completely  dependent  on  orders  for  the  armed  forces.  Mobilisation  of  the 
optical  instruments  industry  was,  in  a  sense,  complete.  Not  only  had  these  businesses  put 
aside  their  familiar  products,  they  had  also  been  forced  to  adopt  changes  in  their 
workforce  and  methods  of  production.  The  demand  for  instruments  and  components  on  a 
scale  previously  unknown,  along  with  the  necessity  to  use  less-skilled  labour,  had  meant 
that  new  machinery  had  been  introduced  and  what  often  amounted  to  an  entirely  new 
work-force  had  been  created  at  the  Ministry's  instigation.  This  should  have  placed  the 
makers  in  a  good  position  to  move  back  into  the  commercial  marketplace,  but  under 
guarantees  given  to  Trade  Unions  in  1915  and  1916,  those  who  had  worked  in  the 
industry  were  guaranteed  re-employment  at  the  war's  end.  Those  returning  from  the  war 
were  ill-prepared  for  a  changed  factory  environment,  even  if  there  was  work  for  them  to 
do. 
Although  the  optical  industry  had  indeed  been  transformed  by  the  war,  2  this 
metamorphosis  had  been  directed  to  meeting  the  war's  demands,  and  little  or  nothing  had 
2  see  Chapter  6  above. 216 
been  done  to  develop  commercial  products.  The  potential  for  more  efficient  manufacture 
was  compromised  or  negated  by  four  years  of  stagnation  in  design  and  civil  product 
development.  Although  there  was  concern  in  the  Ministry  for  the  industry's  long-term 
future,  measures  to  secure  that  future  were  still  only  partly  formed  by  late  1918.  The 
cessation  of  war-related  orders  left  the  `conscript'  makers  in  a  problematical  situation 
where  they  had  neither  government  business  nor  commercial  trade  to  rely  on. 
Two  of  the  three  firms  which  had  been  most  involved  in  optical  munitions  manufacture 
before  the  war  -  the  `regular'  contractors  -  had  also  made  commercial  products  as  well. 
Like  the  `conscripts',  Ottway  &Co.  Ltd.  and  the  Ross  Optical  Company  were  suddenly 
faced  with  the  problems  of  returning  to  peace-time  trading  in  civilian  markets.  Barr  & 
Stroud,  however,  had  no  civil  products  before  the  war  and  relied  entirely  on  armament 
related  business  which  had  come  principally  from  foreign  states.  The  ending  of  large 
scale  munitions  contracts  posed  an  even  greater  potential  problem  for  Barr  &  Stroud  than 
it  did  for  the  other  war-time  makers,  all  of  whom  had  at  least  some  previous  experience 
of  the  civil  trade  in  optical  goods.  For  everyone,  though,  the  immediate  problem  was 
disengagement  from  government  contracting  and  securing  the  best  possible  fmancial 
settlement  for  cancelled  contracts. 
7.3  The  Ministry  of  Munitions'  plans  for  demobilisation 
The  placing  of  contracts  by  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  had  been  done  under  rules  which 
safeguarded  both  the  State  and  the  manufacturers,  providing  for  the  amendment  of 
contracts,  as  well  as  their  early  termination.  In  the  event  of  the  latter,  there  was  the  right 
to  compensation  for  the  manufacturer,  so  long  as  he  was  not  in  breach  of  the  contract's 
terms.  3  Many  were  very  substantial,  with  lengthy  periods  for  completion.  They 
represented  a  steady  source  of  business  for  which  payment  was  never  in  doubt,  and  to 
which  firms  frequently  tailored  premises,  machinery  and  workforce.  Despite  the  apparent 
security  and  certainty  of  munitions  work,  the  contractors  should  have  understood  that  it 
was  by  no  means  immune  to  curtailment  or  cancellation,  but  events  after  the  Armistice 
3  See  Great  Britain,  Ministry  of  Munitions,  Official  History  of  the  Ministry  ofMunitions  (London:  HMSO, 
1922)  Vol.  III  Part  2  pp  112-143  for  details  of  contract  termination  procedures. 217 
suggest  that  these  eventualities  had  been  disregarded  or  forgotten.  Contract  cancellations 
began  on  November  12  t''4  and  for  the  Ministry's  Contracts  Department,  it  appears  that 
the  start  of  the  Armistice  was  synonymous  with  the  certain  end  of  the  war. 
This  immediate  cancellation  of  optical  contracts  was  in  line  with  the  general  policy  that 
had  been  given  `much  attention'  by  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  `for  many  months  before 
the  Armistice'.  5  The  greatest  problem  identified  by  the  Committee  on  Demobilisation 
and  Reconstruction  in  connection  with  the  War's  eventual  end  was  the  cancellation  of 
contracts  no  longer  required  `with  minimum  disturbance  to  industry  and  labour',  with  the 
settling-up  of  contractors'  accounts  as  the  next  most  important  matter  to  be  dealt  with. 
Two  alternatives  for  the  termination  of  orders  had  been  considered  in  depth  before  a 
decision  was  reached  that  was  intended  to  be  applied  universally  across  all  munitions 
production.  The  first  possibility  was  to  begin  by  slowing  down  the  tempo  of  output  and 
then  to  reduce  the  scale  of  production  so  that  contracts  would  go  through  a  gradual 
process  of  arrest,  spreading  the  rate  and  scale  of  redundancies  over  enough  time  to  let 
civil  production  resume  and  absorb  the  munitions  workers  who  would  be  progressively 
released  from  war-work.  That  process  would  be  helped  by  what  was  expected  to  be  high 
levels  of  demand  for  consumer  goods  after  the  shortages  of  the  preceding  three  years. 
The  second,  more  radical,  option  was  to  discontinue  munitions  contracts  `at  the  earliest 
possible  moment'  whatever  the  immediate  effect  on  the  labour  market,  in  the  expectation 
that  rapid  freeing-up  of  capacity  for  civil  products  would  encourage  a  quicker  reversion 
to  pre-war  conditions.  The  final  choice  was  for  the  instant  discontinuation  of  war 
contracts  because  it  was  felt  that  it  was  `undesirable  that  the  output  of  useless  munitions 
should  be  continued  a  day  longer  than  was  absolutely  necessary',  a  principle  the 
Committee  decided  could  safely  be  applied  once  it  knew  that  `unemployment  allowances 
would  be  paid  to  civilian  war  workers  after  demobilisation'.  The  basis  on  which  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  then  made  its  plans  was  that  reversion  to  peace-time  production 
4  National  Archives,  Kew,  (subsequently  PRO)  MUN  4/5308,  Contract  Liquidation  Records,  shows 
responses  to  cancellation  notices  dating  from  November  13th,  i.  e.  to  correspondence  which  must  have  been 
written  on  the  11th  or  12th 
.  $  OH  Vol.  II,  Part  1,  `Administrative  Policy  and  Organisation',  Supplement,  p.  16;  pp.  15  to  19  provide 
source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise  indicated,  and  pp  20  to  42  other  background 
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had  primacy,  and  that  considerations  of  the  subsequent  effects  on  labour  were  `not 
preponderating'. 
It  seems  that  so  far  as  the  optical  industry  at  least  was  concerned,  there  was  no 
knowledge  of  this  policy,  and  the  Ministry's  own  historian  conceded  that  `arrangements 
for  demobilisation  were  not  complete'  by  the  Armistice.  However,  the  plans  for 
immediate  contract  terminations  obviously  were  in  place,  and  they  went  into  operation 
without  delay,  to  the  consternation  of  the  optical  makers. 
7.4  Contract  cancellations  and  their  effects 
The  immediate  and  sharp  reactions  clearly  illustrate  the  extent  of  the  optical  industry's 
dependency  on  government  orders.  R&J  Beck,  probably  the  country's  second-largest 
optical  munitions  contractor,  wrote  to  OMGD  on  the  13th  that  the  cancellation  of  their 
Dial  Sight  and  Trench  Periscope  contracts  would  cause  `the  immediate  lay-off  of  1,300 
men'.  6  To  avoid  this,  Beck  asked  for  `an  arrangement'  whereby  the  contracts  could  be 
run-down  rather  than  cut  off  short.  Six  days  later,  the  Ross  Optical  Company,  which 
shared  Dial  Sight  contracts  with  Beck  as  well  as  having  other  large  orders,  told  OMGD 
that  the  Contracts  Department's  instruction  that  all  supplies  were  to  be  discontinued 
within  three  months  meant  that  about  half  their  700  employees  would  be  thrown  out  of 
work.  7  Like  Beck,  Ross  asked  for  help  in  avoiding  this.  E.  R.  Watts  &  Co.  (one  of  the 
many  `conscripts')  said  their  entire  working  capital  of  £10,000  was  tied  up  in  optical 
munitions  contracts,  and  they  had  no  civilian  orders  at  all.  Adam  Hilger  Ltd,  a  much 
smaller  firm,  warned  that  it  would  immediately  have  to  make  thirty  redundancies  and 
then  progressively  to  dismiss  `all  the  optical  glass  workers  ...  engaged  by  us  during  the 
war'.  8  Serious  problems  were  rapidly  emerging. 
These  contract  terminations  were  almost  certainly  made  without  prior  liaison  with 
OMGD,  possibly  because  of  the  incomplete  state  of  the  Ministry's  planning.  The  optical 
6  G.  A.  B.  Dewar,  The  Great  Munition  Feat  1914-1918  (London:  Constable,  1921)  p.  222,  and  PRO  MUN 
4/5308,,  letter  R&J  Beck  to  OMGD,  13.11.1918. 
PRO  MUN  4/5308,  letter,  Ross  Optical  Co.  to  OMGD,  19.11.1918. 
'PRO  MUN  4/5308,  letter,  Hilger  Ltd  to  OMGD,  21.11.1918. 219 
section,  having  worked  hard  towards  improving  the  industry's  overall  condition,  showed 
immediate  concern  over  the  potentially  damaging  effects  of  sudden  large-scale 
cancellations  .9 
As  early  as  the  15th,  there  were  discussions  with  the  Treasury  about 
whether  contracts  could  be  slowed  down  to  allow  a  transition  from  war  work  and 
minimise  redundancies.  10  Whilst  insisting  that  it  could  not  `deal  preferentially  with  any 
trade  except  for  a  very  short  period'  the'Treasury  conceded  that  there  was  actually  no 
objection  in  principle  as  the  industry  was  a  `new  one',  although  a  decision  needed  to  be 
taken  quickly  about  `the  subsequent  course'  for  its  future.  On  the  18th,  the  Minister  of 
Munitions  asked  for  a  schedule  of  likely  redundancies,  to  which  OMGD  replied  that 
although  it  was  not  possible  to  produce  an  exact  figure,  `the  total  number  of  employees 
in  the  whole  of  the  optical  and  scientific  industries  is  only  about  10,000'.  11  The  Minster 
was  assured  that  `arrangements'  would  be  made  to  minimise  losses,  but  there  was  no  hint 
of  what  these  would  be. 
There  was  ambivalence  in  OMGD's  response  to  the  question  of  redundancies.  On  the  one 
hand  was  the  desire  to  minimise  the  effects  of  cancellations,  but  on  the  other  was  the 
clear  suggestion  that  the  problem  was  of  limited  scale.  If  there  were  `only  about  10,000' 
workers  involved,  then  the  scale  of  the  problem  could  be  regarded  as  small  by  the 
Government,  with  the  implication  that  its  solution  might  not  be  expensive  or 
controversial.  This  was  an  echo  of  Frederick  Cheshire's  strategy  in  approaching  the 
question  of  overhauling  the  industry  in  1915  -  the  deliberate  management  and 
presentation  of  truth  to  create  an  image  which  would  facilitate  a  desired  outcome.  A 
letter  from  R&J  Beck  to  the  Controller  of  Optical  Munitions  on  November  18"'  said  that 
the  firm  had  been  told  to  propose  a  scheme  `to  keep  a  reasonable  number  of  our  hands 
employed  and  to  prevent  our  disbanding  an  efficient  organisation  which  might  be  of 
service  for  assisting  the  reconstruction  of  the  optical  industry'.  12  Beck's  letter  did  not  say 
by  whom  the  instruction  had  been  given,  but  a  reasonable  assumption  is  that  it  came 
9  Nothing  seen  in  the  PRO  MUN  contract  cancellation  files  has  shown  any  collaboration  over  cancellations 
prior  to  the  Armistice. 
°  PRO  MUN  4/5308,  minute,  P.  G.  Henriques  to  HA  Colefax,  OMGD,  15.11.1918. 
PRO  MUN  4/5308,  minute,  G.  Garnsey  to  HA  Colefax,  OMGD,  18.11.1918. 
12  PRO  MUN  4/5308,  letter  R.  &  J.  Beck  to  Controller  Optical  Munitions  Supply,  18.11.1918. 220 
from  OMGD's  Administrative  Director,  and  was  intended  to  support  a  case  for  holding 
together  as  many  skilled  workers  as  possible. 
It  was  apparent  that  the  vast  quantity  of  optical  munitions  on  order  for  Britain  and  her 
Allies  was  no  longer  needed  and  that  almost  all  contracts  would  have  to  be  ended 
prematurely.  Although  the  industry  was  bound  to  be  adversely  affected,  there  were 
safeguards  which  provided  for  compensation  payments  when  a  contract  was  terminated 
by  the  State.  13  An  `Optical  Munitions  Liquidation  Committee'  was  set  up  to  manage  the 
cancellations,  and  by  the  end  of  November  it  had  delivered  a  report.  14  Its  responsibilities 
were  to  decide  which  contracts  to  close,  which,  if  any,  to  maintain,  and  to  scrutinise  the 
performance  of  companies  which  might  be  eligible  for  payments  under  the  termination 
provisions.  To  qualify  for  compensation  payments  or  `liquidation  amounts',  a  maker  not 
only  had  to  have  suffered  a  contract's  premature  ending,  but  also  must  not  have  been  in 
default  of  its  terms.  A  series  of  `preliminary  investigations'  was  started  to  assess 
whether,  from  the  State's  point  of  view,  contactors  had  actually  complied  with  the  terms 
and  conditions  of  the  orders  placed.  '5 
This  may  have  been  sound  practice,  but  because  of  the  often  confused  placing  and 
revision  of  orders,  any  rapid  and  accurate  assessment  of  compliance  was  likely  to  be 
extremely  difficult.  OMGD  appreciated  the  situation  many  of  the  contractors  found 
themselves  in,  and  had  what  might  loosely  be  termed  a  `vested  interest'  in  their  survival 
and  future  prosperity.  There  was  an  inclination  towards  supporting  the  makers  in  their 
appeals  for  financial  assistance,  although  as  will  be  shown,  OMGD  was  by  no  means 
blind  to  the  failings  of  some  of  them.  The  Liquidation  Committee,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
looking  for  evidence  of  non-compliance,  and  had  no  brief  to  assist  the  contractors. 
The  first  to  be  scrutinised  in  detail  were  Beck  and  Ross.  Other  firms  had  been  subjected 
to  `preliminary  reports  for  liquidation  [of  contracts]',  but  on  November  2901  the 
13  OH,  Vol.  I,  section  2  details  these  safeguards. 
14  PRO  MUN  4/5313,  Contract  liquidations,  summary  of  decisions  made  by  Optical  Munitions  Liquidation 
Committee,  29.11.1918. 
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Liquidation  Committee  decided  that  `Special  Investigations  should  be  made  on  Ross  and 
Beck  ...  at  the  earliest  possible  date',  probably  because  of  their  large  contracts  for  the 
expensive  artillery  `Dial  Sight  No.  7',  whose  liquidation  involved  very  considerable 
sums  of  money.  16  The  Controller  of  Optical  Munitions  advised  that  the  Ministry  was 
`obliged  under  outstanding  contracts'  to  take  an  additional  4,550  sights  at  a  cost  of 
£230,000,  whether  it  wanted  them  or  not.  17  After  rangefinders,  dial  sight  contracts  had 
been  the  largest  in  value  and  were  the  Ministry's  greatest  liability.  They  had  been 
numerous,  subject  to  much  amendment,  and  were  a  mixture  of  `running'  ones  (calling  for 
minimum  delivery  rates  over  an  indefinite  period)  and  those  for  a  specified  quantity  (not 
always  with  a  delivery  deadline).  18  For  Beck  and  Ross,  this  was  valuable  long-term 
business,  and  its  premature  ending  must  have  been  viewed  with  great  concern. 
Compensation  provisions  gave  less  than  the  full  value  of  the  contract,  and  a  `War  Break 
Clause'  allowed  the  Ministry  to  escape  from  the  contract  altogether  under  certain 
circumstances;  evidence  of  default  in  particular  would  absolve  the  Ministry  from  any 
liability  for  payment. 
If  the  Liquidation  Committee  was  hoping  for  a  verdict  against  the  contractors,  it  must 
have  been  greatly  disappointed  by  the  findings  of  the  `Special  Investigations'.  The 
investigators  reported  in  less  than  three  weeks,  not  just  on  Beck  and  Ross  but  on  all  the 
other  firms  that  had  been  subjected  to  `preliminary  investigations'.  The  Liquidator 
commented  that 
...  practically  none  of  our  contractors  have  been  able  to  maintain  the 
contracted  rates  of  delivery  in  view  of  the  pressures  put  upon  them  by  this 
department  -  investigation  clearly  shows  that  default  has  not  been  due  to 
negligence  or  circumstances  within  the  control  of  the  contractor.  19 
16  MUN  4/5308,  Contract  liquidations,  sundry  correspondence  and  MUN  4/5313,  Liquidation  Committee 
minute,  29.11.1918. 
17  MUN  4/5308,  Controller  OM  to  Sir  W.  Graham  Greene,  4.12.1918. 
'a  PRO  MUN  4/745,  Orders  Placed  for  Scientific  and  Optical  instruments  etc,  provides  examples  of  such 
contracts  and  their  delivery  terms. 
"  MUN  4/5308,  Liquidator's  note  to  Liquidation  Committee,  20.12.1918. 222 
It  is  tempting  to  think  that  the  Special  Investigators  examined  the  sheaves  of  contracts 
and  alterations  held  by  the  manufacturers,  shook  their  heads  in  disbelief,  and  then  went 
back  to  write  a  diplomatically  worded  report  that  exonerated  the  trade  whilst  not 
specifically  blaming  any  one  party  at  the  Ministry.  To  establish  a  case  for  default  would 
have  required  detailed  and  necessarily  long  investigation  of  each  individual  contract.  The 
report  simply  pointed  out  what  everyone  connected  with  optical  munitions  supply 
already  knew  -  that  the  process  of  procurement  and  supply  during  the  war  had  been 
characterised  by  pressure  and  confusion,  had  been  immensely  complicated  by  shortages 
of  capacity,  raw  materials  and  labour,  and  not  infrequently  exacerbated  by  delays  in 
acceptance  by  the  Army  through  squabbles  over  the  minutiae  of  quality  control  2° 
The  report  may  have  been  made  more  acceptable,  or  even  encouraged,  because  by  then 
`the  labour  situation  was  so  difficult'  that  the  Minister  of  Labour  was  asking  Liquidation 
Officers  `to  avoid  any  action  which  might  result  in  violent  dislocation'.  21  Arrangements 
for  paying  unemployment  allowances  were  still  not  in  place,  and  there  was  a  belated 
recognition  that,  as  the  Armistice  was  still  no  guarantee  that  hostilities  were  finally  over, 
it  would  be  imprudent  to  disperse  `the  means  of  production'  prematurely.  Those  fears 
had  disappeared  by  the  start  of  1919,  and  the  process  of  termination  resumed  after  a  brief 
but  important  check  that  bought  some  small  measure  of  relief  to  the  optical  industry. 
Having  accepted,  for  whatever  reasons,  that  there  were  no  general  grounds  to  escape 
paying  for  prematurely  terminated  contracts,  the  Liquidator  of  Optical  Munitions 
Contracts  told  OMGD  in  early  January  that  the  general  policy  is  [now]  to  close  down 
contracts  for  [all]  stores  not  required  by  mid-March  [1919]s.  22  The  Army's  drastic 
reduction  meant  the  ending  of  practically  all  War  Office  orders  as  demands  rapidly  fell  to 
pre-war  levels.  The  policy  from  March  was  to  be  one  of  ordering  `commercial  articles' 
instead  in  order  to  aid  civilian  industry.  For  the  `regular'  optical  munitions  makers,  this 
was  hardly  a  blessing.  Although  the  War  Office  might  support  civilian  industry  by 
20  see  Chapters  6  and  7  above. 
21  OH,  Vol.  II,  Part  1,  Supplement,  p.  17. 
u  PRO  MUN  4/5308,  Edmund  Batty  to  T.  Knowles,  OMGD,  10.1.1919  supplies  this  and  the  following 
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ordering  off-the-shelf  products,  the  amount  of  `commercial  articles'  the  War  Office 
would  need  for  its  optical  inventory  was  virtually  nil.  Specialised  optical  munitions  were 
held  in  very  large  quantities  and  requirements  would  be  minimal  for  the  foreseeable 
future,  so  that  the  specialist  capability  of  the  firms  drawn  into  optical  munitions  work 
was  now  redundant.  It  required  little  prescience  to  recognise  that  British  military 
contracting  would  support  none  of  the  war-time  `conscript  industry'  and  by  no  means  all 
of  the  `regulars'. 
Although  compensation  payments  had  been  virtually  guaranteed  by  the  Liquidation 
Committee's  findings,  the  instructions  to  cease  production  meant  that  skilled  operatives 
would  be  without  work  until  new  business  was  found,  and  employers  were  unable  and 
unwilling  to  pay  an  idle  workforce  out  of  limited  and  dwindling  resources.  Firms 
urgently  needed  some  means  to  keep  trained  workers  productively  employed  whilst 
attempts  were  made  to  recover  their  pre-war  business  and  slowing  down  contracts  would 
have  been  helped  to  do  this.  In  fact,  the  Controller  of  Munitions  Supply  had  told  OMGD 
on  December  16`h  that  although  all  contracts  extending  beyond  eight  weeks  were  to  be 
terminated  he  now  had  authority  to  slow  down  optical  contracts  `instead  of  using  the 
guillotine'  23  As  his  remit  extended  far  beyond  optics,  this  suggests  that  the  industry's 
need  for  some  special  treatment  had  already  been  recognised.  However,  on  January  10th 
1919,  the  Liquidator's  announcement  about  closing-down  contracts  showed  the  policy 
had  been  revised  and  replaced  by  one  of  making  cash  payments  instead,  an  alteration  that 
compromised  earlier  intentions  to  nurture  a  `new  industry'. 
The  extreme  situation  of  some  firms  is  shown  in  surviving  contract  liquidation 
correspondence 
24  R.  &  J.  Beck  had  no  new  designs  for  commercial  markets;  their 
technical  design  staff  had  been  `entirely  engaged'  on  war  work  since  1915,  and 
development  of  civil  lines  had  been  precluded.  E.  R.  Watts  &  Son  had  become  totally 
dedicated  to  war  production  and,  having  no  free  capital,  was  now  'financially 
embarrassed'  with  the  loss  of  Ministry  orders.  The  Ross  Optical  Company  reported  on 
'  PRO  MUN  4/5308  Minute,  Controller  to  T.  Knowles,  16.12.1918. 
24  PRO  MUN  4/5308  and  4/5309,  Contract  Liquidation  papers  provides  the  source  material  for  this  section 
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January  20th  1919  that  `All  our  contracts  are  now  cancelled  and  all  manufacture  thereon 
has  been  stopped.  '  Adam  Hilger  Ltd  was  in  such  a  state  that  the  firm's  directors  had 
applied  to  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  for  `relief  in  respect  of  hardship  through 
cancellation  of  contracts  ..  . 
'.  Dollond  &  Co.  Ltd  was  `totally  engaged  on  government 
contracts'  with  over  4,000  prism  binoculars  in  process  of  manufacture  which  were  no 
longer  required.  These  had  prominent  government  ownership  marks  that  were 
`impossible  to  remove',  eliminating  any  chance  of  selling  them  commercially  even  if 
buyers  could  be  found.  W.  Ottway  &  Co  Ltd  summed  up  the  generally  depressing 
situation  in  mid-January,  writing  that  since  the  Armistice  their  efforts  to  get  orders  `all 
over  the  place',  had  produced  orders  totalling  scarcely  £100.  Hard  times  had  rapidly 
come  on  the  optical  industry. 
The  war-time  optical  munitions  makers  had  not  generally  been  extensively  involved  in 
government  contracting  before  1915.  All  the  fines,  excepting  Barr &  Stroud,  had  relied 
on  commercial  sales  to  some  extent  and  all  had  particular  areas  of  expertise.  25  For  these 
firms,  the  problem  was  twofold;  there  was  the  matter  of  surviving  until  business  could  be 
recovered,  and  the  need  to  scale-down  both  capacity  and  workforces  from  the  levels 
generated  by  the  war.  Overlaid  onto  this  need  for  transition  were  both  staffing  and 
financial  difficulties  rooted  in  the  measures  taken  during  1915  to  direct  labour  and 
control  both  profits  and  wages  26 
Despite  the  business  it  had  received,  the  industry  was  by  no  means  cash-rich  at  the  end  of 
1918.  War-time  profits  had  been  geared  to  1913/1914  levels  which  were  taxed  at 
increasingly  higher  rates  and  Excess  Profit  Duty  levied  on  surpluses  severely  eroded 
retained  earnings.  The  production  of  accounts  during  the  chaotic  conditions  after  1915 
was  generally  delayed,  meaning  that  provision  had  to  be  made  for  still-uncertain  but 
expectedly  large  amounts  of  taxation.  Operating  costs  had  risen  steeply  from  1914  levels, 
27 
and  the  increasing  rate  of  inflation,  particularly  in  1917  and  1918,  meant  that  many 
25  See  Appendix:  List  of  Manufacturers. 
26  see  OH  Vol.  I,  part  2  for  background  details  of  this  aspect  of  the  control  of  industry. 
27  K  Twigger,  Inflation:  The  Value  of  the  Pound  1750-1998  (London:  House  of  Commons  Library, 
Economics  Policy  and  Statistics  Section,  1999). 225 
contracts  had  been  far  less  profitable  than  expected  when  they  were  signed.  Expensive 
additions  to  premises  and  plant  had  not  always  been  funded  by  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions,  and  were  financed  either  from  cash  reserves  or  with  borrowed  money  bearing 
interest.  Although  the  State  sought  to  limit  contractors'  profits,  it  did  not  indemnify  them 
against  loss  nor  guarantee  their  liquidity. 
The  Ministry's  now-incomplete  contract  records  indicate  that  the  scale  of  compensation 
payments  was  substantial28  Those  seen  show  that  Beck  was  due  to  over  £180,000,  the 
Ross  Optical  Company  due  to  almost  £83,000,  and  Sir  Howard  Grubb  &  Co.  was  owed 
£20,500  for  parts  and  optical  tools  alone.  E.  R.  Watts  &  Son  asked  for  an  advance  of 
£6,500  to  cover  their  immediate  needs  which  was  paid  immediately  and  without  demur, 
suggesting  that  the  total  owing  was  substantially  more.  There  had  also  been  many 
contracts  placed  independently  by  the  Admiralty  up  to  November  1918.  Submarine 
periscopes,  complex  prismatic  gun  sights  for  warship  turrets,  and  naval  rangefinders 
were  never  ordered  through  the  Ministry,  even  after  it  formally  assumed  responsibility 
for  Admiralty  requirements  in  July  1917.  Barr  &  Stroud's  records  show  its  Admiralty 
orders  by  1918  were  considerably  greater  than  War  Office  ones,  29  so  it  is  reasonable  to 
assume  that  Grubb,  Ottway  and  Ross  were  also  due  to  substantial  amounts  for  Navy 
business. 
These  amounts  became  important  in  the  process  of  withdrawal  from  large-scale 
government  contracting  because  they  represented  palliative  redundancy  payments  for 
almost  the  entirety  of  the  war-time  industry.  They  also  marked  the  departure  of  all  the 
`conscripts'  and  some  of  the  old  `regulars'  from  optical  munitions  work.  But,  large  as  the 
liquidation  payments  might  have  been,  they  were  far  from  unencumbered.  Their  value 
was  eroded  by  inflation  since  the  time  prices  had  been  originally  agreed,  and  by  the  need 
to  make  provision  for  still-uncertain  taxation  and  profits  duty.  But  the  subsequent  story 
28  PRO  MLJN  4/5305  to  /5313,  Contract  liquidation  records  contain  much  information.  These  figures  are 
taken  from  /5308. 
29  University  of  Glasgow,  records  of  Barr  &  Stroud  Ltd,  (subsequently  UGD)  295/19/6/3,  London  Office 
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of  those  departed  manufacturers  is  not  within  the  boundary  of  this  account  and  must  be 
sought  elsewhere  . 
7.4  Barr  &  Stroud  versus  the  War  Office  and  the  Admiralty 
Given  the  extent  of  the  difficulties  being  faced  by  the  more  broadly  based  firms,  it  might 
be  expected  that  Barr  &  Stroud  would  have  been  seriously  concerned  by  its  prospects  as 
it  had  no  civil  business  to  fall  back  on,  and  the  large-scale  termination  of  contracts 
represented  the  loss  of  most  of  its  work.  The  company  was  in  a  somewhat  curious 
position  in  1919.  During  the  war  it  had  extended  its  competencies  and  skills  and  become 
self-sufficient  in  virtually  all  aspects  of  the  design  and  production  of  rangefinders  so  it 
was  potentially  even  stronger  and  more  competitive  than  it  had  been  in  1914.  Expansion 
and  vertical  integration  into  glass  production  and  optical  computation  had  removed  the 
two  main  pre-war  weaknesses,  and,  in  theory  at  least,  equipped  the  firm  to  move  into 
optical  work  outside  munitions  contracting.  On  the  other  hand,  the  extended  factory  was 
set  up  entirely  for  ordnance  manufacture  and  the  company's  expertise  was  wholly  in 
making  munitions  related  instruments  which  were  marketed  through  processes  quite 
unlike  civil  products.  Although,  as  already  described,  Barr  &  Stroud  was  largely 
insulated  from  many  of  the  immediate  problems  facing  almost  all  of  the  optical  industry, 
the  firm  was  by  no  means  immune  to  the  difficulties  of  adjusting  to  a  peace  that  was  very 
different  to  that  of  1914. 
However,  both  its  treatment  and  reactions  were  quite  unlike  those  of  the  others,  most  of 
whom  had  signalled  immediate  and  pressing  problems.  On  November  15th,  a  meeting 
was  held  between  Barr  &  Stroud's  Harold  Jackson,  OMGD's  administrative  head,  Mr 
Knowles,  and  a  Captain  Johnson  who  was  presumably  from  the  Ministry's  Contracts 
Department  30  Jackson  was  asked  to  give  `a  considered  statement'  on  the  question  of 
rangefinder  manufacture  and  uncompleted  orders.  His  summary  indicates  the  complexity 
and  confusion  surrounding  optical  munitions  ordering.  Only  a  month  before,  it  had  been 
agreed  that  a  large  rangefinder  contract  be  reduced  from  2,000  to  1,500,  but  it  was  then 
decided  that  another  500  were  actually  needed  to  cover  the  `immediate  needs'  of  Britain, 
30  UGD  295/4/635,  Letter  Book,  HD  Jackson  to  Controller  of  Optical  Munitions  Supply  20.11.1918, 
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Greece  and  the  USA.  The  first  contract  was  already  being  delivered,  and  uncompleted 
instruments  were  in  such  an  advanced  state  of  assembly  that  Jackson  stated  it  would  be 
`inadvisable'  to  terminate  manufacture.  As  for  the  other  500,  he  thought  that  the  Ministry 
should  agree  to  their  completion,  work  having  already  started  and  the  firm's  costing 
methods  not  providing  for  `an  accurate  estimate  of  accounts'  until  the  entire  order  was 
completed.  Barr  &  Stroud's  opinion  was  that  the  Ministry  should  pay  in  full  for  whatever 
it  had  ordered,  but  unlike  other  makers,  there  is  no  evidence  of  desperation  or 
embarrassment.  On  the  18th,  Jackson  indicated  that  the  directors  were  happy  to  have  the 
contract  for  a  very  large  (and  expensive)  experimental  coast-defence  rangefinder 
cancelled,  so  long  as  the  Ministry  paid  for  all  `out  of  pocket  expenses'  incurred 
. 
31  The 
company  gave  every  impression  of  being  in  control  of  its  affairs,  although  lay-offs  were 
already  starting. 
The  first  were  the  female  workers  that  Barr  &  Stroud  had  begun  recruiting  once  the  need 
for  dilution  became  pressing  in  1917  32  Despite  detailed  planning  for  their  training  and 
integration,  it  was  always  clear  that  they  were  there  only  for  the  war's  duration.  On 
November  19th  Jackson  warned  that  redundancies  were  imminent  and  inevitable, 
advising  them  to  seek  alternative  work  before  large  numbers  of  other  redundant  women 
swamped  the  existing  vacancies  in  traditional  areas  of  female  employment.  3  The  next 
day  he  informed  the  local  Employment  Exchange  of  the  first  of  a  series  of  redundancies 
in  the  male  workforce  which  would  begin  on  November  30th.  The  women  numbered 
approximately  400  out  of  a  total  payroll  of  about  2,000,  but  there  is  no  surviving  record 
of  the  rate  at  which  they  were  released.  Presumably  their  dispersal  was  rapid,  because  by 
December  31",  only  112  men  out  of  1,600  had  been  given  notice,  34  which  was  a  much 
smaller  proportion  of  the  workforce  than  the  London  firms  had  threatened  to  dismiss  at 
short  notice. 
31  UGD  295/4/617,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  OMGD,  19.11.1918. 
32  see  Chapter  7  for  details  about  female  workers 
33  UGD  295/16/1/58,  Personal  Papers  of  Dr  W.  Strang:  works  notices. 
34  UGD  295/1611/58,  Personal  Papers  of  Dr  W.  Strang:  works  notices. 228 
This  may  have  been  because  Barr  &  Stroud  still  had  a  considerable  amount  of  Admiralty 
rangefinder  and  submarine  periscope  work.  Over  £140,000  of  orders  were  placed  during 
the  first  ten  months  of  1918,  besides  work  in  progress  from  the  previous  year's  total  of 
£264,000,  and  earlier  contracts  from  1916  35  These  were  not  affected  in  the  same  way  as 
War  Office  orders,  because  they  related  to  ship  construction  programmes  rather  than 
immediate  issues  to  troops.  Warships  already  fitting-out  were  in  no  danger  of 
cancellation,  even  though  the  urgency  of  completion  had  disappeared,  and  would  still 
need  their  outfits  of  rangefinders.  Besides  these,  large  numbers  of  anti-aircraft 
rangefinders  were  also  on  order  for  ships  in  commission  as  well  as  submarine  periscopes 
for  boats  nearing  completion,  none  of  which  seemed  threatened  with  premature 
conclusion.  In  addition,  the  Admiralty  had  ordered  a  number  of  experimental  long-base 
rangefinders  and  mountings  for  trials  in  an  effort  to  solve  the  gunnery  problems  disclosed 
at  the  Battle  of  Jutland  in  1916.36  Although  difficult  to  assess  precisely,  the  total  value  of 
Barr  &  Stroud's  Admiralty  business  in  November  1918  must  have  been  substantially  in 
excess  of  half  a  million  pounds,  with  a  good  proportion  of  it  looking  safe  from 
cancellation.  37 
There  was  also  a  considerable  amount  of  War  Office  work, not  all  of  which  was  expected 
to  terminate  prematurely.  Before  allowing  for  cancellations  and  consolidations,  some 
£292,000-worth  of  orders  had  been  placed  by  the  Ministry  between  March  and  October 
1918,  (excluding  contracts  to  repair  rangefinders)  which  meant  that  a  proportion  of  the 
workforce  could  be  kept  employed,  at  least  in  the  short-term.  38  Scarcely  a  week  after  the 
armistice,  the  company  decided  to  extend  the  lease  on  its  Woolwich  Arsenal  premises 
(where  instruments  for  repair  were  prepared  for  shipment  to  Glasgow)  for  a  year,  clearly 
signalling  it  had  no  immediate  fears  of  War  Office  business  vanishing  overnight.  39 
Nevertheless,  there  were  still  the  problems  of  diminished  government  trade.  The 
rangefinder  contract  discussed  in  November,  for  example,  was  worth  over  £100,000  and 
's  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/5  and  /6,  Customer  Order  files  1916-1919. 
36  UGD  295/19/2/5  and  /6,  Customer  Order  files  1918-1919. 
37  Estimated  from  figures  extracted  from  UGD  295/19/216  and  /7,  Customer  Order  files. 
38  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/6,  Customer  Order  files  1916-1919. 
39  UGD  295/4/634,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  lt,  T.  Lacey  at  Woolwich,  19.11.1918 229 
its  early  termination  involved  a  substantial  loss  of  profit  even  after  compensation.  In  the 
meantime,  deliveries  continued  and  there  was  the  question  of  payment  for  them. 
Established  practice  was  for  payment  only  after  goods  had  been  inspected  and  accepted 
at  Woolwich  Arsenal,  a  procedure  which  had  always  been  subject  to  delays.  0  The 
Ministry  had  been  persuaded  (or  bullied)  into  paying  a  monthly  `standard  advance  of 
£12,500'  for  instruments  delivered  and  waiting  inspection,  but  in  January  1919  it 
proposed  to  terminate  the  arrangement.  41  The  firm  would  have  none  of  this,  pointing  out 
that  dealing  with  the  Ministry  caused  a  `very  unsatisfactory'  cash  position,  illustrated  by 
a  December  debit  balance  to  the  Ministry  of  £37,921,  plus  another  £50,000  for  work  in 
progress.  Rather  than  terminating  the  advance,  said  Jackson,  the  Munitions'  Accounts 
Office  should  increase  it  to  £35,000.  The  Ministry  would  not  accept  Jackson's 
exhortation  to  be  more  generous,  but  it  did  maintain  the  existing  arrangement  until  the 
final  liquidation  payment  in  May  1919. 
Pressure  on  Barr  &  Stroud  to  accept  cancellations  on  the  Ministry's  terms  evidently 
grew.  By  the  end  of  January,  Jackson  had  refused  to  agree  that  no  further  deliveries 
would  be  accepted  after  certain  dates,  as  well  giving  clear  notice  of  Barr  &  Stroud's 
stance  on  the  subject  as  a  whole: 
We  cannot  ...  accept  cancellation  of  contracts  without  compensation, 
more  especially  as  the  reason  for  non-adherence  to  original  delivery  dates 
has  arisen  from  causes  entirely  beyond  our  control.  If  therefore  any  of  our 
contracts  are  deemed  to  be  cancelled  ...  we  reserve  the  right  to  claim  full 
compensation.  42 
Jackson  was  quoting  almost  verbatim  from  the  Special  Investigator's  report. 
40  see  Chapters  6  and  7  above. 
41  UGD  295/4/634,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Director  Munitions  Accounts,  21.1.1919,  provides  the  source 
material  for  the  rest  of  this  paragraph. 
42UGD  295/4/634.  Letter  book,  Jackson  to  Liquidator  of  Optical  Contracts,  27.1.1919,  and  UGD 
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The  skirmishing  continued,  particularly  over  the  large  order  for  2,000  rangefinders.  In 
early  March,  Jackson  told  the  Liquidator  that  if  the  Ministry  had  not  `interfered'  then  `.. 
. 
the  full  number  of  instruments  would  have  been  delivered,  and  presumably  the  full  profit 
would  have  been  made'.  43  The  `fair  way'  was  for  the  Ministry  to  pay  for  all  materials  and 
labour  used,  plus  the  previously  agreed  `oncost'  factor  of  70  percent,  plus  ten  percent  of 
that  total  for  profit,  and  another  ten  percent,  on  the  grand  total  for  `royalty'.  To  show  the 
firm's  reasonable  attitude  to  burdening  the  War  Office  with  unwanted  instruments,  Barr 
&  Stroud  would  then  buy  `the  balance  of  the  undelivered  rangefmders  at  an  agreed 
price'. 
The  firm  was  asking  compensation  for  some  650  instruments  at  the  rate  of  £44.20  each, 
and  its  offer  to  buy  them  back  amounted  to  £5,790,  or  less  than  L9  per  rangefinder.  44 
Even  though  far  less  than  the  cost  price,  it  was  no  trifling  sum,  implying  either  that  Barr 
&  Stroud  could  easily  afford  the  purchase,  or  that  there  was  some  client  in  mind  for 
them.  [If  there  was,  no  sale  followed;  many  of  them  were  still  in  store  in  the  late  1980s 
when  the  company  finally  left  Anniesland  when  they  were  given  gratis  to  any  employee 
who  wanted  one.  45]  By  the  29th,  the  Liquidator  had  agreed  to  almost  all  the  company's 
terms,  except  that  he  offered  only  5  percent  for  `royalty'  46  Jackson  stuck  to  the  firm's 
guns;  `We  think  we  are  entitled  to  some  special  consideration',  he  said,  as  they  had  been 
`inconvenienced'  and  in  any  case  it  was  now  `very  hard'  to  sell  rangefinders.  As  a 
parting  shot,  he  reminded  the  Liquidator  of  a  Government  notice  following  the  Armistice 
saying  that  `Contractors  for  war  materials  would  be  liberally  [sic]  dealt  with'.  By  May 
2nd,  the  Liquidator  had  apparently  given  way,  and  almost  all  the  negotiations  over  War 
Office  contracts  were  ended.  Jackson  then  wrote  that  £21,377  had  been  agreed  upon  for 
the  rangefinders  and  `Everything  is  now  settled  I  think,  except  for  our  claim  for 
... 
47  binocular  prisms'. 
43  UGD  295/4/634,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Liquidator,  Optical  Munitions  &  Glassware  Supply,  4.3.1919. 
"UGD  295/19/8/3,  War  Office  file,  papers  on  liquidation  of  rangefinder  contracts  1919,  Jackson  to 
Liquidator,  8.4.1919  and  29.4.1919. 
45  Personal  communication  from  Mr  David  Carson,  head  of  Barr  &  Stroud's  periscope  department  at  the 
time  of  the  move. 
46  UGD  295/4/634,  Letter  book,  Jackson  to  Liquidator,  Optical  Munitions  &  Glassware  Supply,  29.3.1919. 
47  UGD  295/4/634,  Letter  book,  Jackson  to  Liquidator,  Optical  Munitions  &  Glassware  Supply,  2.5.1919. 231 
Although  the  Ministry  had  officially  taken  over  responsibility  for  Admiralty  supplies  on 
June  30th  1917,  Barr  &  Stroud  continued  to  deal  directly  with  the  Navy  over  rangefinder 
contracts.  Sorting  out  those  cancellations  was  more  protracted  and  difficult  than  for  War 
Office  ones,  and  only  concluded  in  1925  after  much  negotiation  and  not  a  few  threats  on 
both  sides.  Discussions  began  with  the  Director  of  Admiralty  Contracts  in  August  1919 
and  displayed  the  firm's  willingness-  to  exploit  its  de  facto  monopoly  position.  48 
Prices  for  war-time  Admiralty  contracts  had  generally  been  calculated  on  the  same  basis 
as  for  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  the  formula  being  `labour  costs  +  materials  costs  + 
oncost  factor  +  profit  +  royalty'.  During  the  war  the  profit  and  royalty  elements  were 
standardised  at  10  percent  each,  with  materials  and  labour  being  calculated  being  the 
actual  prices.  The  `oncost  factor',  devised  in  the  1890s  to  cover  overheads  and 
background  expenses,  was  normally  set  at  70  percent.  The  firm,  remained  content  with 
this  formula  when  negotiating  settlements  with  the  Ministry,  but  things  went  differently 
with  the  Admiralty. 
Contracts  made  in  1917  and  1918  had  sometimes  departed  from  the  usual  arrangement, 
being  made  on  the  basis  of  a  fixed  sum  to  cover  both  the  `oncost',  and  `profit  and 
royalty'  elements.  In  1919,  when  these  came  under  scrutiny  for  liquidation,  Barr  & 
Stroud  became  concerned  that  compensation  payments  would  not  -  from  the  firm's  point 
of  view  -  fairly  reflect  the  value  of  lost  business.  In  August,  Jackson  pointed  out  that 
when  made  `there  was  an  expectation  of  a  long  period  of  continuous  work'  and  that  both 
wage  and  commodity  costs  had  been  lower.  49  Rising  costs  had  `rendered  quite  inadequate 
the  sums  originally  considered  fair  and  reasonable  to  cover  oncost  plus  profit'  so  that 
some  fixed-price  contracts  were  already  showing  a  loss,  and  others  only  a  'bare  margin 
of  profit'  making  it  `imperative'  for  the  firm  to  ask  for  a  revision  of  the  prices. 
The  money  involved  was  considerable,  Jackson  estimating  in  mid-September  1919  that 
the  amount  already  owing  on  them  was  `considerably  over  £50,000'.  There  were  also  a 
48  UGD  295/19/6/3,  Admiralty  file,  papers  on  liquidated  and  cancelled  contracts,  provides  the  source 
material  for  the  following  section,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
49  UGD  295/19/6/3,  Jackson  to  Director  of  Contracts,  8.8.1919. 232 
large  number  where  even  the  basis  for  payment  was  still  to  be  fixed.  The  company 
requested  that  all  terminated  contracts  be  settled  on  one  basis  irrespective  of  previous 
agreements,  amounting  to  a  retrospective  increase  in  prices.  To  do  this  took  no  little 
nerve  and  showed  considerable  self-confidence  because  the  fixed-sum  contracts  had  been 
freely  entered  into,  there  was  no  legal  ground  for  renegotiation,  and  by  leaving  open  the 
matter  of  final  profits  the  company  had  put  itself  in  a  weak  position.  As  the  client  no 
longer  urgently  needed  the  instruments,  Barr &  Stroud's  position  might  be  considered  to 
have  been  somewhat  weak. 
The  initial  response  from  the  Contracts  Department  certainly  showed  no  inclination  to 
help,  peremptorily  demanding  a  full  list  of  the  contracts  involved  and  the  full  disclosure 
of  profit  and  loss  accounts  from  1913  to  1918  50  In  addition,  the  Director  wrote  that  he 
was  prepared  to  send  the  matter  to  the  Treasury  Contracts  Committee  which  had  the 
power  to  make  a  final  decision  against  which  there  could  be  no  appeal,  implying  that  the 
firm  might  consequently  find  itself  even  worse  off.  Quite  unshaken,  Jackson  sent  only 
the  list  which  information,  he  pointed  out,  the  Director  already  had,  and  refused  to 
provide  accounts  or  balance  sheets,  saying  `We  do  not  see  that  they  can  furnish  any 
useful  information'.  51  In  fact,  there  were  as  yet  no  results  for  1917  and  1918;  like  other 
firms,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  found  the  war's  chaotic  trading  conditions  meant  that  accounts 
were  not  only  difficult  to  prepare  but  largely  meaningless  without  some  means  to 
disentangle  the  involvement  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  in  day-to-day  business  and  to 
allow  for  inflation.  52  As  for  the  threat  to  refer  matters  to  the  Treasury,  he  urged  the 
Director  of  Contracts  to  do  that  `with  the  least  possible  delay',  probably  confident  that 
the  threat  was  hollow.  (Having  lit  the  touch-paper,  the  firm  then  had  to  watch  it  bum  -a 
slow  process  which  continued  well  beyond  the  boundaries  of  this  study,  lasting  for  six 
years  before  the  Admiralty  eventually  settled  all  the  claims  virtually  in  full,  paying  out 
£356,808.  ) 
so  UGD  295/19/6/3,  Letter  Book,  Admiralty  to  Barr  &  Stroud  12.8.1919. 
s'  UGD  295/19/6/3,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Admiralty,  18.8.1919. 
52  UGD  295/11/1,  Balance  sheets,  profit  and  loss  accounts,  Jackson's  working  papers. 233 
These  apparently  fraught  negotiations  with  the  Contracts  Department  had  no  immediate 
effect  on  work  in  hand  although,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  following  chapter,  the  whole 
relationship  between  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  firm  came  under  scrutiny  at  the  Admiralty 
and  the  nature  of  that  association  began  to  change.  New  orders  in  1919  totalled  scarcely 
£10,000  but  there  was  still  a  substantial  amount  of  other  work  from  earlier  orders  in 
progress,  submarine  periscope  and  anti-aircraft  rangefinder  development  was  proceeding 
steadily  and  a  set  of  experimental  rangefinders  for  trials  nearing  completion.  53  Besides  all 
this,  the  company  was  examining  and  reporting  on  war-time  German  instruments  as  they 
came  into  the  Navy's  possession,  so  that  both  technical  staff  and  production  workers 
were  being  kept  busy  for  the  moment.  54 
Although  prepared  to  fight  for  as  much  as  possible  from  its  cancelled  contracts,  and 
although  certain  that  a  reduced  level  of  Admiralty  business  would  continue,  Barr  & 
Stroud  -  like  all  the  other  demobilised  optical  munitions  contractors  -  was  faced  with  a 
pressing  need  to  secure  additional  work  to  avoid  further  contraction.  Some  of  this  might 
come  from  foreign  navies  which  had  been  starved  of  up-to-date  instruments  during  the 
war,  but  in  early  1919  this  was  uncertain  and  hedged  about  with  political  considerations 
as  the  recent  combatants  considered  their  post-war  positions.  Diversification  into  civilian 
markets  was  one  way  for  Barr  &  Stroud  to  hold  its  plant  and  workforce  together. 
Michael  Moss  and  lain  Russell  have  given  a  useful  `broad-brush'  picture  of  the  firm's 
efforts  at  extending  its  product  base  immediately  after  the  Armistice,  and  William  Reid 
has  described  its  attempts  to  manufacture  and  market  binoculars.  5s  These  accounts  point 
out  the  company's  lack  of  experience  in  selling  to  non-government  customers,  indicate  a 
lack  of  adept  direction,  and  imply  failure  by  suggesting  that  the  resulting  financial 
benefits  were  at  best  minimal  and  sometimes  non-existent.  However,  scrutiny  of  the 
firm's  records  indicates  that  these  attempts  were  never  expected  greatly  to  support  the 
business,  and  that  the  concept  of  failure  in  commercial  marketing  is  actually 
ss  Extracted  from  UGD  295/19/2/6  and  /7,  Customer  Order  files  1919. 
S4  UGD  295/4/132,  Letter  Book,  J.  W.  French  to  Archibald  Barr,  3.5.1919. 
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inappropriate.  The  evidence  strongly  suggests  that  Barr  &  Stroud  never  saw  any 
substantial  future  for  itself  outside  optical  munitions  manufacture  and  that  the  apparent 
attempts  at  diversification  were  really  efforts  at  internally-generating  subsidies  to  support 
core  activities  in  the  lean  times  anticipated  following  the  war's  end. 
William  Reid  considered  that  the  decision  in  1919  to  start  production  of  binoculars  was 
not  propitiously  chosen.  He  maintained  that  this  was  `the  worst  period  in  history  to 
launch  such  a  venture',  as  large  quantities  of  war-surplus  glasses  came  onto  the  market  as 
soldiers  returned  home  with  improperly  retained  Army-issued  instruments  and  War 
Office  surplus  stocks  started  to  be  sold  off.  56  However,  an  official  decision  on  the  large- 
scale  disposal  of  stores  was  not  even  made  until  23'  September  1919,  when  the  intention 
put  before  the  Cabinet  was  that 
All  Government  Stores  in  the  UK,  and  in  every  theatre  of  war  and  all  ports 
whatsoever  to  be  declared  surplus  forthwith  and  sold  as  soon  as  possible, 
excepting  only  sufficient  to  provide  for  the  peacetime  requirements  of  the 
Fighting  Services  and  such  duly  authorised  reserves  as  prudence  may  require 
in  the  interests  of  safety...  57 
The  Government's  desire  was  clearly  to  be  rid  of  as  much  as  possible  in  the  shortest 
possible  time,  without  regard  to  prices  fetched: 
The  intention  is  to  release  storage  and  circulate  stores  and  materials  without 
delay  and  for  this  reason  sales  should  be  effected  even  at  reduced  prices, 
rather  than  hold  out  for  better  results  which  would  entail  the  retention  of 
storage  accommodation  which  the  commerce  of  this  country  so  badly  needs, 
and  which  is  hindering  trade.  58 
Although  there  was  the  possibility  of  binoculars  being  put  onto  the  market  at  very  low 
prices  in  late  1919,  this  could  hardly  have  been  known  by  the  company  earlier  in  the 
56  William  Reid  (2001)  p.  22. 
S'  PRO  WO  32/4947,  minute,  Secretary,  War  Cabinet  to  Secretary,  War  Office,  23.9.1919. 
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year.  And,  given  the  continual  shortages  of  such  instruments  being  complained  about  in 
the  Ministry's  own  war-time  weekly  reports,  the  high  war-time  attrition  rates,  and  the 
large  quantities  retained  by  the  Admiralty,  the  notion  of  an  avalanche  of  very  cheap 
59  binoculars  swamping  the  domestic  market  after  1919  cannot  readily  be  sustained. 
Reid  went  on  to  account  for  the  firm's  decision  partly  through  the  expectation  that  the 
substantial  pre-war  German  export  trade  in  optical  goods  would  not  be  resumed,  and 
partly  through  `restless  ambition  marinated  in  optimism'  60  Neither  of  these  suggestions 
stands  close  examination.  In  early  1919  there  had  been  no  indications  from  the  victorious 
Allies  that  any  peace  settlement  would  restrict  pre-war  German  trading  activities  and  so 
embargo  the  manufacture  or  export  of  optical  goods  61  What  was  certain,  though,  was 
that  the  disruption  of  pre-war  distribution  and  marketing  structures  suffered  by  the  more 
important  German  firms  in  Britain  meant  at  least  a  temporary  lack  of  optical  imports. 
Antje  Hagen  has  described  the  extent  of  their  pre-war  activities  and  how  the  problems 
they  faced  subsequent  to  the  Armistice  in  recovering  lost  assets  and  rebuilding  their 
operations  delayed  the  return  of  German-made  instruments  to  the  British  market.  62  Far 
from  being  `the  worst  period  in  history'  to  begin  manufacturing  binoculars,  from  Barr  & 
Stroud's  position  the  timing  was  not  only  good  but  even  imperative.  The  decision  to  start 
in  early  1919  had  nothing  to  do  with  ambition  or  optimism  but  was  rather  the  result  of 
the  firm's  realistic  assessment  of  its  immediate  needs  and  opportunities,  combined  with  a 
piece  of  sharp  commercial  opportunism. 
One  of  Barr  &  Stroud's  biggest  problems  was  the  retention  of  its  optical  workers. 
Building  a  self-sufficient  optical  department  had  been  difficult  because  precision  optical 
working  in  Glasgow  was  unknown  before  the  company  set  up  its  own  glass-working 
shop.  Unlike  the  London-based  optical  companies,  which  were  concentrated 
geographically  and  effectively  provided  themselves  with  a  pool  of  skilled  labour,  Barr  & 
Stroud  had  never  been  able  to  recruit  experienced  workers  locally.  Before  the  war  the 
s'  PRO  MUN  4/165,  MUN  4/166  and  MUN  4/167,  Weekly  and  Monthly  Reports. 
60  William  Reid  (2001)  p.  22. 
61  see  Jaffe  (1985)  Chapter  4. 
62  Antje  Hagen,  `Export  versus  Direct  investment  in  the  German  Optical  Industry'  Business  History, 
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business  either  had  to  entice  workers  from  far  afield  or  train  new  ones  from  scratch.  In 
1919,  for  the  first  time  Barr  &  Stroud  had  a  full  complement  of  optical  workers  carrying 
out  all  the  processes  needed  to  make  even  the  most  complex  rangefinders.  Loosing  them 
would  put  the  business  back  to  the  unsatisfactory  pre-war  state  when  it  depended  on 
outside  contractors  who  were  frequently  unable  to  work  to  the  required  standards.  The 
only  commercial  optical  product  with  sophisticated  lens  and  prism  systems  similar  to 
those  of  the  rangefinder  -  and  which  had  any  prospect  of  being  sold  in  substantial 
numbers  -  was  the  prismatic  binocular.  63  It  alone  offered  the  chance  of  keeping  the 
experienced  optical  workforce  employed  in  the  face  of  uncertain  prospects  for 
Government  orders. 
During  the  war,  Barr &  Stroud  had  contracted  to  make  120,000  prisms  for  the  Army's 
`Binocular  No.  3.64  This  was  the  first  time  they  had  been  mass  produced  in  Britain,  and 
the  firn  had  acquired  considerable  expertise  in  making  the  most  expensive  optical 
component  of  the  binocular.  When  the  war  ended,  the  contract  was  incomplete,  and  a 
large  number  of  prisms  were  still  at  Glasgow  in  various  stages  of  completion.  The  rough- 
moulded  glass  blocks  for  them  had  been  supplied,  at  the  Ministry's  expense,  by  Chance 
Brothers  Ltd.  When  the  prism  contract  was  `closed  down',  Barr &  Stroud  not  only 
claimed  compensation  but  also  offered  to  buy  the  blocks  still  at  Glasgow  at  well  below 
cost,  as  well  as  tendering  to  buy  a  large  number  of  binocular  `optical  sets'  (spherical 
lenses)  from  the  Liquidator  of  Munitions  Contracts  65  With  all  the  optical  components  to 
hand,  the  firm  then  needed  only  to  provide  the  mechanical  body  parts  and  assemble 
everything.  Binocular  manufacture  would  thus  initially  be  done  mainly  using 
components  bought  far  cheaper  than  normal  costs. 
The  decision  to  start  production  was  not  to  satisfy  any  `restless  ambition'  or  even  to 
enhance  the  firm's  profitability,  but  to  safeguard  the  future  of  the  optical  workshop  and 
its  skilled  staff;  as  one  of  the  firm's  directors  later  wrote,  `something  had  to  be  done 
63  H T.  Seeger,  Feldstecher:  Fernglaser  Im  Wandel  Der  Zeit  (Borken,  Germany:  Bresser-Optik,  1989),  and 
F.  Watson,  Binoculars,  Opera  Glasses  and  Field  Glasses  (Princes  Risborough,  Bucks:  Shire  Books,  1995) 
gives  background  information. 
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immediately  for  the  sake  of  the  optical  workers  ...  one  of  the  objects  of  the  decision  was 
to  keep  at  least  some  of  the  [optical  shop]  machines  in  operation'.  66  The  binocular 
project  was  the  product  of  what  was,  for  Barr &  Stroud,  a  typical  combination  of  altruism 
and  pragmatism.  The  desire  to  provide  employment  for  the  optical  shop  went  beyond  a 
philanthropic  ideal  in  wanting  to  do  something  simply  for  the  sake  of  the  workers. 
Disbanding  a  large  proportion  of  the  skilled  optical  hands  would  have  severely  weakened 
the  ability  to  handle  future  munitions  contracts  and  the  venture  was  conceived  principally 
as  a  way  of  holding  together  skilled  operatives  who  would  subsequently  have  been 
almost  impossible  to  replace.  The  directors,  through  shrewd  recognition  of  the  potential 
utility  of  newly-surplus  prisms  and  lenses,  set  about  creating  what  amounted  to  an 
internally  generated  subsidy  to  keep  the  optical  shop  in  existence. 
The  company  also  began  making  `Kinematograph'  machines.  67  These  cinema  film 
projectors  were  by  no  means  alien  to  Barr  &  Stroud's  munitions  products.  Besides  an 
optical  system,  they  used  geared  driving  and  other  mechanical  components  which  were 
related  to  the  mechanisms  in  the  rangefinders  already  being  made  at  the  factory.  The 
firm's  machine  tools  and  its  workers'  skills  could  readily  be  applied  to  their  production, 
and  it  was  expected  that  demand  for  them  would  quickly  begin  to  increase 
substantially-68  The  Ross  Optical  Company  and  A.  Kershaw  &  Sons  Ltd.,  both  optical 
munitions  makers  during  the  war,  also  made  similar  machines,  and  Kershaw  in  particular 
had  considerable  experience  with  them  that  dated  back  to  before  the  war.  69  By  April 
1919,  Barr  &  Stroud  had  a  contract  for  530  machines,  and  work  began  on  them  during 
June  7° 
The  profits  to  be  made  were,  however,  substantially  less  than  those  from  military  and 
naval  work.  The  contract  had  a  gross  value  of  £26,500,  but  Jackson  regarded  it  as 
unprofitable  compared  to  Government  work.  Each  machine  sold  at  £50,  apparently  based 
UGD  295  Unlisted  material:  J.  M.  Strang  manuscript  The  History  of  Barr  &  Stroud.  p.  124. 
67  Moss  &  Russell  (1988)  p.  103. 
68  Moss  &  Russell  (1988)  p.  104. 
69  Leeds  Industrial  Museum  Library,  Kershaw  material  (unclassified),  `A  Kershaw  &  Sons,  Leeds:  A  brief 
history  based  on  notes  by  Mr.  Cecil  Kershaw'. 
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on  the  actual  costs  of  labour  and  materials  and  influenced  by  other  makers'  prices, 
whereas  using  the  established  formula  for  optical  munitions  work  the  figure  would  have 
been  at  least  double.  Unlike  optical  munitions,  the  movie  projector  market  was  well 
supplied  and  competitive,  with  neither  demand  nor  need  for  innovation  or  technical 
superiority,  and  price  the  over-riding  consideration.  Jackson  believed  that  the  return  was 
inadequate  in  relation  to  the  margins  the  firm  had  always  enjoyed  on  its  munitions 
contracting  and  was  only  prepared  to  accept  it  because  he  felt  it  was  essential  to  keep  the 
plant  employed  for  the  company's  immediate  welfare.  71  Although  there  might  be  some 
future  profit,  the  principal  motivation  was  again  to  retain  as  many  skilled  workers  as 
possible.  As  with  the  binocular  optics,  even  relatively  rudimentary  work  at  a  reduced 
profit  was  better  than  losing  highly  experienced  fitters  whose  value  was  largely  in  their 
`savoir-faire'. 
The  other  moves  towards  diversification  taken  in  1919  and  mentioned  by  Moss  and 
Russell  were  never  likely  to  generate  significant  income.  72  Substantial  profits  were  again 
less  important  than  actually  doing  work.  The  simple  `Impactor'  golf  practice  device, 
made  for  another  company  to  sell,  kept  some  of  the  apprentices  busy  and  retained  them  at 
minimal  cost  to  the  business.  It  was  only  ever  made  in  small  numbers  and  eventually 
abandoned  when  its  parent  company  failed.  The  `Optophone'  was  a  complex  electrical 
instrument  intended  to  convert  printed  words  in  books  into  sounds  by  which  the  blind 
would  be  able  to  `read  books  by  ear',  and  really  was  an  expression  of  Archibald  Baff  's 
philanthropic  character.  73  It  never  proved  successful  and  was  eventually  allowed  to  fade 
away,  once  again  having  shown  a  loss  to  the  business.  A  plan  to  manufacture  motor  cycle 
engines  (which  employed  some  of  the  mechanical  techniques  used  in  making 
rangefinders)  was  also  taken  up  in  1919,  but  it  developed  slowly  and  the  decision  to  start 
production  was  not  taken  until  the  end  of  1920.  Eventually,  after  both  technical  and 
marketing  difficulties,  it  too  was  terminated  without  any  financial  benefit  to  the  firm. 
71  UGD  295/4/315,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Barr,  9.9.1919. 
72  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  pp.  104-106. 
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None  of  these  `great  efforts'74  to  move  into  commercial  lines  generated  much  in  the  way 
of  profits,  and  emphasise  the  extent  to  which  the  company's  expertise  and  success  was 
connected  with  optical  munitions.  Diversification  for  Barr  &  Stroud  was  not  intended  to 
move  into  new  territory,  but  was  a  means  of  holding  together  as  much  of  the  workforce 
as  possible  until  munitions  work  established  a  new  equilibrium.  The  months  following 
the  war's  end  were  characterised  by  uncertainty  about  the  future  for  the  whole  of  the 
optical  industry,  but  Barr  &  Stroud  alone  of  the  optical  munitions  makers  made  the 
decision  to  remain  wedded  to  that  now  unpredictable  speciality.  Where  all  the  other  firms 
saw  their  futures  in  the  civil  market,  Barr  &  Stroud  banked  on  its  core  activity  returning 
to  a  level  great  enough  to  sustain  the  business,  recognising  that  it  lacked  the  expertise  or 
infrastructure  to  move  quickly  and  successfully  into  large-scale  new  activities  which 
might  substantially  replace  optical  munitions  work.  Although  accepting  the  need  for 
short-term  amendments  to  its  product  range,  there  was  no  doubt  that  rangefinders  would 
continue  as  the  mainstay  of  the  business. 
7.5  Conclusion 
1919  was  a  significant  year  for  optical  munitions  manufacturing  in  Great  Britain.  It  saw 
the  large  and  specialised  war-time  industry  vanish  completely  within  a  few  months  as 
the  need  for  its  existence  disappeared.  In  one  way,  this  was  in  accord  with  what  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  had  planned  for.  When  Frederick  Cheshire  was  its  Joint  Head,  he 
had  worked  to  cultivate  a  climate  in  which  the  whole  of  optical  instrument  making  in 
Britain  would  be  brought  up  to  a  level  where  sophisticated  apparatus  could  be  designed 
and  made  economically  on  a  scale  large  enough  to  let  the  industry  compete  profitably 
with  foreign  makers  in  peace-time,  and  to  meet  all  the  country's  needs  in  the  event  of 
war.  The  notion  of  a  separate  optical  munitions  industry  had  no  place  in  Cheshire's 
philosophy,  and  much  of  his  efforts  had  gone  into  creating  what  he  saw  as  the  essential 
underpinnings  of  scientific  training  which  would  benefit  technical  optics  generally.  That 
his  ideas  for  reform  were  incomplete  when  the  war  ended  was  unfortunate,  and  the 
sudden,  premature  casting  loose  of  the  industry  from  government  work  was  bound  to 
have  serious  implications  for  the  future  of  the  optical  trade.  The  vicissitudes  suffered  by 
74  Moss  and  Russell  (1988)  p.  108. 240 
the  makers  of  civil  optics  after  1919  are  really  separate  to  this  account,  and  have  yet  to  be 
examined  and  analysed.  What  is  relevant  here  is  that  for  practical  purposes  the  optical 
munitions  industry  actually  reverted  to  its  pre-war  state  leaving  only  one  substantial 
maker  which  had  to  struggle  to  keep  its  capabilities  intact.  The  problems  encountered  by 
Barr  &  Stroud  were  analogous  to  those  suffered  by  specialist  armaments  makers,  and 
heighten  the  case  for  considering  optical  munitions  production  as  a  distinctly  separate 
activity  to  instrument  making  in  general.  The  weakness  of  Cheshire's  ideas  lay  in  failing 
to  recognise  this  and  put  in  place  in  any  mechanism  by  which  the  capacity  could  be 
maintained.  The  result  was  that  the  nation's  capability  for  optical  munitions  production, 
after  four  years  of  trial  and  effort  was  left  in  no  better  state  than  it  had  been  in  August 
1914,  with  only  one  company  retaining  either  the  inclination  or  ability  to  stay  in  the 
game.  Over  the  next  four  years,  Barr  &  Stroud  was  to  become,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  the  British  optical  munitions  industry,  as  the  following  chapter  relates. 241 
Chapter  8 
Adaptation  and  survival,  1919  to  1923 
8.1  Introduction 
The  period  from  1919  to  1923  was  extremely  difficult  for  the  optical  munitions  industry. 
The  peace  brought  new  political  attitudes  to  armaments,  and  the  resulting  shift  to  arms 
limitation  and  reduction  contrasted  sharply  to  the  pre-war  years  which  had  been 
characterised  by  the  willingness  of  governments  to  spend  heavily  on  military 
technologies.  Budgets  shrank,  and  the  War  Office  found  itself  with  surplus  optical 
munitions  which  would  not  need  replacing  for  a  considerable  time.  This  practically 
eliminated  demand  for  land  service  instruments  and  for  most  pre-war  producers,  military 
optics  ceased  to  be  viable  business.  Matters  were  different  with  sophisticated  naval 
instruments  such  as  large  rangefinders  and  submarine  periscopes,  where  demand  did  not 
vanish  because  progress  in  related  weapons  technologies  sustained  the  need  for 
improvements,  even  though  the  quantities  required  were  relatively  small.  Diminished 
requirements  meant  that  by  1923  only  one  British  company  was  still  substantially 
involved  in  complex  optical  munitions,  and  of  the  other  makers  mentioned  earlier,  only 
three  continued  occasionally  to  manufacture  less  complex  optics  for  the  forces.  Frederick 
Cheshire's  gloomy  assessment  of  optical  munitions  manufacture  in  1915  perhaps  came 
closer  to  the  truth  in  1923  than  when  he  originally  made  it;  fewer  firms  were  involved 
and  the  capacity  for  mass  production  even  less  than  before  the  war.  This  chapter 
examines  the  policies  and  strategies  devised  by  the  major  participants  and  examines  the 
extent  to  which  they  were  successful,  providing  another  reminder  of  how  the  optical 
industry  was  faced  with  further  difficulties  interacting  with  a  range  of  external  factors 
which  crossed  social,  economic  and  political  dimensions  and  added  to  the  internal 
problems  relating  to  the  technical  aspects  of  instrument  design  and  production.  The 
ability  of  Barr  &  Stroud  to  attain  a  significant  degree  of  success  in  resisting  the  tendency 
of  external  factors  to  force  it  onto  a  new  path  suggests  that  they  had,  in  Thomas  Hughes' 242 
words,  become  `systems  builders',  successfully  evolving  strategies  to  enable  them  to 
cope  successfully  with  maintaining  their  products  in  the  `enduring  whole'.  ' 
8.2  The  problems  facing  the  makers 
Optical  munitions  producers  have  previously  been  seen  as  part  of  general  instruments 
manufacturing  rather  than  the  armaments  industry,  and  it  has  been  assumed  their 
problems  were  those  of  the  makers  of  civil  optical  goods.  Mari  Williams  illustrated  a 
number  of  difficulties  faced  by  British  precision  instruments  producers,  and  Anita 
McConnell  described  the  problems  facing  Thomas  Cooke's  of  York.  2  Williams  identified 
problems  of  inadequate  research  and  development,  difficulties  of  providing  appropriate 
education  and  training,  and  the  threat  from  foreign  competition  which  benefited 
significantly  from  exchange  rate  advantages.  McConnell  dealt  generally  with  the 
commercial  problems  facing  Cooke's  trying  to  regain  its  pre-war  commercial  trade,  but 
gave  little  attention  to  its  munitions  activities  after  1919.  The  instruments  trade  certainly 
had  its  share  of  difficulties,  but  they  were  by  no  means  the  same  as  those  facing  the 
manufacturers  of  military  or  naval  optics.  The  weaknesses  identified  by  Williams  were 
not  always  found  in  the  munitions  makers,  and  even  where  they  were,  their  correction 
would  not  necessarily  have  benefited  individual  companies. 
The  principal  difficulty  for  makers  of  complex  service  optics  was  not  any  of  those 
touched  on  by  Williams  and  McConnell.  Scientific  training  was  not  lacking  at  Barr  & 
Stroud,  for  example,  nor  were  research  and  development  departments  absent  there  or  at 
Cooke's.  The  increasing  complexity  of  the  most  important  optical  munitions  made  them 
the  province  of  a  very  small  number  of  manufacturers  who  certainly  did  not  lack  the 
necessary  expertise  to  design  and  manufacture  them,  and  because  of  the  insistence  of 
domestic  supply  by  the  armed  forces,  questions  of  foreign  competition  were  irrelevant. 
Rather,  the  difficulty  was  that  the  massive  reduction  in  post-war  arms  budgets  made 
1  J.  Law,  `Technology  and  Heterogenous  Engineering:  The  Case  of  Portuguese  Expansion'  in  Bijker  et  al 
(1989)  p.  112. 
2  Roy  and  Kay  MacLeod,  `Government  and  the  Optical  Industry  in  Britain,  1914-18'  in  J.  M.  Winter,  ed. 
War  and  Economic  Development  (Cambridge:  University  Press,  1975),  Man  E.  W.  Williams,  The 
Precision  Makers:  a  History  of  the  Instruments  Industry  in  Britain  and  France,  1870-1939  (London: 
Routledge,  1994),  Chapters  5  and  6,  and  Anita  McConnell,  Instrument  Makers  to  the  World:  a  History  of 
Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms  (York,  England:  William  Sessions  Ltd,  1997)  pp  76-80. 243 
successful  involvement  difficult  because  of  the  paucity  of  orders.  Adding  to  the  problem 
was  the  peculiar  nature  of  naval  rangefinders  and  submarine  periscopes  compared  to  civil 
instruments  like  microscopes  and  spectrometers,  which  almost  wholly  precluded  the 
possibility  of  spin-off  that  could  have  aided  other  commercial  production.  These  key 
munitions  instruments  needed  technologies  and  manufacturing  facilities  unlike  those 
normally  employed  in  civil  instrument  making.  Although  precision  devices  requiring 
tolerances  similar  to  laboratory  instruments,  naval  rangefinders  and  periscopes  were 
massive  objects  requiring  welding  torches  and  30-foot  lathes  in  their  manufacture,  as 
well  as  heavy  lifting  gear  to  move  around  workshops.  Their  lenses  and  prisms,  although 
often  weighing  less  than  an  ounce,  were  buried  in  massively  complex  frameworks  that 
frequently  weighed  nearly  a  ton  and  whose  construction  required  specialised  tooling  and 
abilities  that  were  unknown  in  the  precision  instruments  industry.  To  move  between  one 
field  and  the  other  was  not  a  straightforward  exercise. 
Because  of  falling  demand  and  the  trade's  idiosyncratic  nature,  few  firms  showed  the 
inclination  and  ability  to  remain  substantially  in  optical  munitions  production.  Sir 
Howard  Grubb  &  Company  never  resumed  munitions  activities  after  the  Armistice  and 
ceased  entirely  to  be  involved,  whilst  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd,  whose  activities  had 
always  been  broadly  based,  struggled  for  several  years  to  remain  active  in  military  optics. 
Barr  &  Stroud,  whose  specialised  business  had  no  previous  commercial  lines,  found  it 
easier  to  remain  in  optical  munitions  than  to  diversify  into  civil  products.  Their  differing 
degrees  of  success  illustrate  how  difficult  it  was  to  make  headway  with  optical 
munitions  in  the  early  1920s.  Of  the  other  pre-1919  optical  munitions  makers,  all 
returned  to  their  civil  activities  and  continued  substantially  as  before,  with  a  handful 
occasionally  making  sighting  telescopes  or  prism  binoculars  when  the  War  Office  placed 
small  orders  for  them.  Only  A.  Kershaw  &  Sons  Ltd  of  Leeds  and  two  London 
companies  -  W.  Ottway  &  Co.  Ltd,  and  the  Ross  Optical  Company  Ltd  -  received  any 
War  Office  business  up  to  the  end  of  1923.3  They  all  regarded  military  contracting  as 
3  National  Archives,  Kew,  London  (subsequently  PRO)  WO 395/4,  Annual  Reports  of  the  Director  of 
Army  Contracts,  1920-1921  to  1923-1924. 244 
only  a  very  small  part  of  their  business,  picking  up  and  developing  pre-war  activities  as 
best  they  could. 
8.3  Sir  Howard  Grubb  &  Company 
The  one  important  company  that  failed  to  make  the  transition  back  to  its  pre-war  status 
was  the  original  maker  of  submarine  periscopes,  Sir  Howard  Grubb  &  Company.  The 
firm  had  made  them  right  from  the  introduction  of  submarines  in  the  Royal  Navy  in 
19014  and  had  been  the  sole  British  maker  until  the  Great  War,  when  Kelvin  Bottomley 
&  Baird  of  Glasgow  started  productions  The  company  shared  some  of  the  monopoly 
characteristics  of  Barr  &  Stroud,  but  with  important  differences  that  had  an  important 
bearing  on  its  ultimate  fate.  In  1917,  Sir  Howard,  the  firm's  sole  proprietor,  had  been 
forced  by  the  Admiralty  to  shift  periscope  production  from  Rathmines  near  Dublin  to  St 
Albans  in  Hertfordshire,  partly  to  reduce  the  risks  from  U-boats  when  shipping 
completed  instruments  across  the  Irish  Sea,  and  partly  through  security  fears  over 
political  unrest  in  Ireland.  6  The  choice  of  site  was  the  Admiralty's,  relocation  was  slow 
and  still  far  from  complete  when  the  war  ended,  leaving  the  business  in  a  difficult 
situation  from  which  it  never  really recovered. 
Grubb's  post-war  problems  were  probably  worse  than  for  any  other  long-established  fine 
recently  engaged  in  optical  munitions.  The  disruption  of  the  move  had  interfered  with 
both  periscope  production  and  contracts  for  less  complex  instruments,  which  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  had  largely  been  able  to  terminate  without  paying  substantial 
compensation.  7  The  narrow  interpretation  of  performance  clauses  to  the  Ministry's 
benefit,  despite  the  situation  having  been  forced  on  the  company,  denied  the  business  the 
useful  injections  of  cash  that  helped  many  others  to  ride  out  the  difficulties  of  translating 
their  manufacturing  back  to  pre-war  commercial  activities!  As  late  as  March  1919, 
although  work  on  small  instruments  was  still  being  carried  out  in  Dublin,  the  St  Albans 
`  See  Chapter  4  above. 
s  University  of  Glasgow  Archives,  Records  of  Kelvin  &  Hughes  Ltd,  UGD  33/4/2,  Inventories  and 
valuations,  1919. 
6  I.  S.  Glass,  Victorian  Telescope  Makers,  The  Lives  and  Letters  of  Thomas  and  Howard  Grubb  (Bristol: 
Institute  of  Physics  Publishing)  p.  213. 
7  Williams  (1994)  p.  106,  and  PRO  MUN  4/5306  Contract  cancellations  and  liquidation  advances. 
a  see  Chapter  8  above. 245 
factory  remained  incomplete  and  yet  to  start  production-9  This  was  not  really  the  result  of 
any  failure  on  the  company's  part,  and  it  is  hard  not  to  feel  some  sympathy  for  Sir 
Howard's  subsequent  plight. 
He  had  not  volunteered  to  make  the  move,  which  had  been  forced  on  him  through  the 
powers  of  the  Admiralty  under  the  Munitions  of  War  Act.  If  possible  he  would  have 
preferred  to  abandon  it  once  the  war  ended,  but  `the  arrangements  ... 
had  gone  so  far 
when  the  Armistice  occurred  that  it  was  impossible  to  go  back',  10  and  in  any  case  neither 
the  Admiralty  nor  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  were  eager  to  relinquish  war-time  controls. 
The  Dublin  works  were  under  military  guard  to  protect  government  stores  from  expected 
civil  unrest,  and  he  believed  his  business  would  not  be  free  `for  some  time  yet'.  This, 
along  with  the  Rathmines  works'  partially  dismantled  condition  and  the  unfinished  state 
of  the  St  Albans  site  meant  that  he  could  neither  take  up  unfinished  pre-war  contracts  for 
astronomical  telescopes  nor  complete  whatever  government  work  there  was  on  hand.  " 
Adding  to  these  woes  was  widespread  industrial  unrest  in  Ireland  which  prevented  the 
shipping  of  `three  hundred  tons  of  machinery'  still  missing  from  the  new  works  and 
ii}terfered  with  operations  at  the  already  disrupted  Irish  factory.  The  choice  of  the  new 
factory  had  been  entirely  the  Admiralty's,  and  there  seems  to  have  been  little  enthusiasm 
for  the  whole  project  within  the  company.  With  some  prescience,  Sir  Howard  noted  in 
1919  that  `I  am  afraid  we  are  in  for  a  bad  time'.  12 
He  was  quite  right.  By  August  1921,  even  with  the  transfer  to  St  Albans  finally  complete, 
things  were  going  badly.  The  recession  had  set  in,  and  Grubb  was  in  low  spirits;  he  wrote 
to  an  overseas  client  who  was  still  awaiting  a  large  astronomical  telescope  ordered  before 
the  war  that  `It  is  very  difficult  for  an  outsider  to  understand  the  state  of  things  in  this 
countryjust  now  ... 
factories  closing  or  closed  all  around,  everyone  trying  to  realize,  no 
one  buying 
... 
'.  13  His  business  was  by  then  in  straitened  circumstances.  Periscope 
manufacture,  the  mainstay  of  Grubb's  optical  munitions  work,  had  stopped  once  the 
9  Glass  (1998)  p.  214. 
1°  Glass  (1998)  p.  214,  Grubb  to  Inns,  27.3.1919. 
"  see  PRO  MUN  4/5306,  Contract  Cancellations  and  Liquidation  Advances. 
'Z  Glass  (1998)  p.  215. 
13  Glass  (1998)  p.  215,19.8.1921,  Grubb  to  Ines. 246 
move  from  Dublin  began  and  never  restarted.  Almost  no  new  civil  astro-telescope  work 
had  come  in,  and  existing  orders  were  very  much  behind  schedule.  The  business  was 
barely  surviving. 
The  loss  of  the  periscope  business  was  critical  and  contributed  substantially  to  the  firm's 
dire  condition  in  the  early  1920s.  Grubb  was  by  inclination  a  telescope  maker  who  had 
been  drawn  into  optical  munitions  around  the  time  of  the  Boer  War  through  an 
association  with  the  armaments  firm  of  Vickers,  and  the  production  of  submarine 
periscopes  had  almost  certainly  helped  the  business  financially  before  1914.14 
Astronomical  telescopes  were  never  renowned  for  producing  high  profits,  and  payment 
for  them  frequently  protracted.  ls  Both  McConnell  and  Glass  illustrated  the  uncertain 
economics  of  that  business,  and  Grubb  had  benefited  from  the  regular  substantial 
payments  that  periscope  manufacture  and  servicing  brought  in.  16  Although  he  had 
enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  supply,  its  nature  was  significantly  different  to  Barr  &  Stroud's 
position  with  rangefinders.  Unlike  Barr  &  Stroud,  Grubb  had  never  dealt  directly  with 
the  Admiralty,  either  individually  or  as  a  business,  and  consequently  failed  to  establish 
the  same  rapport  that  Barr  &  Stroud  enjoyed.  His  relationship  with  Vickers,  established 
when  they  first  became  involved  with  submarines,  evolved  into  that  of  sub-contractor, 
and  his  periscopes  were  supplied  direct  to  Vickers  (for  many  years  the  monopoly  builder 
of  submarines)  who  delivered  the  boats  fitted  with  them.  The  Navy's  technical 
requirements  for  periscopes  went  to  Vickers,  who  then  passed  them  to  Grubb.  In 
consequence  of  this  separation,  Sir  Howard  was  unable  to  build  up  the  connections  that 
Barr  &  Stroud  enjoyed  with  the  Navy,  and  this  ultimately  contributed  to  his  loss  of 
periscope  manufacture. 
In  1915,  the  Admiralty  had  approached  Barr  &  Stroud  to  see  if  a  rangefinder  could  be 
incorporated  into  its  existing  periscopes.  That  proved  impossible,  but  the  company 
"  Glass  (1998)  p.  206. 
's  H.  C.  King,  The  History  of  the  Telescope  (London:  Charles  Griffin  &  Co.  Ltd,  1955),  Chapters  XV  and 
XVII  provide  background  material. 
16  Cambridge  University  Library,  Vickers  Collection  (subsequently  CUL/VC):  Document  739,  Periscopes 
-  correspondence  with  Sir  Howard  Grubb  1908-1908:  Document  1003,  Electric  Boat  Company 
correspondence  1901-1907. 247 
offered  to  make  an  entirely  new  type  incorporating  a  specially  designed  rangefinder  that 
would  readily  replace  the  instruments  in  boats  already  in  service.  "  The  proposal  was 
accepted  and  a  contract  placed  in  1917  not  only  for  it,  but  also  trial  models  of 
conventional  types.  18  This  involvement  of  Barr  &  Stroud  in  periscope  design  and 
manufacture  came  at  a  most  inopportune  moment  for  Grubb.  At  the  same  time  that  the 
Admiralty  was  insisting  periscope  manufacture  be  shifted  to  England  unavoidably 
interrupting  deliveries,  setting  up  an  additional  supplier  would  have  made  sense,  but  that 
was  not  the  principal  motive  for  the  Navy's  involving  Barr  &  Stroud.  Neither  was  there 
any  complaint  about  Grubb's  periscopes.  They  were  generally  satisfactory  by 
contemporary  standards,  and  were  also  being  made  by  Kelvin  Bottomley  &  Baird  at 
Glasgow,  presumably  to  ensure  sufficient  output  during  the  war.  19  But,  the  Royal  Navy 
was  minded  to  have  a  combined  rangefinder-periscope  and  Grubb  had  no  background  in 
rangefinder  design  which  was  even  more  complex  and  problematical  than  the 
periscope's.  It  made  more  sense  to  approach  Barr  &  Stroud  for  the  novel  instrument 
because,  unlike  Grubb,  that  firm  not  only  had  wide  rangefinder  experience,  but  also  a 
large  design  department,  a  secure  factory,  and  -  most  importantly  -  had  come  to 
command  the  confidence  of  the  Navy.  The  anticipated  interruption  of  Grubb's  output  in 
the  planned  move  to  England  added  to  the  Navy's  inclination  to  draw  Barr  &  Stroud  into 
periscope  manufacture.  Grubb's  vulnerability  was  unfortunate,  and  in  large  measure 
neither  his  own  creation  nor  the  result  of  ineptitude.  Nevertheless,  this  combination  of 
circumstances  completely  removed  Grubb's  primacy  in  periscope  making  and  transferred 
that  role  to  Barr  &  Stroud  which  not  only  replaced  Grubb  as  the  Navy's  preferred 
supplier  but  eventually  attained  a  monopoly. 
Grubb's  company  struggled  unsuccessfully  after  1918,  and  the  St  Albans  works  never 
became  fully  operational.  In  1920  Sir  Howard  tried  to  `re-organise  [the]  business  on  a 
very  much  enlarged  basis'  for  astro-telescope  work,  but  this  was  never  carried  through.  2° 
17  Michael  Moss  &  lain  Russell,  Range  &  Vision:  The  First  Hundred  Years  of  Barr  &  Stroud  (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream  Publishing,  1988)  pp.  83  and  84. 
1E  UGD  295/19/2/5,  Customer  Order  records  1917. 
19  Norman  Friedman,  U.  S.  Submarines  through  1945  (Annapolis,  Maryland:  Naval  Institute  Press,  1995), 
Appendix  B  provides  background  material. 
20  Glass  (1998)  p.  215,  Grubb  to  Ines,  26.5.1921. 248 
By  October  1922,  the  company  was  `weak  financially  and  probably  in  the  hands  of  their 
bankers  21  and  in  1923  there  were  still  `confused  heaps  of  material  ... 
lying  on  the  new 
workshop  floors'  including  parts  for  submarine  periscopes  whose  contracts  had  been 
terminated  in  1919.22  The  relocation  of  the  business  had  a  catastrophic  effect  on  its 
ability  and  efficiency-,  it  ceased  entirely  to  produce  optical  munitions,  continued  to 
decline  as  a  builder  of  large  astro-telescopes  and  eventually,  in  January  1925,  went  into 
liquidation.  23 
Grubb's  failure  as  an  optical  munitions  maker  resulted  principally  from  being  compelled 
to  relocate  to  England.  A  second,  but  inseparable,  cause  was  the  coincidental  decision  of 
the  Admiralty  to  bring  Barr  &  Stroud  into  periscope  manufacture,  which  opened  an 
opportunity  for  that  firm  to  assume  Grubb's  previous  role.  The  massive  disruption  that 
followed  the  move  was  entirely  predictable,  but  although  Grubb  was  opposed  to  moving 
he  lacked  the  ability  to  dissuade  either  the  Admiralty  or  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  from 
the  idea.  The  inability  to  resolve  the  chaos  once  the  war  ended  and  the  income  from 
munitions  contracts  ceased,  reflected  Grubb's  financial  weakness  and  compromised  his 
ability  to  take  up  his  pre-war  commercial  work;  it  also  crippled  his  prospects  of 
continuing  to  be  competitive  with  his  conventional  periscopes  which  were  not 
immediately  superseded  and  continued  satisfactorily  in  service  for  many  years 
afterwards.  4  For  Sir  Howard  Grubb,  the  war  had  brought  no  lasting  benefits.  His 
business,  more  than  any  other  in  optical  munitions,  suffered  through  serving  the  State. 
The  firm's  subsequent  failure  as  an  instrument  maker  stemmed  from  the  harmful  effects 
of  Admiralty  enforced  policies  during  the  war  rather  than  the  shortcomings  identified  by 
Mari  Williams  in  the  civil  precision  instruments  industries. 
21  Glass  (1998)  p.  216,  Innes  to  Secretary  of  State,  Pretoria,  19.5.1923. 
u  Glass  (1998)  p.  215,  Frank  Robbins  report. 
23  Glass  (1998)  p.  225. 
u  Cumbria  Archives,  Barrow-in-Furness:  Vickers  Material  BDB  16/500,  handbooks,  and  specifications, 
various  dates,  1918  to  1927. 249 
8.4  Thomas  Cooke  &  Sons  Ltd  (Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms  Ltd  from  1922)25 
The  fate  of  Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms  in  1923  had  many  similarities  with  Sir  Howard 
Grubb's  business,  but  its  route  there  was  very  different.  Cooke's  had  a  broader  base  in 
optical  work  -  including  service  optics  -  than  Grubb,  although  its  earlier  importance  to 
the  British  service  was  far  less.  The  company  had  ceased  to  be  independent  when 
Vickers  acquired  70  percent  of  its  shares  in  1915,26  a  circumstance  that  bore  heavily  on 
its  post-war  course.  The  wider  involvement  in  ordnance  products  and  the  support  of  the 
massive  armaments  company  should  have  placed  the  business  in  a  stronger  position  to 
compete  in  optical  munitions  work,  but  Cooke's  struggled  to  make  headway  after  the 
war,  losing  money  until  eventually  its  parent  withdrew  support  and,  like  Grubb,  it  went 
into  liquidation.  As  with  Grubb,  the  company  lacked  any  close  rapport  with  the  Royal 
Navy,  and  despite  the  connections  its  parent  company  already  had  with  the  Department 
of  Naval  Ordnance,  it  never  built  up  the  kind  of  relationship  that  had  always  worked  in 
Barr  &  Stroud's  favour. 
The  relationship  between  Vickers  and  Cooke's  is  not  easy  to  understand,  and  even  the 
reason  for  buying  such  a  large  stake  in  the  firm  is  unclear.  J.  D.  Scott  considered  it  was 
`to  bring  a  particular  product  more  directly  under  control',  meaning  the  mechanical  fire 
control  instruments  that  Cooke's  were  already  supplying.  7  This  may  be  correct,  but 
Vickers  was  probably  more  interested  in  the  connections  Cooke's  had  with  the  Argo  Co. 
Ltd.,  which  was  the  marketing  agency  for  the  Pollen  system  of  naval  gunnery  control  that 
had  been  rejected  by  the  Admiralty  in  191428  Not  only  did  Cooke's  make  all  its 
mechanical  elements,  the  firm  had  also  introduced  a  sophisticated  long-base  rangefinder 
for  it  that  was  radically  different  from  the  Barr  &  Stroud  pattern  and  promised  to  be 
superior.  29  Cooke's  had  a  majority  interest  in  Argo,  so  that  by  acquiring  the  one,  Vickers 
acquired  the  other  as  well.  Cooke's  was  the  only  other  British  company  to  have 
constructed  a  large  naval  rangefinder  before  the  war,  it  was  highly  competent  in  optical 
u  The  term  'Cooke's'  is  used  to  describe  both. 
26  J.  D.  Scott,  Vickers,  A  History  (London:  Weidenfeld  &  Nicolson,  1962)  p.  132. 
27  Scott  (1962),  p.  132. 
28  J.  T.  Sumida  In  Defence  of  Naval  Supremacy;  Finance,  Technology,  and  British  Naval  Policy  1889-1914 
(London:  Routledge,  1993),  Chapter  6  provides  a  full  account  of  these  events. 
21  McConnell  (1992)  p.  74. 250 
design,  and  offered  Vickers  an  opportunity  to  integrate  optical  munitions  capability  into 
its  other  armaments  operations.  Cooke's  importance  to  Vickers  lay  partly  in  its  optical 
expertise  and  partly  in  its  ability  to  tackle  the  specialised  optical  and  mechanical 
engineering  needed  for  complex  optical  munitions.  What  Vickers  did  not  do,  though,  was 
to  take  over  the  day  to  day  running  of  the  firn,  nor  even  to  establish  a  strong  presence  on 
its  board.  3°  Instead,  the  business  was  left-very  much  to  its  own  devices,  with  its 
munitions  department  coming  under  Cooke's  general  management  and  accounting 
structure. 
Although  there  was  much  to  commend  the  idea  of  integrating  Cooke's  into  Vickers 
armaments  operation  as  a  base  for  optical  munitions  manufacture,  the  exercise  ultimately 
proved  costly  and  problematical.  Cooke's  had  not  been  asked  to  make  sophisticated 
optics  for  either  the  War  Office  or  Admiralty  during  the  war,  all  its  production  being  for 
relatively  simple  sighting  telescopes,  none  of  which  were  the  company's  monopoly.  Nor 
had  it  actually  sold  any  rangefinders  to  either  British  or  foreign  governments  because  all 
the  deals  that  were  in  progress  before  the  war  were  frozen  by  the  hostilities.  1  As  a  result, 
Vickers  owned  an  optical  instruments  company  with  no  proven  record  in  complex 
armaments  optics,  which  had  no  programme  to  develop  new  products  -  civil  or  military  - 
and  which  was  also  in  a  weak  financial  condition.  Unlike  Barr &  Stroud,  Cooke's  had  no 
experience  in  selling  to  foreign  armed  forces,  and  its  name  lacked  sufficient  cachet  to 
command  the  attention  of  prospective  buyers.  All  the  potential  for  optical  munitions  sales 
actually  lay  in  the  firm's  ability  to  design  and  manufacture  instruments  nominated  by 
Vickers  as  a  result  of  its  own  armaments  experience.  The  failure  by  Vickers' 
management  to  separate  civil  and  military  optical  products  meant  that  the  parent 
company  found  itself  propping  up  a  business  that  struggled  to  overcome  the  problems  of 
post-war  re-adjustment,  whilst  the  munitions  products  that  were  developed  under 
Vickers'  aegis  failed  to  find  markets  either  at  home  or  abroad. 
30  No  mention  of  any  such  steps  occurs  in  CUUVC  Document  1366,  Directors'  Minute  Book,  entries  1920 
to  1924,  and  University  of  York,  Borthwick  Institute,  Vickers  Instruments  Archive  (subsequently  VIA) 
AJB  030/1.1.1,  Cooke  Directors'  Minute  Book,  entries  1915  onwards. 
31  McConnell  (1992)  p.  74. 251 
Cooke's  had  never  been  a  particularly  profitable  business  and  although  its  accounting 
records  have  not  survived,  by  late  1922  the  company  was  clearly  struggling  despite  its 
recent  acquisition  of  one  of  its  instrument-making  rivals,  Troughton  &  Simms  Ltd.  of 
London.  32  This  had  actually  been  done  with  Vickers'  encouragement  and  money,  but  it  is 
unclear  how  Vickers  might  have  benefited  from  it.  33  Troughton  &  Simms  was  a  smaller 
firm  which  had  little  expertise  in  optical  munitions,  its  war-time  activities  had  been  on  a 
smaller  scale  than  Cooke's,  and  its  design  capabilities  virtually  non-existent.  Anita 
McConnell  suggested  that  Vickers  were  persuaded  into  the  acquisition  because 
Troughton  &  Simms'  management  was  better  than  Cooke's,  producing  `competitive 
goods  at  lower  prices'.  34  This  is  doubtful:  the  London  firm  was  also  financially  weak  and 
Elinor  Mennim  showed  that  after  1920  there  was  a  crucial  lack  of  effective  direction  and 
management,  with  strong  disagreement  between  the  two  principal  family  shareholders 
whose  chief  desire  was  to  be  rid  of  the  responsibility  of  running  the  business  in 
increasingly  difficult  conditions.  S  Whatever  the  underlying  reasons  for  the  purchase,  the 
result  was  a  further  weakening  of  Cooke's  overall  condition  and  the  merged  company 
continued  to  decline. 
Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms  was  not  actually  selling  any  optical  munitions,  although  it 
had  prepared  designs  and  built  prototypes  of  instruments  that  Vickers  hoped 
subsequently  to  market.  Vickers'  aviation  interests  led  to  a  `Prismatic  Bomb  sight'  being 
manufactured  in  1919,  as  well  as  an  `Aeroplane  Periscope'  that  allowed  a  pilot  to  see  the 
ground  directly  under  his  aircraft.  36  The  following  year,  Vickers'  naval  interests  led  to 
new  designs  of  large  naval  rangefinders  for  Admiralty  trials  to  decide  on  future  standard 
types,  and  in  1920  and  1921  a  number  of  rangefmders  and  range-and-heightfmders  were 
constructed  for  both  surface  and  anti-aircraft  use.  37  This  must  have  been  an  additional 
drain  on  Cooke's  resources.  The  Admiralty  was  accustomed  to  having  trial  instruments 
32  McConnell  (1992)  p.  77. 
33  CUUVC  Document  1366,  Directors'  Minute  Book,  entry  30.9.1920. 
34  McConnell  (1992)  p.  77. 
35  VIA  AJB  050/1.2.3,  Troughton  &  Simms  Balance  Sheets  1914-1919,  Income  Tax  Papers  and  Stock 
Figures  provide  financial  details,  and  E.  Mennim,  Reid  's  Heirs:  a  Biography  of  James  Simnxs  Wilson 
(Braunton,  Devon:  Merlin  Books,  1990)  p.  127  describes  family  relationships. 
36  NqAkM  070/13,  Index  to  Optical  Munitions  Drawings,  references  3524  and  3677. 
37  VIA  AJB  070/13,  Index  to  Optical  Munitions  Drawings,  references  3434  to  3492,  and  3860. 252 
supplied  gratis,  and  the  costs  of  developing  them  were  expected  to  be  borne  by  the 
submitting  company,  which  may  explain  both  why  the  Vickers'  Board  was  starting  to 
register  concerns  over  Cooke's  finances  and  why  it  was  prepared  to  keep  underwriting 
the  losses.  8 
The  Vickers  finance  committee  had  forecast  in  September  1920  that  Cooke's  bank 
overdraft  would  exceed  £58,000  by  the  following  June.  Cooke's  bankers  (who  were  not 
Vickers')  were  obviously  uneasy,  having  recently  refused  to  raise  the  existing  overdraft 
ceiling  of  £45,000,  and  in  consequence  Vickers  had  to  lend  Cooke's  £15,000  to  meet 
immediate  needs.  In  addition,  another  £75,000  was  needed  to  cover  liabilities  for  Excess 
Profits  Duty.  By  February  1921  Vickers'  loans  stood  at  £39,000,  and  Cooke's  bankers 
were  asking  for  the  overdraft  to  be  guaranteed,  a  further  indication  of  their  doubts  over 
the  firm's  finances.  The  deterioration  continued  with  a  trading  loss  of  £10,000  for  the 
financial  year  ended  30th  September  1922.  The  now-guaranteed  overdraft's  ceiling  was 
increased,  with  Vickers'  support,  first  to  £60,000  and  then  to  £80,000  in  the  following 
January.  The  trading  loss  for  1922-1923  worsened  to  £16,183  with  unpaid  Excess  Profits 
Duty  of  over  £22,000  still  to  find  besides,  and  by  then  it  was  clear  that  Cooke's  was  no 
longer  a  viable  business.  9  Vickers  finally  `grew  tired  of  pumping  cash  into  an  ailing 
company'  late  in  1923  and  liquidated  the  firm  in  the  following  Spring.  40 
The  only  optical  munitions  designs  recorded  at  York  from  1921,  when  Cooke's  position 
was  seriously  worsening,  until  the  close  of  1923  were  some  observation  periscopes  for 
naval  gun  turrets  and  a  prismatic  sight  for  the  Vickers-Berthier  light  machine  gun  which 
Vickers  hoped  to  sell  to  the  War  Office  and  the  Indian  Army.  41  Like  the  earlier 
rangefinders  and  aeroplane  instruments,  these  came  to  nothing.  The  observation 
periscopes,  for  some  unexplained  reason,  were  actually  made  by  Barr  &  Stroud,  42  and  the 
machine  gun  sight  languished  because  neither  prospective  client  made  its  mind  up  about 
32  see  Barr  &  Stroud's  previous  experiences  described  in  earlier  chapters  above. 
39  CUINC  Document  1366,  Directors'  Minute  Book,  entries  30.9.1920,24.2.1921,19.7.1922,28.9.1922, 
23.1.1923,28.3.1924  and  2.5.1924. 
40  McConnell  (1992)  p.  79. 
"  VIA  AJB  070/1.3,  Index  to  Optical  Munitions  Drawings,  references  3905  and  3906. 
42  UGD  295/4/336,  Letter  Book,  Harold  Jackson  to  Vickers,  12.7.1922. 253 
the  Vickers-Berthier  gun.  The  rangefinders  produced  for  the  Admiralty  trials  in  1921 
failed  to  convince  the  Royal  Navy  of  their  superiority  (although  Barr  &  Stroud  saw  them 
as  a  serious  threat  and  worried  about  prospects  until  May  1922),  43  and  the  aeroplane 
instruments  apparently  never  went  into  production.  Not  a  single  Cooke-Vickers  optical 
project  successfully  generated  orders  between  1919  and  the  end  of  1923. 
The  difficulty  in  understanding  Vickers'  relationship  with  Cooke's  is  illustrated  by  the 
acquisition  of  marketing  rights  for  Barr &  Stroud  products  in  Spain  in  1921  and  the 
willingness  to  have  Cooke  observation-periscope  designs  made  by  Barr  &  Stroud.  44The 
marketing  rights  included  both  naval  and  land-service  rangefinders,  both  types  which 
Cooke's  was  already  able  to  make.  One  possible  answer  for  the  agency  acquisition  is  that 
Vickers  was  then  working  hard  to  sell  the  Spanish  government  an  entire  coast-defence 
gunnery  system,  and  it  may  be  that  the  client  had  shown  a  preference  for  the  proven  and 
familiar  Barr  &  Stroud  instruments,  rather  than  because  Vickers  doubted  Cooke's  ability 
eventually  to  manufacture  a  competitive  product  45  It  would  have  made  no  sense  for 
Vickers  to  prejudice  a  very  large  project  through  a  refusal  to  supply  something  the 
customer  preferred  or  demanded.  Whatever  the  reasoning,  Spain  bought  sixteen  Barr  & 
Stroud  field-artillery  rangefinders  worth  £2,000  through  Vickers  in  1922  and  £9,837  of 
larger  models  the  following  year,  and  afterwards  no  more  attempts  to  promote  Cooke- 
Vickers  rangefinders  were  made.  6A  satisfactory  explanation  for  out-sourcing  the 
periscopes  is  harder  to  find,  but  whatever  the  reason,  Vickers  chose  to  go  outside  its  own 
organisation  for  a  product  which  it  could  have  made  itself.  This  was  scarcely  an 
expression  of  confidence  in  Cooke,  Troughton  &  Simms,  and  possibly  by  the  time  Barr 
&  Stroud  were  given  the  order  the  Vickers  Board  had  already  written-off  the  idea  of 
using  Cooke's  for  optical  munitions  production. 
Vickers'  attempts  to  capitalise  on  the  integration  of  optical  capacity  into  its  armaments 
business  did  not  fail  because  of  the  difficulties  Cooke's  had  in  marketing  its  civil 
43  UGD  295/4/334,  Letter  Book,  Harold  Jackson  to  F.  Morrison,  2.5.1922. 
"  Vickers  CUL/VC  1367,  Directors'  Minute  Book  9,27.10.1921. 
45  CUIJVC  1367,  Directors'  Minute  Book  9,27.10.1921. 
"UGD  295/19/2/11,  Customer  Order  files  1923. 254 
products.  The  lack  of  success  was  firstly  because  the  amount  of  new  munitions  business 
available  at  home  and  abroad  was  small  and  secondly  because  all  the  advantages  lay  with 
the  established  and  demonstrably  successful  competition.  Even  if  Cooke's  had  been  a 
profitable  instruments  company,  Vickers'  efforts  at  developing  a  range  of  optical 
munitions  would  still  not  have  succeeded  up  to  1923.  That  failure  was  almost  inevitable, 
given  the  scarcity  of  government  business  and  Cooke's  previous  lack  of  success  in 
selling  ordnance  products  in  competition  with  rivals.  Faced  with  a  dominant  and  proven 
domestic  competitor,  and  in  the  absence  of  either  demonstrable  functional  failure  in  the 
Navy's  rangefinding  instruments  or  being  able  to  demonstrate  any  presumptive  anomaly, 
Vickers  had  little  chance  of  displacing  Barr  &  Stroud  as  the  Admiralty's  preferred 
supplier.  Cooke's  failure  as  an  instrument  maker  and  Vickers'  failure  as  an  optical 
munitions  supplier  were  quite  separate  issues. 
Left  alone,  Cooke's  would  probably  not  have  continued  with  optical  munitions  after  the 
war.  Its  earlier  efforts  had  brought  no  financial  rewards,  and  the  firm  probably  felt  it  had 
suffered  through  its  association  with  the  vexatious  Arthur  Pollen's  dealings  with  the 
Admiralty.  47  War-time  munitions  profits  had  been  small  as  a  result  of  State  taxation 
policies,  and  like  almost  every  other  maker  Cooke's  finished  in  a  weaker  state  than  when 
it  began  as  a  munitions  conscript.  That  the  firm  was  a  reluctant  player  in  1919  does  not 
necessarily  mean  it  would  have  survived  solely  as  an  instrument  maker  -  the  vicissitudes 
of  the  British  instruments  industry  described  by  Mari  Williams  were  felt  as  keenly  by 
Cooke's  as  by  anyone  else.  The  company's  potential  utility  to  Vickers  justified  continued 
support  only  until  it  eventually  became  clear  that  no  substantial  optical  munitions  work 
was  likely  in  the  foreseeable  future,  and  that  matters  relating  to  Cooke's  civil 
manufacturing  should  not  be  allowed  to  drift  further.  Any  hope  of  profits  from  civil 
instruments  in  1920  were  long  gone  by  1923  and  it  then  made  sense  for  Vickers  to  let  the 
ailing  company  go  to  the  liquidator,  apparently  relinquishing  all  involvement  with  optical 
munitions.  However,  Cooke's  story  did  not  end  there;  Vickers  eventually  bought  the 
company's  assets  and  re-floated  it  under  their  own  direct  control,  so  that  they  kept  some 
47  Anthony  Pollen,  The  Great  Gunnery  Scandal  (London:  William  Collins  &  Co.  Ltd,  1980)  Chapters  Ito 
V  provide  background  material  on  Pollen  and  his  association  with  Cooke's. 255 
capacity  for  fine  mechanical  and  optical  engineering  as  well  as  running  the  instruments 
business  on  a  more  or  less  profitable  footing  until  the  re-armament  programmes  of  the 
late  1930s  pulled  Cooke's  once  again  into  optical  munitions  contracting.  48  For  Cooke 
Troughton  &  Simms  Ltd,  1923  marked  not  so  much  the  end  of  optical  munitions 
manufacture,  but  the  start  of  a  period  of  hibernation. 
8.5  Barr  &  Stroud 
Unlike  Grubb  and  Cooke's,  Barr  &  Stroud  not  only  stayed  in  business  but  remained 
almost  entirely  dedicated  to  optical  munitions.  It  had  the  benefits  of  a  continuing 
domestic  monopoly,  an  effective  and  tightly  controlled  management  structure,  and  both 
the  determination  and  ability  to  continue  exploiting  its  previous  success.  However, 
success  is  a  relative  term,  and  Barr  &  Stroud  sometimes  found  that  it  amounted  to  little 
more  than  simply  remaining  in  business.  Despite  its  corporate  assets,  the  problems  of 
maintaining  the  firm's  existence  were  often  considerable  and  frequently  outside  the 
Directors'  control.  One  critically  important  -  though  intangible  -  asset  that  Barr  & 
Stroud  possessed,  uniquely  amongst  British  optical  munitions  makers,  was  a  relationship 
with  the  Admiralty  that  had  continued  unbroken  since  1892.  This  association,  which  both 
brought  benefits  and  obligations  to  each  party,  was  a  very  significant  factor  in  Barr  & 
Stroud's  survival  in  the  difficult  times  of  the  early  1920s,  despite  some  fundamental 
alterations  in  its  nature. 
The  relationship  was,  nevertheless,  not  something  that  could  be  taken  for  granted  by  the 
company.  The  war  had  imposed  strains  on  it,  and  in  particular  on  the  firm's  earlier  ability 
to  set  prices  for  Admiralty  work  as  it  alone  thought  fit.  That  had  been  overturned  by  the 
provisions  of  the  Munitions  of  War  Act  which  had  imposed  a  series  of  controls  intended 
to  bring  war-work  firmly  under  the  State's  governance.  9  Almost  immediately  after  the 
Armistice,  Barr  &  Stroud  sought  to  be  rid  of  those  controls,  causing  the  Admiralty  to 
look  closely  at  how  it  saw  the  nature  of  post-war  dealings.  The  fum  wanted  to  be  able  to 
`E  McConnell  (1992)  pp.  86-88. 
49  Great  Britain,  Ministry  of  Munitions,  Official  History  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  (London:  HMSO, 
1922)  Vol.  1  Part  N,  Sections  1  to  5  describes  these  controls. 256 
negotiate  freely  over  prices,  to  pursue  whatever  markets  seemed  opportune,  and  be  rid  of 
the  war-time  controls  that,  like  Sir  Howard  Grubb,  it  felt  to  be  restrictive  and  irksome  50 
This  request  to  be  released  had  an  effect  on  the  Admiralty  which  Barr  &  Stroud  may  not 
have  anticipated  and  which  apparently  remained  unknown  to  the  company.  51  Before 
replying,  the  Admiralty  set  out  to  consider  the  merits  of  control  from  the  Navy's 
viewpoint,  and  opinions  were  sought  within  the  service  as  to  the  future.  The  responses 
illustrate  that  there  was  by  no  means  unanimity  about  how  the  firm  was  regarded  within 
the  Navy.  52 
The  Naval  Contracts  Department  favoured  keeping  Barr  &  Stroud  permanently  under 
Admiralty  control  by  extending  the  war-time  arrangements.  There  would  be  `great 
advantage'  in  keeping  the  firm's  skills  and  technical  facilities  available  on  demand, 
although  difficulties  were  seen  in  arranging  what  amounted  to  a  takeover.  State  business 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  keep  the  firm  going,  and  Government  ownership  would 
preclude  not  only  foreign  work  but  also  commercial  production  because  `the  Private 
Trade  would  not  appreciate  Government  competition'.  A  subsidy  would  therefore  be 
needed,  which  the  Director  saw  as  being  problematical  to  arrange.  Nevertheless,  the 
Contracts  Department  favoured  bringing  the  company  into  the  Navy's  hierarchical 
structure,  so  that  prices  might  be  controlled  and  contractual  arguments  avoided. 
Those  arguments  were  not  welcomed  by  the  Director  of  Naval  Ordnance  (DNO)  who 
saw  Barr  &  Stroud  in  a  different  light.  His  response  illustrates  the  service's  internal 
tensions  about  taking  over  the  company.  53  The  DNO  said  that  because  the  firm  was  the 
only  British  maker  of  naval  rangefinders  it  was  `imperative'  to  keep  it  going  both  for 
peace-time  needs  and  future  requirements  in  time  of  war.  That  would  better  be  done  by 
maintaining  the  status  quo.  The  idea  of  outright  control  disturbed  the  Ordnance 
Department  because  it  threatened  the  nature  of  the  relationship  that  had  grown  up  with 
50  UGD  295/4/146,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  6.12.1918. 
st  Nothing  in  the  contemporary  letter  books  examined  shows  any  knowledge  of  it. 
52  Ministry  of  Defence,  Naval  Library.  Monthly  Record  of  Principal  questions  Dealt  with  by  the  Director  of 
Naval  Ordnance  (subsequently  PQ),  July  to  December  1918.  Minute  No.  192,17.12.1918.  other  minutes 
provide  the  source  material  for  the  rest  of  this  section,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 
PQ,  July  to  December  1918,  Director  of  Naval  Ordnance  to  Director  of  Navy  Contracts,  21.12.1918. 257 
the  company,  and  the  Department  was  perfectly  happy  to  have  an  independent  Barr  & 
Stroud  acting  virtually  as  its  consultant.  The  tendency  of  service  hierarchies  to  resist 
change,  as  described  by  William  McBride,  54  is  not  necessarily  confined  to  their  internal 
structures.  As  with  ordnance,  where  the  commercial  development  of  weapons  had  long 
been  accepted  as  working  to  the  Navy's  advantage,  so  the  design  and  supply  of  optical 
munitions  was  established  as  an  external  but  inseparable  adjunct.  The  firms  supplying 
both  had  become  so  closely  identified  with  the  Navy's  own  interest  that  they  were  seen 
as  inseparable  from  its  functional  framework.  With  Barr  &  Stroud,  the  Gunnery  Branch 
strongly  resisted  any  change  in  the  relationship,  seeking  to  maintain  the  familiar  and 
satisfactory  arrangement  that  had  evolved  in  the  preceding  twenty  five  years  . 
Even  worse  than  unwelcome  structural  change  was  the  chance  that  the  firm  might  fail 
completely.  For  the  Gunnery  Branch,  the  solution  was  to  let  the  firm  again  sustain  itself 
with  foreign  business.  The  hierarchical  structure  again  resisted  change,  not  through 
conservatism  or  prejudice  but  through  a  justifiable  fear  of  a  future  functional  failure  in 
design  and  supply.  The  DNO  insisted  State  control  was  neither  `advisable  nor  necessary' 
and  urged  that  `no  other  restrictions'  should  be  imposed  beyond  those  already  in  place, 
stressing  that  it  would  take  until  `well  into  1920'  to  complete  current  orders.  In  his 
judgement  there  was  `no  other  firm  in  the  country  who  can  be  compared  with  Barr  & 
Stroud  in  respect  of  their  experience  and  facilities 
... 
'.  and  urged  an  immediate  meeting 
to  settle  what  work  should  be  regarded  as  `specially  confidential'.  That  would  clear  the 
way  for  Barr  &  Stroud  to  seek  new  foreign  business  and  make  up  any  shortfall  in 
Admiralty  orders  to  ensure  its  survival. 
The  idea  of  perpetuating  control  was  abandoned  by  the  end  of  February  1919,  probably 
without  the  firm  ever  having  any  inkling  of  it.  SS  The  advantages  in  preserving  the  status 
quo,  where  the  Navy  obtained  rangefinder  research  virtually  free  of  charge,  were 
massively  in  the  Admiralty's  favour,  and  the  Contracts  Department  was  disregarded. 
54  William  McBride,  Technological  Change  and  the  U.  S.  Navy1865-1945  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University  Press,  2000)  pp.  4  and  5. 
55  UGD  295/4/146,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  re.  conference  with  Barr  &  Stroud, 
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However,  the  war-time  controls  were  not  immediately  rescinded,  a  situation  that  Barr  & 
Stroud  was  temporarily,  if  unwillingly,  obliged  to  accept. 
The  question  of  fording  new  business  was  pressing.  Contracts  were  disappearing  and 
work  to  replace  them  was  urgently  needed.  Orders  were  most  likely  from  foreign  navies 
which  had  been  starved  of  rangefinder  deliveries  since  1914,  but  some  of  the  war-time 
controls  -  particularly  those  relating  to  secrecy  -  stood  firmly  in  the  way.  In  a  typically 
studied  approach  to  the  Admiralty,  Harold  Jackson  first  assured  their  Lordships  that 
`nothing  can  give  us  greater  satisfaction'  than  continuing  to  work  for  the  Royal  Navy, 
and  that  the  firm  would  continue  all  the  security  precautions  `maintained  during  the  war', 
including  not  soliciting  foreign  sales  without  specific  consent.  Then,  almost  certainly 
with  clients  already  waiting,  he  blandly  asked  whether,  without  further  special 
applications,  he  could  supply  France,  Italy,  Japan  and  the  U.  S.  A.  with  `any  instruments 
actually  in  use  by  H.  M.  Fleet'  at  the  date  of  the  Armistice.  Jackson  presumably  got  his 
way,  because  there  were  no  further  letters  of  protest  from  him, but  the  problem  of  foreign 
sales  for  the  new  instruments  being  developed  for  the  Royal  Navy  was  less  easily  solved. 
He  agreed  to  defer  the  matter  until  questions  of  limiting  the  spread  of  armaments 
`attaching  to  the  proposed  League  of  Nations  have  been  formulated  and  agreed  by  the 
Powers'.  There  were  now  constraints  on  business  that  were  unknown  in  1914.56 
They  went  far  beyond  those  imposed  by  the  Admiralty  and  were  likely  to  be  an  even 
greater  problem.  Jackson  touched  on  the  nature  of  future  difficulties  when  he  mentioned 
the  limiting  of  armaments  and  the  embryonic  League  of  Nations,  implying  that 
opportunities  were  likely  to  be  governed  by  factors  outside  the  firm's  control.  Much  of 
its  pre-war  prosperity  had  come  from  supplying  Europe's  large  conscript  armies,  none  of 
whom  were  now  in  the  market  for  instruments  as  they  shrank  rapidly  leaving  enormous 
surpluses  of  optical  munitions.  The  neutral  states  which  had  been  denied  deliveries  after 
late  1914  generally  maintained  only  small  armies,  and  even  if  they  offered  some 
opportunity  for  business  the  value  of  their  likely  trade  was  small. 
'"  UGD  295/4/146,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  3.3.1919,  is  the  source  for  this 
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If  the  prospects  of  foreign  land-service  business  were  discouraging  in  early  1919,  there 
was  greater  optimism  over  naval  orders.  Even  the  Allied  navies  had  been  starved  of 
rangefinders  since  1914,  and  war  experience  emphasising  the  need  for  effective  gunnery 
control  systems,  suggested  there  was  a  reasonable  expectation  of  foreign  business  when 
navies  sought  to  modernise.  Jackson  must  have  had  orders  pending  when  he  wrote  to  the 
Admiralty  in  March  that  year,  and  there  were  actually  still  some  rangefinders  for  foreign 
governments  held  in  store  from  1914  when  deliveries  had  been  embargoed.  57  As  an 
antidote  for  excess  optimism  though,  there  was  virtually  no  new  foreign  warship 
construction  outside  Japan  and  the  United  States.  New  ships  had  always  been  the  prime 
movers  for  high-value  orders,  because  with  rangefinders  went  their  associated  mountings 
and  data  transmission  systems.  The  U.  S.  Navy  had  a  large  programme  of  capital-ship 
building,  but  Barr  &  Stroud  had  never  captured  its  business  as  it  had  done  with  France  or 
Japan  before  1914,  and  after  1915  the  British  government  had  prevented  the  firm 
pursuing  American  sales.  By  1919,  the  U.  S.  optical  company  of  Bausch  &  Lomb  had 
advanced  so  far  that  it  was  unlikely  that  Barr  &  Stroud  could  win  major  orders,  but  Japan 
still  lacked  any  sophisticated  optical  industry  and  its  navy  had  so  many  earlier  ties  with 
the  company  that  Barr  &  Stroud  must  have  seen  the  Imperial  Navy  as  the  main  chance  of 
foreign  sales. 
However,  to  Michael  Moss  and  lain  Russell,  `Barr  &  Stroud's  immediate  future  looked 
bleak'  in  1919,  with  the  directors  `resigned  to  the  fact  that  there  was  no  prospect  of  a 
revival  in  [munitions]  orders  ... 
in  the  near  future'.  58  This  was  by  no  means  the  case,  and 
their  opinion  paints  a  gloomier  picture  than  the  evidence  warrants.  The  company  was  still 
busy;  turnover  for  the  year  was  a  substantial  ££369,279,1,200  of  the  workforce  still 
employed  in  the  autumn  working  a  47-hour  week,  and  -  most  importantly  -  the  order 
book  was  by  no  means  empty.  59  The  value  of  those  uncompleted  orders  is  not  easy  to 
assess  as  the  firm's  financial  records  are  not  always  easy  to  interpret,  but  the  sums 
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59  UGD  295  unclassified,  Strang  Material,  financial  papers,  UGD  295/4/315,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  the 
Federation  of  British  Industries,  11.10.1919,  and  UGD  295/4/131,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Conrad  Beck, 
23.1.1919. 260 
involved  were  certainly  very  considerable,  probably  exceeding  half  a  million  pounds, 
even  if  the  future  of  some  of  the  contracts  was  uncertain.  60  Ordnance  work  was  certainly 
not  about  to  evaporate  and  the  Board  was  definitely  not  in  despair.  In  fact,  by  November 
1919,  the  directors  had  agreed  unanimously  that  they  could  not  `consider  any 
abandonment  of  our  armament  business'  and  that  it  must  be  maintained  if  at  all 
possible.  61  As  for  them  being  `resigned'  to  the  prospect  of  no  new  munitions  orders,  in 
October  Jackson  asked  the  Admiralty  to  confmn  there  was  no  objection  to  quoting  the 
Imperial  Japanese  Navy  for  new  rangefinders,  and  began  negotiations  with  the  Coventry 
Ordnance  Company  for  a  `complete  fire  control  system'  62  In  November  the  Admiralty 
asked  for  a  design  for  a  new  rangefinder  for  large  submarines,  as  well  as  additional  fire 
control  instruments  for  the  torpedo  directing  rangefinders  on  large  surface  ships.  3  And  in 
December  negotiations  began  with  the  Dutch  Army  for  600  infantry  and  artillery 
rangefinders,  to  make  up  for  the  dearth  of  deliveries  since  1914.64  Although  these 
negotiations  were  all  in  the  early  stages,  prospects  were  by  no  means  lacking  and 
confidence  certainly  not  absent. 
Even  if  prospects  were  far  from  barren,  there  was  still  the  problem  of  managing  the 
present.  Inflation  and  reduced  margins  had  greatly  eroded  the  fine's  profitability.  65 
Turnover  was  actually  lower  than  the  last  year  before  the  war  after  allowing  for  inflation 
-  only  £166,000  against  £188,000  in  adjusted  figures.  66  Manufacturing  profit  was  down 
from  55  percent  to  26  percent,  which  with  higher  operating  costs  resulted  in  a  recorded 
pre-tax  loss  of  £530.  Bank  overdrafts  were  £62,402,  the  highest  recorded  since  the 
limited  company's  creation.  Against  this,  the  year's  new  orders  received  were  only  just 
61  1  am  grateful  to  Paul  Hodgson 
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over  £39,000  which  meant  that  the  value  of  work  on  the  books  was  declining.  Overall, 
the  situation  was  far  from  ideal,  although  a  long  way  from  crisis. 
However,  1920  saw  a  marked  deterioration  in  the  firm's  position.  Recorded  turnover 
declined  to  £310,822,  manufacturing  profits  fell  to  only  12  percent,  and  the  year-end 
showed  a  very  large  pre-tax  loss  of  £80,497.  Although  orders  had  increased  to  £91,114, 
this  was  insufficient  to  sustain  the  business,  and  after  allowing  for  inflation,  new  work 
was  only  one  eighth  of  that  received  in  1913.  Borrowings  had  increased  to  £129,497  by 
the  end  of  December,  and  it  appeared  that  without  some  radical  change  of  circumstances 
the  business  would  be  heading  towards  insolvency.  The  firm  sought  to  achieve  this 
through  reforming  its  relationship  with  the  Admiralty. 
In  the  autumn  of  1920,  Barr  &  Stroud  requested  an  annual  subsidy.  This  marked  a  major 
change  in  the  way  the  firm  saw  its  relationship  with  the  Admiralty  and  prompted  the 
latter  to  reconsider  its  own  role  in  the  association.  The  company  asked  for  £50,000  yearly 
`for  the  purpose  of  continuing  their  Experimental  and  Research  work  and  also  for 
maintaining  in  a  state  of  efficiency  their  own  plant  as  well  as  the  plant  and  factory  put  up 
by  the  Admiralty  [during  the  war]'.  67  In  essence,  the  company  wanted  the  State  to 
guarantee  the  costs  of  running  the  business,  a  circumstance  inconceivable  in  1914. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Barr  &  Stroud's  position  was  far  from  satisfactory.  This 
stemmed  partly  from  diminishing  business  and  partly  from  the  twin  burdens  of 
maintaining  an  expensive  research  and  development  section  whilst  carrying  a  substantial 
amount  of  Admiralty  debt.  The  research  facility,  which  worked  almost  entirely  on 
Admiralty  projects,  was  the  firm's  largest  standing  charge  and  its  salary  costs  had  risen 
from  5.23  percent  of  turnover  in  1913  to  18.05  percent  in  1919.68  Manufacturing  wages 
fluctuated  with  output,  but  the  cost  of  scientific  staff  had  continued  to  grow  irrespective 
of  current  production,  and  sustaining  research  and  design  was  Barr  &  Stroud's  heaviest 
single  expense.  A  guarantee  of  £50,000  would  cover  it  and  many  of  the  company's  other 
67  PRO  ADM  212/46,  Barr  &  Stroud  correspondence. 
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standing  costs  as  well.  However,  such  a  subsidy  would  not  help  with  the  question  of 
outstanding  bills. 
There  were  substantial  Admiralty  debts  for  war-time  contracts  where  Barr  &  Stroud  had 
financed  the  work's  progress.  Their  total  is  now  difficult  to  assess,  and  it  appears  to  have 
been  a  problem  even  at  the  time.  In  October  1919  Jackson  reckoned  that  the  sum  owing 
for  finished  and  invoiced  jobs  alone  was  `not  less  than'  £58,663.69  To  complicate 
matters,  invoices  had  not  been  submitted  for  many  completed  contracts  because  the  basis 
for  charging  was  still  not  agreed.  70  There  were  73  of  these  still  to  be  settled  in  August 
1919,  whose  value  is  not  recorded  in  the  surviving  records.  71  And  there  were  frequently 
long  delays  in  payments  for  pre-priced  contracts  which  forced  the  firm  to  press  hard  for 
settlement  on  several  occasions,  more  than  once  even  telegraphing  requests  for  money.  72 
Because  materials  and  labour  costs  were  paid  by  Barr  &  Stroud  as  contracts  progressed, 
the  burden  of  financing  Admiralty  orders  continued  to  grow,  even  as  the  total  value  of 
work  on  hand  was  falling. 
At  the  beginning  of  1920,  these  pressures  were  showing.  Jackson  was  in  discussions 
with  the  Department  of  Naval  Ordnance  about  a  large  project  involving  the  development 
of  a  new  30-foot  rangefinder  intended  to  become  standard  for  capital  ships,  and  on  22°a 
January  he  wrote  that  unless  relations  with  the  Contracts  Department  improved  `we  shall 
ask  for  our  name  to  be  removed  from  the  Admiralty  list  [of  approved  contractors]  -  if 
indeed  it  is  not  automatically  removed  by  proceedings  in  the  Bankruptcy  Court  !  [sic]  '73 
This  illustrates  Jackson's  willingness  to  play  one  section  of  the  Admiralty  against 
another.  The  frustration  with  the  Contracts  Department  is  clear,  but  it  was  the  Ordnance 
Department  that  stood  to  suffer  most  from  the  possible  loss  of  Barr &  Stroud  and  it  was 
to  them  that  he  made  both  threat  and  complaint.  The  threat  was  delivered  with  a  light 
69  UGD  295/4/147,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Admiralty,  Advisor  of  Costs  of  Production,  20.10.1919. 
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touch  (and  a  delayed  action  fuze),  but  the  complaint  about  the  Contracts  Department's 
shortcomings  was  justified  as  many  of  the  firm's  immediate  difficulties  could  be  laid  at 
its  door.  What  the  business  needed  was  not  only  orders,  but  also  prompt  payment  for 
them.  In  early  1920,  Barr  &  Stroud's  greatest  difficulty  was  to  match  income  to 
outgoings,  and  having  to  borrow  large  sums  at  interest  to  finance  the  Admiralty  was 
expensive  and  clearly  fivstrating.  74  Jackson's  complaint  was  part  of  his  continuing  efforts 
to  extract  the  money  due  from  the  Admiralty. 
By  the  Autumn  of  1920,  those  efforts  had  seemingly  had  little  effect.  Faced  with  the 
subsidy  request  implying  that  the  company  was  in  difficulties,  the  Admiralty  once  again 
looked  at  the  relationship.  It  passed  the  question  to  the  Director  of  Scientific  Research 
(DSR)  for  an  opinion  on  the  cost  of  maintaining  a  research  department  to  handle 
rangefinder  design  and  construction,  as  well  as  optical  glass  research.  75  The  question  was 
not  whether  the  sum  requested  was  reasonable,  but  whether  the  research  could  be  done 
cheaper  by  the  service  itself.  The  DSR  made  a  general  examination  of  rangefinder 
procurement  and  his  report  illustrated  the  position  the  Admiralty  thought  the  Navy  to  be 
in  vis-ä-vis  the  company,  strongly  suggesting  that  Barr  &  Stroud  had  succeeded  in 
colouring  the  Admiralty's  perceptions  very  much  to  the  firm's  benefit. 
He  accepted  that  Barr &  Stroud  was  `in  financial  difficulties'  and  that  the  consequences 
of  its  failure  would  be  serious.  There  were  no  substantial  new  British  orders  likely  `for 
some  time'  to  come  and  the  firm's  foreign  business  would  only  last  for  about  two  years. 
Without  assistance,  Barr  &  Stroud  would  have  to  convert  to  commercial  instrument 
making,  and  subsequently  `...  close  the  rangefinder  business  down  completely'  in  order 
to  handle  the  new  work.  That  would  put  the  fighting  services  `in  a  most  dangerous 
position'  as  there  was  no  other  firm  to  step  in.  `We  must  have  rangefinders'  he  said, 
neatly  summing  up  the  Admiralty's  predicament.  76 
74  UGD  295  unclassified  material,  Russell  research  notes,  Barr  &  Stroud  Board  Meeting  19.2.1919. 
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If  Barr  &  Stroud  discontinued  rangefinder  operations,  the  creation  of  an  Admiralty 
research  and  experimental  department  would  be  essential,  as  no  other  firm  `would  be  in 
the  position  to  make  [rangefinders]  without  assistance'.  The  DSR  estimated  its  annual 
costs  as  between  £17,500  and  £22,500  for  research  into  the  mechanical  aspects  of 
rangefinder  design,  and  suggested  either  setting  up  a  government  factory  to  produce 
entire  instruments,  or  a  state-owned  assembly  shop  to  assemble  parts  made  by  other 
instrument  firms.  His  preferred  plan  however,  was  for  the  Admiralty  to  take  over  the 
large  new  premises  it  had  built  at  Glasgow  during  the  war,  then  progressively  transfer 
both  plant  and  personnel  from  Barr  &  Stroud  as  the  company  dropped  out  of  rangefinder 
manufacture.  This  would  avoid  any  `dangerous  hiatus  during  which  the  supply  of 
rangefinders  would  be  completely  stopped'.  Almost  as  an  afterthought,  he  suggested  that 
the  State  might  buy  a  controlling  interest  in  Barr  &  Stroud  `and  then  run  the  firm  in  the 
way  they  wanted'. 
The  Director  of  Scientific  Research  was  perhaps  unclear  about  what  should  actually  be 
done,  but  an  opinion  dated  1e  December  1920  from  the  Admiralty  Research  Laboratory 
at  Teddington  was  much  more  decisive.  This  acknowledged  that  the  question  of  subsidy 
was  problematical,  but  in  the  present  circumstances  there  was  simply  `no  choice':  there 
was  no  State  rangefinder  factory  and  it  would  take  `some  years'  to  create  an  effective 
one,  so  `some  Agreement  with  [Barr  &  Stroud]  must,  in  the  public  interest,  be  arrived 
at...  '  This  was  very  much  to  the  point  and  in  line  with  the  Admiralty's  eventual 
conclusion.  77 
The  decision  was  that  a  subsidy  would  be  the  most  effective  and  simplest  way  to  assure 
the  supply  of  rangefinders  and  the  Admiralty  then  approached  the  War  Office  for  its  co- 
operation  in  securing  funds  from  the  Treasury.  The  War  Office,  doubtless  remembering 
its  unsuccessful  pre-war  attempts  to  buy  rangefinders  elsewhere,  agreed  to  the  overtures, 
and  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts  subsequently  recorded  that  `...  in  view  of  the 
probable  smallness  of  orders  in  the  near  future,  the  Admiralty  and  War  Office  have 
conjointly  made  application  for  Treasury  sanction  to  subsidise  Barr  &  Stroud  to  enable 
"  PRO  ADM  212/46,  Memorandum  from  Director  of  Scientific  Research  to  Admiralty,  December  1920. 265 
that  firm  to  keep  in  being  its  existing  facilities  for  manufacturing'.  78  The  paucity  of 
current  War  Office  orders  could  hardly  be  disputed,  just  £75  having  been  spent  with  the 
firm  in  year  April  1  1920  to  March  31't  1921,  out  of  a  total  outlay  on  optics  of  only 
£2,347.79 
The  application  was  vetoed  by  the  Treasury,  which  refused  to  provide  funds  because  in 
its  judgement  the  current  warship  building  programme  would  provide  enough  work  to 
keep  the  firm  going.  80  Exactly  how  this  conclusion  was  arrived  at  is  hard  to  see,  given 
the  absence  of  major  warships  then  being  built  in  Britain,  but  the  decision  stood,  leaving 
the  Services  facing  the  prospect  of  Barr  &  Stroud  withdrawing  from  rangefinder 
building.  However,  the  course  of  subsequent  events  turned  out  to  be  very  much  different 
from  what  might  have  been  expected. 
When  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts  wrote  his  annual  report  in  March  1921,  he  noted 
the  Treasury's  refusal  but  observed  that  it  had  not  been  possible  to  take  any  further  action 
on  Barr  &  Stroud's  behalf,  as  the  firm  had  made  no  further  appeal  for  assistance.  81  Given 
that  scarcely  six  months  earlier  the  company  had  been  predicting  great  difficulty  in 
staying  in  optical  munitions,  the  lack  of  subsequent  calls  for  succour  raises  questions  as 
to  what  had  happened  in  the  meantime.  1920  had  continued  to  be  difficult.  In  mid- 
September,  Barr  &  Stroud  reminded  the  Naval  Staffs  Director  of  Gunnery  that  although 
the  Navy  was  calling  for  lots  of  new  designs,  there  was  still  `no  real  work'  coming  in.  82 
Admiralty  orders  for  new  instruments  and  servicing  contracts  for  the  year  came  to  just 
over  £17,888,  or  just  19.6  percent  of  the  year's  new  equipment  business.  83  Without 
Japanese  orders  totalling  £71,953,  the  year  would  have  been  catastrophic. 
The  new  year  marked  a  sudden  upturn  in  the  company's  attitude  and  its  fortunes. 
January's  orders  came  to  £37,900,  which  apart  from  1915,  was  the  largest  ever  for  that 
'S  PRO  WO  395/4,  Report  of  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts  1920-1921;  31.3.1921,  p.  14. 
"  PRO  WO  395/4,  Report  of  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts  1920-1921,  p.  91. 
80  PRO  WO  395/4,  Report  of  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts  1920-1921;  31.3.1921,  p.  14. 
11  PRO  WO  395/4,  Report  of  the  Director  of  Army  Contracts  1920-1921;  31.3.1921,  p.  14. 
62  UGD  295/4/149,  Letter  Book,  J.  W.  French  to  Capt.  F.  C.  Dreyer,  15.9.1920. 
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month.  84  In  late  February  the  bank  overdraft  was  down  from  almost  £100,000  at  the  end 
of  December  to  only  £54,000,  `without  any  Excess  Profits  duty  repayment'  and  `two  or 
three  large  accounts  still  to  be  paid',  85  and  Jackson  observed  that  Japan's  recent  decision 
not  to  accept  any  reduction  of  armaments  `may  be  sad  from  the  humanitarian  point  of 
view,  but  it  is  not  likely  to  cause  much  sorrow  with  Barr  &  Stroud  Ltd'.  86  The  Admiralty 
had  pronounced  the  new  30-foot  FX  rangefinder  model  `excellent',  and  was  asking  about 
an  even  larger  one.  87  Armaments  business  was  now  encouraging,  unlike  the  civil 
ventures  started  soon  after  the  war's  end  and  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  none  of 
which  seemed  likely  to  be  profitable.  The  Optophone  device  was  uncertain  of  making 
even  a  `small  return'  on  its  investment,  the  cinema  projector  programme  was  mired 
because  the  single  client  could  not  pay  for  the  machines  already  delivered,  and  the  motor 
cycle  engine  project  was  demanding  such  large  sums  that  the  Directors  had  been  obliged 
to  talk  `solemnly  about  costs'.  88  Despite  all  these  difficulties,  Jackson  was  able  to  tell  a 
correspondent  `Don't  think  I'm  not  cheerful  ... 
'89  a  sentiment  which  probably  summed 
up  the  firm's  overall  attitude  in  early  1921. 
There  were  indeed  some  changes  for  the  better  that  year.  Despite  the  prediction  in  late 
1920  that  the  Royal  Navy  would  have  little  business  for  Barr  &  Stroud  in  the  near  future, 
the  Admiralty  ordered  almost  £60,000-worth  of  equipment,  making  it  the  largest  client  in 
1921.90  The  Imperial  Japanese  Navy  was  the  next  largest,  with  orders  of  nearly  £53,000. 
The  total  value  of  new  business  that  year  was  £125,610,  an  increase  of  38  percent  on 
1920's  figure  of  £91,114.  Although  this  was  an  encouraging  trend,  the  state  of  new 
business  was  not  so  much  getting  better  as  becoming  less  bad. 
94  UGD  295/  MI  I  Jackson  to  Barr  16.2.21. 
as  UGD  295/  M  11  Jackson  to  Barr  16.2.21. 
86  UGD  295/4/325,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Barr,  16.2.1921. 
a'  UGD  295/4/325,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Barr,  25.2.1921. 
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25.2.21  J  to  Tongue  &  Co.,  and  25.2.1921.  UGD  295/4/325,  Letter  Book,  25.2.21  Jackson  to  Barr, 
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Nevertheless,  the  underlying  condition  of  the  business  was  improving.  Manufacturing 
profit  increased  to  £98,629,  up  from  12  percent  to  36  percent  of  output,  and  there  was  a 
small  pre-tax  profit  of  £4,406  compared  to  the  previous  loss  of  £80,497.  Even  more 
importantly,  the  accounts  in  December  1921  showed  the  borrowings  at  the  end  of  1920 
had  been  discharged,  and  even  after  paying  £26,000  of  dividends  there  was  still  £10,765 
cash  in  the  bank,  plus  another  £2,335  in  French  National  Bonds.  A  fall  in  turnover,  from 
£310,822  to  £259,226  represented  the  working-through  of  older  contracts  before 
payments  for  newer  ones  began,  and  continued  the  expected  trend  in  sales  91  There  had 
clearly  been  a  major  turnaround,  but  it  was  not  accounted  for  by  either  an  increase  in 
sales  or  a  massive  reduction  in  operating  costs.  The  transformation  probably  resulted 
from  refunds  for  earlier  overpayments  of  Excess  Profits  Duty.  These  large  war-time 
payments  (on  top  of  income  tax)  totalling  at  least  £225,000  according  to  Jackson's 
working  papers,  must  have  harmed  liquidity,  and  their  progressive  repayment,  which 
according  to  Moss  and  Russell  began  in  1918,  must  have  been  instrumental  in  restoring 
the  balance  sheet  to  a  satisfactory  condition. 
This  welcome  trend  continued  as  prospects  for  munitions  business  began  to  improve 
during  1921,  enhanced  by  the  Government's  belated,  and  reluctant,  decision  in  December 
1920  to  restart  capital-ship  building  which  had  finally  come  to  a  halt  with  the  completion 
of  the  battlecruiser  Hood  in  May  1920.92  None  other  had  been  planned  after  1916,  partly 
because  the  fleet  action  at  Jutland  that  year  had  raised  questions  about  what  types  of 
ships  and  armament  were  actually  needed.  93  The  post-war  elimination  of  the  German 
High  Seas  Fleet  as  a  threat  had  been  countered  by  the  apparent  willingness  of  the  United 
States  to  complete  its  very  large  war-time  construction  programme  that  would  have 
challenged  the  superiority  of  the  Royal  Navy,  and  which  was  the  subject  of  much 
political  and  naval  debate.  94  In  January  1920,  the  Admiralty  had  urged  that  four  new 
ships  be  started  in  the  financial  year  1921-1922,  with  four  more  the  year  after.  In 
91  UGD  295/11/1,  Balance  sheets,  profit  and  loss  accounts  1912-1928:  audited  accounts  and  working 
papers. 
Z  Alan  Raven  &  John  Roberts,  British  Battleships  of  World  War  Two  (London:  Arms  &  Armour  Press, 
1976)  p.  75. 
93  Raven  &  Roberts  (1976)  Chapters  1  to  5. 
94  Phillips  Payson  O'Brien,  British  and  American  Naval  Power:  Politics  and  Policy  1900-1936  (Westport, 
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December  1920,  the  Committee  for  Imperial  Defence  agreed  that  whilst  diplomatic 
efforts  would  be  made  to  check  the  USA's  naval  programme,  the  Admiralty  could  begin 
planning  the  ships  it  had  advocated.  In  fact,  design  studies  had  been  progressing  since 
95  1919,  and  thirteen  different  designs  had  been  examined  by  early  1921,  so  that  plans  for 
the  first  four  ships  were  approved  as  early  as  August  1921,  invitations  to  tender  issued  on 
3'd  September,  and  orders  placed  on  26th  October. 
To  Barr  &  Stroud,  this  must  have  been  welcome  news.  In  March  1921  the  Admiralty  had 
approached  the  firm  about  a  rangefinder  of  over  40-foot  base,  96  and  by  June  discussions 
were  taking  place  with  shipbuilders  Armstrong  Whitworth  over  the  necessary  turret 
installation.  97  The  new  ships  were  to  reflect  all  the  lessons  of  the  war  as  well  as  more 
recent  progress  in  design,  which  meant  rangefinders  that  were  larger,  more  sophisticated 
in  design  and  more  complex  in  construction  to  give  more  accurate  readings.  Barr  & 
Stroud's  `duplex'  design  incorporating  two  instruments  in  a  common  housing,  provided 
an  increase  in  the  rate  at  which  readings  could  be  fed  into  the  newest  range  and  bearing 
computers  and  was  accompanied  by  a  new  height-fording  rangefinder  was  intended  for 
both  anti-aircraft  and  surface  use,  providing  information  for  gun  direction  and  fuse-delay 
settings  98  These  were  all  vastly  more  expensive  than  those  in  battleships  during  the 
Great  War,  and  were  also  to  be  provided  on  a  much  larger  scale.  The  four  battlecruisers 
were  to  carry  at  least  three  41-foot  instruments  each  for  the  main  armament  as  well  as 
sets  of  15-foot  duplex  instruments  for  the  other  guns  and  torpedo  armament,  all  requiring 
associated  sighting  telescopes,  periscopes  and  fire-control  equipment,  and  representing  a 
substantial  amount  of  business. 
Any  optimism  felt  by  Barr  &  Stroud  at  the  ordering  of  these  ships  was  to  be  of  short 
duration.  There  had  been  considerable  political  reluctance  to  embark  on  a  costly  capital 
ship  programme  in  Britain,  and  a  similar  desire  in  the  USA  to  disengage  from  its  own 
programme.  In  July  1921,  the  USA  had  called  a  conference  of  major  naval  powers  to 
95  Raven  &  Roberts  (1976)  p.  98  provides  the  source  for  order  dates. 
%  UGD  295/4/315.  Letter  Book,  Letter  Book,  Jackson  to  Barr,  2.3.1921. 
"  UGD  295/4/150,  Letter  Book,  J.  W.  French  to  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  25.6.1921. 
98  UGD  295/4/150,  Letter  Book,  J.  W.  French  to  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  29.6.1921. 269 
discuss  the  whole  question  of  naval  armaments,  and  this  met  in  Washington  during  the 
November.  The  resulting  Washington  Treaty  limited  new  building  and  fixed  relative 
strengths  between  the  navies  of  the  signatories.  Welcome  as  this  may  have  been  to  the 
politicians,  it  had  serious  implications  for  Barr  &  Stroud  because  one  of  the  key  clauses 
was  `a  ten-year  capital  ship  building  holiday'99  which  ended  British  plans  to  build  the 
eight  new  warships  for  which  the  firm  had  been  going  to  supply  all  the  optical  fire 
control  apparatus,  as  well  as  curtailing  the  Japanese  programme  that  would  also  have 
brought  it  considerable  new  business-100  The  only  immediate  consolation  was  that  the 
Royal  Navy  was  to  be  allowed  to  construct  two  new  battleships  requiring  similar  outfits 
of  optical  instruments,  so  that  there  was  still  to  be  some  business  for  Barr  &  Stroud. 
None  of  the  rangefinders  for  the  subsequently  cancelled  ships  had  been  ordered  by  the 
end  of  1921,  but  design  work  was  progressing  and  the  firm's  research  and  development 
department  was  fully  employed,  even  if  manufacturing  work  was  still  insufficient  for  the 
entire  work  force.  In  September,  Jackson  told  a  naval  officer  enquiring  about  joining  the 
firm  that  although  Barr &  Stroud  was  `having  a  pretty  thin  time  at  present'  and  had  laid 
off  shop-floor  workers,  there  was  no  intention  of  letting  any  of  the  design  staff  go.  '01 
When  the  Admiralty  Research  Laboratory  approached  Jackson  in  December,  asking  if  he 
could  help  them  find  a  skilled  optical  designer,  he  replied  that  he  made  every  effort  to 
keep  them  and  had  not  let  even  a  single  one  go.  102  This  emphasised  the  company's  policy 
of  maintaining  its  strategy  of  adherence  to  optical  munitions  production,  despite  the  high 
costs  of  research  and  design  -  nearly  all  the  salaries  of  £29,347  in  1921  went  to  it  -  and 
the  difficulty  of  finding  new  business  to  keep  it  going.  103 
Orders  for  1921  came  to  £125,610,  and  even  with  the  ship  cancellations  resulting  from 
the  Washington  Treaty,  new  contracts  in  the  next  twelve  months  increased  by  41  percent 
to  £177,399.  However,  Admiralty  orders  fell  to  £23,000  and  War  Office  orders  for  anti- 
"O'Brien  (1998)  p.  166. 
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aircraft  rangefinders  were  just  £25,835  so  that  had  the  company  been  forced  to  rely  on 
British  trade  alone,  the  consequences  would  certainly  have  been  dire:  even  with 
commercial  orders  for  rangefinders  from  shipping  companies  the  total  of  home  orders 
was  less  than  £55,000  and  insufficient  to  maintain  the  business.  The  trading  account  for 
1921  showed  an  actual  expenditure  of  £85,800  on  operating  costs,  excluding 
manufacturing  wages,  and  for  1922  the  figure  was  £71,350.  The  average  gross 
(manufacturing)  profit  margin  between  1902  and  1922  was  51  percent,  with  1921  at  38 
percent  and  1922  at  52  percent;  using  this  as  an  approximate  guide  to  the  level  of 
business  needed  to  sustain  the  company,  relying  on  British  orders  alone  in  1921  and  1922 
would  have  resulted  in  massive  and  crippling  losses.  As  it  was,  foreign  government 
contracts  enabled  the  firm  to  remain  solvent  and  hold  a  substantial  proportion  of  its 
skilled  workforce  together. 
Improvement  continued  in  1923.  Turnover  increased  by  7.33  percent  to  El  94,901.  Orders 
rose  more  substantially,  by  22.94  percent  to  £218,091,  of  which  civil  products  amounted 
to  only  3.9  percent.  Barr  &  Stroud  was  still  almost  entirely  an  optical  munitions  business, 
with  the  vast  majority  of  that  work  -  82  percent  -  coming  from  rangefinders.  This  was  a 
remarkable  state  of  affairs.  No  other  manufacturer  demonstrated  such  an  ability  to  sustain 
itself  on  sales  of  military  or  naval  optics  in  the  early  1920s.  In  Britain,  by  1923  every 
other  optical  company  had  ceased  to  be  involved.  The  German  makers  were  forbidden  to 
engage  in  optical  munitions  production  because  of  the  provisions  of  the  Versailles 
Treaty,  and  although  Zeiss  had  set  up  a  Dutch  company  to  circumvent  this  proscription  it 
was  still  not  operational.  104  In  the  USA,  Bausch  &  Lomb  ran  its  ordnance  products 
within  the  framework  of  a  large  business  with  substantial  involvement  in  ophthalmic  and 
scientific  instruments  manufacturing,  and  made  little  progress  in  foreign  munitions 
sales.  105  Notable  as  this  achievement  was,  Barr  &  Stroud  was  still  in  a  far  from  ideal 
position. 
'04  Reid,  W.  "Military  Binoculars  from  Venlo.  "  In  A  Farewell  to  Arms:  Liber  Amicorum  in  Honour  of  Jan 
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British  service  orders  for  1923  totalled  £114,994,  which  on  their  own  would  not  have 
sustained  the  business.  It  was  only  foreign  sales  that  made  it  viable.  But,  some  87  percent 
of  that  business  came  from  the  Imperial  Japanese  Navy,  leaving  Barr  &  Stroud  largely 
dependent  on  one  foreign  client.  Japan  had  always  been  the  firm's  largest  overseas  buyer 
of  naval  instruments,  and  in  1922  and  1923  had  ordered  rangefinders  and  commissioned 
a  prototype  mechanical  analogue  fire-control  computer.  106  Japan  still  lacked  an  optical 
industry  that  could  make  rangefinders  as  well  as  the  precision  mechanical  engineering 
capability  necessary  for  the  analogue  computer,  but  this  was  not  something  Barr  & 
Stroud  expected  to  continue  indefinitely.  For  several  years  the  Japanese  Navy  had  had 
resident  inspectors  at  the  Glasgow  works,  and  by  mid-1922  the  company  knew  that  two 
of  them  who  had  already  returned  home  were  designing  rangefinders  and  submarine 
periscopes  intended  to  be  built  in  Japan.  107  The  firm  was  also  well  aware  that  Zeiss  had 
set  up  a  Dutch  subsidiary  to  build  optical  munitions,  and  may  have  known  that  Zeiss  had 
already  established  connections  both  with  Bausch  &  Lomb  in  the  USA  and  the  Tokyo 
firm  Nippon  Kogaku.  108  The  anticipated  growth  in  Japan's  optical  self-sufficiency  may 
account  for  Barr  &  Stroud's  subsequent  willingness  to  keep  the  Admiralty  informed 
about  the  Japanese  fire-control  contract,  although  in  July  1923  the  firm  hoped  for  at  least 
one  substantial  order  following  the  successful  demonstration  of  the  prototype.  109  A  major 
problem  for  the  evolving  Japanese  industry  came  with  the  earthquake  of  September  1923 
when  the  Nippon  Kogaku  works  were  destroyed,  causing  delays  on  its  route  to  self- 
sufficiency  and  prolonging  the  connection  with  Barr  &  Stroud.  '  10 
The  Admiralty's  orders  for  1923  included  only  part  of  the  rangefinder  outfits  for  the  two 
battleships  built  as  a  result  of  the  Washington  Treaty.  Only  the  smaller  instruments  for 
the  secondary  armament  were  ordered  during  1923,  at  a  cost  of  £24,820,  with  the  bulk  of 
Naval  orders  that  year  coming  through  £72,000  worth  of  contracts  for  similar 
106  UGD  295/4/637,  Letter  Book,  J.  W.  French  to  Col.  Alison,  Royal  Artillery  College,  Woolwich, 
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'°'B&LA,  Saegmuller  letters,  and  J.  Alexander,  `Nikon  and  the  Sponsorship  of  Japan's  Optical  Industry  by 
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rangefinders  intended  for  cruisers.  The  very  large  main-armament  outfits,  worth  £40,813, 
were  in  fact  officially  ordered  early  the  next  year,  although  work  on  them  had  begun 
during  1923.111  These  were  significant  because  they  were  the  last  orders  for  such 
enormous  and  complex  rangefinders  until  the  late  1930s,  and  marked  the  suspension  of 
this  activity  for  almost  fifteen  years  until  the  resumption  of  capital-ship  building. 
The  close  of  1923  saw  Barr  and  Stroud  in  far  better  shape  than  three  years  previously. 
1920  must  be  considered  as  the  low  point  for  Barr  &  Stroud.  Even  though  Moss  and 
Russell  considered  1924  to  have  been  the  firm's  `lowest  ebb,  '  112  the  earlier  date  marked  a 
more  critical  situation.  Manufacturing  profit  as  a  percentage  of  output  reached  its  lowest 
at  only  12  percent  and  the  pre-tax  trading  loss  of  £80,497  was  the  greatest  ever  recorded 
by  the  company.  In  addition,  although  in  earlier  years  the  company  had  borrowed  money 
from  its  own  members  to  save  bank  charges  and  interest,  '  13  during  1920  it  paid  interest  at 
2  percent  over  bank  base  rate  to  them  and  was  prepared  to  take  up  £75,000  in  loans, 
suggesting  that  its  bankers  were  unwilling  or  unable  to  extend  as  much  credit  as  the 
business  anticipated  needing.  This  principally  reflected  a  problem  of  liquidity  rather  than 
anything  else,  and  it  was  solved  in  1921  through  massive  tax  refunds  which  wiped  out 
the  heavy  deficit.  After  1920,  things  were  never  so  bad  again,  and  by  1923  the  point  had 
been  reached  where  the  percentage  of  profit  on  manufacturing  output  had  returned  to  pre- 
war  levels  and  orders  were  again  at  a  level  that  would  let  the  business  survive. 
8.6  Into  suspense 
By  1923,  the  British  optical  munitions  industry  was  quantitatively,  if  not  qualitatively, 
inferior  to  its  condition  in  1914,  with  only  one  business  actively  engaged  in  producing 
instruments  on  a  significant  scale.  This  was  not  the  result  of  inadequacies  in 
technological  ability,  nor  any  lack  of  business  acumen,  but  came  about  because  the 
demand  for  military  and  naval  equipment  had  fallen  internationally  to  a  level  where 
armaments  products  of  all  kinds  were  hard  pressed  to  find  adequately  remunerative 
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markets.  Optical  munitions  makers  fared  little  different  to  those  making  weapons  after 
the  war  and  were  generally  forced  to  diversify  in  order  to  survive,  Barr  &  Stroud  alone 
successfully  maintaining  its  status  as  a  speciality  producer,  albeit  on  a  smaller  scale  than 
before  the  war.  Capacity  had  adjusted  to  current  demand,  and  the  industry  was  at  the  start 
of  what  can  be  described  as  a  period  of  hibernation  during  which  the  ability  to  produce 
all  kinds  of  optical  munitions  would  be  sustained,  even  though  output  remained  at  a  low 
level  for  the  remainder  of  the  1920s.  The  disposition  to  limit  armaments  constricted  the 
British  optical  munitions  industry  but  failed  to  bring  its  elimination,  leaving  enough  of  a 
nucleus  to  build  on  when  the  shift  to  re-armament  eventually  arrived. 274 
Conclusion 
The  story  of  optical  munitions  manufacture  in  Britain  between  1888  and  1923  involves  a 
successful  technological  manufacturing  community  that  is  not  always  easy  to  categorise 
and  which  runs  counter  to  perceptions  of  general  relative  decline  in  British  scientific  and 
technological  industries  during  this  period.  Its  small  size  and  comparative  obscurity 
when  set  beside  other  sectors  engaged  in  manufacturing  either  weapons  or  scientific 
instruments  has  led  to  its  being  almost  wholly  overlooked,  and  to  misidentification  and 
misunderstanding  by  the  few  historians  who  have  previously  stumbled  upon  it.  It  was  a 
peculiar  industry  whose  progress  was  as  much  governed  by  the  State's  defence  policies 
as  commercial  ability,  and  which  despite  its  comparatively  small  size  came  to  assume  an 
importance  of  strategic  significance. 
The  introduction  to  this  thesis  made  the  point  that  the  industry's  story  was  diverse  and 
complicated,  suggesting  that  its  interpretation  and  understanding  could  be  aided  by 
reference  to  one  or  more  of  the  models  which  seek  to  explain  the  nature  of  change  over 
time  in  the  study  of  history.  The  necessarily  brief  summary  of  their  chief  characteristics 
indicated  that  although  all  of  them  might  be  appropriately  applied  to  different  phases  in 
the  industry's  evolution,  the  one  best  suited  to  be  a  general  model  here  was  Thomas 
Hughes'  `systems  approach',  with  its  emphasis  on  considering  together  both  the 
technological  and  social  factors  that  bore  on  the  evolution  of  events.  This  model  of 
explanation  has  indeed  fitted  well  with  the  story  of  the  progress  of  optical  munitions 
production  in  Great  Britain  in  the  review  period,  even  though  at  times  it  has  become 
apparent  that  certain  events  outside  this  specialised  field  had  a  deterministic  effect  that 
eventually  carried  through  to  the  industry  itself.  At  the  start  of  the  story,  for  example, 
recent  advances  in  the  technology  of  gun  propellants  can  be  understood  to  have  caused 
directly  a  rapid  and  unprecedented  progress  in  the  design  of  weapons,  enabling  their 
ranges  to  became  so  greatly  extended  as  to  trigger  a  demand  for  some  means  to  measure 
distances  on  the  battlefield.  The  process  that  led  to  the  emergence  of  the  new  propellants 
may  well  itself  have  been  driven  by  a  series  of  complex  and  interacting  social  and 
technical  forces,  but  the  result  of  that  process  -  `nitro  powder'  was  the  catalyst,  the 275 
determining  factor  in  the  next  stage  in  weapons  technology.  To  this  extent,  `hard 
determinism'  does  have  its  place  in  the  study,  but  the  subsequent  evolution  of  optical 
munitions  manufacture  can  only  be  explained  through  a  highly  involved  process  that 
places  the  technical,  the  scientific,  the  social,  the  political,  and  the  economic  in  a  shifting 
but  ever  present  juxtaposition.  By  the  end  of  the  account,  there  is  again  a  condition  that 
can  be  seen  as  deterministic,  where  the  cost  of  armaments  (in  political,  economic  and 
social  terms)  was  seen  as  so  prohibitive  that  there  was  an  over-riding  political  imperative 
to  curtail  both  their  development  and  proliferation.  Again,  a  complex  and  socially  driven 
process  led  to  a  deterministic  outcome  which  then  caused  those  managing  the  industry  to 
react  in  a  similarly  complex  way  to  evolve  strategies  for  survival. 
This  study  of  a  highly  specialised  and  relatively  small  scale  industry  tends  to  support  the 
use  of  the  approach  taken  by  Hughes,  if  only  because  his  model  has  a  broader  compass 
than  the  others  considered  at  the  outset.  If  the  others  are  less  satisfactory,  it  is  because 
they  do  not  encompass  all  the  elements  of  this  story  and  their  relevance  is,  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  extent,  only  partial.  They  may  be  reconciled  with  each  other  and  with  this  story  to 
some  extent;  certainly  none  (not  even  hard  determinism)  can  be  dismissed  as  irrelevant 
or  flawed  but  their  capacity  to  make  sense  of  the  subject  is  less  than  the  systems 
approach.  Whether  or  not  the  optical  munitions  industry  fits  perfectly  with  Hughes' 
model,  that  is  the  one  which  best  facilitates  its  understanding.  The  purpose  of  the 
exercise  was,  after  all,  to  document  and  explain  the  industry,  rather  than  to  provide  a 
detailed  critical  assessment  of  a  range  of  theories  and  models  in  the  history  of 
technology  or  the  evolution  of  businesses. 
Those  historians  who  have  touched  on  this  idiosyncratic  industry  assumed  without 
question  that  optical  munitions  production  was  a  component  of  the  scientific  instruments 
industry.  Optical  instruments  for  warfare  were  taken  to  be  little  more  than  variations  of 
those  for  civil  applications;  it  was  taken  for  granted  that  the  makers  of,  say,  microscopes 
or  survey  instruments  could  -  and  did  -  adapt  both  their  products  and  manufacturing 
techniques  to  supply  whatever  the  British  Army  and  Royal  Navy  required  in  optical 
instrumentation.  As  the  preceding  account  has  indicated,  such  an  understanding  is  far 276 
from  correct,  firstly  because  most  of  the  instruments  used  as  optical  munitions  came  to 
be  far-removed  from  civil  patterns  and  secondly  because  the  nature  of  the  market  for 
them  was  quite  unlike  any  commercial  one.  The  evolution  of  the  optical  munitions 
industry  can  only  be  understood  by  locating  it  within  the  framework  of  the  larger 
armaments  industry,  although  in  a  tantalising  paradox  its  constituent  businesses  were 
never  actually  part  of  the  arms  manufacturing  community.  The  British  optical  munitions 
makers  functioned  in  a  demand-led  market  which  was  based  on  evolving  weapons 
technologies  and  heavily  influenced  by  both  domestic  and  foreign  political 
considerations,  whilst  depending  on  the  civil  instrument  producing  community  for  many 
of  its  optical  techniques,  raw  materials,  and  skilled  workers. 
At  a  time  when  much  of  British  technological  industry  can  be  shown  as  fitting  well  with 
notions  of  relative  decline,  this  one  showed  a  pattern  of  financial  and  technological 
growth  right  up  to  the  start  of  the  Great  War,  flourishing  in  a  climate  of  lavish  spending 
on  armaments  and  increasingly  dominated  by  one  company,  Barr  &  Stroud,  that  by 
deliberately  choosing  to  specialise  in  what  became  a  particularly  important  type  of 
optical  munitions  -  the  rangefinder  -  created  for  itself  a  dominant  place  in  the  world 
market  for  them.  It  would  be  misleading  to  say  that  Barr  &  Stroud  competed  successfully 
against  a  German  optical  industry  that  was  acknowledged  by  contemporary 
commentators  as  being  the  world's  largest  and  which  represented  the  very  highest  levels 
of  optical  design  and  manufacturing  skills,  because  the  reality  is  that  the  German 
companies  were  forced  to  compete  (almost  always  unsuccessfully)  against  Barr  &  Stroud 
for  markets  other  than  their  domestic  one. 
Archibald  Barr &  William  Stroud  became  `first-movers'  in  rangefmder  manufacture  and 
established  an  early  lead,  not  because  they  recognised  a  marketing  opportunity  and 
exploited  it  -  as  William  Armstrong  did  with  his  breech  loading  artillery  weapon  after 
1854  -  but  because  they  were  serendipitously  drawn  as  academics  to  a  military  problem 
that  awaited  a  solution,  and  because  of  their  willingness  to  persevere  in  finding  an 
answer,  even  though  the  commercial  rewards  were  not  immediately  quantifiable.  Had 
they  not  been  discouraged  by  the  slow  progress  of  their  earlier  joint  academic  research 277 
project  in  1888,  they  would  never  have  taken  up  rangefinder  design,  and  had  they  been 
entrepreneurs  by  profession  they  would  almost  certainly  have  been  so  deterred  by  the 
difficulties  they  met  in  their  rangefinder  experiments  that  they  would  have  abandoned  the 
idea  after  their  failure  in  the  1889  trials.  The  question  of  chance  in  theories  and  models  of 
explanation  in  history  may  be  resistant  to  scientific  employment  but  sometimes,  as  in  this 
case,  it  cannot  be  ignored.  Unlike  Armstrong,  who  first  identified  a  market  and  then, 
stimulated  by  motives  that  were  as  much  patriotic  as  business-like,  invented  a  novel 
product  through  the  application  of  engineering  techniques  that  were  familiar  to  him,  the 
Professors  Barr  and  Stroud  stumbled  accidentally  across  rangefinders  and  taught 
themselves  as  they  went  along.  Their  rapid  progress  up  the  learning  curve  came  from  the 
application  of  scientific  methodology  which  enabled  them  to  become  `first-movers'  in 
the  field  and  build  up  a  lead  that  competitors  found  extremely  difficult  to  overcome 
before  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1914. 
Barr  &  Stroud's  performance  as  a  business  can  be  interpreted  in  two  ways.  One  is  that  it 
was  a  success,  running  counter  to  notions  of  a  general  under-performance  in  British 
technological  industries  before  1914,  and  exploiting  the  benefits  that  first-mover  status 
conveyed  to  secure  both  market  share  and  profitability.  The  other  is  that  weaknesses  in 
management  caused  a  failure  to  employ  adequately  the  strategies  of  vertical  integration 
that  were  needed  to  ensure  it  obtained  all  the  facilities  it  required  along  its  chain  of 
production,  which  inhibited  its  development  and  limited  its  capacity  for  diversification 
out  of  a  highly  specialised  and  narrow  market.  Both  of  these  interpretations  contain 
elements  of  truth.  The  company  was  indeed  profitable,  and  it  undeniably  had  a 
hegemonical  market  position  in  1914,  but  at  the  same  time  it  did  fail  to  integrate  fully 
into  lens  and  prism  manufacture,  a  condition  whose  causes  and  implications  must  be 
understood  before  a  judgement  can  be  reached. 
Alfred  Chandler  proposed  a  number  of  reasons  why  firms  might  carry  out  vertical 
integration,  suggesting  that  the  most  common  was  `to  ensure  a  steady  supply  of 278 
materials'  for  production  processes.  '  That  certainly  applied  to  Barr  &  Stroud,  and  its 
problems  obtaining  adequate  quantities  of  high  quality  optical  components  were  manifest 
right  from  its  formation,  tending  to  worsen  as  the  level  of  business  grew  more  rapidly 
after  1912,  and  reaching  a  peak  in  the  first  two  years  of  war  when  the  inability  to  procure 
optical  materials  and  parts  at  times  threatened  to  halt  production  altogether.  That  failure, 
which  might  also  be  described  as  limited  success,  came  from  two  causes.  Firstly,  as 
Chandler  suggested,  the  `personal  ties  and  relationships'  typified  by  those  with  Adam 
Hilger  &  Co.,  `helped  to  assure'  the  fulfilment  of  contracts  and  diverted  attention 
towards  improving  the  relationship  rather  than  replacing  it  with  another,  more 
satisfactory,  arrangement.  But  where  Chandler  said  that  such  arrangements  tended  to 
divert  businesses  away  from  investing  in  production  facilities  and  that  most  makers 
`preferred  other  routes  to  growth'  Barr  &  Stroud  were  actually  prepared  to  make  the 
investment  but  were  restrained  from  developing  a  substantial  optical  manufacturing 
capacity  by  factors  that  were  largely  beyond  their  control  and  that  reflected  the  condition 
of  British  optical  manufacturing  in  general,  and  in  particular  the  lack  of  structures  for 
scientific  education  and  technical  training  that  had  already  been  identified  by  the 
instruments  industry  itself.  It  was  not  that  Barr  &  Stroud  did  not  want,  or  could  not 
afford,  to  make  such  a  move,  but  that  there  was  no  means  to  obtain  the  necessary  skilled 
labour  except  from  other  optical  businesses,  all  of  whom  were  geographically  remote. 
Once  that  impasse  was  ended  by  changes  created  during  the  Great  War,  then  the  firm 
moved  quickly  into  large-scale  optical  production  and  integrated  even  further  into  optical 
glass  design  and  manufacture. 
The  apparent  success  of  Barr  &  Stroud  combined  with  its  uniquely  extensive  surviving 
archive  tends  to  skew  attention  towards  it  and  emphasises  an  unfortunate  -  though 
unavoidable  -  reduction  of  attention  on  the  other  pre-war  optical  munitions  makers,  most 
of  whom  have  left  little  in  the  way  of  records.  This  is  regrettable,  particularly  in  the  case 
of  Sir  Howard  Grubb  &  Co.  who  had  a  British  monopoly  of  submarine  periscope 
manufacture  until  well  after  the  start  of  the  Great  War  and  may  well  have  exported  them 
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successfully  in  competition  with  the  German  Goerz  company.  For  most  of  these  lesser 
players,  all  that  can  be  said  is  that  they  met  the  requirements  of  the  British  armed  forces 
adequately  and  provided  a  source  of  supply  that,  contrary  to  previous  suggestions,  did 
make  Britain  independent  of  foreign  supplies  after  the  Boer  War.  The  importance  of 
these  relatively  small-scale  manufacturers  was  that  they  provided  a  base  on  which  to 
build  much  of  the  massively  expanded  war-time  industry,  a  stage  for  which  much  more  is 
known  about  them  thanks  to  the  surviving  records  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions. 
That  archive  material  allows  the  opportunity  to  judge  how  well  the  optical  munitions 
industry  responded  to  the  challenges  of  the  Great  War,  and  provides  a  large  body  of  data 
about  what  happened  from  mid-1915  to  late  1918.  Unfortunately,  the  printed  History 
reflects  only  what  the  Ministry  chose  to  record  of  what  it  saw  as  its  main  achievements, 
and  the  remaining  manuscript  material  was  heavily  `weeded-out'  in  an  apparently 
arbitrary  manner  during  the  closing  down  of  the  Ministry  in  the  early  1920s. 
Nevertheless,  much  unpublished  confidential  material  remains  to  show  the  `coupled 
agendas'  that  ran  within  the  Ministry's  Optical  Section  and  which  represented  largely 
unofficial  efforts  to  inject  State  aid,  not  into  optical  munitions  manufacture,  but  into  the 
peace-time  framework  of  the  civil  instruments  industry  in  an  effort  to  bring  it  to  a  level 
of  parity  with  its  German  counterpart.  What  emerges  is  a  picture  showing  the  diversion 
of  the  short-term  energies  needed  to  complete  industrial  mobilisation  and  accelerate  war 
output  into  a  longer-term  effort  to  create  a  strong,  science  and  technology  oriented 
instruments  industry  that  could  quickly  and  effectively  adapt  to  large-scale  munitions 
production  in  the  event  of  a  future  war.  That  philosophy  reflected  governmental  pre-war 
attitudes  to  the  structure  of  armaments  production  which  had  envisaged  private 
manufacturers  supplementing  the  State  arsenals  to  achieve  adequate  output,  but  in  the 
case  of  the  optical  industry  the  notion  ignored  the  essential  difference  that  there  was  no 
State-owned  capacity  for  manufacture.  Cheshire's  plan  to  secure  future  optical  munitions 
supplies  through  a  rejuvenated  civil  industry  also  contained  the  flaw  of  making  no 
provision  for  keeping  that  sector  of  activity  alive  in  peace-time  when  demand  might  be 
minimal. 280 
One  inference  from  that,  and  one  which  is  very  hard  to  resist,  is  that  despite  what  he  had 
already  seen  since  the  late  spring  of  1915,  Cheshire  was  still  failing  to  grasp  the 
fundamental  differences  between  almost  all  optical  munitions  and  civil  instruments  in 
mid-1916  when  his  efforts  to  create  a  new  infrastructure  for  advanced  education  in  optics 
were  well  under  way.  Most  of  his  plans  were  rooted  in  the  entrenched  pre-war  attitudes 
and  desires  of  the  instrument  making  community  that  had  become  virtually  an 
intellectual  paradigm  and  built  up  enough  momentum  to  keep  attention  fumly  focused  on 
the  need  to  create  an  optical  industry  closely  modelled  on  the  German  one  that  had  long 
been  regarded  as  intrinsically  superior.  Neither  Cheshire  nor  his  colleagues  recognised 
that,  so  far  as  optical  munitions  were  concerned,  there  was  no  critical  inferiority  in  the 
British  model.  None  of  that  means  that  his  emphasis  on  technical  training  was  misplaced; 
far  from  it,  it  was  the  lack  of  it  before  the  war  that  had  prevented  Barr  &  Stroud  from 
successfully  integrating  into  lens  and  prism  manufacture  and  its  provision  was  long 
overdue.  His  misjudgement  was  in  not  understanding  how  very  different  not  just  the 
instruments  were,  but  also  the  circumstances  surrounding  their  marketing  and  sale. 
It  was  ironic  that  Cheshire's  success  in  pushing  for  university-level  training  in  optical 
design  should  lead  to  him  leaving  the  Ministry  in  1917,  before  the  rest  of  his  ideas  had 
matured  to  a  point  where  results  were  likely.  His  departure  caused  much  of  the 
momentum  he  had  built  up  to  dissipate,  and  little  was  done  to  set  up  the  network  of 
technical-school  teaching  that  he  had  envisaged.  The  end  of  the  war,  which  seems  to 
have  come  much  sooner  than  anyone  in  the  Optical  Section  expected,  brought  all  those 
developments  to  a  halt  and  created  chaos  throughout  the  war-time  optical  munitions 
makers. 
Peace  found  the  industry  fully  adapted  to  war  work  after  a  lengthy  process  of  industrial 
mobilisation,  and  both  unprepared  and  ill-equipped  to  abandon  munitions  work  and 
resume  making  civil  products.  All  Alfred  Esslemont's  war-time  energies  had  been  used 
to  create  capacity  for  war  products,  and  the  end  of  new  orders  together  with  the  almost 
immediate  and  total  cancellation  of  government  contracts  meant  that  the  war-time 
conscript  industry  quickly  found  itself  redundant  and  disbanded,  having  to  resurrect  civil 281 
product  lines  and  seek  out  old  clients.  Of  the  pre-war  optical  munitions  makers,  only 
Barr  and  Stroud  had  been  a  total  specialist,  and  it  was  the  specialisation  that  had  brought 
its  earlier  prosperity  that  now  threatened  it  with  collapse;  Barr  &  Stroud  never  had 
commercial  products  and  almost  all  its  old  clients  were  either  fully  stocked  or  closed- 
down  by  the  war.  The  return  to  peace  was  a  bigger  trial  than  the  war  itself. 
The  problems  Barr  &  Stroud  faced  in  1919  would  almost  certainly  have  occurred  to  some 
lesser  extent  even  there  had  been  no  conflict.  By  1914,  most  of  the  benefits  it  had 
enjoyed  as  a  first-mover  were  ending,  not  because  it  had  fallen  behind  in  the  technology 
of  what  it  produced  nor  because  of  its  inadequate  integration  in  optical  production,  but 
because  most  of  its  foreign  clients  were  approaching  self-sufficiency  in  optical 
manufacture.  The  firm's  profits  since  1905  had  increasingly  come  from  overseas  armed 
forces  in  countries  which  either  lacked  the  ability  to  produce  complex  optics  or  which 
were  prevented  from  making  particular  types,  such  as  the  rangefinder,  through 
international  patent  protection.  In  1912,  for  example,  neither  Austro-Hungary  nor  Russia 
had  advanced  optical  industries  and  Barr  &  Stroud  had  been  able  to  start  negotiations  to 
supply  both  countries  with  rangefinders,  parts  of  whose  designs  were  still  covered  by 
patents.  Two  years  later,  as  war  began,  technology  transfer  via  foreign  firms  who  had 
established  factories  there  meant  that  both  countries  could  consider  the  production  of 
sophisticated  instruments,  and  the  patents'  lives  were  running  out.  Once  the  earlier 
contracts  were  complete,  Barr  &  Stroud's  chances  of  finding  fresh  orders  would  be 
diminished,  although  not  necessarily  eliminated.  The  same  applied  in  France  and  Italy,  as 
well  as  the  USA,  and  the  only  other  country  likely  to  be  a  large  buyer  of  military 
rangefinders  was  Japan,  whose  optical  industry  was  still  relatively  backward.  The 
momentum  of  Barr  &  Stroud's  success  was  starting  to  dissipate,  not  because  of  superior 
competition  but  through  a  combination  of  growing  foreign  self-sufficiency,  market 
saturation  and  the  absence  of  any  demonstrably  superior  rangefinder  to  replace  expensive 
instruments  whose  service  lives  were  likely  last  a  goodly  number  of  years.  In  1914  the 
firm  was  reaching  a  condition  that,  but  for  the  war,  would  soon  have  demanded  attention 
to  the  question  of  alternative  products. 282 
For  Barr  &  Stroud,  then,  the  problem  after  1918  was  how  to  convert  to  peace  in  order  to 
survive.  The  development  stimulated  by  the  war  meant  that,  unlike  in  1914,  the  firm  was 
now  largely  self  sufficient  in  everything  except  large  quantities  of  the  simpler  optical 
glasses,  and  could  undertake  to  manufacture  every  item  of  optical  munitions  required 
either  by  the  Anny  or  the  Royal  Navy.  It  was  the  antithesis  of  Cheshire's  prescription  for 
an  optical  munitions  industry  -a  business  that  made  only  optical  devices  for  warfare  and 
lacked  the  ability  to  manufacture  a  range  of  civil  products  in  order  to  sustain  itself  in 
peace-time,  demonstrating  its  characteristics  as  an  armaments  manufacturer.  Faced  with 
the  evaporation  of  such  business,  the  firm's  management  turned  to  a  two-pronged 
strategy  for  survival  which  embraced  diversification  and  state  subsidy. 
The  problems  of  war  industries  in  adapting  to  peace  through  diversification  were 
examined  by  Alfred  Chandler,  who  observed  that  armaments  firms  frequently  lacked  the 
relevant  managerial  and  technical  skills  needed  to  move  into  unfamiliar  markets?  That 
this  condition  applied  to  Barr  &  Stroud  seems  demonstrated  by  the  lack  of  success  in 
attempts  to  diversify  into  motor  cycle  engines  and  cinema  projectors,  but  in  fact  the 
firm's  philosophy  in  these  efforts  was  quite  different  to  other,  much  larger,  arms 
businesses  who  sought  to  replace  one  activity  with  another.  To  Barr  &  Stroud,  the  issue 
was  of  what  could  be  made  using  existing  capacity,  which  might  be  sold  commercially  to 
provide  a  bridge  until  enough  government  business  came  in  to  keep  the  firm  employed  in 
optical  munitions  manufacture.  As  early  as  1919,  the  Board  was  convinced  that  the  future 
lay  in  doing  what  the  business  had  always  done,  despite  the  problems  confronting  them. 
The  correctness  of  that  judgement,  based  on  instinct  rather  than  a  detailed  study  of 
options,  was  shown  by  the  subsequent  success  in  getting  the  Admiralty  to  believe  that  the 
symbiotic  relationship  that  had  evolved  between  them  over  the  previous  thirty  years  was 
balanced  in  favour  of  the  Royal  Navy,  and  that  the  company  had  to  be  kept  alive  for  the 
benefit  of  the  service  rather  than  the  firm.  Survival  was  not  always  a  matter  of  making  a 
demonstrably  superior  product.  Although  the  Admiralty,  or  rather  the  Treasury,  balked  at 
an  outright  subsidy,  the  willingness  of  the  Admiralty  to  guarantee  a  substantial  level  of 
profit  on  a  reduced  volume  of  business  enabled  Barr  &  Stroud  to  retain  enough  of  their 
2  Chandler  (1994)  p.  342. 283 
skilled  workforce  to  keep  going  in  the  munitions  business,  and  to  be  able  to  abandon  its 
relatively  un-remunerative  civil  ventures.  By  1923,  irrespective  of  the  reduced  levels  of 
business,  Barr  &  Stroud  was  tacitly  recognised  as  `an  essential  arm'  of  the  Admiralty's 
establishment.  3  It  also  remained,  as  in  1914,  the  world's  only  manufacturer  devoted 
wholly  to  the  production  of  optical  munitions. 
For  the  British  optical  munitions  industry  in  the  early  1920s,  success  had  become 
synonymous  with  survival.  In  1888  there  had  been  no  industry,  it  had  emerged  after  then 
in  the  wake  of  evolving  armaments  technologies  and  its  products  only  became  taken 
seriously  by  the  British  Army  and  the  Royal  Navy  in  the  first  years  of  the  20a'  century. 
By  1914,  still  led  by  the  evolution  of  military  science,  optical  munitions  were  an  integral 
part  of  strategic  weapons  systems  and  the  importance  of  their  makers  to  the  state  starting 
to  become  apparent.  The  Great  War  provided  a  totally  unprecedented  scale  of  demand 
and  created  a  vastly  expanded  and  vital  industry  that  suffered  an  inevitable  implosion 
with  the  Armistice  of  1918,  threatening  to  leave  the  State  without  any  means  of 
producing  the  now-essential  instrumentation  of  warfare.  Such  a  simple  summary  implies 
a  deterministic  nature  to  the  shaping  of  the  industry,  but  as  the  preceding  narrative  has 
shown,  much  of  that  shaping  was  done  under  social  and  cultural  influences  that  were  no 
less  important  than  the  technology  that  framed  them.  Under  those  influences  the  optical 
munitions  industry  equipped  not  only  Britain's  armed  forces  but  also  most  of  the  world's 
navies  before  1914,  provided  profits  for  its  members,  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  greatest 
war  yet  experienced,  and  emerged  from  it  in  a  drastically  truncated  but  still  capable  form. 
That  it  was  effectively  reduced  to  only  one  company  was  not  so  much  evidence  of  failure 
but  an  unavoidable  adaptation  to  vastly  changed  circumstances.  Faced  with  a  major  shift 
of  international  political  attitudes  towards  armaments  that  looked  likely  to  eliminate  any 
large  future  demand  for  optical  munitions,  Barr  &  Stroud  not  only  survived  the  transition 
from  war  to  peace,  but  through  adhering  to  a  policy  of  austere  specialisation  continued 
until  the  re-armament  programmes  of  the  1930s  simultaneously  resurrected  optical 
munitions  and  stimulated  the  development  of  the  electronic  range  and  targeting  systems 
Chandler  (1994)  p.  345. 284 
that  would  eventually  make  them  obsolete.  1923  marked  not  the  end  of  the  British  optical 
munitions  industry,  but  the  start  of  a  period  of  hibernation. 285 
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